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S.  Hrg.  108-875 


IMPLICATIONS     FOR     THE     DEPARTMENT     OF 
DEFENSE    AND    MILITARY    OPERATIONS    OF 
r\^  PROPOSALS    TO    REORGANIZE    THE    UNITED 
STATES  INTELLIGENCE  COMMUNITY 


Y  4.AR  5/3:S.HRG.  108-875 

Implications    for   The   Department 

BEFORE  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  AKMED  SERVICES 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

ONE  HUNDRED  EIGHTH  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 


AUGUST  16  AND  17,  2004 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Armed  Services 


SUPERINTENDENT  OF  DOCUMENTS 


DEPOSITORY 


JAN  2  B  2006 


BOSTON  PUBLIC  LIBRARY 
GOVERNMENT  DOCUMENTS  DEPT. 


U.S.   GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
WASHINGTON  :  2005 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

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S.  Hrg.  108-875 


IMPLICATIONS     FOR     THE     DEPARTMENT     OF 
DEFENSE    AND    MILITARY    OPERATIONS    OF 
rA^  PROPOSALS    TO    REORGANIZE    THE    UNITED 
STATES  INTELUGENCE  COMMUNITY 


Y  4.AR  5/3:S.HRG.  108-875 

Implications    for   The   Department 

BEFORE  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON  ARMED  SERVICES 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

ONE  HUNDRED  EIGHTH  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 


AUGUST  16  AND  17,  2004 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Armed  Services 


SUPERINTENDINT  0^  DOCUMINTS 
DEPOSITORY 


JAN  2  S  ZOOB 


BOSTON  PUBLIC  LIBRARY 
GOVERNMENT  DOCUMENTS  DEPT. 


U.S.   GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
WASHINGTON   :  2005 


For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 

Internet:  bookstore.gpo.gov    Phone;  toll  free  1866)  512-1800;  DC  area  (202)  512-1800 

Fax;  (202)  512-2250     Mail:  Stop  SSOP,  Washington,  DC  20402-0001 


COMMITTEE  ON  ARMED  SERVICES 


JOHN  WARNER, 
JOHN  McCAIN,  Arizona 
JAMES  M.  INHOFE,  Oklahoma 
PAT  ROBERTS,  Kansas 
WAYNE  ALLARD,  Colorado 
JEFF  SESSIONS,  Alabama 
SUSAN  M.  COLLINS,  Maine 
JOHN  ENSIGN,  Nevada 
JAMES  M.  TALENT,  Missouri 
SAXBY  CHAMBLISS,  Georgia 
LINDSEY  O.  GRAHAM,  South  Carolina 
ELIZABETH  DOLE,  North  Carolina 
JOHN  CORNYN,  Texas 


Virginia,  Chairman 
CARL  LEVIN,  Michigan 
EDWARD  M.  KENNEDY,  Massachusetts 
ROBERT  C.  BYRD,  West  Virginia 
JOSEPH  I.  LIEBERMAN,  Connecticut 
JACK  REED,  Rhode  Island 
DANIEL  K.  AKAKA,  Hawaii 
BILL  NELSON,  Florida 
E.  BENJAMIN  NELSON,  Nebraska 
MARK  DAYTON,  Minnesota 
EVAN  BAYH,  Indiana 
HILLARY  RODHAM  CLINTON,  New  York 
MARK  PRYOR,  Arkansas 


Judith  A.  Ansley,  Staff  Director 
Richard  D.  DeBobes,  Democratic  Staff  Director 


(II) 


CONTENTS 


CHRONOLOGICAL  LIST  OF  WITNESSES 

Implications  for  the  Department  of  Defense  and  Military  Operations  of 
Proposals  to  Reorganize  the  United  States  Intelligence  Community 

august   16,  2004 

Page 

Schlesinger,  Dr.  James  R.,  Former  Secretary  of  Defense,  Chairman,  The 
Mitre  Corporation  8 

Carlucci,  Frank  C,  Former  Secretary  of  Defense,  Chairman  Emeritus,  The 
Carlyle  Group  17 

Hamre,  Dr.  John  J.,  Former  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense,  President  and 

Chief  Executive  Officer,  Center  for  Strategic  and  International  Studies  20 

Implications  for  the  Department  of  Defense  and  Military  Operations  of 
Proposals  to  Reorganize  the  United  States  Intelligence  Community 

august   17,  2004 

Rumsfeld,  Hon.  Donald  H.,  Secretary  of  Defense;  Accompanied  by  Dr.  Stephen 

A.  Cambone,  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Intelligence  91 

McLaughlin,  Hon.  John  E.,  Acting  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  101 

Myers,  Gen.  Richard  B.,  USAF,  Chairman,  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 107 

(III) 


IMPLICATIONS  FOR  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF 
DEFENSE  AND  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 
PROPOSALS  TO  REORGANIZE  THE  UNITED 
STATES  INTELLIGENCE  COMMUNITY 


MONDAY,  AUGUST  16,  2004 

U.S.  Senate, 
Committee  on  Armed  Services, 

Washington,  DC. 

The  committee  met,  pursuant  to  notice,  at  2:40  p.m.  in  room  SH- 
216,  Hart  Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  John  Warner  (chairman) 
presiding. 

Committee  members  present:  Senators  Warner,  McCain,  Roberts, 
Sessions,  ColHns,  Talent,  Chambliss,  Dole,  Cornyn,  Levin,  Ken- 
nedy, Lieberman,  Reed,  Bill  Nelson,  E.  Benjamin  Nelson,  Dayton, 
and  Clinton. 

Committee  staff  member  present:  Judith  A.  Ansley,  staff  director. 

Majority  staff  members  present:  Charles  W.  Alsup,  professional 
staff  member;  Brian  R.  Green,  professional  staff  member;  Thomas 
L.  MacKenzie,  professional  staff  member;  Paula  J.  Philbin,  profes- 
sional staff  member;  and  Richard  F.  Walsh,  counsel. 

Minority  staff  members  present:  Richard  D.  DeBobes,  Democratic 
staff  director;  and  Creighton  Greene,  professional  staff  member. 

Staff  assistants  present:  Alison  E.  Brill,  Andrew  W.  Florell,  and 
Bridget  E.  Ward. 

Committee  members'  assistants  present:  Cord  Sterling,  assistant 
to  Senator  Warner;  Darren  M.  Dick,  assistant  to  Senator  Roberts; 
Lindsey  R.  Neas,  assistant  to  Senator  Talent;  Russell  J. 
Thomasson,  assistant  to  Senator  Cornyn;  Sharon  L.  Waxman, 
Mieke  Y.  Eoyang,  and  Jarret  A.  Wright,  assistants  to  Senator  Ken- 
nedy; Frederick  M.  Downey,  assistant  to  Senator  Lieberman;  Wil- 
liam K.  Sutey,  assistant  to  Senator  Bill  Nelson;  Eric  Pierce,  assist- 
ant to  Senator  E.  Benjamin  Nelson;  Mark  Phillip  Jones,  assistant 
to  Senator  Daj^on;  and  Andrew  Shapiro,  assistant  to  Senator  Clin- 
ton. 

OPENING  STATEMENT  OF  SENATOR  JOHN  WARNER, 
CHAIRMAN 

Chairman  Warner.  The  committee  meets  this  afternoon  to  re- 
ceive testimony  from  three  very  distinguished  former  public  office- 
holders, all  of  whom  have  performed  service  that  eminently  quali- 
fies them  to  provide  to  the  committee,  and  to  the  Senate  as  a 
whole — indeed  Congress — their  views.  Former  Secretaries  of  De- 
fense (SECDEF)  James  Schlesinger  and  Frank  C.  Carlucci,  and 

(1) 


former  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  John  Hamre  are  with  us  today. 
We  welcome  each  of  you  back  before  this  committee. 

Your  views  on  the  various  recommendations  for  reform  of  the 
U.S.  InteUigence  Community,  particularly  the  recommendations  of 
the  9/11  Commission  and  the  proposals  of  President  Bush,  are  criti- 
cal to  this  committee's  understanding  of  how  those  recommended 
changes  will  impact  the  Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  and  future 
military  operations. 

I  note  that  the  committee  also  invited  former  SECDEF  Harold 
Brown  to  testify.  He  was  unable  to  join  us  today,  but,  without  ob- 
jection, I  shall  place  his  statment  in  this  record.  It  is  a  very  inter- 
esting letter.  I'm  not  sure  but  I  think  it  was  provided  to  each  of 
you. 

[The  information  referred  to  follows:] 


August  9, 2004 


The  Honorable  John  Warner 

The  Honorable  Carl  Levin 

United  States  Senate  Committee  on  Aimed  Services 

228  Russell  Senate  Office  Building 

Washington,  DC  20510 


Dear  Chairman  Warner  and  Ranking  Member  Levin, 

Thank  you  for  the  invitation  conveyed  in  your  letter  of  August  3"*,  2004.  I  regret  that 
commitments  in  California  will  prevent  me  from  appearing  before  the  Senate  Armed  Services 
Committee  on  August  16*.  But  perhaps  you  would  find  it  helpful  to  have  this  brief  statement  of 
my  views,  wiiich  I  wouW  appreciate  your  entering  in  the  record. 

I  believe  that  the  9/1 1  Commission  has  performed  a  great  service  in  its  description  of  the 
events  leading  to  the  destruction  of  the  World  Trade  Center  towers  and  the  attack  on  the 
Pentagon,  and  in  its  analysis  of  failures  in  intelligence  and  in  other  elements.  The  prescriptions 
of  the  commission,  and  those  of  President  Bush,  are  considerably  more  problematic. 

The  president's  proposal  seems  to  me  to  add  another  layer  of  review  without  giving  it 
substantial  authority  to  make  decisions.  That  risks  removing  the  customers  for  the  intcUigence 
product  fiuther  from  the  producers  as  well  as,  by  burying  sensitive  operations  deeper,  reducing 
the  likelihood  of  adequate  policy  review.  Better  coordination  and  rationalization  of  the 
intelligence  community's  plans,  budgets  and  activities,  which  I  agree  is  needed,  could  be  as 
appropriately  done  to  the  degree  implied  in  the  president's  proposal,  as  I  understand  it,  by  the  IC 
(Intelligence  Community)  Staff  that  reports  to  the  DCI,  or  by  a  Deputy  to  the  National  Security 
Advisor,  without  adding  this  extra  layer.  As  it  happens,  I  believe  that  the  DCI,  through  the  IC 
staff,  ought  to  play  a  larger  role  than  is  now  the  case  in  drafting  a  unified  intelligence  program 
that  extends  out  over  a  five-year  period.  Such  a  program  would  then  be  worked  on  jobtly  by  the 
IC  staff  and  the  Undersecretary  of  Defense  for  InteUigence,  with  disagreements  resolved  by  the 
DCI  and  the  Secretary  of  Defense  or,  if  that  feils,  by  the  President. 

The  Commission's  proposed  organization  has  some  attractive  elements.  Joint  Centers  to 
cover  regional  and  functional  areas  of  mtcrest,  into  which  all  sources  would  feed  information, 
make  sense  (Though  there  are  some  overlap  problems:  would  Iran  be  deah  with  by  the  non- 
proliferation  center,  the  Middle  East  Center,  or  the  terrorism  center?).  Dual  hatting  may  also  be 
attractive,  though  only  if  it  is  done  by  delegation  of  line  authority  by  both  agency  heads.  I  find 
very  strange  the  thought  that  the  head  of  one  agency  (the  NHD)  should  have  the  authority  to  hire 
and  fire  sub  cabinet  officers  in  a  different  department  (e.g.  an  Undersecretary  of  Defense,  an 


Assistant  Secretary  level  bureau  chief — INR — in  the  State  Departn^nt).  Ami  there  are 
loose  ends  whose  magnitude  and  importance  equal  or  exceed  the  intelligence  issues.  One  is  the 
relation  between  intelligence  and  operations.  The  Conjmission  report  notes  this,  but  appears  to 
assume  that  the  specialized  centers  do  the  job.  But  the  operations  resulting  from  a  policy 
decision,  whose  inputs  mclude  but  are  not  limited  to  intelligence,  may  or  will  be  diplomatic 
(State),  military  (Defense),  covert  (CIA),  paramilitary  (Defense  or  CIA),  economic  (Treasiay 
and  many  others).  That  connection  cannot  be  made  by  the  DCI,  the  IC,  or  an  MID;  it  is  an  NSC 
function. 

A  related  and  perhaps  even  more  important  omission  from  both  proposals  is  the  issue  of 
support  for  military  operations,  mentioned  in  your  letter.  Not  only  is  the  battkfield-rclated 
intelligence  derived  from  national  as  well  as  tactical  and  organic  collectors  vital  to  military 
operations.  The  effectiveness  ofU.S.  forces  relies  on  secure  communications;  every  unit's 
survival  depends  on  that  NSA  function.  And  the  prospect  of  cyberwarfare,  both  military  and 
economic,  both  defensive  ar)d  offensive,  heightens  the  importance  of  that  fiinction,  the 
intelligence  conponcnt  of  which  is  a  very  modest  part.  Moreover,  neither  proposal  deals 
adequately  with  finding  the  proper  balance  between  the  need  for  domestic  intelligence  on  the 
terrorist  threats  and  the  civil  liberties  that  define  American  fiieedoms.  Nor  does  either  grapple 
effectively  with  the  problem  of  a  bias  toward  prosecution  over  prevention,  mherent  in  any  law- 
enforcement  agency  such  as  the  FBI. 

I  rnention  these  issues  to  illustrate  the  main  point  that  I  would  like  to  make.  The  issue  of 
organizing  the  government  for  a  world  in  which  there  is  a  major  threat  to  the  U.S.  fix)m 
terrorism,  arising  from  the  Civil  War  within  Islam  and  its  interaction  with  U.S.  goals  and 
policies,  is  a  serious  and  difficult  one.  But  that  is  not  the  only  potential  conflict  (North  Korea, 
the  Taiwan  Strait,  for  example)  and  intelligence  is  not  the  only  tool.  I  believe  it  would  be  a 
grave  mistake  to  decide  on  a  major  reorgani2ation  of  the  national  security  structure  in  the  few 
hectic  and  partisan  months  immediately  before  a  presidential  election,  based  on  the 
recommendations  of  a  group  that,  no  matter  how  eminent  and  bipartisan,  was  chartered  for 
another  purpose  and  added  this  as  a  chapter  in  its  report,  or  based  on  an  axlministration  proposal 
devised  as  a  hasty  response  to  a  political  threat.  1  would  note  that  neither  the  National  Security 
Act  (1947),  nor  its  major  Amendments  (1949,  1958)  nor  the  Goldwater  Nichols  Act  (1986)  was 
adopted  during  a  presidential  election  year.  I  hope  your  committee,  and  the  Congress  as  a  whole, 
as  well  as  the  Bush  Administration  or  a  Kerry  Administration,  can  give  these  issues  the  time  and 
thought  that  they  deserve. 


Sincerely  yours. 


Harold  Brown 
Counselor,  CSIS 


Chairman  Wakner.  The  findings  and  recommendations  of  the 
9/11  Commission  have  captured  the  interest  of  our  President,  Con- 
gress, and  perhaps  most  important,  the  American  people.  We  are 
privileged  to  have  with  us  today  three  individuals  who  have  been 
attending  a  number  of  the  hearings  on  behalf  of  the  families,  and, 
indeed,  one  who  was  a  survivor  of  the  attack.  Mrs.  Loreen  Sellitto, 
of  Families  United  to  Bankrupt  Terrorism,  you  lost  your  23-year- 
old  son  in  Tower  1;  Mary  Fletchet,  Voices  of  September  11,  you  lost 
your  24-year-old  son  in  Tower  2;  and  Rosemary  Dillard,  a  critically- 
injured  Pentagon  survivor. 

The  Commission  has  given  the  Nation— and,  indeed  Congress— 
a  roadmap,  a  series  of  recommendations  to  move  forward.  It's  now 
the  responsibility  of  Congress,  working  with  the  administration,  to 


thoroughly  examine  and  evaluate  these  recommendations  and  to 
enact  those  changes  which  will  strengthen — and  I  emphasize 
"strengthen" — our  Intelligence  Community  (IC). 

The  hearings  we  are  conducting  this  week,  together  with  the 
many  hearings  that  other  committees  in  both  the  Senate  and  the 
House  have  conducted  or  are  conducting  during  the  recess  period, 
are  an  important  part  of  this  process.  I  commend  the  President, 
both  for  the  swift  action  he  has  taken  to  embrace  certain  elements 
of  the  Commission's  recommendation,  and  also  for  the  many  things 
he  has  done  to  make  our  Nation  safer  since  the  fateful  day  in  Sep- 
tember 2001. 

Of  the  41  recommendations  made  by  the  Commission,  some  have 
already  been  enacted  over  the  past  several  years,  more  will  be  done 
through  executive  order.  As  the  Commission  noted:  "in  the  nearly 
3  years  since  September  11,  Americans  have  been  better  protected 
against  terrorist  attack."  But  we  must  constantly.  Congress  and 
the  administration,  work  to  improve  it.  It's  not  going  to  stop.  Such 
legislation  as  we  may  enact  will  have  to  continue  year  after  year 
to  work  on  it. 

Our  focus,  however,  today  is  on  the  DOD.  As  our  witnesses  know, 
the  DOD  is  home  to  the  largest  portion  of  the  IC,  and  DOD  is  sec- 
ond only  to  the  President  as  the  largest  consumer  of  the  intel- 
ligence produced  by  the  IC.  We  must  not  lose  sight  of  these  facts 
as  we  consider  the  way  ahead.  My  overriding  concern,  as  I  examine 
changes  to  our  IC,  is,  what  changes  will  best  help  the  warfighter — 
the  soldier,  the  sailor,  the  airman,  and  the  marine — who  is  fighting 
today  and  tomorrow  and  in  the  future  to  keep  the  terrorist  threat 
far  from  our  shores?  How  can  we  better  provide  the  necessary  in- 
telligence to  these  warfighters? 

I  think  we  can  all  agree  that  the  U.S.  Armed  Forces  are  the  fin- 
est in  the  world.  One  of  the  reasons  for  that  is,  we  have  a  very  pro- 
fessional military  intelligence  organization.  An  organization  starts 
with  the  combat  support  agencies  (CSA),  the  Defense  Intelligence 
Agency  (DIA),  the  National  Security  Agency  (NSA),  and  the  Na- 
tional Geospatial-Intelligence  Agency  (NGA),  which  feed  through 
the  regional  joint  intelligence  centers  to  the  unified  commanders, 
and  then  to  the  lowest-level  tactical  unit  on  the  ground.  This  intel- 
ligence structure  is  an  essential  part  of  our  military  operations. 

This  has  not  always  been  the  case.  This  committee  was  very 
deeply  involved  in  overseeing  the  military  actions  in  Iraq.  It  was 
not  that  long  ago  when  national-level  intelligence  support  to  the 
warfighter  was  deemed  by  many  of  the  professionals  as  somewhat 
inadequate.  The  military's  experience  during  Operation  Desert 
Storm  was  a  watershed  event.  General  Schwarzkopf  testified  before 
this  committee,  in  June  1991,  and  told  Congress  that  responsive 
national-level  intelligence  support  for  his  mission  in  the  first  Per- 
sian Gulf  War  was  "unsatisfactory." 

Since  then,  the  Department,  together  with  other  elements  of  the 
IC,  has  painstakingly  built  the  intelligence  and  operational  capa- 
bilities that  we  saw  so  convincingly  demonstrated  on  the  battle- 
fields of  Afghanistan  and  Iraq.  As  we  examine  ways  to  reform  our 
IC  in  this  process  we're  in  now,  we  must  ensure  that  we  do  nothing 
to  break  or  degrade  those  aspects  of  the  IC  that  are  working  well 
now. 


We  simply  must  not  make  any  changes  which  could,  despite  the 
best  of  intentions,  hinder  the  ability  of  our  troops  to  successfully 
fulfill  their  missions.  As  members  of  this  committee,  it  is  our  re- 
sponsibility to  ensure  that  the  quality  and  timeliness  of  intelligence 
support  to  our  regional  combatant  commanders  and  our  deployed 
forces,  as  well  as  our  Nation's  leaders,  is  in  no  way  degraded.  We, 
in  this  mission  here,  seek  to  make  it  better. 

The  commissioners  correctly  pointed  out  that  our  intelligence 
structure  failed  to  connect  the  dots,  in  terms  of  observing  and  then 
fusing  together  the  indicators  of  the  significant  threat  from  al 
Qaeda  in  the  recent  years  and  months  leading  up  to  the  actual  at- 
tack on  our  Nation  on  September  11,  2001.  Most  agree  that  the 
most  significant  problems  were  an  unwillingness  to  share  informa- 
tion, on  the  part  of  some  agencies,  and  a  structural  inability  to 
combine  domestic  and  foreign  intelligence.  The  recommended  solu- 
tion, however,  is  to  recognize  the  entire  community,  not  just  to 
focus  on  parts  that  were  unsatisfactory.  We  must  examine  the  rea- 
sons for  these  dramatic  proposals  by  the  9/11  Commission,  and  un- 
derstand how  the  recommended  solutions  do  or  do  not  address  the 
problems  identified  in  the  Commission's  report. 

As  I've  considered  the  recommendations  of  the  Commission  and 
the  unique  challenges  for  our  military  forces  in  fighting  the  global 
war  on  terrorism,  a  number  of  questions  come  to  mind.  What  is  the 
essence  of  the  problem:  organization,  budget  authority,  effective 
leadership,  or  the  appointment  authority?  How  can  the  National 
Intelligence  Director  (NID)  and  the  SECDEF  establish  a  more  ef- 
fective partnership  to  achieve  success  at  all  levels — national,  re- 
gional, and  tactical  military  operations? 

Under  current  law,  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  (DCI), 
certainly  on  paper,  in  the  statute,  has  significant  budgetary  author- 
ity over  all  elements  of  the  IC.  How  has  this  authority  been  exer- 
cised, or  not  been  exercised,  in  the  past?  Is  there  a  view  that  that 
current  statutory  authority  is  inadequate?  What  should  be  the  role 
of  the  SECDEF,  in  the  budgets  and  operations,  as  he  now  performs 
them,  on  behalf  of  the  agencies  which  consume  constantly  about  85 
percent  of  the  National  Foreign  Intelligence  Program?  Were  the 
SECDEF  to  be  excluded  in  some  means,  how  can  we  assure  that 
the  requirements  of  the  Department,  the  combatant  commanders, 
and  the  warfighter  be  addressed? 

These  are  sobering  questions,  and  they're  questions  that  require 
careful  consideration.  Clearly,  we  must  seize  this  opportunity  to  act 
if  we  deem  it  necessary,  but  we  also  have  a  responsibility  to  ensure 
our  actions  are  prudent,  carefully  analyzed,  and  thoroughly  de- 
bated. Legislation  of  a  similar  importance  to  our  national  security 
structure,  such  as  the  National  Security  Act  of  1947  and  Gold- 
water-Nichols  Act  of  1986,  were  considered  very  carefully  over  a 
period  of  time  before  Congress  acted.  I  am  confident  that  we.  Con- 
gress, can  act,  if  we  deem  it  necessary,  during  this  session  of  Con- 
gress. 

I  have  committed  publicly  that  I,  personally,  am  not  engaged  in 
a  turf  war  with  any  other  committee  or  any  other  part  of  this  sys- 
tem. I,  personally,  will  do  everything  I  can,  working  with  my  col- 
leagues here  in  the  Senate,  most  particularly  on  this  committee 
and  the  Intelligence  Committee  on  which  I  am  serving,  to  try  and 


strengthen  and  to  pass  such  legislation  as  we  deem  essential  to 
achieve  that  strengthening. 

Thank  you. 

Senator  Levin? 

STATEMENT  OF  SENATOR  CARL  LEVIN 

Senator  Levin.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

First,  let  me  join  you  in  welcoming  our  witnesses  today.  They  are 
very  important  witnesses.  They've  made  major  contributions  to  the 
security  of  this  Nation.  We're  grateful  to  them  for  that  service,  as 
well  as  for  being  here. 

This  is  the  first  hearing  of  the  Armed  Services  Committee  on  the 
recommendations  of  the  9/11  Commission  and  the  implications  of 
those  recommendations  for  the  DOD  and  military  operations. 

We  have  suffered  from  massive  intelligence  failures  in  the  last 
several  years.  First,  as  reported  by  the  9/11  Commission,  the  IC 
failed  to  share  information  necessary  to  connect  the  dots  in  a  man- 
ner that  might  have  warned  us  of  the  coming  terrorist  attacks.  Sec- 
ond, as  reported  by  the  Intelligence  Committee,  much  of  the  intel- 
ligence analysis  and  the  evidence  in  the  possession  of  the  Central 
Intelligence  Agency  (CIA)  leading  up  to  the  war  in  Iraq  was  over- 
stated, or  unsupported,  or  exaggerated,  or  mischaracterized. 

The  9/11  Commission  performed  a  valuable  service  to  the  Nation 
in  evaluating  the  intelligence  problems  preceding  the  attacks  and 
recommending  changes  intended  to  improve  our  future  intelligence 
and  national  security.  Its  identification  of  the  huge  failures  of  the 
intelligence  agencies  to  share  information  with  each  other  before 
September  11  is  very  similar  to  the  findings  of  the  joint  investiga- 
tion of  the  Senate  and  House  Intelligence  Committees  that  was  re- 
leased in  July  2003.  Those  findings  led  to  significant  reform  of  the 
IC,  including  the  creation  of  a  new  Terrorist  Threat  Integration 
Center  (TTIC). 

The  9/11  Commission  recommends  the  creation  of  a  similar  Na- 
tional Counterterrorism  Center  (NCTC)  which,  like  the  TTIC, 
would  be  responsible  for  the  fusion  and  analysis  of  terrorist  intel- 
ligence. The  main  difference  between  the  proposed  NCTC  and  the 
recently  established  TTIC  would  be  the  NCTC's  additional  duty  of 
joint  planning,  including  operational  tasking  of  counterterrorist  op- 
erations, including,  apparently,  those  conducted  bv  military  forces 
under  the  DOD. 

The  9/11  Commission  also  recommended  that  we  create  the  posi- 
tion of  an  NID  within  the  Executive  Office  of  the  President,  with 
authority  over  the  national  intelligence  budget  and  the  hiring  and 
firing  power  over  the  leader  of  the  national  intelligence  agencies, 
including  agencies  that  reside  within  the  DOD. 

Although  the  President  has  agreed  to  the  establishment  of  an 
NID,  he  apparently  does  not  support  placing  the  proposed  director 
in  the  Executive  Office  of  the  President,  or  giving  him  control  over 
the  national  intelligence  budget,  or  the  hiring  and  firing  power  over 
the  leader  of  the  national  intelligence  agencies.  Without  such  au- 
thority, the  9/11  Commission  argues  that  the  new  NID  would  not 
have  the  power  needed  to  manage  and  oversee  the  IC  effectively. 

Similarly,  while  the  President  has  agreed  to  the  establishment  of 
the  NCTC,  he  apparently  does  not  support  the  Commission's  rec- 


8 

ommendation  that  the  head  of  the  NCTC  "must  have  the  right  to 
concur  in  the  choices  of  personnel  to  lead  the  operating  entities," 
and  that  he  should  have  the  authority  to  jointly  plan  for  and  assign 
operational  responsibilities  to  other  agencies,  and  should  be  subject 
to  Senate  confirmation. 

The  DOD  has  expressed  concern  that  some  of  the  proposals  of 
the  9/11  Commission  could  make  us  less  secure  by  confusing  the 
chain  of  command  for  military  operations  and  by  separating 
warfighters  from  the  tactical  intelligence  that  they  need  on  an  ur- 
gent basis.  Our  committee  has  a  special  responsibility  to  weigh  the 
impact  of  these  proposals  on  the  DOD  and  its  military  operations 
in  light  of  these  concerns.  While  we  are  clearly  involved  in  a  dif- 
ferent kind  of  war  than  the  Cold  War,  the  lines  between  what 
might  have  been  characterized  in  previous  times  as  national  or 
strategic  intelligence  and  intelligence  that  is  more  tactical  have  be- 
come much  less  clear  and  distinct. 

In  trying  to  draw  such  lines,  we  should  not  overlook  the  fact  that 
the  military  is  involved  directly  in  the  war  on  terrorism.  Tactical 
intelligence  requirements  of  the  combatant  commanders  include 
having  information  on  al  Qaeda  and  Osama  bin  Laden  and  the 
Taliban.  That  intelligence  is  essential  in  the  war  on  terrorism.  In- 
deed, combatant  commanders  are  heavily  engaged  in  the  part  of 
the  war  on  terrorism,  and  that  intelligence,  therefore,  is  not  just 
"national  intelligence,"  it  is  clearly  tactical,  critically-needed-ur- 
gently  intelligence. 

Regardless  of  what  responsibilities  that  we  choose  to  give  to  the 
proposed  NID  and  the  NCTC,  and  wherever  we  decide  to  place 
these  offices  on  the  organization  chart,  we  must  take  steps  to  avoid 
the  shaping  and  exaggeration  of  intelligence  information  to  support 
the  policies  of  an  administration.  Independent  and  objective  intel- 
ligence is  a  matter  of  vital  national  importance.  Objective,  unvar- 
nished intelligence  should  inform  policy  choices. 

Policy  should  not  drive  intelligence  assessments.  We  must  take 
steps  in  any  reorganization  to  minimize  the  potential  for  politiciz- 
ing intelligence.  In  that  regard,  placing  the  NID  in  the  White 
House  may  be  problematic,  because  this  placement  would  seem  to 
increase  the  likelihood  of  politicization  rather  than  to  decrease  it. 

I  look  forward,  Mr.  Chairman,  as  I  know  all  of  us  do,  to  hearing 
the  witnesses'  testimony.  Again,  we're  very  grateful  to  them. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Dr.  Schlesinger,  we  invite  you  to  lead  off.  I'd  like  to  say  to  the 
committee  that  I  had  the  privilege  of  knowing  Dr.  Schlesinger  for 
many  years.  We  served  together  in  the  DOD  in  1972,  1973,  and 
1974.  I  was  fortunate  to  work  with  you  when  you  were  in  DCI.  In 
all  these  many  years,  we  have  maintained  a  close  personal  and  pro- 
fessional contact,  so  it's  particularly  enjoyable  to  see  you  here 
today,  and  you  have  extraordinary  experience  on  which  to  address 
these  issues. 

STATEMENT  OF  DR.  JAMES  R.  SCHLESINGER,  FORMER  SEC- 
RETARY OF  DEFENSE,  CHAIRMAN,  THE  MITRE  CORPORA- 
TION 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman. 


Mr.  Chairman,  members  of  the  committee,  I  am  grateful  to  this 
committee  for  providing  this  opportunity  to  comment  on  the  nature 
of  intelhgence  and  on  the  reforms  proposed  by  the  9/11  Commis- 
sion. 

The  9/11  Commission  has  given  us  a  detailed  and  revealing  nar- 
rative of  events  leading  up  to  September  11.  It  has  also  proposed 
a  substantial  reorganization  of  the  IC,  changes  that  do  not  logically 
flow  from  the  problems  that  the  Commission  identified  in  its  nar- 
rative. It  is,  therefore,  incumbent  upon  us  to  examine  the  Commis- 
sion's proposals  with  care,  lest  in  our  haste,  we  do  more  harm  than 
good. 

The  Commission  has  rightly  observed  that  the  events  leading  up 
to  September  11  represented  a  failure  of  imagination,  yet  one 
should  not  assume  that  changing  wiring  diagrams  is  a  sure-fire 
way  to  stimulate  imagination.  Imagination  always  has  an  uphill 
fight  in  bureaucratic  organizations.  Creating  an  additional  bureau- 
cratic layer  scarcely  leads  to  bringing  imagination  to  the  top. 

Mr.  Chairman,  in  these  brief  remarks  I  shall  attempt  to  discuss 
the  issue  of  intelligence  reform  under  three  headings.  First,  the  in- 
herent problems  of  intelligence.  Second,  why  control  of  intelligence 
from  outside  of  the  DOD  is  a  particularly  bad  idea.  Given  the  evo- 
lution of  U.S.  technology  and  military  strategy,  it  would  not,  follow- 
ing your  remarks,  Mr.  Chairman,  be  of  help  to  the  warfighter. 
Third,  to  draw  some  implications  for  intelligence  reform. 

First,  intelligence  is  inherently  a  difficult  business.  Intelligence 
targets  naturally  seek  to  conceal  what  they  are  doing,  and  have  a 
strong  tendency  to  mislead  you.  A  central  problem  in  intelligence 
is  to  discern  the  true  signals  amidst  the  noise.  The  relevant  signals 
may  be  very  weak.  Without  question,  there  is  a  great  deal  of  noise. 

Countless  events  are  being  recorded  each  day,  and  countless 
events  are  failing  to  be  recorded,  or  are  deliberately  hidden.  More- 
over, false  signals  are  deliberately  planted.  We  may  talk  glibly 
about  "connecting  the  dots,"  but  that  is  far  easier  ex  post  than  ex 
ante.  It  is  only  in  retrospect  that  one  knows  which  dots  were  the 
relevant  dots  among  the  countless  observations  and  the  unobserved 
phenomena,  and  how  those  relevant  dots  should  be  connected. 
Prior  to  that,  one  has  only  a  mass  of  observations  and  possible  evi- 
dence subject  to  a  variety  of  h3rpotheses  and  interpretations. 

Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  may? 

[The  information  referred  to  follows:! 


10 


11 


One  way  tickets 


4  Arab  looking 
men  in  aisle  seats 


Paid  Cash 


J. 


Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  These  are  the  dots  that  we  can  observe  in  ad- 
vance. They  are  of  different  phenomena,  they  are  of  different  size. 
There  are  hidden  dots  amongst  them.  After  the  event,  certain  dots 
stand  out,  as  would  be  these  four  dots.  But  not  in  advance.  Then 
when  we  look  back,  we  can  easily  see,  there  is  Mohammed  Atta, 
and  here  are  one-way  tickets,  and  there  are  four  Arab-looking  men 
in  aisle  seats,  and  here  they  paid  cash.  After  the  event,  we  can  see 
that  very  clearly. 

I'll  slip  this  up  there  for  now.  I'll  come  back  to  that  later. 

Mr.  Chairman,  even  if  there  are  no  preconceptions  or  initial  bi- 
ases, organizations  will  drift  toward  a  structured  theory  of  an  issue 
under  study.  Thus,  an  organization,  any  organization,  develops  a 
concept  of  reality.  Over  time,  that  concept  likely  will  harden  into 
a  conviction  or  mindset  that  discounts  observations  or  evidence  in 
conflict  with  the  prevailing  concept,  and  highlights  observations 
that  seem  to  be  supportive  as  evidence.  Evidence  to  the  contrary 
is  regularly  shaken  off.  Thus,  the  quality  of  analysis  becomes  criti- 
cal in  providing  good  intelligence.  That  is  why  reducing  competition 
in  analysis  is  the  wrong  way  to  go,  especially  in  quest  of  the  false 
goal  of  eliminating  duplication.  Centralization  of  intelligence  analy- 
sis is  inherently  a  dubious  objective  when  there  is  a  wide  range  of 
consumers  of  intelligence  with  a  variety  of  interests,  responsibil- 
ities, and  needs. 

Second,  intelligence  is  increasingly  interwoven  with  military  op- 
erations. The  advance  of  military  technology  and  its  embodiment  in 
our  military  forces  have  made  intelligence  ever-more  integral  to  our 
military  strategy  and  battlefield  tactics  and  to  this  country's  im- 
mense military  advantage.  That  military  advantage  is  reflected  in 


12 

such  rubrics  as  information  superiority,  information  dominance, 
battlefield  awareness,  and  net-centric  warfare.  In  brief,  it  relies 
upon  rapid  detection  of  targets  through  sensors,  the  rapid  commu- 
nication of  those  target  locations  to  command  centers,  the  assign- 
ment of  precisely  guided  weapons  to  those  targets  at  the  discerned 
locations,  and  damage  assessment,  again  communicated  to  com- 
mand centers,  to  determine  whether  additional  weapons  delivered 
are  necessary.  In  all  of  this,  the  accuracy,  the  immediacy,  and  the 
believability  of  intelligence  are  crucial. 

Thus,  in  recent  decades,  intelligence,  when  wedded  to  command, 
control,  and  communications  (C^),  has  become  the  core  of  America's 
battlefield  dominance  and  military  superiority.  In  short,  C-cubed- 
I  (C^I)  has,  in  itself,  become  almost  a  powerful  weapons  system. 
But  commanders  in  the  field  must  have  confidence  that  the  intel- 
ligence assets  will  be  available  with  certainty  and  that  information 
will  be  reliably  and  quickly  disseminated.  It  is  for  this  reason  that 
plucking  intelligence  away  from  C^  has  become  increasingly  un- 
wise. C^  and  intelligence  should  be  designed  and  operated  as  an  in- 
tegrated whole. 

It  has  taken  many  years  to  persuade  our  military  commanders 
that  national  assets  will  reliably  be  available  to  them  in  the  event 
of  conflict.  This  started  in  the  1970s,  but  did  not  really  reach  fru- 
ition until  the  Gulf  War,  in  1990-1991.  Following  your  comments, 
Mr.  Chairman,  on  that  Gulf  War,  if  one  talks  to  those  who  partici- 
pated, like  General  Horner,  he  is  still  irate  about  the  failures  of  the 
national  assets  to  be  delivered  to  him  in  a  timely  way. 

Sustaining  that  confidence  of  our  military  commanders  that  na- 
tional assets  will  be  designed  and  exercised  with  their  wartime 
needs  in  mind  remains  crucial.  In  the  absence  of  such  confidence, 
the  temptation  for  our  combatant  commanders  will  be  to  try  to  de- 
velop intelligence  assets  under  their  own  control,  even  if  those  as- 
sets are  inferior. 

To  possess  intelligence  assets  of  one's  own  is  a  time-honored  goal 
for  virtually  all  major  decisionmakers.  That  is  why  intelligence  as- 
sets are  so  widely  distributed.  That  is  why  the  perennial  quest  for 
greater  centralization  has  been  both  delusory  and  invariably  ne- 
gated. 

To  shift  control  over  crucial  intelligence  assets  outside  the  DOD 
risks  weakening  the  relative  military  advantage  of  the  United 
States,  and,  at  the  same  time,  creates  the  incentive  to  divert  re- 
sources into  likely  inferior  intelligence  capabilities  which  would 
further  reduce  the  available  forces. 

But  that  is  not  the  end,  Mr.  Chairman.  The  question  would  be, 
where  does  one  draw  the  line?  Take  one  critical  example:  Now  cen- 
tral to  information  dominance  and  to  our  military  operations  is  the 
Global  Positioning  System  (GPS).  It  is  an  information  system  not 
normally  regarded  as  part  of  the  IC.  Nevertheless,  it  is  critical  for 
effective  intelligence  operations  and,  thus,  to  the  effectiveness  of 
our  military  forces.  Does  budget  control  over  GPS  also  pass  to  an 
NID? 

In  a  complex  system  of  systems,  the  perceived  need  to  move  fur- 
ther, beyond  what  historically  has  been  defined  as  intelligence,  will 
not  cease.  Historic  intelligence  and  non-intelligence  systems  are 


13 

now  Siamese  twins.  King  Solomon  had  a  comparatively  easy  task 
in  proposing  to  split  the  baby  in  half. 

Third,  intelligence  management,  like  intelligence,  itself,  is  an  in- 
herently difficult  business.  There  are  countless  questions.  Which 
are  the  ones  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  decisionmakers?  There 
are  countless  observations.  Some  are  relevant  signals,  most  are 
noise.  Where  are  the  missing  signals?  Only  in  retrospect  can  one 
be  sure  of  the  answer.  Regrettably,  we  are  not  clairvoyant.  Predict- 
ing the  future  is  especially  fraught  with  difficulty. 

To  speak  of  the  failure  of  imagination  is  really  to  acknowledge 
the  limitations  of  the  human  intellect.  Individual  analysts  will  all 
have  their  slightly  different  interpretations  of  what  is  going  on. 
Their  viev/s  must  be  selected  and  combined.  Though  we  regularly 
urge  ourselves  to  think  outside  of  the  box,  that  is  mostly  an  exhor- 
tation. The  problem  with  thinking  the  unthinkable  is  that  nobody 
believes  you.  Analysts  will  temper  their  views  within  the  range  of 
acceptability.  Those  who  stretch  receptivity  likely  will  be  viewed,  or 
dismissed,  as  worrywarts,  zealots,  or,  even  worse,  oddballs.  That 
does  little  to  enhance  one's  status  in  the  organization,  or  one's  ca- 
reer. 

As  mentioned  earlier,  organizations  also  have  their  inherent  lim- 
its. Different  organizations  will  gravitate  towards  different  ways  of 
organizing  reality,  based  upon  their  range  of  responsibilities  and 
also  on  their  interests,  in  a  narrower  sense. 

Most  individuals  make  themselves  comfortable  in  their  own  orga- 
nizations by  not  challenging  a  prevailing  consensus.  It  would  be  an 
immense  help  if  management  were  to  encourage  criticism, 
contrarian  views  that  challenge  the  prevailing  orthodoxy.  One  way 
of  doing  this  is  to  establish  a  devil's  advocacy  organization  within 
the  larger  organization  to  challenge  the  predominant  beliefs.  But  it 
is  an  imperfect  solution;  at  best,  an  ameliorative.  The  individuals 
assigned  to  such  an  organization  will  have  to  be  protected,  at  the 
top,  from  subsequent  retribution. 

Mr.  Chairman,  we  should  always  bear  in  mind  that  intelligence 
assessments,  hopefully  objective,  will  then  rise  through  the  political 
hierarchy  to  inform  the  judgments  of  decisionmakers.  Politics, 
under  normal  conditions,  is  typically  an  engine  to  soothe  and  to  re- 
assure. It  reflects  that  political  imperative  known  as  optimism. 
Until  the  Nation  is  aroused,  alarmist  views  are  treated  with  dis- 
belief. 

I  recall  an  episode  in  1950  when  an  intelligence  analyst,  examin- 
ing the  indicators,  had  concluded  that  Chinese  troops  had  already 
been  introduced,  in  large  numbers,  into  North  Korea,  as  the  United 
Nations  command  advanced  towards  the  Yalu.  The  recipient — he 
was  peddling  this  tale  around  Washington,  and  ultimately  reached 
high  into  the  Department  of  State — of  his  briefing  listened  very  po- 
litely. When  it  was  over,  he  responded  as  follows,  'Toung  man, 
they  wouldn't  dare." 

Moreover,  national  perspectives  frequently  are  dominated  by  po- 
litical axioms,  and  intelligence  failures — so-called — are  quite  fre- 
quently the  failures  of  prevailing  political  axioms.  In  1990,  Iraq's 
neighbors  reassured  themselves  that,  "An  Arab  state  would  never 
attack  another  Arab  state."  In  1973,  a  prevailing  political  axiom  in 
Israel,  an  axiom  which  affected  the  intelligence,  was  that  their 


14 

Arab  neighbors  would  never  dare  attack,  as  long  as  Israel  had  air 
superiority.  Of  course,  I  should  mention  the  conviction — inter- 
national, as  well  as  national — that,  without  question,  Saddam  Hus- 
sein has  weapons  of  mass  destruction. 

The  process  of  fashioning  such  a  political  axiom  is  strongly  abet- 
ted that,  over  time,  any  caveat  coming  up  from  lower  levels  in  the 
IC  gets  stripped  away  as  information  moves  up  the  political  hier- 
archy. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  trust  that  Congress  will  remember  Hippocrates' 
injunction,  "First  do  no  harm."  In  altering  the  structure  of  the  IC, 
it  is  essential  to  deliberate  long  and  hard,  and  not  to  be  stampeded 
into  doing  harm. 

On  page  339  of  the  report  of  the  9/1 1  Commission,  the  commis- 
sioners wisely  state,  "In  composing  this  narrative,  we  have  tried  to 
remember  that  we  write  with  the  benefit  and  the  handicap  of  hind- 
sight. Hindsight  can  sometimes  see  the  past  clearly,  with  20-20  vi- 
sion, but  the  path  of  what  happens  is  so  brightly  lit  that  it  places 
everything  else  more  deeply  into  shadow." 

Mr.  Chairman,  our  understanding  of  past  events  becomes  perfect 
only  in  hindsight,  if  then.  There  will  never  be  any  corresponding 
perfection  in  intelligence  organizations,  which  necessarily  must  op- 
erate with  foresight.  Reform  may  now  be  necessary.  Yet  in  the  vain 
pursuit  of  a  perfect  intelligence  organizations,  do  not  shake  up  in- 
telligence in  a  way  that  does  do  harm  and,  in  pursuit  of  this  will- 
of-the-wisp  perfection,  damage,  in  particular,  those  military  capa- 
bilities that  we  alone  possess. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Dr.  Schlesinger  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  by  Dr.  James  R.  Schlesinger 

Mr.  Chairman,  members  of  the  committee:  I  am  grateful  to  the  committee  for  pro- 
viding this  opportunity  to  comment  on  the  nature  of  intelHgence  and  the  reforms 
suggested  by  the  9/11  Commission.  The  9/11  Commission  has  given  us  a  detailed 
and  revealing  narrative  of  events  leading  up  to  September  11.  It  has  also  proposed 
a  substantial  reorganization  of  the  Intelligence  Community  (IC) — changes  that  do 
not  logically  flow  from  the  problems  that  the  commission  identified  in  its  narrative. 
It  is,  therefore,  incumbent  upon  us  to  examine  the  commission's  proposals  with  care, 
lest  in  our  haste  we  do  more  harm  than  good.  The  commission  has  rightly  observed 
that  the  events  leading  up  to  September  11  represent  "a  failure  of  imagination."  Yet, 
one  should  not  assume  that  changing  wiring  diagrams  is  a  sure  fire  way  to  stimu- 
late imagination.  Imagination  always  has  an  up-hill  fight  in  bureaucratic  organiza- 
tions. Creating  an  additional  bureaucratic  layer  scarcely  leads  to  bringing  imagina- 
tion to  the  top. 

Mr.  Chairman,  in  these  brief  remarks,  I  shall  attempt  to  discuss  the  issue  of  intel- 
ligence reform  under  three  headings:  first,  the  inherent  problems  of  intelligence;  sec- 
ond, why  control  of  intelligence  from  outside  of  the  Department  of  Defense  is  a  par- 
ticularly bad  idea,  given  the  evolution  of  U.S.  technology  and  military  strategy;  and, 
third,  to  draw  some  implications  for  intelligence  reform. 

1.  Intelligence  is  inherently  a  difficult  business.  Intelligence  targets  naturally  seek 
to  conceal  what  they  are  doing — and  have  a  strong  tendency  to  mislead  you.  The 
central  problem  in  intelligence  is  to  discern  the  true  signals  amidst  the  noise.  The 
relevant  signals  may  be  very  weak  and,  without  question,  there  is  a  great  deal  of 
noise.  Countless  events  are  being  recorded  each  day — and  countless  events  are  fail- 
ing to  be  recorded  or  are  deliberately  hidden.  Moreover,  false  signals  are  delib- 
erately planted.  We  talk  ghbly  about  "connecting  the  dots,"  but  that  is  far  easier 
ex-post  than  ex-ante.  It  is  only  in  retrospect  that  one  knows  which  dots  were  the 
relevant  dots,  among  the  countless  observations  and  unobserved  phenomena — and 
how  those  relevant  dots  should  be  connected.  Prior  to  that,  one  has  only  a  mass  of 
observations  and  possible  evidence — subject  to  a  variety  of  h5T)otheses  and  interpre- 
tations. 


15 

Even  if  there  are  no  preconceptions,  or  initial  biases,  organizations  will  drift  to- 
ward a  structured  theory  of  an  issue  under  study.  Thus,  an  organization — any  orga- 
nization— develops  a  concept  of  reality.  Over  time,  that  concept  likely  will  harden 
into  a  conviction  or  mindset  that  discounts  observations  or  evidence  in  conflict  with 
the  prevailing  concept  and  highlights  observations  that  seem  to  be  supportive  as  evi- 
dence. Evidence  to  the  contrary  is  regularly  shaken  off. 

Thus,  the  quality  of  analysis  becomes  critical  in  providing  good  intelligence.  That 
is  why  reducing  competition  in  analysis  is  the  wrong  way  to  go — especially  in  quest 
of  the  false  goal  of  eliminating  duplication.  Centralization  of  intelligence  is  inher- 
ently a  dubious  objective,  when  there  is  a  wide  range  of  consumers  of  intelligence — 
with  a  variety  of  interests,  responsibiUties,  and  needs. 

2.  Intelligence  is  increasingly  interwoven  with  military  operations.  The  advance 
of  military  technology  and  its  embodiment  in  our  military  forces  have  made  intel- 
ligence ever  more  integral  to  our  military  strategy  and  battlefield  tactics  and  to  this 
coimtry's  immense  military  advantage.  That  military  advantage  is  reflected  in  such 
rubrics  as  "information  superiority,"  "information  dominance,"  "battlefield  aware- 
ness," and  "net-centric  warfare."  In  brief,  it  relies  upon  rapid  detection  of  targets 
through  sensors,  the  rapid  communication  of  those  target  locations  to  command  cen- 
ters, the  assignment  of  precisely-guided  weapons  to  those  targets  at  the  discerned 
locations,  and  damage  assessment,  again  communicated  to  command  centers,  to  de- 
termine whether  additional  weapons  are  necessary.  In  all  of  this,  the  accuracy,  the 
immediacy,  and  the  believability  of  intelligence  is  crucial. 

Thus,  in  recent  decades,  intelligence,  when  wedded  to  command,  control,  and  com- 
munications, has  become  the  core  of  America's  battlefield  dominance  and  military 
superiority.  In  short,  C^I  has  in  itself  almost  become  a  powerful  weapon-system.  But 
commanders  in  the  field  must  have  confidence  that  the  intelligence  assets  will  be 
available  with  certainty  and  that  information  will  be  reliably  and  quickly  dissemi- 
nated. It  is  for  this  reason  that  plucking  intelligence  away  from  command,  control, 
and  communications  has  become  increasingly  unwise.  They  should  be  designed  and 
operated  as  an  integrated  whole. 

To  illustrate  the  now-enhanced  role  of  intelligence  in  the  system-of-systems  that 
under  girds  U.S.  military  advantage,  I  have  included  as  a  backup  an  illustration 
from  Vision  2020,  with  which  you  likely  are  familiar.  It  illustrates  the  crucial  role 
of  information  superiority  in  binding  together  the  seversd  aspects  of  military  engage- 
ment to  achieve  battlefield  dominance. 

It  has  taken  many  years  to  persuade  military  commanders  that  national  assets 
will  reliably  be  available  to  them  in  the  event  of  conflict.  This  started  in  the  1970s, 
but  did  not  really  reach  fruition  until  the  Gulf  War  in  1990-1991.  Sustaining  that 
confidence  of  our  military  commanders  that  national  assets  will  be  designed  and  ex- 
ercised with  their  wartime  needs  in  mind  remains  crucial.  In  the  absence  of  such 
confidence,  the  temptation  for  our  combatant  commanders  will  be  to  try  to  develop 
intelligence  assets  under  their  own  control,  even  if  they  are  inferior.  To  possess  in- 
telligence assets  of  one's  own  is  time-honored  for  virtually  all  major  decision-mak- 
ers. That  is  why  intelligence  assets  are  so  widely  distributed.  That  is  why  the  peren- 
nial quest  for  greater  centralization  has  been  both  delusory  and  invariably  negated. 

To  shift  control  over  crucial  intelligence  assets  outside  the  Department  of  Defense 
risks  weakening  the  relative  military  advantage  of  the  United  States — and  at  the 
same  time  creates  the  incentive  to  divert  resources  into  (likely  inferior)  intelligence 
capabilities,  which  would  further  reduce  the  available  forces. 

But  that  is  not  the  end.  The  question  is:  where  does  one  draw  the  line?  Take  one 
critical  example.  Now  central  to  information  dominance  and  to  our  military  oper- 
ations is  the  Global  Positioning  System  (GPS).  It  is  an  information  system,  not  nor- 
mally regarded  as  part  of  the  IC.  Nevertheless,  it  is  critical  for  effective  intelligence 
operations — and  thus  to  the  effectiveness  of  our  military  forces.  Does  budget  control 
over  GPS  also  pass  to  a  Director  of  National  Intelligence?  In  a  complex  system-of- 
systems,  the  perceived  need  to  move  further  beyond  what  historically  has  been  de- 
fined as  intelligence — will  not  cease.  Historic  intelligence  and  non-intelligence  sys- 
tems are  now  Siamese  twins.  King  Solomon  had  a  comparatively  easy  task  in  pro- 
posing to  split  the  baby  in  half. 

3.  Intelligence  management,  like  intelligence  itself,  is  an  inherently  difficult  busi- 
ness. There  are  countless  questions.  Which  are  the  important  ones  to  bring  to  the 
attention  of  the  decisionmakers?  There  are  countless  observations.  Some  are  rel- 
evant signals;  most  are  noise.  Where  are  the  missing  signals?  Only  in  retrospect  can 
one  be  sure  of  the  answer.  Regrettably,  we  are  not  clairvoyant.  Predicting  the  future 
is  especially  fraught  with  difficulty. 

To  speak  of  the  "failure  of  imagination"  is  really  to  acknowledge  the  limitations 
of  the  human  intellect.  Individual  analysts  will  all  have  their  slightly  different  in- 
terpretations of  what  is  going  on.  Their  views  must  be  selected  and  combined. 


16 

Though  we  regularly  are  urged  to  "think  outside  the  box,"  that  is  mostly  an  exhor- 
tation. The  problem  with  "thinking  the  unthinkable"  is  that — nobody  believes  you! 
Analysts  will  temper  their  views  within  the  range  of  acceptability.  Those  who 
stretch  receptivity  likely  will  be  viewed — or  dismissed — as  "worrywarts,  zealots,  or 
even  worse,  oddballs."  That  does  little  to  enhance  one's  status  in  the  organization 
or  one's  career. 

As  mentioned  earlier,  organizations  also  have  their  inherent  limits.  Different  or- 
ganizations will  gravitate  towards  different  ways  of  organizing  reality — based  upon 
their  range  of  responsibilities  and,  also,  their  interests  in  a  narrower  sense.  Most 
individuals  make  themselves  comfortable  in  their  own  organizations  by  not  chal- 
lenging a  prevailing  consensus.  The  only  solution  within  an  organization  is  to  estab- 
lish a  Devil's  Advocacy  organization  to  challenge  the  prevailing  beliefs.  But,  it  is  an 
imperfect  solution,  at  best  an  ameliorative,  and  the  individuals  assigned  to  such  an 
organization  will  have  to  be  protected  at  the  top  from  subsequent  retribution. 

Mr.  Chairman,  we  should  always  bear  in  mind  that  intelligence  assessments, 
hopefully  objective,  will  then  rise  through  the  political  hierarchy  to  inform  the  judg- 
ment of  decisionmakers.  Politics,  under  normal  conditions,  is  t3T)ically  an  engine  to 
soothe  and  to  reassure.  (It  reflects  that  political  imperative  known  as  optimism.) 
Until  the  Nation  is  aroused,  alarmist  views  are  treated  with  disbelief.  I  recall  an 
episode  in  1950,  when  an  intelligence  analyst,  examining  the  indicators,  had  con- 
cluded that  the  Chinese  had  already  introduced  large  numbers  of  troops  into  North 
Korea,  as  the  United  Nations  command  advanced.  He  was  pedaling  this  tale  around 
Washington  and  ultimately  reached  high  into  the  State  Department.  The  recipient 
of  his  briefing  listened  very  politely.  When  it  was  over,  he  responded  as  follows: 
"Young  man,  they  wouldn't  dare." 

Moreover,  national  perspectives  frequently  are  dominated  by  political  axioms — 
and  intelligence  failures,  so-called,  are  quite  frequently  the  failures  of  prevailing  po- 
litical axioms.  In  1990,  Iraq's  neighbors  reassured  themselves  that  "an  Arab  state 
would  never  attack  another  Arab  state."  In  1973,  a  prevailing  political  axiom  in 
Israel  (which  affected  intelligence)  was  that  their  Arab  neighbors  would  never  at- 
tack as  long  as  Israel  had  air  superiority.  Of  course,  I  should  mention  the  convic- 
tion, international  as  well  as  national,  that  "without  question,  Saddam  Hussein  has 
weapons  of  mass  destruction."  The  process  of  fashioning  such  a  political  axiom  is 
strongly  abetted  that  over  time  any  caveats  coming  up  from  lower  levels  in  the  IC 
get  stripped  away  as  information  moves  up  the  political  hierarchy. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  trust  that  Congress  will  remember  Hippocrates'  injunction: 
"First,  do  no  harm."  In  altering  the  structure  of  the  IC,  it  is  essential  to  deliberate 
long  and  hard — and  not  to  be  stampeded  into  doing  harm.  On  page  339  of  the  Re- 
port of  the  9/11  Commission,  the  commissioners  wisely  state: 

"In  composing  this  narrative,  we  have  tried  to  remember  that  we  write  with 
the  benefit  and  the  handicap  of  hindsight.  Hindsight  can  sometimes  see  the 
past  clearly — with  20/20  vision.  But  the  path  of  what  happened  is  so  bright- 
ly lit  that  it  places  everything  else  more  deeply  into  shadow." 

Mr.  Chairman,  our  understanding  of  past  events  becomes  perfect  only  in  hind- 
sight— if  then.  There  will  never  be  any  corresponding  perfection  in  intelligence  orga- 
nization— which  necessarily  must  operate  with  foresight.  Reform  may  now  be  nec- 
essary. Yet,  in  the  vain  pursuit  of  a  perfect  intelligence  organization,  do  not  shake 
up  intelligence  in  a  way  that  does  do  harm — and  in  pursuit  of  this  will  of  the  wisp, 
damage,  in  particular,  those  military  capabilities  that  we  alone  possess. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  shall  be  pleased  to  answer  any  questions  that  you 
or  members  of  the  committee  may  have. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you,  Dr.  Schlesinger.  That's  a  very 
strong  and  clear  message. 

Secretary  Carlucci,  I'd  Hke  to  also  advise  my  colleagues,  that 
while  you  are  best  known,  maybe,  for  serving  as  SECDEF,  you  also 
served  as  the  Deputy  to  the  Director  of  CIA  for  some  4  years,  am 
I  not  correct? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Three  years. 

Chairman  WARNER.  So,  much  like  Dr.  Schlesinger,  you've  worked 
at  both  of  those  agencies  and  the  Department. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Yes,  sir. 


17 

STATEMENT  OF  FRANK  C.  CARLUCCI,  FORMER  SECRETARY  OF 
DEFENSE,  CHAIRMAN  EMERITUS,  THE  CARLYLE  GROUP 

Mr.  Caelucci.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  thank  you  for  in- 
cluding me  with  this  distinguished  panel. 

Senator  Levin,  members  of  the  committee,  I  think  this  hearing 
is  very  important  because  any  organization,  any  reorganization — 
and  I've  been  through  a  number — is  disruptive.  You  have  to  be  cer- 
tain that  the  long-term  gain  exceeds  the  short-term  loss.  You  also 
have  to  be  certain  that  the  solution  fits  the  problem. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  a  prepared  statement.  I'm  going  to  sum- 
marize it,  with  your  permission. 

Chairman  Warner.  Without  objection,  it  will  be  admitted  into 
the  record. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  We  need  to  be  sure  that  the  solution  fits  the  prob- 
lem. It's  tempting,  because  we  have  15  organizations  with  the  label 
"intelligence"  on  them,  to  say  they  ought  to  be  under  common  man- 
agement. But  as  Jim  Schlesinger  has  just  pointed  out,  some  com- 
petition, particularly  among  the  analytical  agencies,  is,  indeed, 
healthy;  I  would  argue,  necessary. 

As  this  committee  is  well  aware,  unity  of  command  is  necessary 
for  any  military  operation.  So  is  intelligence,  and  Jim  Schlesinger 
has  discussed  that  in  some  detail,  and  I  agree  with  virtually  every- 
thing he  has  said. 

The  failings  of  September  11,  as  I  read  the  report,  were  in  the 
areas  of  human  resources  intelligence  (HUMINT)  and  analysis. 
These  can  be  improved  without  disrupting  the  DOD  chain  of  com- 
mand. The  CSAs  are  already  subject  to  the  DCI's  programming  and 
budgeting  authority,  as  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  pointed  out  in  your 
opening  statement.  The  DCI  has  the  concurring  authority  on  peo- 
ple. I  question  whether  much  more  is  needed.  It  is  true  that  DIA, 
on  the  analytical  side,  competes  with  CIA  in  some  areas,  but  that 
is,  by  and  large,  healthy. 

I  cannot  find  in  the  9/11  Commission  Report  a  convincing  case 
that  September  11  stemmed  from  any  Pentagon  failure  to  coordi- 
nate. The  dots  problems  were  mainly  between  domestic  and  foreign 
intelligence — and  intelligence,  on  the  one  hand,  and  law  enforce- 
ment, on  the  other — and  the  NCTC,  as  proposed  by  the  9/11  Com- 
mission, should  go  a  long  way  to  solving  these  problems. 

I  would  have  the  center  report  to  the  DCI.  I  do  not  favor  the  cre- 
ation of  an  NID,  certainly  not  in  the  White  House,  for  reasons.  Sen- 
ator Levin,  that  you  have  already  discussed.  I  lived  through  that, 
as  National  Security  Advisor,  in  the  wake  of  Iran-Contra. 

The  dilemma  is  that  if  you  give  teeth  to  the  NID,  you  risk  dis- 
rupting combat  support,  as  Jim  has  described  in  some  detail,  you 
disrupt  the  unity  of  command,  and  you  have  agency  heads  in  one 
department,  DOD,  reporting  to  somebody  outside  that  depart- 
ment— hardly  a  healthy  relationship.  If  you  don't  give  teeth  to  the 
NID,  then  you've  created  a  useless  layer.  In  either  case,  you've 
weakened  the  DCI,  and  you've  created  a  competitor  to  the  National 
Security  Advisor. 

A  better  approach,  in  my  judgment,  at  least  one  that's  less  dis- 
ruptive, would  be  to  set  up  the  NCTC  and  strengthen  the  DCI's  au- 
thority in  areas  where  analysis  may  show  it's  needed.  I  question 
whether   it's   needed.    I   think,    Senator   Lieberman   and   Senator 


18 

Levin,  you  heard  this  morning  from  former  Director  Stansfield 
Turner,  that  he  had  plenty  of  authority  at  the  time  he  was  director. 
I  can  vouch  for  that,  because  I  was  his  deputy,  as  I  think  you  men- 
tioned this  morning.  So  I  question  how  much  more  is  needed.  It 
may  be  just  a  question  of  exercising  existing  authority. 

There's  been  a  lot  of  focus  on  the  organizational  issue.  Let  me 
mention  some  other  shortcomings  which  I  think  are  at  least  as  im- 
portant. They  are  not  mentioned — some  of  them  are  not  mentioned 
in  the  9/11  Commission  Report. 

I  see  no  mention  of  better  trade-craft  in  the  recruitment  of  hard 
targets.  I  learned  many  years  ago,  as  a  Foreign  Service  Officer 
(FSO)  in  the  field  working  with  case  officers,  that  the  best  way  to 
recruit  is  to  be  able  to  protect  sources  and  methods,  or  at  least 
have  the  perception  that  you  can  protect  sources  and  methods. 

Unfortunately,  the  perception  out  in  the  real  world  is  that  our 
country  can't  protect  sources  and  methods.  I  can  remember,  when 
I  was  Deputy  DCI,  the  head  of  a  European  Intelligence  Service  say- 
ing to  me,  "Frank,  we  don't  give  you  all  our  information,  because 
you  can't  keep  a  secret."  Imagine,  Senators,  that  you  were  an  Iraqi 
under  Saddam  Hussein,  and  a  CIA  case  officer  came  to  you,  and 
you  took  a  look  at  the  leaks  coming  out  of  the  U.S.  Government — 
there  are  a  couple  of  investigations  underway  already — the  Free- 
dom of  Information  Act  being  applied  to  the  CIA,  and  the  prolifera- 
tion of  oversight  committees.  Would  you  put  your  name  on  the 
rolls?  All  the  skilled  in  the  world  won't  do  us  any  good  in  that  se- 
cretive part  of  the  world  unless  we  do  a  better  job  of  keeping  our 
own  secrets. 

The  Commission  did  have  some  positive  recommendations  to 
make  on  the  classification  of  information  and  on  congressional 
oversight.  But,  in  general,  they  were  hostile  to  the  need-to-know 
principle.  I  can't  imagine  distributing  information  to  people  who 
don't  need  to  know.  I  think  we  need  to  retain  the  need-to-know 
principle. 

Good  collection  of  intelligence  entails  risk-taking  in  the  recruit- 
ment process.  Ever  since  the  days  of  the  Church  Committee,  we 
have  discouraged  risk  in  our  intelligence  organizations.  We've  in- 
dicted professionals  for  carrying  out  their  responsibility.  We've 
made  it  more  complicated,  or  put  a  chill  on  the  recruitment  of  peo- 
ple with  human-rights  violations  on  their  record,  when,  indeed, 
those  are  some  of  the  very  people  we  need  to  be  going  after. 

Sure,  there  are  failures,  and  we  need  to  determine  why  those 
failures  came  about;  but  there  are  also  successes,  largely 
unheralded,  and  we  should  not  risk  the  successes  by  excessive  fin- 
ger-pointing at  the  failures. 

Final  point  is  resources.  I  think  we  can  all  agree  that,  in  the 
1990s,  we  shortchanged  DOD,  State,  and  our  intelligence  agencies. 
The  rebuilding  process  is  underway,  thanks  to  members  of  this 
committee,  among  others,  but  it  will  take  longer  to  rebuild  than  it 
takes  to  tear  down.  When  I  think  of  the  length  of  time  required  to 
recruit,  train,  organize  hard-cover  for  intelligence  case  officers,  I 
agree  with  George  Tenet  when  he  says  the  rebuilding  process  will 
take  5  years.  Let's  hope  that  we  don't  prolong  this  process  by  hasty 
and  ill-advised  organizational  moves. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 


19 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Mr.  Carlucci  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  by  Frank  C.  Carlucci 

Mr.  Chairman,  Senator  Levin,  members  of  the  committee:  It  is  a  pleasure  to  ap- 
pear before  you  today  and  I  commend  you  for  holding  these  hearings.  Reorganiza- 
tions are  always  disruptive  and  we  must  be  certain  the  long-term  gain  outweighs 
the  inevitable  short-term  loss. 

We  must  also  be  certain  the  solution  fits  the  problem.  Just  because  15  agencies 
carry  an  intelligence  label  doesn't  mean  they  all  should  be  integrated.  Indeed  man- 
aged competition  is  a  healthy  component  of  good  intelligence. 

Unity  of  command  is  essential  for  military  operations.  So  is  good  intelligence,  as 
the  9/11  report  acknowledges.  Leaving  aside  the  reluctance  of  policy  makers  to  act 
on  warning,  the  failings  of  September  11  appear  to  be  principally  in  HUMINT  and 
analysis.  Improving  HUMINT  can  be  done  without  disrupting  the  Pentagon  chain 
of  command.  Eighty  percent  of  the  Intelligence  budget  is  frequently  cited  as  dis- 
proportional  DOD  control.  These  assets  are  mainly  in  the  hardware  area  and  hence 
very  costly.  The  NRO,  NSA  and  NGA  are  already  subject  to  the  DCI's  budgeting 
and  programming  authority.  I  question  whether  further  DCI  control  is  needed  or  de- 
sirable. The  service  HUMINT  operations  are  largely  tactical  and  nobody  proposes 
separating  them.  DIA's  HUMINT  largely  comes  through  the  Attache  System  and  is 
coordinated  by  Ambassadors  at  the  local  level.  DIA's  analytical  effort  can  and  should 
compete  with  that  of  CIA. 

I  fail  to  find  in  the  9/11  report  a  convincing  case  that  the  September  11  problem 
stemmed  from  the  failure  of  the  Pentagon  agencies  to  coordinate.  On  the  contrary, 
the  "dots"  problem  seems  to  be  mainly  between  the  CIA  and  the  FBI  on  the  one 
hand,  and  law  enforcement  and  intelligence  on  the  other,  not  with  DOD.  TTIC  and 
the  Patriot  Act  have  gone  a  long  way  to  solving  some  of  these  problems.  The 
Counterterrorism  Center,  which  would  build  on  TTIC,  is  a  good  idea  despite  the 
dangers  of  putting  intelligence  and  operational  planning  close  to  each  other. 

I  beUeve  the  Counterterrorism  Center  should  report  to  the  DCI.  I  do  not  favor  cre- 
ating the  post  of  NID,  certainly  not  in  the  White  House  where  it  would  be  too  close 
to  both  the  political  and  the  policy  process.  Its  main  value  would  be  to  serve  as  a 
coordinator  of  domestic  and  international  intelligence.  The  dilemma  is  that  if  you 
give  the  NID  budget  and  personnel  authority  over  DOD,  even  if  he  or  she  is  not 
in  the  White  House,  you  jeopardize  combat  support  and  disrupt  the  military  unity 
of  command.  You  also  create  a  competitor  to  the  National  Security  Advisor.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  you  don't  give  the  NID  budget  and  personnel  authority,  you  add  a 
useless  layer  and  weaken  the  DCI  in  the  process.  A  better  approach  would  be  to 
set  up  the  Counterterrorism  Center  and  strengthen  the  DCI's  concurring  authority 
over  the  CSA's  where  it  may  be  inadequate.  The  main  thing  though  is  to  make  sure 
the  DCI  has  clout  over  both  the  CIA  and  the  FBI. 

If  one  goal  is  to  improve  HUMINT  there  are  shortcomings  more  important  than 
organizational  structure.  They  are  not  dealt  with  in  the  9/11  report.  I  learned  as 
an  FSO  working  with  case  officers  in  the  field  that  the  key  to  good  HUMINT  is  the 
ability  to  protect  sources  and  methods,  or  better  said  the  perception  that  we  can 
protect  sources  and  methods.  In  the  intelligence  business  perception  is  as  important 
as  fact. 

Unfortunately  the  widespread  perception  is  that  we  can't  protect  our  sources  and 
methods.  I  can  recall  the  head  of  a  major  European  Intelligence  Service  telling  me 
when  I  was  DDCI  that  he  withheld  information  from  us  because  we  "couldn't  keep 
a  secret." 

Imagine  you  were  an  Iraqi  under  Saddam  Hussein  and  a  CIA  case  officer  ap- 
proached you.  Knowing  about  extensive  leaks,  the  constant  pressure  on  the  Agency 
(including  by  the  9/11  Commission)  to  reveal  more  information,  the  use  of  FOIA  to 
reveal  CIA  material  and  multiple  congressional  oversight  committees,  would  you 
want  your  name  on  the  rolls?  All  the  skilled  Arabist's  in  the  world  won't  be  able 
to  recruit  in  the  highly  secretive  Middle  East  unless  we  commit  to  better  protection 
of  sources  and  methods. 

The  commission  did  make  some  positive  recommendations  for  a  tiered  classifica- 
tion system  and  streamlined  congressional  oversight  but  their  overall  thrust  was  to 
abolish  "need  to  know"  and  have  a  more  open  intelligence  process — an  oxymoron. 
It  is  good  to  disseminate  information,  but  the  dissemination  process  is  useless  un- 
less there  is  reliable  information  to  disseminate.  One  source  compromised  means 
many  sources  not  recruited. 

Grood  collection  also  requires  risk  taking.  Much  of  our  approach  to  intelligence 
since  the  Church  Committee  has  been  to  discourage  risk.  Whether  it  is  indicting 
professionals  for  canying  out  policy  or  making  it  complicated  to  recruit  human 


20 

rights  violators  we  have  put  a  chill  on  entrepreneurial  activity.  There  will  be  fail- 
ures and  we  should  determine  why,  but  there  are  successes,  largely  unheralded,  and 
we  should  not  risk  them  by  seizing  on  every  failure  to  point  fingers  of  blame. 

A  final  word  on  resources.  They  are  needed.  It  is  clear  we  cut  DOD,  State,  and 
Intelligence  too  much  in  the  1990s — over  30  percent.  The  capability  we  lost  can  be 
rebuilt  but  not  as  quickly  as  it  was  eliminated.  Bearing  in  mind  the  time  required 
to  recruit,  train  and  organize  effective  cover  in  tightly  closed  societies  or  terrorist 
groups  I  think  George  Tenet's  estimate  of  5  years  is  on  the  mark.  I  hope  we  don't 
prolong  that  period  by  making  the  wrong  organizational  moves. 

Chairman  Wakner.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Secretary.  Another  strong 
statement,  very  clear  in  your  views. 
Secretary  Hamre? 

STATEMENT  OF  DR.  JOHN  J.  HAMRE,  FORMER  DEPUTY  SEC- 
RETARY OF  DEFENSE,  PRESIDENT  AND  CHIEF  EXECUTIVE 
OFFICER,  CENTER  FOR  STRATEGIC  AND  INTERNATIONAL 
STUDIES 

Dr.  Hamre.  Chairman  Warner,  Senator  Levin,  thank  you  for  in- 
viting me. 

I  acknowledge  I  come  here  with  severe  disadvantage,  compared 
to  my  colleagues  at  this  table  who  have  such  deep  richness  of  tal- 
ent and  experience  compared  to  me,  but  I  do  have  the  indisputable 
advantage  in  that  I  worked  for  all  of  you  for  10  years.  So  I  throw 
myself  on  your  mercy,  and  hope  that  you  remember  kindly  your 
children.  [Laughter.] 

Chairman  WARNER.  Before  you  further  demean  your  creden- 
tials  [Laughter.  ] 

— let  me  point  out  that  you  perhaps  have  as  much  experience  as 
any  of  us  with  regard  to  the  issue  of  budgeting.  In  the  course  of 
the  colloquy  here  between  my  colleagues  and  myself  and  the  wit- 
nesses, we  will  try  and  define  your  individual  views  on  that. 

Dr.  Hamre.  I'd  be  happy  to  respond  to  that,  sir. 

Chairman  WARNER.  You  do  have  experience  there. 

Dr.  Hamre.  I  do,  sir.  Thank  you. 

Let  me  say,  I  am  grateful  to  the  work  of  the  9/11  Commission 
for  having  opened  up,  for  all  of  us,  a  debate  we  really  should  have 
as  a  country.  How  do  we  need  to  organize  our  intelligence  services 
that  support  us  in  this  important  endeavor  to  protect  the  country? 
As  I've  written  before,  my  concern  about  the  recommendations  that 
flow  from  them  is  that  they  are  organizing,  or  reorganizing,  the  IC 
too  narrowly  around  one  set  of  problems. 

Yes,  the  connect-the-dot  problem  is  very  real,  and  we  do  need  to 
anticipate,  in  our  structure,  how  we  try  to  solve  that  problem.  Just 
as  important,  in  my  view,  is  the  collective  narrowness  of  thinking 
that's  endemic  in  the  intelligence  process  when  it's  supporting  deci- 
sionmaking. Those  two,  I  think,  are,  frankly,  in  tension  with  each 
other. 

If  you  try  to  organize  the  entire  IC  around  one  dimension,  con- 
necting the  dots,  frankly,  I  feel  that  we're  going  to  make  it  much 
susceptible  for  a  narrowness  and  a  group-think  to  set  in  if  we  put 
everj^hing  under  one  person.  If,  by  contrast,  we  try  to  keep  broad 
diversity  in  the  IC,  as  we  have  now,  we  have  a  coordination  prob- 
lem. So  it's  these  two,  I  think,  that  we  have  to  try  to  solve  simulta- 
neously. 


21 

My  concern  about  the  9/11  Commission  is  that  it  creates  an  NID 
and  tries  to  coordinate  by  bringing  all  of  the  budget  and  personnel 
control  under  his  authority.  I  must  tell  you,  I  would  be  very  uneasy 
with  that,  having  been  the  Comptroller  in  the  DOD,  and  having 
been  the  Deputy  Secretary.  To  have  a  major  element  of  my  depart- 
ment really  working  for  another  cabinet  individual  is,  I  think,  a 
real  mistake.  You  can't  help  but  have  that  become  a  source  of  great 
friction  over  time,  and  I  think  that  would  not  be  healthy. 

I  also  think  it  is  really  not  a  good  idea  to  strip  away  from  the 
Cabinet  Secretaries  their  assessment  capacity  to  evaluate  intel- 
ligence on  their  own.  They  need  to  come  into  a  meeting  with  the 
President — and,  frankly,  come  before  all  of  you  in  hearings  on  the 
Hill — with  their  own  independent  capacity  to  reach  a  judgment,  not 
just  simply  receiving  it  from  a  central  authority. 

So  I  do  not  think  it's  a  good  idea  to  focus  in  such  a  narrow  way 
that  we  get  one  point  of  view  coming  out  of  an  IC.  I  really  think 
a  far  greater  risk  lies  in  having  that  too  narrowly  constrained,  and 
for  Cabinet  Secretaries,  like  these  two  gentlemen,  not  to  come  be- 
fore you  in  a  hearing,  or  not  to  come  before  the  President,  to  make 
their  case  on  their  own  assessment. 

Now,  I've  seen  what  the  Commission  has  recommended,  what 
Senator  Kerry  has  recommended,  and  I've  seen  what  the  President 
has  recommended.  I,  probably  much  like  my  two  colleagues  here, 
think  that  the  current  situation  is  preferable  to  the  two  that  are 
on  the  table  before  you.  I,  personally,  think  that  the  9/11  Comniis- 
sion's  recommendation  would  create  a  very  dysfunctional  situation 
in  the  executive  branch.  But  I  also  think  that  the  President's  rec- 
ommendation is  going  to  create  a  very  weak  NID  and,  the  way  it 
was  announced,  could  weaken  the  CIA  in  the  process.  I  think  that's 
a  step  back. 

So  I  come  to  a  conclusion.  If  the  politics  is  going  to  drive  us  to 
have  an  NID,  then,  I  have  to  conclude,  we  have  to  find  a  way  to 
make  that  individual  have  some  genuine  heft  in  the  process. 
They're  not  going  to  be  strong  just  simply  running  interagency  co- 
ordination structures.  They're  going  to  have  to  have  institutional 
depth. 

So  my  recommendation,  which  I  realize  is  controversial,  would  be 
to  move  the  intelligence  factories — and  that  is  the  NRO,  the  NSA, 
and  the  NGA — under  the  NID.  Just  the  factories. 

Now,  some  have  asked  me  why  do  I  not  recommend  that  we 
move  HUMINT.  Frankly,  those  aren't  factories.  Those  are  artisan 
craft  shops,  and  I  don't  think  they're  of  the  same  scale.  I  think  we 
should  keep  them  where  they  are.  I  think  they  ought  to  be  with 
the  CIA  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  DOD  or  the  Defense  Human 
Intelligence  Service.  I  think  you  should  leave  them  there.  But  the 
factories  that  produce  the  raw  material,  I  feel  could  be  brought 
under  this  and  give  genuine  depth  to  the  NID. 

Now,  Secretary  Schlesinger  rightly  raised  how  crucial  it  is  for  us, 
in  the  DOD,  to  have  reliable  intelligence  for  our  warfighting.  It 
isn't  a  matter  of  just  getting  a  finished  intelligence  product.  We 
need  the  electrons.  We  need  the  electrons  on  the  battlefield,  almost 
in  real  time,  to  be  able  to  do  our  job. 

Now,  I  will  say  that  a  good  number  of  those  platforms  that 
produce  tactical  intelligence  are  under  the  management  and  control 


22 

of  the  DOD  already,  and  that  would  not  change  by  moving  the  par- 
ent of  the  NSA  to  this  new  NID.  But  I  do  think  that  there  would 
be  problems  that  would  emerge  if  you  were  to  move  the  factories 
over  under  this  individual.  But  I  think  they're  manageable  prob- 
lems. At  least  I  know  how  I  would  manage  it  if  I  were  to  do  that. 
We  come  to  this — we,  DOD — would  come  to  this  with  considerable 
clout,  frankly.  Each  of  those  three  agencies  would  collapse  if  we 
pulled  out  our  people  and  our  resources. 

Dr.  Schlesinger  said  that  there  would  be  a  tendency  to  reproduce 
those  capabilities.  Frankly,  we  can't  afford  it.  I  mean,  we  are  going 
to  rationalize  our  process.  We've  had  to  do  that  by  the  expense  of 
these  platforms  already. 

So  I  think  that  there  would  be  a — no  question,  there  would  be 
some  tensions,  but  I  think  it  is  something  we  could  manage.  I,  per- 
sonally, would  recommend  that  the  deputies — myself,  if  I  had  been 
in  the  job,  the  deputy — or  the  Vice  Chief  of  the  Joint  Chiefs,  as  well 
as  other  deputies — serve  as  a  board  of  directors  to  the  NID  on, 
really,  a  daily  basis,  to  ensure  that  we're  getting  the  kind  of  sup- 
port and  product  that  we  need. 

As  I  said,  I  don't  think  this  is — I  propose  this  really  because  I'm 
trying  to  find  a  path.  If  it  is  inevitable  that  we're  going  to  have  an 
NID  split  away  from  the  CIA,  we  have  to  have  a  strong  position, 
and  I  think  this  is  a  plausible  way  to  do  it,  although  I  do  acknowl- 
edge that  there  are  going  to  be  some  challenges.  I  look  forward  to 
answering  your  questions  or  talking  with  you  about  them. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Dr.  Hamre  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  by  Dr.  John  J.  Hamre 

Chairman  Warner,  Ranking  Member  Levin,  distinguished  members  of  the  com- 
mittee, thank  you  for  inviting  me  to  participate  in  this  critical  hearing.  I  am  grate- 
ful that  you  are  undertaking  this  review.  How  we  organize  our  government  to  un- 
dertake critical  intelligence  is  one  of  the  most  fundamental  problems  we  face.  We 
need  your  thoughtful  review  and  considered  judgment.  This  is  not  something  to 
rush.  Please  take  your  time  to  think  through  these  issues  carefully. 

With  your  permission,  I  would  ask  that  you  accept  as  my  statement  a  copy  of  the 
article  I  wrote  that  appeared  Monday  in  the  Washington  Post.  It  outlines  everything 
I  would  otherwise  want  to  say  this  morning.  I  would  like  to  amplify  on  that  state- 
ment, however,  to  discuss  the  implications  this  holds  for  the  Defense  Department. 

Let  me  say  at  the  outset  that  American  warfighting  is  more  dependent  on  intel- 
ligence today  than  at  any  time  in  our  history.  The  globe  is  not  getting  smaller;  our 
forces  are,  so  we  have  to  get  maximum  efficiency  by  being  precise  in  our  planning 
and  operation.  We  depend  on  superb  tactical  intelligence. 

A  good  deal  of  those  capabilities  are  organic  to  our  operating  forces.  But  we  also 
depend  on  the  intelligence  support  we  receive  from  the  National  Security  Agency 
(NSA),  the  National  Geospatial-Intelligence  Agency,  and  the  National  RJeconnais- 
sance  Office.  I  honestly  believe  we  can  count  on  that  support  and  have  it  tactically 
relevant,  even  if  those  organizations  are  transferred  to  a  new  central  intelligence 
organization  under  a  new  DNL  But  there  are  some  steps  we  should  take. 

First,  I  believe  we  should  continue  to  send  our  military  personnel  to  those  institu- 
tions, even  after  transfer.  Frankly  we  need  to  do  that  because  we  don't  have  the 
rotation  base  exclusively  within  the  military  services  to  support  our  force  structure 
and  manage  our  personnel.  We  need  the  wider  job  rotation  base  that  these  agencies 
provide.  So  it  is  in  our  interests  for  two  reasons — to  insure  they  continue  to  focus 
on  us  and  to  insure  that  our  best  tactical  intelligence  operators  have  a  rotation  base. 

Second,  I  would  explicitly  establish  a  very  senior  board  of  directors  to  oversee  the 
new  department.  These  individuals  would  actually  be  representatives  for  the  Cabi- 
net Secretaries  who  have  the  constitutional  missions  assigned  them  by  the  Presi- 
dent. The  Intelligence  Community  (IC)  should  be  accountable  to  them,  and  we  need 
a  standing  structure  that  insures  that  oversight  and  accountability. 

Third,  I  believe  that  we  are  on  the  edge  of  a  new  set  of  military  intelligence  plat- 
forms— long  dwell  unmanned  vehicles  is  a  good  example — that  provide  needed  tac- 


23 

tical  intelligence,  but  which  also  feed  the  national  system.  I  would  make  those  DOD 
investments  and  keep  them  in  the  Defense  Department.  We  already  know  how  to 
jointly  task  them  for  tactical  and  national  missions. 

Fourth,  I  think  the  two  Armed  Services  Committees  need  to  strengthen  their 
oversight  of  intelligence.  But  the  focus  should  be  on  outputs,  not  on  inputs.  Too 
much  of  the  oversight  today  is  devoted  to  the  review  of  the  annual  budget  inputs 
to  the  system,  not  an  assessment  of  the  capabilities  we  get  from  the  systems.  Your 
oversight  will  help  insure  that  the  new  intelligence  system  is  responsive  to  our 
warfighters. 

Thank  you  for  inviting  me  to  participate  today.  I  am  pleased  to  answer  any  ques- 
tions you  have  at  the  appropriate  point. 


Washington  Post 

A  Better  Way  to  Improve  Intelligence: 

The  National  Director  Should  Oversee  Only  the  Agencies  That  Gather  Data 

By  John  Harare 

Monday,  August  9,  2004;  Page  A15 

It's  refreshing  to  have  a  big  debate  in  Washington.  Too  often  our  debates  are  small  and  arcane. 
The  Sept.  1 1  commission  has  touched  off  a  much- needed  debate  of  constitutional  proportions: 
How  do  we  best  organize  the  intelligence  functions  of  the  government  to  protect  the  nation,  yet 
oversee  those  ftmctions  to  protect  our  citizens  from  the  government? 

The  commission  has  rendered  an  enormous  contribution  to  the  nation.  But  its  recommendations 
need  to  be  the  starting  point  for  a  great  debate,  not  the  final  word.  Political  passions  are  rising, 
which  portends  danger.  The  American  system  of  government  is  designed  to  move  sbwly,  for 
good  reason.  Such  a  big  and  complex  country  needs  to  fully  consider  all  the  implications  of 
major  changes.  We  make  mistakes  when  we  move  quickly,  and  we  can't  afford  to  make  a 
mistake  here. 

Good  as  they  are,  the  commission's  recommendations  are  too  narrowly  centered  on  one  problem. 
This  is  understandable.  The  commission  was  established  to  examine  the  problems  the 
government  had  detecting  and  preventing  the  terrorist  attacks  on  Sept.  11,  2001 .  By  defmition, 
that  was  a  matter  of  coordination  among  elements  of  the  government,  both  vertically  widiin 
organizations  and  horizontally  across  institutions.  This  is  often  referred  to  as  the  "cormect  the 
dots"  problem. 

But  that  isn't  the  only  trouble  with  the  intelligence  community.  Before  the  war  m  Iraq,  the  policy 
and  intelligence  communities  held  the  near-unanimous  conviction  that  Iraq  was  chock  fuU  of 
chemical  and  biological  weapons,  yet  we  found  nothing.  We  collectively  embraced  a  iiniform 
mind-set,  which  is  every  bit  as  serious  a  problem  as  connecting  the  dots. 

The  field  of  view  of  our  intelligence  community  is  too  narrow.  The  conununity  is  relatively 
small  and  its  component  institutions  isolated.  It  is  understandably  and  necessarily  preoccupied 
with  protecting  sources  and  methods.  And  bureaucracies  naturally  fight  for  resources.  In  that 
environment,  intelligence  bureaucrats,  like  bureaucrats  in  any  organization,  strive  to  please  their 
policy  bosses.  Taken  together,  these  factors  contribute  to  an  endemic  narrowness  of  perspective. 
The  shorthand  label  given  to  this  problem  is  "groupthink." 

We  need  to  fight  that  narrowness  by  creating  more  competition  for  ideas  in  the  intelligence 
assessment  world.  The  competition  among  ideas  is  improved  when  different  organizations 
reporting  to  different  bosses  compete  for  better  insights  and  perspectives.  Bringing  together  the 


24 

entire  intelligence  community  under  a  single  boss  who  exercises  budget  and  personnel  control 
would  further  constrain  the  constructive  competition  we  need  within  the  inteUigence  commimity. 

The  two  great  problems  —  connecting  the  dots  and  avoiding  groupthink  —  are  in  tension  with 
each  other.  Implementing  an  organizational  solution  to  just  one  of  the  problems  will  worsen  the 
other. 

The  great  debate  underway  in  Washington  has  two  camps.  The  Sept  1 1  conunission.  Sen.  John 
Kerry  and  many  congressional  leaders  believe  a  new  director  of  national  intelligence  (DNI)  can 
succeed  only  if  the  person  in  that  job  controls  the  budgets  and  personnel  of  the  intelligence 
agencies.  People  in  this  camp  would  leave  the  agencies  with  their  host  departments  but  give  the 
budgets  and  control  of  personnel  to  the  new  director. 

President  Bush  chose  a  different  path.  His  plan  would  create  a  relatively  weak  DNI,  whose 
power  would  come  firom  managing  a  set  of  interagency  processes  and  supervising  a  set  of  ill- 
defmed  new  centers.  Unfortunately,  if  unintentionally,  this  approach  also  diminishes  the 
bureaucratic  standing  of  the  CIA. 

In  sum,  both  approaches  are  flawed.  I  know  from  personal  e)q)erience  in  government  that 
ambiguous  command  authority  is  dangerous.  Keeping  intelligence  agencies  within  a  department 
whose  budgets  and  senior  leadership  depend  on  people  outside  the  (tepartment  won't  work. 
Similarly,  we  have  a  long  history  to  demonstrate  that  the  power  and  standing  of  central 
coordinators  of  interagency  processes  --  Washington  policy  wonks  now  call  them  "czars"  ~ 
deteriorate  rapidly  with  time. 

More  fimdamentally,  each  of  these  two  approaches  solves  one  of  the  great  problems  but 
exacerbates  the  other.  The  Sept.  1 1  conMnission's  proposal  would  improve  "dot- connecting"  but 
would  threaten  competition  among  ideas.  The  president's  recommendation  would  better  sustain 
idea  competition  but  do  little  to  solve  the  problem  of  interagency  coordination. 

Frankly,  I  didn't  favor  the  idea  of  creating  a  DNI,  but  I  understand  poUtics.  Both  political  leaders 
in  a  hotly  contested  campaign  have  endorsed  it  as  a  symbol.  We  will  have  a  DNI.  We  now  have 
to  ensure  tiiat  we  get  a  good  solution.  There  is  a  third  patL 

The  new  DNI  should  run  the  existing  interagency  intelligence  centers  or  their  successors  and 
coordinate  the  tasking  process.  But  the  DNI  needs  to  be  imdergirded  with  real  institutional 
power.  The  technical  collection  agencies  --  notably  the  National  Reconnaissance  Office,  the 
National  Securiy  Agency  and  the  National  Geospatial- Intelligence  Agency  —  could  be 
transferred  to  the  DNI.  The  new  director  would  manage  the  factories  that  provide  raw  material 
and  support  to  the  intelligence  bureaus,  which  would  remain  within  the  Cabinet  departments. 

This  approach  would  facilitate  the  integration  of  data  collection  while  preserving  diversity  of 
perspective  across  the  community  for  purposes  of  strategic  assessment.  Cabinet  secretaries  could 
devote  their  energies  to  demanding  better  analysis,  rather  than  managing  large  bureaucracies  that 
run  machines  to  collect  raw  material  for  the  intelligence  process.  This  approach  also  would 
ensure  that  oversight  of  domestic  surveillance  on  American  citizens  remained  a  responsibility  of 


25 


the  attorney  general,  who  is  charged  with  protecting  our  civil  liberties.  Even  here,  however,  the 
FBI  could  turn  to  the  central  collection  agency,  but  under  the  attorney  general's  supervision. 

My  friends  in  the  Defense  Department  are  shocked  that  I  have  suggested  this  approach.  Modem 
American  war- fighting  is  more  dependent  on  high- technology  intelligence  than  ever  before,  they 
note.  We  carmot  decouple  the  close  working  ties  between  our  intelligence  capabilities  and  our 
war  fighters. 

But  there  are  ways  to  ensure  that  we  sustain  those  close  working  ties,  We  should  continue  to 
send  our  best  military  personnel  to  work  in  these  agencies  and  to  support  national  collection 
efforts  with  tactical  military  intelligence  systems.  The  DNI  shoiild  have  a  board  of  directors 
made  up  of  senior  operators  fix)m  die  supported  departments.  And  imderlying  it  all  is  what  I 
know  to  be  true:  that  all  civilian  employees  in  diese  agencies  consider  it  their  highest  priority  to 
support  the  American  warrior  in  combat.  That  will  not  change,  even  if  these  institutions  report 
directly  to  a  DNI. 

Yes,  there  will  be  challei^es  and  problems,  but  they  are  manageable.  It  is  said  that  the 
intelligence  community  needs  a  reform  like  that  of  the  Goldwater-Nichols  Act,  which 
transformed  the  Defense  Department  In  fact,  Goldwater-Nichols  changed  the  Defense 
Department  because  it  institutionalized  demand  for  better  capabilities  fi-om  the  military  services. 
The  Pentagon  fiercely  fought  Goldwater-Nichols  when  it  was  proposed  by  Congress.  Now  it 
swears  by  its  results.  We  have  proved  in  the  Defense  Department  that  we  can  bring  competing 
institutions  together  for  a  common  purpose  without  forcing  people  to  wear  a  conunon  uniform. 

TTie  writer  is  president  and  chief  executive  of  the  Center  for  Strategic  &  International  Studies 
and  a  former  deputy  secretary  of  defense.  The  views  expressed  here  are  his  own. 


©  2004  The  Washington  Post  Company 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you.  The  committee  will  now  proceed 
to  its  6-minute  round.  I'll  start  off  with  Dr.  Schlesinger. 

On  page  4 — I  repeat  your  testimony — "To  shift  control  over  cru- 
cial intelligence  assets  outside  the  DOD  risks  weakening  the  rel- 
ative military  advantage  of  the  United  States,"  and  so  on.  The  op- 
erative word  is  "to  shift  control." 

Then  I  look  at  the  statement  by  the  National  Security  Advisor 
to  the  President,  Ms.  Rice,  and  she  said  the  following,  "We  expect 
that  the  NID  would  have  significant  input  into  the  development  of 
a  budget."  Now,  that's  not  shifting  control  in  the  President's  posi- 
tion. Now,  I  recognize  September  11  is  on  a  different 

But  let's  go  back  and  explore.  Is  there  a  bridge  between  these 
two  "poles,"  so  to  speak,  of  shifting  absolute  control  and  the  ques- 
tion of  significant  input?  May  I  suggest  the  following,  which  I  have 
mentioned  pubhcly,  and  that  is,  let  the  SECDEF  retain  the  budget 
structure,  the  actual  people  who  work  on  all  of  these  things  and 
put  it  together.  It's  very  complicated.  We're  talking  about  tens  of 
thousands  of  people  in  these  various  agencies,  am  I  not  correct  in 
that? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  Yes. 

Chairman  Warner.  Tens  of  thousands  of  people.  Leave  them 
put.  Let  the  SECDEF  create  the  budget,  but  in  coordination  with 
the  NID,  allowing  the  maximum  of  input.  At  the  time,  presumably 
and  optimally,  when  they  would  have  a  concurrence  on  the  various 


26 

points — that  they  would  then  jointly  submit  that  budget  to  the 
President  so  that  there  would  be  accountability  to  both  individuals. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  I  have  little  problem  with  that.  I  think  that 
Frank  has  already  observed  that  we  have  moved  a  long  way  in  that 
direction.  I  think  that  both  Don  Rumsfeld  and  George  Tenet  would 
say  that  they  already  have  that  degree  of  collaboration.  This  might 
formalize  it. 

Chairman  WARNER.  I  think  that  would  be  the  objective  of  the 
legislation,  which  I  hope,  by  the  way,  would  not  be  driven  by  poli- 
tics. Dr.  Hamre.  I  hope  it  would  be  driven  by  good  sense. 

So  on  that  point,  you  feel  that  that  is  a  bridge  between  some  of 
the  poles  here. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Yes. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Would  you  like  to  speak  to  that,  Secretary 
Carlucci? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  think  already,  or  at  least  when  I  was  in  the 
CIA,  the  Director  put  together  the  National  Foreign  Intelligence 
Program  (NFIP),  which  was  then  worked  out  with  the  SECDEF.  I 
can  remember  when  I  was  in  the  job  John  Hamre  was  in,  as  Dep- 
uty Secretary  of  Defense,  I  persuaded  the  Office  of  Management 
and  Budget  (0MB)  to  let  me  determine  the  intelligence  budget,  be- 
cause it  was  a  straight  tradeoff  with  the  DOD  budget,  because  the 
President  had  already  determined  the  top  line  of  the  DOD  budget. 
I  gave  intelligence  a  higher  growth  rate  than  I  gave  DOD.  So  a  col- 
laborative relationship  already  exists,  and  I  think  your  suggestion 
is  appropriate. 

Chairman  WARNER.  In  your  study  of  the  9/11  report,  and  in  my 
study,  I'm  not  sure  that  they  recognize  fully  the  extent  to  which 
this  is  currently  done.  Am  I  correct  in  that  observation? 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  I  think  that's  correct,  Mr.  Chairman.  If  you  re- 
call, I  think  that  what  they're  sa5ring  is,  we  have  failed  to  connect 
the  dots. 

Chairman  Warner.  Right. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  That  does  not  mean  that  there's  not  coordina- 
tion on  the  budget. 

Chairman  WARNER.  No.  I  think  we've  reached  consensus. 

Dr.  Hamre,  how  do  you  feel?  You've  had  a  lot  of  experience. 

Dr.  Hamre.  I  sure  have,  and  I've  put  together  eight  budgets,  four 
of  them  as  the  comptroller,  then  four  when  I  was  in  the  deputy's 
job.  To  be  honest,  there's  not  nearly  the  close  review  of  the  intel- 
ligence budget  that  people  think  there  is.  When  you  look  at  what 
we  submit  to  all  of  you,  it's  really  quite  skimpy  by  comparison  to 
what  it  is  that  you  ask  that  we  submit  for  the  DOD.  There  is  co- 
ordination, but  it's  really  quite  limited. 

To  be  candid,  I  think  the  quality  of  oversight  inside  the  executive 
branch  isn't  as  strong  as  it  ought  to  be  of  the  intelligence,  so  that 
ought  to  be  strengthened.  But  I  think  the  reason  it  hasn't  been, 
frankly,  so  strong  is  that  there  has  been  a  de  facto  tug-of-war  be- 
tween DOD  and  the  IC  over  who  has  the  lead.  In  that  struggle, 
frankly,  that — just  really  has  not  dug  into  it  as  deeply  as  we  prob- 
ably should  have. 

Chairman  WARNER.  All  right,  then  do  you  feel  that  the  creation 
of  the  post  of  NID,  with  what  I  outlined,  is  a  joint  responsibility? 
While  the  people  would  be  retained  in  the  DOD,  the  actual  work 


27 

product  would  be  coordinated  carefully  with  the  NID,  and  then 
they  would  both  sign  off  on  it,  and  both  names  would  appear  as  it 
goes  to  the  President.  Do  you  think  that  would  help  remove  some 
of  the  criticisms? 

Dr.  Hamre.  I  think  that  that  is,  as  the  secretaries  have  said, 
quite  similar  to  what's  done  now.  It  needs  to  be  strengthened,  no 
matter  what.  Is  it  going  to  get  better  by  creating  the  NID?  Not  nec- 
essarily. It  isn't  necessarily  going  to  be  better  if  you  create  the 
NID.  The  process  is  weak  right  now  because  there  are  two  bosses 
and  there  are  two  separate  chains,  and,  frankly,  there's  a  lot  of  am- 
biguity between  those  two  chains.  That's,  frankly,  replicated  up 
here  on  the  Hill.  We've  divided  the  oversight  of  the  intelligence 
budgets  and  the  armed  services  budgets. 

Chairman  WARNER.  But  that's  a  separate  problem,  budgets. 

Dr.  Hamre.  So  we  see  this  throughout  the  system. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Mr.  Chairman? 

Chairman  WARNER.  Yes? 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  The  Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  Secretary  of 
Energy  jointly  sign  off  on  the  stockpile  requirements  for  our  nu- 
clear weapons.  There  is  also  a  Nuclear  Weapons  Council  that  is 
made  up  of  members  of  the  DOD  and  Energy  Department,  and  that 
may  be  the  model  you're  seeking. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Right.  Let  me  just  take  it  to  the  next  step, 
and  that  is  the  hiring  and  firing.  Here,  I  draw  on  some  modest  ex- 
perience I  had  in  5  years  working  for  you,  Jim,  and  the  two  prede- 
cessors. Laird,  Elliott,  Richardson — three  of  them.  The  heads  of 
DIA,  traditionally — NSA — have  been  military  officers.  I  can  recall 
that  each  of  the  military  secretaries  were  asked  to  nominate — you 
recognize  that,  too,  in  your  experience — and  maybe  a  dozen  or  more 
individuals.  The  SECDEF,  together  with  the  secretaries  of  the  mili- 
tary departments,  really  had  a  lot  of  personal  knowledge  about 
each  of  those  individuals,  and  the  selection  process  was  driven  al- 
most entirely  on  credentials  and  experience,  and  those  were  the 
factors  that  made  the  final  decision. 

Now,  the  NID  simply  doesn't  have  the  benefit  of  having  gotten 
to  know  those  individuals  through  the  many  trips  that  each 
SECDEF  and  service  secretaries  make  to  the  commands,  visit  with 
them  and  families,  and  everything  else.  Therefore,  I  think,  again, 
I  draw  another  parallel  with  the  budget,  and  that  is  that  there 
would  be  a  joint  consideration  and  a  joint  submission  of  that  name. 
But  given  that  the  DOD  would  have  more  insight,  certainly,  into 
the  military  nominees — now,  I  don't  suggest  that  they  always  have 
to  be  military. 

So,  again,  I  come  down  to  a  similar  process  on  the  hiring  and  fir- 
ing, and  that  would  be  collaborative  between  the  SECDEF  and  the 
NID,  and  then  a  joint  recommendation.  Would  I  be  correct  in  that 
assumption? 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  At  the  moment,  there  is  collaboration  on  the 
hiring  side.  I  think  that  that  collaboration  would  break  down  on 
the  firing  side. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Let's  hope  it  wouldn't. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Yes. 

Chairman  WARNER.  They  both  have  to  remain  accountable,  if 
they  have  their  two  names  on  that  nominee. 


28 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  I  think  when  you  were  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  Mr.  Chairman,  you  might  have  been  hesitant  to  share  cer- 
tain information  with  somebody  who  was  necessarily  reporting  to 
somebody  outside  the  building.  I'd  ask  you  to  reflect  on  that  possi- 
bility. 

Chairman  Warner.  I  think  that  we've  come  to  the  point — there's 
the  old  adage,  "need  to  know,"  but  we  also  now  have  the  "need  to 
share,"  and  there  has  to  be  a  greater  sharing  of  information. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  One  very  useful  thing  that  an  NID  can  do  is 
to  break  down  the  classification  boundaries  among  these  intel- 
ligence agencies. 

Chairman  WARNER.  You  and  I  have  discussed  that. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Yes. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Secretary  Carlucci,  to  you  for  an  answer  on 
the  hiring  and  firing-sharing? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  think  there  would  need  to  be  a  mechanism  for 
breaking  down  an  impasse.  That  is  to  say,  if  they  can't  agree,  even- 
tually one  of  them  sends  a  name  forward  to  the  President,  with  a 
dissent  by  the  other,  so  that  the  President  can  make  a  decision. 

Chairman  WARNER.  If  there  were  an  impasse,  I  would  presume 
that  the  President  would  be  involved 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Yes. 

Chairman  Warner. — and  perhaps  reconcile  it. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  The  other  point  I  would  make — ^your  comment 
that  the  DCI  doesn't  have  the  opportunity  to  know  military  peo- 
ple— my  recollection  is  that  either  the  DCI  or  the  DDCI  has  to  be 
a  military  officer,  at  least  in 

Chairman  Warner.  It  has  been  that  practice. 

Mr.  Carlucci. — by  practice,  so  that  one  or  the  other  of  them 
should  have  knowledge  of  the  military  people  who  are  proposed. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Some  knowledge,  but  perhaps  not  to  the  de- 
gree of  the  SECDEF. 

Senator  Levin? 

Senator  Levin.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Under  the  current  law,  the  DCI  is  responsible  for  developing  and 
presenting  to  the  President  the  annual  budget.  That's  the  current 
law.  So,  in  terms  of  preparation  of  the  budget,  it's  right  where  the 
9/11  Commission  is  saying  it  should  be  prepared,  it  seems  to  me, 
under  law. 

When  it  comes  to  execution  of  the  budget — by  executive  order, 
that  is  now  basically  in  the  DOD.  But,  Secretary  Carlucci,  when 
you  were  deputy  to  Admiral  Turner,  as  you  just  indicated  and  he 
indicated  this  morning,  in  the  Carter  administration,  that  was 
done  differently,  by  executive  order  at  that  time.  That  execution  of 
the  budget  was  in  the  hands  of  the  intelligence  people.  Is  that  cor- 
rect? That's  what  Admiral  Turner,  at  least,  told  us  this  morning. 
I  thought  you  were  indicating  something  like  that  earlier  today. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  have  trouble  understanding  what  you  mean  by 
"execution."  Do  you  mean,  has  the  money  been  spent  or  has  the 
program  been  carried  out  the  way  that  Congress  directed? 

Senator  LEVIN.  Including  reprogramming. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Including  reprogramming? 

Senator  Levin.  Right. 


29 

Mr.  Carlucci.  The  answer  to  your  question,  then,  is  yes,  that 
was  done  by  the  DCI. 

Senator  Levin.  That  was  done  by  the  DCI,  so  that — by  executive 
order,  I  emphasize — this  shift  could  be  made  back,  if  it  were  desir- 
able  

Mr.  Carlucci.  Sure. 

Senator  Levin. — to  the  intelligence 

Mr.  Carlucci.  That's  the 

Senator  Levin. — the  head  of  intelligence. 

Mr.  Carlucci. — point  I  tried  to  make,  that  we  don't  necessarily 
have  to  have  statutes  here. 

Senator  Levin.  Right. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  There  is  some  flexibility. 

Senator  Levin.  So  that's,  it  seems  to  me,  point  one.  To  the  extent 
that  it's  desirable  to  shift  back,  reprogramming  into  the  DCI  or  a 
successor,  that  could  be  done  by  executive  order  without  legislation. 

Now,  when  we  look  at  the  September  11  failures,  what  I  don't 
see  is  any  connection  between  the  failures  and  where  that  re- 
programming  authority  on  the  budget  should  lie.  I  don't  see  any 
connection  to  the  remedy  which  is  proposed.  Do  any  of  you  see  the 
relationship  between  the  remedy  proposed,  which  is,  basically,  put 
reprogramming  or  execution  of  the  budget  back  in  intelligence,  and 
the  failures  which  preceded  September  11? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  think  we're  fixing  a  non-problem,  to  be  honest 
with  you. 

Senator  LEVIN.  Do  either  of  the  other  witnesses  see  the  relation- 
ship between  that  remedy  and  the  flaws  before  September  11? 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  No.  Here's  the  thing,  Senator  Levin.  One  of 
the  commissioners  confirms  that  they  spent  18  months  studying 
the  problem  of  September  11,  and  3  weeks  to  put  together  this  re- 
form of  the  IC.  I  think  that  that  tells 

Senator  Levin.  But  specifically,  though.  That's  a  general  com- 
ment. But  specifically  then,  at  least — and  I  won't — Dr.  Hamre,  un- 
less you  have  a  difference  on  this,  I'll  say,  so  far  we  don't  have  any 
connection  between  the  flaws  before  September  11  and  that  par- 
ticular remedy,  relative  to  who  has  the  reprogramming  power. 

Dr.  Hamre.  The  reprogramming  isn't  really  going  to  solve  a  prob- 
lem like  that.  It's  really  your  capacity  to  structure  the  IC  prospec- 
tively through  your  budget- 


Senator  Levin.  Through  the  budget,  which,  by  law,  by  title 

Dr.  Hamre.  Right. 

Senator  Levin.— Section  403-3  of 

Dr.  Hamre.  Right. 

Senator  LEVIN. — 50  USC,  belongs,  or  is,  right  now,  in  the  DCI. 

Now,  if  this  is  right,  what  we've  said  so  far,  we  have  this  situa- 
tion, that  the  remedy,  relative  to  the  budget  change,  does  not  cor- 
rect the  flaws.  To  the  extent  it's  desirable,  an3rway,  it  can  be  done 
by  executive  order.  Now,  that's  my  summary  of  what  your  testi- 
mony is  so  far. 

Now,  on  the  personnel  side  of  this  issue,  we  have,  under  current 
law,  the  requirement  that  the  SECDEF  obtain  the  concurrence  of 
the  DCI  before  submitting  to  the  President  any  nomination  to  head 
the  NSA  or  NGA  or  NRO.  The  only  one  left  out  of  that  would  be 
the  DIA.  So,  right  now,  under  law,  with  that  one  exception,  which 


30 

I  think  would  be  continued,  probably,  by  the  9/11  Commission,  al- 
though I  may  be  wrong — right  now,  the  concurrence  of  the  DCI  is 
required  before  the  appointment,  at  least,  is  made.  So  that  if  that 
is  robustly  implemented,  presumably  we  have  a  DCI  who  has  a 
veto  over  any  intelligence  head  of  those  three  agencies.  Is  that — 
are  you  with  me  so  far?  Okay. 

Is  that  not  an  adequate  input  into  who  the  heads  of  that  agency 
is — those  agencies  are  to  meet  the  goals,  it  seems  to  me,  which  are 
desirable  goals,  of  the  9/11  Commission.  Namely,  which  is  that 
there  be  a  significant  input  into  who  is  going  to  run  the  intelligence 
for  those  three  agencies?  Does  it  meet  the  9/11  Commission's  very 
legitimate  point  about  having  the  person  responsible  for  intel- 
ligence also  having  hiring  authority  for  the  people  who  are  going 
to  be  collecting  it? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  think  it  does. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  It  does. 

Senator  Levin.  Do  you  agree  with  that? 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  It  does. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  agree  with  it. 

Senator  Levin.  Okay. 

Now,  just  on  the  accountability  issue.  Perhaps  one  of  the  two 
most  troubling  things  to  me  is  that  the  Commission  did  not  ad- 
dress, in  my  book,  the  accountability  failures  prior  to  September 
11.  I  disagree  with  you  here,  Dr.  Schlesinger.  When  you  have  all 
those  dots  up  there,  it's  not  just  that  the  dots  weren't  connected; 
it's  that  the  information  was  not  shared  which  would  have  allowed 
for  the  dots  to  be  connected.  You  put  dots  on  a  board,  and  obvi- 
ously, there's  no  automatic  logic  to  connecting  them.  But  the  infor- 
mation which  would  have  allowed  the  dots  to  be  connected  was  not 
shared,  as  required  by  job  description.  You  had  people  in  the  CIA 
who  knew  that  al  Qaeda  operatives,  who  had  attacked  the  U.S.S. 
Cole  and  were  members  of  al  Qaeda,  had  entered  the  United 
States,  and  never  notified  the  FBI,  as  their  responsibility  was.  You 
had  FBI  people — in  Minneapolis,  in  Phoenix — who  did  what  they 
were  supposed  to  do,  notified  the  national  FBI  office,  the  bin  Laden 
desk  at  the  FBI  office,  and  nothing  was  done  with  critically  action- 
able information  about  people  in  the  United  States  who  were  clear- 
ly connected  to  bin  Laden.  Those  are  failures  to  do  one's  job  and 
there's  no  one  been  held  accountable  for  that. 

How  do  we  get  greater  accountability  into  this  process  to  address 
those  kind  of  failures  which  were  at  the  heart  of  the  September  11 
failure?  They  weren't  who  has  budget  responsibility;  it  was  people 
not  doing  their  jobs.  How  do  we  get  that  into  this  process? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  If  this  were  today — if  that  were  being — happening 
today,  we  would  look  to  TTIC.  Presumably,  after  we  set  it  up,  we'd 
look  to  the  NCTC. 

Senator  Levin.  My  time  is  up  but  do  either  of  you  have  anything 
to  add  to  that? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  My  only  observation  is  that,  after  the  1970s, 
it  was  prohibited  to  share  intelligence  information  with  law  en- 
forcement, and  that  that  was  one  of  our  problems.  I  agree  fully, 
Senator  Levin,  that  we  did  not  share  as  much  as  we  could.  But 
there  were  restrictions. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much,  Senator  Levin. 


31 

Senator  McCain. 

Senator  McCain.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  want  to  thank  the  witnesses  for  being  here.  There  aren't  three 
individuals  for  whom  I  have  greater  respect  and  appreciation  for 
your  incredible  contributions  to  our  country,  and  I'm  very  grateful 
they're  here. 

I  must  say,  though,  that  I  think  I've  had  an  out-of-body  experi- 
ence here,  because  when  I  summarize  the  testimony  of  the  wit- 
nesses, we  really  don't  have  to  do  anything  substantive,  as  far  as 
reorganizing  our  ability  and  enhancing  our  ability  to  fight  the  war 
on  terrorism,  which  all  of  us  agree  is  going  to  be  with  us  for  a  long 
time. 

Secretary  Carlucci  mentioned  we  have  to  keep  our  own  secrets. 
I  don't  know  anyone  who  would  disagree  with  that.  The  need  to 
know — Senator  Levin  just  pointed  out  that  somebody  felt  it  was 
such  a  need  to  know  that  they  didn't  inform  the  proper  agencies 
that  people  were  taking  pilot  training  in  Phoenix,  Arizona.  Risk- 
taking  is  at  a  minimum  now,  according  to  everj^hing  that  I've 
read,  and  that  is  that  our  now-intelligence  services  sit  in  the  em- 
bassy and  wait  for  the  somebody  to  walk  in. 

I  don't  know  how  long  we're  going  to  keep  blaming  the  Church 
Committee.  It's  been  about  30  years  now  since  the  Church  Commit- 
tee had  their  hearings.  Maybe  the  effect  of  the  Church  Committee 
would  have  some  kind  of  half-life  after  awhile. 

Yes,  we've  had  successes.  But  for  us  to  rest  on  those  successes, 
given  the  ample  evidence  of  massive  failures  that  caused  the  worst 
attack  on  the  United  States  of  America  in  our  history,  I  think 
would  not  be  satisfactory  to  my  constituents. 

Secretary  Carlucci,  you  mentioned  that  rebuilding  is  underway, 
and  that  former  DCI  Tenet  said  it  would  take  5  years.  What  was 
he  doing  the  previous  years  when  he  was  in  charge?  As  a  member 
of  the  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  (WMD)  Commission,  I  have 
been  finding  out  more  and  more  information,  most  of  which  is  pub- 
lic knowledge,  that  there  were  massive  failures.  A  guy  named 
"Curveball"  gives  information  which  was  accepted  on  its  face  and 
somehow  became  a  part  of  Secretary  of  State's  testimony  before  the 
United  Nations  Security  Council — that,  and  other  information  he 
now  deeply  regrets — that  he  presented  as  fact.  According  to  Mr. 
Woodward,  the  WMD  information  was  a  "slam  dunk"  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States. 

I  guess  my  counter-argument  to  the  testimony  is,  for  us  to  main- 
tain the  status  quo  is  simply  not  acceptable.  I  am  not  a  Member 
of  the  Intelligence  Committee.  But,  reading  this  report,  no  matter 
whether  they  spent  3  days  or  3  weeks  or  3  months,  they  did  some 
incredibly  valuable  work. 

I'd  be  glad  to  hear  your  responses,  but  my  question  also  is  that, 
in  your  testimony,  none  of  you  have  addressed  the  recommenda- 
tions for  a  fundamental  reorganization  of  how  Congress  exercises 
its  oversight.  They're  very  critical  of  Congress's  oversight  capabili- 
ties and  activities,  responsibility  and  blame  that  I  think  is  well  de- 
served, because — not  because  of  the  nature  of  the  individuals,  but 
the  nature  of  the  system.  I'd  like  to  hear  your  comments  to  mine, 
but  also  response  to — if  you  have  any  ideas  or  thoughts — on  reor- 


32 

ganizing  how  Congress  could  better  exercise  its  oversight  respon- 
sibiUties. 

Dr.  Schlesinger? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  Fools  rush  in  where  angels  fear  to  tread,  and 
recommendations  as  to  how  Congress  should  reorganize  itself 

Senator  McCain.  I  could  help  you. 

Dr.  Schlesinger. — usually  fall  on  deaf  ears.  I  think  that  you 
should  carefully  consider  the  joint-committee  procedure  that  we 
had  for  atomic  energy  as  a  better  way  of  organizing  activities  on 
both  sides  of  the  aisle.  I'm  not  recommending  it;  I  think  you  should 
consider  it. 

As  to  what  is  wrong  with  intelligence,  that  is  a  matter  of  good 
analysis,  improved  analysis,  and  hiring  good  people.  The  problem 
was  not  the  Church  Committee,  it  was  the  reaction  to  the  Church 
Committee  in  law  and  executive  orders  that  said,  "Don't  talk 
amongst  each  other."  There's  some  very  silly  examples  that  oc- 
curred as  a  response  to  those  injunctions. 

Senator  McCain.  I'd  be  glad  to  hear  from  Secretary  Carlucci,  but, 
in  response,  again,  there  was  no  law  or  any  custom  or  anything 
else  that  prevented  the  information  about  people  taking  pilot  train- 
ing in  Phoenix  from  getting  to  the  right 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  Absolutely  right. 

Senator  McCain.  There  are  a  lot  of  things  that  happened  that 
there's  neither  law  nor  action  of  the  Church  Committee  that  would 
have  prevented  this  incredible  stovepiping  which  has  been  identi- 
fied by  a  large  number  of  experts  as  one  of  the  serious  problems 
that  we  have. 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  That's  absolutely  right,  and  we  need  to  get  rid 
of  the  stovepiping,  and  that's  one  of  the  things  that  an  NID  can, 
indeed,  do.  Because  only  the  clout  of  somebody  with  authority  from 
the  President  can  eliminate  some  of  those  classification  barriers. 

Senator  McCain.  Secretary  Carlucci? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Senator  McCain,  I  didn't  mean  to  give  the  impres- 
sion, and  I  hope  I  didn't,  that  I  think  everything  is  fine  and  we 
shouldn't  make  any  changes.  Indeed,  I  think  we  ought  to  set  up  the 
NCTC,  and  that's  a  major  change.  What  I  was  saying  is,  be  careful 
about  moving  the  organizational  boxes  around,  because  you  may 
make  the  problem  worse. 

So  you  can  enhance  the  DCI's  authority.  Let's  look  at  it — as  Sen- 
ator Warner  is  already  doing,  let's  look  at  the  DCI's  authority  and 
see  where  the  shortcomings  are,  set  up  the  NCTC,  and  proceed 
from  there.  There  may  be  things  that  we  could  do  afterwards  that 
would  be  important.  But,  to  take  what  Jim  Schlesinger  said,  "First 
do  no  harm." 

Senator  McCain.  Do  you  have  any  comment  about  reorganizing 
Congress's  oversight  responsibilities? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  It's  not  been  my  area  of  expertise.  Clearly,  there 
are  too  many  committees.  To  set  up  some  kind  of  a  joint  committee 
would  be  a  highly  desirable  thing  to  do. 

I  mentioned  trade-craft.  There's  been  a  lot  of  talk  about  connect- 
ing the  dots,  and  that  was  the  failing  of  our  intelligence  system. 
Okay,  so  be  it.  But  had  we  had  one  asset  inside  of  al  Qaeda,  we 
might  have  had  highly  accurate  information.  So  let's  also  look  at 


33 

our  trade-craft.  Let's  not  just  say  it's  a  matter  of  organizational 
structure  or  connecting  the  dots. 

Dr.  Hamre.  Senator  McCain,  first  I — our  current  system  of  budg- 
eting, as  we — when  it  comes  to  the  IC — and  it's  because  we  have 
two  different  chains — and,  frankly,  there's  a  lot  of  ambiguity  over 
who's  in  charge.  People  fight  for  the  authority,  not  necessarily  fol- 
lowing through  with  the  kind  of  details  that  we  should  have.  I, 
frankly,  see  the  same  extending  up  here  on  the  Hill.  The  quality 
of  oversight  is  very  uneven.  The  committees  are  too  big,  as  Sec- 
retary Carlucci  said.  Far  too  much  time  is  being  devoted  to  arguing 
over  budget  inputs,  not  enough  about  what's  coming  out  of  the  sys- 
tem. The  Intelligence  Committees  and  the  Armed  Services  Commit- 
tees compete  with  the  Appropriations  Committees  to  try  to  do  the 
same  job:  control  dollars.  I  think  that's  something  that  we  really 
should  look  at. 

There  is  a  range  of  things.  I  have  some  ideas.  I  think  it  would 
be  useful  to  have,  as  Secretary  Schlesinger  said,  a  joint  oversight 
committee  that  is  comprised  of  the  two  Intelligence  Committees  to 
really  do  oversight  of  the  intelligence  process.  So  there  are  a  num- 
ber of  things  that  need  to  happen.  It's  a  rather  wide  set  of  rec- 
ommendations I  think  you'd  want  to  consider  if  you  were  looking 
at  oversight  for  the  community. 

You  don't  have  any  jurisdiction,  for  example,  over — or  the  Intel- 
ligence Committee  really  doesn't  have  much — over  the  FBI,  and  yet 
the  connecting-the-dots  problem  was  very  much  a  domestic/foreign- 
intelligence  issue.  Those  all  have  to  be  put  on  the  table.  How  you 
structure  it  to  deal  up  here  is  going  to  involve  some  fairly  big 
changes. 

I'd  be  happy  to  come  and  talk  later.  I  got  myself  in  a  lot  of  trou- 
ble in  the  House  for  being  too  public,  but  I'll  do  it  again,  if  you 
want. 

Senator  McCain.  You  never  get  in  trouble  here.  [Laughter.! 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Waener.  Thank  you,  Senator  McCain. 

Senator  Kennedy. 

Senator  Kennedy.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  join  with  all  of 
those  in  welcoming  a  very  distinguished  panel. 

I  had  the  chance  over  the  last  10  days  or  so  to  go  through  pretty 
much  all  of  the  9/11  Commission  Report,  and  it  obviously  has  to 
bring  back  to  all  the  families  those  extraordinary  moments  and 
times  of  deep  loss,  and  you  can't  read  through  that  extraordinary 
report  without  recognizing  it.  It's  also  a  tremendous  challenge  for 
the  country. 

Now  we  are  attempting  to  deal  with  these  recommendations.  It's 
against  a  background  where  I  think  all  of  our  panelists  have  ac- 
knowledged the  extraordinary  progress  that's  been  made,  in  terms 
of  communications,  intelligence,  and  information.  The  Gulf  War, 
won  72  hours  from  the  time  of  siting  onto  a  target  until  the  time 
weapons  could  be  delivered,  to — now  to  20  minutes — the  progress 
that's  been  made  has  been  extraordinary.  No  one  wants  to  upset 
that.  No  one  wants  to  disturb  it. 

But  the  fact  is,  we're  facing  a  newer  world,  a  newer  world  with 
al  Qaeda.  A  newer  world  with  al  Qaeda.  This  is  not  the  issue  of 
changing,  ensuring  that  government  is  going  to  do  what  it  has  to 


34 

do  and  should  do,  and  has  the  most  important  responsibihty  to  do, 
and  that  is  to  protect  its  people — to  protect  its  people — and  also  to 
secure,  obviously,  the  best  that  we  can,  in  terms  of  our  national — 
of  our  defense  forces.  That's  obviously  important. 

We're  mindful  that  this  is  an  issue  which — in  asking  the  Con- 
gressional Research  Service,  which  I  did  in  preparation  for  this 
hearing — this  issue  about  how  we  can  make  our  intelligence  sys- 
tems more  effective,  they've  given  me  15  different  reports,  going 
back  to  Herbert  Hoover,  about  steps  that  could  be  taken,  most  of 
them  not  enormously  dissimilar  from  the  9/11  Commission.  Not 
enormously  dissimilar.  Not  enormously  dissimilar. 

The  one  I  want  to  speak  to  you  about — I  haven't  got  the  time  to 
go  on  through  them — is  the  Scowcroft  Commission  Report.  This 
isn't  someone  who  is  reckless  in  recommendations;  this  is  a  person 
who  has  served  under  seven  Presidents,  been  a  distinguished  mili- 
tary leader,  been  a  national  security  officer,  heads  the  National  Se- 
curity Office  for  Bush  1,  now  the  head  of  the  Foreign  Intelligence. 
He  had  some  enormously  important  recommendations  that  are  not 
greatly  dissimilar  from  the  recommendations  of  the  9/1 1  report. 

Let  me  just  summarize.  This  is  a — just  very  quickly,  from  a  New 
York — or  from  a  Time  magazine  story.  "Scowcroft  chaired  a  year- 
long study  on  the  subject  and  sent  his  report  to  the  President  in 
March.  There,  it  collects  dust.  At  a  black-tie  dinner  last  week" — 
this  is  in  December  2002 — "when  he  presented  an  award  to  CIA 
George  Tenet,  Scowcroft  broke  cover  again.  Tor  years,  we  had  a 
poorly  organized  intelligence  system,'  he  said,  'but  it  didn't  matter, 
because  all  the  threats  were  overseas.  So  now  we  have  a  huge 
problem.  It  is  unfair,'  he  said,  'to  ask  Tenet  to  take  responsibility 
for  intelligence  matters  when  he  has  authority  over  only  some  of 
them.  I  think  it's  time  we  give  him  all  the  tools  he  needs  to  do  the 
job.'  The  room,  full  of  spooks,  spy  chiefs,  exploded  in  applause.' " 

Now,  maybe  the  Scowcroft  Commission  recommendations  aren't 
the  answer,  maybe  September  11  is  not  the  answer,  but  the  Amer- 
ican people  know  we're  dealing  with  al  Qaeda  that's  out  there  in 
towns  and  communities,  trying  to  steal  weapons  of  mass  destruc- 
tion, bioterrorism,  working  day  and  night,  in  terms  of  its  kind  of 
a  threat.  I  think  we  have  to  be  able  to  evaluate — I  don't  know  why 
we  can't  look  at  the  Scowcroft  Commission  and  make  the  rec- 
ommendations— but  we  have  to  have  serious  recommendations, 
rather  than,  as  Senator  McCain  has  mentioned,  just  saying, 
"Things  are  working  okay." 

Let  me  ask  you,  Mr.  Hamre.  How  satisfied  are  you,  today,  given 
what  you  know  and  given  what  you  understand  is  the  current  situ- 
ation, that  we  are  doing  everything  that  we  can — should  be  doing, 
in  terms  of  dealing  with  the  threat  of  al  Qaeda? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Senator,  this  is  a — that's  a  much  broader  question 
than  just  the  issue  before  us.  I  think  that — first  of  all,  I  would  say, 
I  think  there's  a  good  deal  more  cooperation  between  the  intel- 
ligence and  law  enforcement  communities  than  ever  existed  before. 
Is  it  sufficient  to  divert  the  next  attack?  Maybe  not,  I  don't  know, 
but  it's  certainly  much,  much  better  than  it  was.  The  focus — we 
have  many  more  people  who  are  now  worrying  on  this  issue,  com- 
pared to  what  we  had  before. 


35 

Now,  institutionally,  you'll  have  to  ask,  is  that — does  that  have 
sta5ring  power?  I  think  the  issue  in  front  of  you  and  the  rest  of  Con- 
gress is,  do  you  need  to  put  an  institutional  framework  to  this?  I, 
personally,  think  that  the  system  that  we  have  right  now  is,  we 
tend  to  have  a  weak  coordination  structure.  It's  not  that  the  au- 
thorities aren't  strong  for  the  DCI — he  has  very  strong  authori- 
ties— but  he's  not  chosen  to  use  them  all,  and  they've  fallen  into, 
frankly,  disrepair,  because  he's  bucked  up  against  very  powerful 
SECDEFs  through  the  years. 

So  I  think  you — now  you  have  to  ask  the  question,  do  you  change 
that?  Do  you  basically  ask  him  to  override  the  SECDEF,  or  do  you 
institutionally  give  him  more  standing,  independence,  and  power, 
as  was  recommended  by  the  Commission?  At  some  point,  we're 
going  to  have  to  restore,  in  a  more  institutional  way,  some  of  those 
authorities  to  coordinate  across  the  government.  But  I  think  that 
there  is  a  lot  of  risk  of  doing  it  the  way  the  9/11  Commission  rec- 
ommended. 

Senator  Kennedy.  Are  you  familiar  with  the  recommendations  of 
the  Scowcroft  Commission? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Sir,  I  have  never  read  it,  because  I  don't  think  it's 
been  publicly  released,  but  I  am  aware  of  the  recommendations. 

Senator  Kennedy.  Could  you  give  us  any  reaction  as  to 

Dr.  Hamre.  I  think  they  were  also  trying — they  recommended 
creating  an  NID,  separated  from  the  CIA  director.  I  worry  that 
there's  not  enough  basis  inside  the  Scowcroft  recommendations  for 
a  strong  NID,  because,  under  that  formula,  he's  still  largely  going 
to  be  managing  a  set  of  procedures,  and  I  think  that  it  needs  to 
be  stronger  than  that,  frankly. 

Senator  Kennedy.  Could  I  ask  the  other — if  my  time  permits — 
Secretary  Schlesinger  and  Secretary  Carlucci,  whether  you're  fa- 
miliar with  the  Scowcroft  Commission  and  what  you  could  tell  us 
about  it? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  Yes,  I  am  familiar  with  it.  I  make  the  first  ob- 
servation, General  Scowcroft's  remarks  at  the  black-tie  dinner,  he 
said,  "In  the  past,  the  threat  has  been  overseas."  The  inference 
from  that  is  that  we  have  to  have  better  coordination  between  the 
agency  and  the  other  intelligence  agencies  and  the  FBI,  which  has 
been  perhaps  the  weakest  point  of  all.  The  reforms  that  he  sug- 
gested do  nothing  about  that. 

Senator  Kennedy.  My  time's  up.  Do  you  think  we  ought  to  have 
that  before  the  committee,  the  Scowcroft  Commission? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  I  think  that,  whatever  you  do,  you  must  have 
a  better  coordination  between  CIA  and  FBI,  for  the  very  reasons 
that  you  remind  us 

Senator  Kennedy.  I  was  thinking  about  the  report. 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  On  the  report.  As  my  remarks  indicated,  I  do 
not  think  that  it  would  be  wise  for  the  warfighter  or  for  the  DOD 
to  take  coordination  between  C^  and  intelligence  out  of  the  DOD. 
I  think  that  that  would  do  damage  to  the  warfighter,  and  I  think 
that  the  attempt  of  commanders  in  the  field  will  be  to  substitute 
other  assets  for  the  ones  that  they  think  have  been  lost  to  them. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Just  one  quick  point.  Nobody  has  said  that,  "The 
intelligence  system  is  working  fine.  Let's  keep  it  the  way  it  is." 


36 

We've  all  made  recommendations  for  change.  I  agree  with  what 
Jim  has  just  said. 

Senator  KENNEDY.  Thank  you. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  WARNER.  For  the  record,  the  Scowcroft  Commission 
Report  has  not  been  released  by  the  White  House,  so — there  have 
been  some  public  discussion  of  its  major  points,  and  we're  going  to 
look  into  seeing  whether  or  not  we  can  have  greater  access  to  it. 

Senator  Roberts. 

Senator  ROBERTS.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  just  had  a  talk  with  Brent  Scowcroft  last  Thursday.  Even  at  my 
age,  I  begged  him,  on  hands  and  knees,  to  release  the  report  to  the 
Intelligence  Committee  and  to  the  Armed  Services  Committee.  He 
pointed  out  he  is  still  the  president  of  the  President's  Foreign  Pol- 
icy Advisory  Board,  and,  as  such,  comes  under  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  National  Security  Council  (NSC)  and  would  have  to  receive 
clearance  from  the  White  House  to  make  that  report  public.  I  agree 
with  Senator  Kennedy,  and  I  agree  with  you. 

Finally,  after  struggling  from  my  hands  and  knees,  I  said  that 
Senator  Rockefeller  and  I  would  make  that  request,  and  that  we 
would  also  make  a  personal  call  to  the  White  House  to  see  if  we 
couldn't  get  that  done.  With  all  of  the  horsepower  that  the  chair- 
man has,  and  the  vice  chairman  has,  I  am  very  hopeful  we  can  get 
that  done. 

Let  nobody  state  that  we  are  abrogating  our  responsibilities  and 
challenge  to  try  to  implement  the  goals  of  the  9/11  Commission  and 
to  meet  our  responsibilities  with  the  families.  Senators  Collins  and 
Lieberman  just  concluded  a  hearing,  as  of  this  morning,  where  they 
had  the  DCIs,  Webster,  Woolsey,  and  Turner.  All  three  indicated 
that  they  were  for  an  NID,  with  some  modification — I  don't  want 
to  say  that  carte  blanche — and  also  the  NCTC.  There  was  no  com- 
ment on  how  we  fix  the  oversight  of  Congress  in  which,  by  my 
count,  we  have  at  least  eight  committees,  plus  0MB,  in  charge  of 
these  decisions. 

Let  me  say  that,  with  Senators  Warner  and  Levin  and  myself, 
I  was  also  hopeful  that  Senator  Rockefeller  would  be  able  to  attend, 
being  the  Vice  Chairman  of  the  Intelligence  Committee — we  share 
their  very  strong  feeling  that  we  must  preserve  the  tactical  intel- 
ligence to  the  warfighter.  That's  a  given.  That's  the  tactical  intel- 
ligence and  related  activities  (TIARA)  part  of  the  program,  in  re- 
gards to  tactical  intelligence. 

Now,  we  have  seven  committees,  I  think,  that  have  held  hearings 
during  this  break.  It's  not  a  break.  We  have  about  13  to  go,  and 
it'll  probably  be  up  to  20  by  the  time  we  come  back  into  session. 
So  I  think  there  is  real  work  being  done  in  September  and  I  am 
very  thankful  for  that. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I'd  like  to  ask  unanimous  consent  that  the  speech 
you  made  on  the  Senate  floor,  as  of  July  22,  be  inserted  into  the 
record  at  this  point. 

You  spoke  before  the  Senate  as  the  chairman  of  the  Senate 
Armed  Services  Committee.  You  talked  about  the  9/11  report  being 
a  roadmap,  but  then  you  also  pointed  out,  made  the  comment  that 
amounted  to  a  sweeping  indictment  that  we  have  been  dysfunc- 
tional in  our  oversight. 


37 

I've  been  a  member  of  this  committee  for  8  years.  Of  course, 
you've  been  the  chairman,  off  and  on,  along  with  Senator  Levin. 
You  pointed  out  that  you  structured  the  Goldwater-Nichols  legisla- 
tion and  we  created  the  Special  Operations  Command.  Through  the 
efforts  of  Senator  Lieberman  and  Senator  Coats,  you  have  also  cre- 
ated a  Subcommittee  on  Emerging  Threats  and  Capabilities.  That 
subcommittee,  by  the  way,  warned,  in  1999,  what  could  happen  to 
the  World  Trade  Center.  In  that  subcommittee,  we  have  made  a  lot 
of  progress  with  regards  to  joint  experimentation,  homeland  de- 
fense, counterterrorism,  and  future  technologies  and  concepts  that 
will  be  needed  to  confront  all  sorts  of  future  threats. 

Then  you  had  a  minority-view  report.  This  report  is  10  years  old, 
signed  by  Senators  Warner,  Danforth,  Stevens,  Lugar,  and  Wallop. 
Bottom  line,  "Reductions  in  the  U.S.  intelligence  capabilities  in  this 
period  of  international  stability  are  unwise  and  do  not  serve  the 
Nation's  long-term  security  interests."  There's  more.  Basically,  this 
is  1994,  10  years  ago. 

So  I'd  like  the  entire  speech  to  be  made  part  of  the  record.  I 
think  it's  pertinent.  In  setting  the  record  straight,  I  congratulate 
you,  sir,  and  I  think  you  made  some  fine  comments. 

Chairman  Warner.  Without  objection.  I  think  we  should  also 
note  that  you've  been  the  distinguished  chairman  of  the  Sub- 
committee on  Emerging  Threats  and  Capabilities  since  the  day  it 
was  created. 

[The  information  referred  to  follows  :1 


38 


S8608 


CONGRESSIONAL  RECORD  —  SEN  ATE 


July  22,  2004 


VU  COMMI£aiON  REPORT 

Mr.  NEILSON  of  Florida.  Mr.  Presi- 
dBiit,  I  rise  to  conunent  about  the  9A1 
Commloslon  report.  I  think  it  is  an  ex- 
cellent report.  Its  recommeudationfi 
ought  to  be  Implemented  and  they 
oaght  to  be  implemented  soon  by  the 
Congress.  G-lven  the  fact  that  we  are 
near  gridlock  in  an  election  season  and 
tt  is  very  unlikely  in  September  when 
we  come  back  from  the  August  recess 


we  will  get  an.ythiQ^  done,  I  think  we 
oug-ht  to  consider  coming  back  after 
the  election  and  Implementing  the  rec- 
ommendatlooB  of  the  report.  Why?  Be- 
cause the  only  way  we  protect  our- 
selves from  the  enemies  whom  we  call 
terrorists  Is  to  have  accurate  and  time- 
ly Inforraatilon. 

The  terrbiist  uses  surprise  and 
stealth,  and  the  only  way  to  defeat 
that  Is  by  having  accurate  and  timely 
intelligence 

So  whatever  we  need  to  do  to  avoid 
the  colossal  intelligence  failure  we  had 
on  September  11  and  the  colossal  intel- 
ligence failure  we  had  again  prior  to 
going  Into  Iraq,  we  best  get  about  the 
job  of  correcting  that  information 
gathering,  information  flow,  and  Infor- 
mation analysis  so  we  can  try  to  con- 
tinue to  thwsLrt  the  attempts  at  doing 
oiimage  to  as. 

Is  it  not  interesting  what  the  9/11 
Commission  report  said?  It  speoifJcally 
defined  the  terrorist  as  someone  who  is 
usually  an  Isiainist  fundamentalist 
who  has  warped  the  teachings  of  Islam 
so  that  it  becomes  a  passion  of  hatred, 
and  out  of  that  wanting  to  do  damage 
to  the  free  world.  Of  course,  we  being 
the  superpower  are  the  target  of  that. 

It  was  also  noteworthy  In  the  Com- 
miSBlon's  report,  as  they  are  sug- 
gesting how  to  restructure  the  Intel- 
ligence api>aratus.  they  have  suggested 
having  a  national  intelligence  director 
and  that  the  oounterterrortsm  center 
would  be  a  compendium  that  would  re- 
port to  him.  It  is  also  Interesting  that 
they  stll]  wanted  to  keep  the  adminis- 
tration of  intelligence  gathering  and 
analysis  from  direct  political  involve- 
ment. So  the  Comniission  did  not  rec- 
ommepd  the  new  Intelligence  chief  be  a 
member  of  the  President's  Cabinet  but 
rather  be  what  they  have  defined  as  the 
National  Intelligence  Director.  Then  in 
all  of  these  aubdepartraents  that  have  a 
myriad  of  filling  out  a  flow  chart,  an 
organizational  chart,  it  is  interesting 
how  all  of  the  different  components  of 
InteUlgenoe,  the  CIA,  the  DIA,  the  FBI. 
would  then  fit  together  into  this  new 
apparatus. 

We  only  have  to  remember  that 
about  a  month  ago  we  had  another 
major  information  failure,  and  this  was 
at  the  time  of  President  Reagan's  fu- 
neral. We  had  the  Governor  of  Ken- 
tucky on  his  State  airplane,  having 
been  given  clearance  by  the  FAA  to 
come  In  and  land  at  Washington  Na- 
tional Airport,  and  his  transponder  was 
not  working.  He  had  been  given  clear- 
ance by  the  FAA,  hut  the  FAA  was  not 
communicating  with  the  military.  So 
the  miUtary.  seeing  a  blip  on  the  radar 
moving  to  the  center  of  Washington, 
without  a  transponder,  sent  out  the 
alert  and,  of  course,  everybody  In  this 
U.S.  Capitol  building  and  In  all  of  those 
office  buildings  off  to  the  side  of  this 
building  got  the  emergency  evacuate 
order,  so  much  so  that  the  Capitol  Po- 
lice, bless  their  hearts,  were  shouting 
at  the  top  of  their  lungs,  get  out  of  the 
building,  run,  there  ia  an  inbound  aii^ 
craft. 


39 


July  22,  2004 


CONGRJESSIONAL  RECORD— SENATE 


S8609 


So  how  many  more  of  these  do   we     Spe'ichar  Mam  has  left  and  has  given  destruction.  But  he  had  a  special  team 

need   to   have  before  we  come  to   the     up  the  search.  I  hope  that  is  not  true,  that  was  led  by  Major  Eamee.  who  has 

commonaense  reality  that;  we  are  not    The  tamUy  who  lives  la  my  State.  In  now  been  promoted  to  lieutenant  oolo- 

collating  and  coordinating  all  of  this    Jacksonville.  FL.  deserves  to  have  clo-  neL  That  youny  officer  was  as  devoted 

mlormation  like  we  ought  to?  So.  we    sure.  The  family  has  been   through  a  as  any  that  I  could  ever  Imagine  In  the 

best  get  on  the  process  of  reforming    trauma  like  hardly  any  of  u£  could  be-  search.,  when  I  visited  with  him  In  his 

the  system.                                                        lleve.  The  WashingTion  Times  gives  a  headquarters  in  Baghdad.  At  the  time 

Now  we  have  a  good  blueprint  with    great  deal  of  detail.  1  don't  tnow  If  It  we  had  actually  gone  to  one  of  the  cells 

13  true  or  not.  but  If  it  is.  then  what  where  we  thought  maybe  it  was  Scott 

this  country  owes  to  that  family  is  to  Speicher  s  initials  on  the  wall,  having 

keep  searching.  If  a  team  has  been  re-  been  scratched  into  the  stucco:  MS5. 

That  leads  me  to  the  next  subject  I     turned,  as  the  Washington  Times  has  All  those  leads  did  not  pan  ont.  But 

want  to  talk  about,  our  allies.  The  9/11     stated,  then  it  is  important  that  what-  there  are  other  leads  they  need  to  fol- 

Coramission  report  also  says  something     ever   the   size   of  that   team,    that  we  low.  It  is  my  hope  the  U.S.   military 

that  many  of  us  in  this  Chamber  have     have  a  presence.   As  long  as  the  U.S.  will  continae  to  do  that,  even  though 

been  saying  for  some  period  of  time:     military  is  located  there,  a  fallen  filer  General  Dayton  is  not  in  Iraiq  anymore. 


which  to  do  it.  We  have  an  opportrunlty 
to  make  America  safer — and.  with 
allies.  QOlte 


You  can't  go  out  and  be  succeeeful  in  in  the  future  will -always  have  the  con- 
the  war  on  terror  until  you  can  bring  fldence  to  know  we  are  not  going  to 
.  lot  of  colleagues,  a  lot  of  allies.  In     leave  him  or  her  there  alone,  and  we 


and   he    deserves    to    be    home.    Eh^en 
though  Colonel  Eames  is  not  in  Iraq 
If  those   leads  would  be   continued. 


a  coordinated  and  planned  effort  so  you     are  coming  to  get  you.  We  didn't  do     Colonel  Eames  would,  in  fact,  be  back 


i^q   in   a   heartbeat,   following   up 
the    Senator    that  new  information. 

I  want  to  take  the  occasion  of  re- 
minding the  Senate  that  this  Senator 
will    continae    to    speak    out    on    this 


am   de- 


Internationalize  the  effort  We  did  that  that  with  Scott  Speicher 

brlUlantly  13  years  ago  in  the  gulf  war.  Mr.     WARNER.     WUl 

We   did   that   again   bniUantly   in   Af-  yield? 

ghonlatan  when  we  started  going  after  Mr.    NELSON   of   Florida 

bin  Laden.  But  we  didn't  do  that  In  lighted  to  yield.                                             _ 

Iraq.  Especially,  we  didn't  do  it  m  Iraq  Mr.  WARNER.  First  and  foremost,  I  iggue,  to  remind  the  U.S.  military  of  its 

after  a  brtlliant  military  victory.   We  can't    comment    on    the    Washington  obligation    to   continue   to   search   for 

didn't  do  It  in  the  occupation.  Times  article.    But   yesterday,   in    the  evidence  so  the  case  of  Scott  Speicher 

What  the  9/11  Commission  is  pointing  course    of    an    Armed    Services    Com-  ^^^^  \^  brought  to  closure, 

out  is  that  if  you  want  to  Improve  the  mlttee    briefing    by    General    Dayton,  mj.  president.  I  yield  the  floor. 

InteUiKence-gathering  mechanism   and  who  at  this  point  in  time  Is  also  brief-  j^   WARNER.  Mr.  President.  I  com- 

analyala,  then  you  have  to  Intematlon-  Ing     the     Senate     Intelligence     Com-  tngn^   my    colleague.   He   has   worked 

allze  the  effort.  That  stands  to  reason,  mittee — and  I  Just  left  the  InteUigence  very  hard  on  the  Speicher  case  and  un- 

Fortunately,  through  Interpol  and  dl-  Committee    meeting    to    come    to    the  (jonbtedly  his  commitment  will  c^rry 

rect     one-to-one     relationships     with  floor — the  matter  was  discuseed.  That  forward.  I  suggest,  based  on  what  waa 

other  countries'   intelligence   ^rvlces,  much  I  will  oonflrm.  as  appropriate.  As  ^^^  yesterday,  that  he  will  be  in  con- 

we  get  a  lot  of  that  Information.  But  as  a   member    of   Che    Committee    of   the  sujtatlon    with    the    Secretary    of   the 

the  9A1  Commission  said,  we  have  to  do  Armed  Services,  my  able  friend  knows  (^^vy    He  has  the  authority  to  make 

a  lot  more.  that  at  every  Juncture  our  committee,  disclosores   as  he   sees   fit   about   this 

The    9/U    Comraisaicn    also    told    us  largely  through  yourself  and  Senator  ^ja^e  but  I  believe  General  Dayton,  in  a 

something  that  we  didn't  know.  It  said  Roberts  most  often,  brings  up  a  our-  ^         proteseional    and    conscientious 

the  country  of  Iran  may  have  taclll-  rent  report  on  that.  way  will  discharge  his  duties. 

tated  al-Qalda.  It  did  not  suggest  that  I  will  not  say.  other  than  it  was  a  «/               o              nr 

Iran's     Government     knew     anything  matter  that  was  discussed,  and  General  aT^tJe^^'^^^  ^  fl'^ 

about  the  planning  for  the  September  Dayton  shared  with  us  his  views.  But  I  ^^-  WARNKR.  Mr.  President,  I  would 

11  attack,  but  It  suggested  that  some  of  wish  to  point  out.  in  discussing  it  with  "^^  ^°  provide  this  Senator's  observa- 

those  operatives  passed  through  Iran.  General  Dayton,  he  finds  that  whatever  "°°S'    'eT    preUrainary    though    they 

■There  have  been  a  number  of  us  in  was   carried   today,    reflects   It   as  his  ™»y  ^^-  with  regard  to  the  report  of 

this  body  who  have  been  talking  about  views,  and  he  simply  wants  to  say  the  "^^  *1'  CoramlBslon  which  was  made 

Iran;  that  after  September  U.  and  the  final  decision  rests  with  the  Secretary  PUbl'o  today. 

importance    of    going    after    al-Qaida,  of  the  Navy,  not  General  Daytott,  as  to  Yesterday  I  joined  about  a  dozen  or 

that  the  next  imminent  threat  to  the  the    course    of    this    Investigation.    So  ^o  Senators,  the  distinguished  majority 

Interest  of  the  United  States  were  the  that  rauch.I  will  say.  Beyond  that.  I  be-  leader,   and   others   to  receive   a  brief 

coontTles    of   Iran    and    North    Korea,  Ueve,  regrettably.  It  was  a  top  secret  private  briefing.  That  was  our  first  of- 

Why?  Because  they  are  trying  to  ac-  briefing,  but  nevertheless  Information  Ocial  glimpse  of  this  rejiort.  I  have  not 

quire  or  alpaady  are  bnildlng  nuclear  might  well  have  gotten  out.  That  is  re-  l^^^  "J^s  opportunity  to,  of  course,  go 

oapablllty.  Therefore.  I  tbiTiif  it  is  very  grettable.  through    this    rather    prodigious    vol- 

Important  that  we  get  our  act  together  I  thank  the  Senator  for  bringing  it  ume— each  Member  received  a  copy— 

and  implement  this  Commission  report  up.  I.  too.  Join  you  in  fervently  wishing  but  I  do  Intend  to  do  so  because  I  think 

for  many  reasons.  That  is  jost  one  ad-  and   praying  for   Scott   Speicher    The  "  is  ^  'sry  important  contribution  by 

dltlonal  reason.  Senator  has  to  be  commended  for  the  tWs  Commission.  I  think  many  parts  of 

I  see  the  esteemed  chairman  of  the  amount  of  time  he  has  spent  on  this  it   can   provide   a  roadmap   for   things 

Senate  Armed  Services  Committee  has  situation.  tha-t  most  be  done. 

come  mto  the  Chamber.  I  want  to  say  Mr  NELSON  of  Florida.  I  thank  my  It  has  been  my  privilege  to  serve  in 
in  Ills  presence,  as  he  knows,  as  one  of  colleague,  my  esteemed  chairman.  I  am  the  Senate--  this  is  my  26th  year,  ajid  I 
the  members  of  his  committee,  on  ti  a  devoted  member  of  his  committee,  commit  to  work  with  other  oolleagnes. 
completely  different  subject.  I  have  iinder  his  leadership.  I  thank  the  Sen-  all  colleagues,  to  see  what  we  can  do  to 
spoken  out  time  and  time  again  about  ator  from  Virginia  for  all  the  personal  strengthen  our  ability,  not  only  In  In- 
the  plight  and  the  determination  to  encouragement  he  has  given  to  me  as  telUgence,  but  across  the  board  in  a"J 
find  some  evidence  about  CAPT  Scott  we  have  Telentlessly  kept  after  this,  areas  of  national  security. 
Speicher,  the  Navy  pilot  who  was  shot  trying  to  find  some  evidence.  As  privileged  as  1  am  to  be  the  chair- 
down  on  the  first  night  of  the  gulf  war  I  do  want  to  say.  since  my  colleague  man  of  the  Senate  Armed  Services 
In  1991  mentioned  General  Dayton.  I  think  he  Committee,  I  am  prepared  to  listen  to 

There  is  a  report,  in  the  Washington  performed  magnlflcently.  He,  of  coarse,  hovr  the  responsibilities  of  that  oom- 

Tlmes — and  I  will   make  reference   di-  had  many  other  responsibilities  other  mlttee  should  be  changed  for  the  bet- 

rectly  only  to  what  is  reported  In  to-  than     Just      the      search     for     CAPT  ter.   I  will  not  participate  in  any  ob- 

day'a  Washington  Times— and  what  tie  Speiciier.  He  had  all  ciie  responsllDll-  structloii  slmcly  beesuse  of  turf.  I  hftVS 

Washington    Times     says    is     that     a  ities  of  the  search  for  weapons  of  mass  lieen  here  too  long.  Also,  this  changed 


40 


S8610 


CONGRESSIONAL  RECORD  —  SENATE 


July  22,  2004 


world  In  which  we  live  l8  bo  very  dif- 
ferent than  when  I  came  to  thlB  insti- 
tution a  cniarter  of  a  century  ago.  and 
most  particularly  in  the  aftermath  of 
the  tragedy  of  9/11. 

So  I  think  it  iB  Incumbent  upon  all  of 
us  In  the  CongrresB  and.  indeed,  the  ex- 
ecutive branch  to  have  a  strong  self-ex- 
amination of  the  areas  covered  by  this 
report;  to  use  this  report,  along  with 
input  from  other  commtBSions.  groups, 
and  individuals,  as  a  sort  of  roadn:iap  to 
guide  iiB  into  those  areas  which  need  to 
be  carefully  reviewed. 

Out  of  that  proceas.  which  I  hope  is  a 
carefully  thought  through,  not  rushed, 
deliberative  process.  I  hope  will  evolve 
such  changes  as  we.  Congress,  deem 
necessary  to  strengthen  our  capability 
to  deter  and.  if  necessary,  engage  fur- 
ther in  this  war  against  terrorism.  So. 
therefore.  I  say  with  respect,  1  welcome 
the  recommendations  of  the  Commis- 
sion. I  commit  to  study  them  and  com- 
mit to  wort  with  my  colleagues. 

Yesterday  a  specific  qaestiOD  was  put 
to  the  two  cochairmen  of  the  9/11  Cora- 
mlBSlon:  Is  America  safer  today?  And 
their  unhesitating  acknowledgment 
was  It  Is  safer  today,  and  I  agree  it  is. 
Is  it  as  safe  as  we  need?  None  of  us  be- 
lieve that.  But  I  think  oonBcientious 
efforts  have  been  made  all  along  the 
way  to  make  this  a  safer  Nation,  and 
we  have.  In  large  measure,  succeeded 
with  the  goals  within  the  timetable  we 
have  had. 

I  am  disappointed,  however,  that 
there  was  not  more  thorough  dialog  be- 
tween the  9/11  ComralsBlon  and  Mem- 
bers of  the  Congress.  I  do  not  take  that 
personally.  I  did  have  an  opportunity 
to  visit  Id  ray  ofHce  some  2  weeks 
ago — a  very  pleasant  viait — with  one 
member,  at  which  time  we  exchanged 
views.  Somehow  I  do  not  feel  that  was 
the  type  of  consultation  that  enabled 
us  to  get  into  the  report  and  make  con- 
structive contribtitlons.  I  do  not  sug- 
gest all  536  Members  of  Congress  troop 
up  before  the  9/11  Commission.  We  do 
not  have  time  to  do  that.  Somehow  it 
seems  to  me  a  better  balance  could 
have  been  struck  between  the  knowl- 
edge and  the  ideas  we  have  in  the  Insti- 
tution of  the  legislative  branch  of  our 
Government  that  could  have  been 
shared  with  this  Commission.  After  all, 
the  Commission  was.  In  many  respects, 
created  as  a  consequence  of  the  actions 
of  Congress. 

Havmg  said  that.  I  am  going  to  take 
some  specific  issue  with  this  rather 
sweeping  indictment  that  we  have  been 
dysfunctional  In  our  oversight. 

All  throughout  my  public  servloe,  I 
have  been  privileged  to  have  a  number 
of  jobs,  and  1  am  very  humble  about  it. 
but  I  am  far  from  perfect,  and  I  have 
always  welcomed  constructive  advice 
and  criticism.  But  this  time  this  dys- 
functional brush  that  was  wiped  across 
struck  me  as  not  fair  to  certain  things 
I  personally  have  a  knowledge  of  that 
were  done  by  this  body,  the  Senate. 

I  will  start  back  some  years  a^o  In 
1987  when,  as  a  member  of  the  Armed 
Services  Committee,  we  structured  the 


Goldwater-Nichols  legislation  which 
bad  sweeping  ramifications  in  our  over- 
all defense  setup.  It  has  been  hailed 
since  that  period  of  time  as  a  landmark 
achievement  by  the  Congress  to  begin 
to  transform  our  military  from  the 
cold  war  era  to  the  era  of  the  threats 
today  which  are  so  diverse  and  so  dif- 
ferent as  compared  to  those  we  con- 
fronted during  World  War  n  and  in  the 
immediate  aftermath  of  the  cold  war. 

That  was  quite  an  accomplishment 
and.  in  large  meastire.  is  owing  to  Sen- 
ator Goldwater  and  Congressman  Nich- 
ols. Again.  I  had  the  privilege  to  serve 
with  those  two  men  for  many  years, 
long  before  we  started  the  Goldwater- 
Nichols  Act. 

As  a  member  of  the  Armed  Services 
Committee— and  I  say  with  humility 
and  personal  pride,  I  was  a  close  per- 
sonal friend  of  Senator  Goldwater.  I  ad- 
mired him  so  much  and  looked  forward 
to  the  times  we  worked  together  and 
traveled  together.  I  remember  Con- 
gressman Nichols  bore  the  scars  of 
World  War  n.  having  been  a  very  cou- 
rageous serviceperson  in  that  wax.  He 
was  extremely  conscientious  about  his 
duties  on  the  House  Armed  Services 
Committee.  These  twc  giants  in  the 
way  of  thinking  got  together  and  re- 
lentlessly drove  this  legislation 
through  both  bodies  of  the  Congress, 
and  it  has  withstood  the  test  of  tune. 

Contemporaneous  with  this,  I  re- 
member my  dear  friend  with  whom  1 
came  to  the  Senate,  Senator  Cohen, 
who  later  became,  after  he  resigned 
from  the  Senate.  Secretary  of  Defense. 
We  worked  together  as  a  team  with 
others  to  carve  out  of  the  Department 
of  Defense,  taking  from  the  Army,  the 
-Navy,  the  Air  Force,  and  the  Marines 
some  of  the  best  and  the  brightest  to 
create  the  Special  Operations  Com- 
mand. 

While  today  most  colleagues  have 
seen  their  magnificent  performance 
worldwide,  particularly  as  a  front  line 
against  terrorism,  I  remmd  them  it 
was  a  tough  and  long  struggle,  vigor- 
ously resisted  by  the  Department  of 
Defense,  to  create  this  new  entity  and 
to  give  them  their  dedicated  assets  of 
modest  naval  vessels,  modest  number 
of  airplanes,  and  other  equipment 
which  was  their  own.  But  we  suc- 
ceeded. Today  those  forces  have  estab- 
lished themselves  in  the  contemporary 
military  history  of  this  country  as  an 
essential  part  of  our  military  struc- 
ture, much  admired  by  all,  much 
envied  by  all,  and  their  performance 
record  is  second  to  none.  I  do  not  mean 
to  suggest  by  that  they  have  outpaced 
or  outperformed  the  basic  elements, 
particularly  combat-committed  ele- 
ments of  the  Army,  Navy,  Air  Force, 
and  Marines.  No,  it  is  that  the  whole 
military  looks  with  a  sense  of  pride  to- 
ward tihelr  accomplishments.  I  am 
proud  to  have  been  a  part  of  estab- 
lishing this  important  part  of  our 
armed  forces. 

Then  tn  1999,  when  1  was  privileged 
for  the  first  time  to  become  chairman 
of   the    Senate    Armed    Services   Com- 


mittee, 1  went  in  there  and  1  changed 
basically  a  structure  that  had  been  In 
place  for  decades,  the  subcommittee 
structure-  Again,  I  carved  out  a  new 
subcommittee  called  Subcommittee  on 
Emerging  Threats  and  Capabilities. 
This  is  1999.  This  is  not  in  the  after- 
math of  9/11.  This  is  1999. 

I  must  say.  I  have  had  the  construc- 
tive support  of  the"  members  of  the 
committee,  and  by  pure  coincidence — I 
am  speaking  of  the  Subcommittee  on 
Emerging  Threats  and  Capabilities— 
the  first  chairman  of  that  sub- 
committee, the  distinguished  Senator 
from  Kansas,  Mr.  ROBERTS,  just  walked 
into  the  Chamber,  and  perhaps  he  will 
have  a  word  or  two  about  the  functions 
of  that  subcommittee. 

Mr.  President,  1  say  to  my  distin- 
guished colleague,  I  was  saying  the  9/11 
Commission  has  brushed  the  Congress 
as  being  sort  of  dyafimctional.  and  I 
was  going  back  in  history.  The  Senator 
from  Kansas  was  one  of  my  prlncli>al 
supporters  on  establishing  the  Sub- 
committee on  Emerging  Threats  and 
Capabilities.  He  has  been  ranking 
member  or  chairman  of  that  sub-  ~ 
committee,  and  under  his  leadership 
and  that  of  the  full  committee,  we  have 
achieved  a  great  deal,  and  have  helped 
the  Department  of  Defense  move  for- 
ward in  the  areas  of  joint  experimen- 
tation, homeland  defense, 
counterterrorlsm,  and  future  tech- 
nologies and  concepts  that  will  be 
needed  to  confront  future  threats. 

That  subcommittee  was  directed  to 
look  forward  a  decade  and  determine 
what  are  the  threats  that  are  going  to 
face  the  United  States  of  Amerloa  euid 
how  best  our  Department  of  Defense 
needs  to  transform  itself  and  allocate 
assets  and  men  and  women  to  take  up 
the  positions  of  responsibility  to  meet 
those  threats. 

That  subcommittee  has  done  its 
work  and  done  it  admirably  and  has 
measurably  enhanced  the  overall 
strength  of  our  military  today. 

My  distinguished  colleague.  Senator 
Roberts  from  Kansas,  is  chairman  of 
the  Intelligence  Committee.  I  am  privl 
leged  to  serve  on  that  committee 
today.  In  years  past.  I  was  privileged  to 
serve  8  years.  We  have  this  rotation  In 
the  Senate,  and  this  is  my  second  tour 
on  that  committee.  When  I  was  vice 
chairman,  together  with  other  mem 
bers  of  that  committee,  we  fought  hard 
against  the  cuts  in  intelUgenoe. 

I  aak  tmaoimous  consent  that  por- 
tions of  the  minority  view  report  be 
printed  into  the  Record. 

There  being  no  objection,  the  mate- 
rial was  ordered  to  be  printed  In  the 
Record,  as  follows: 

MiNORTTY  Views  of  Senators  Wabhir. 

DANPXiRTH.  Stevens.  Luqar,  and  Waixop 

The  UQit«d  Statee  must  maintain  aad 
atreji^tben  U.S.  Ini^alllgeDce  capabilities  to 
provide  for  the  future  eeourtty  of  the  Nation 
and  for  the  protection  of  Ite  Intereste  around 
the  globe.  The  U.S.  ahould  commit  more  re- 
BoQTces  to  actUevement  of  that  objective 
than  the  flso&l  year  1994  Intelligence  author- 
ization bill  reported  by  the  Select  Com- 
miti,ee  on  IntelllgeDoe  would  provide. 


41 


July  22,  2004 


CONGRESSIpNAL  RECORD  —  SENATE 


SSftlL 


Tne  U.S.  ticed  graso  secarltv  riaks  during 
the  Cold  War.  but  It  fAued  them  la  an  Inter- 
national  environment  tli3rt  was  compara- 
bly stable  and  predictable.  Wit*  tHe  end  of 
■  the  Cold  War  and  the  dissolution  of  the  So- 
rtet  Union  and  Its  Warsaw  Pact  military  al 
nance,  the  U  S  had  hoped  lor  a  'New  World 
Order-  wltb  stable  and  steady  proirreso  'to- 
ward greater  democracy,  freedom  and  free 
enterprise.  WUat  the  U  s.  fares  in  the  post 
Cold  War  era.  however.  Is  a  more  chaotic  en- 
vironment with  maltlple  chaUenges  to  US. 
Interests  that  complicate  the  efforts  of  the 
U  S.  and  cooperaUne  nanona  to  achlefe  the 
desired  prosress.  In  an  unstable  wortd  ol  dl- 
verec  and  mcreaalns  challenges,  the  need  for 
robnat  and  reliable  U  3  Intelligence  capa- 
bilities hae  grown  rather  than  diminished. 
America  faces  a  world  In  whicb- 
Ethnlc.  religious  and  social  tenelona  spawn 
regional  conflicts. 

A  camber  of  cations  possess  nuclear  weap- 
ons and  the  means  to  deliver  thorn  on  a  tal- 

^  Other  nations  seek  nuclear,  chemical  or  bi- 
ological weapons  of  rr.aeii  destruction  and  the 
means  to  deUver  them; 

Terrorist  organlzatlona  contmue  :o  oper- 
ate and  attack  U.S.  lateresto  (Including  here 
at  home,  as  the  bombing  of  the  World  Trade 
Center  In  New  YoTt  reflects); 

International  drug  organizations  oontUins 
on  a  vast  scale  to  produce  Illegal  drugs  and 
smuggle  them  into  the  US. „and 

US.  economic  interests  are  under  constant 
challenge. 

The  United  States  continues  to  have  a 
vital  interest  In  close  monitoring  of  develop- 
ments in  the  mdependent  republics  on  the 
territory   of  the  former   Soviet   Uyjon.  The 


U  S  Government  needs  accurate  and  timely 
IncelllgeDce  on  the  nuclear  arsenals.  faclU- 
tiea  and  mater.ala  located  In  Rossia,  Ukraine 
andj^^har  repnbllcs;  the  economic  and  mili- 
tary reBtruotarln*  m  the  republics;  and  the 
ethnic,  religloofl  and  other  Booial  turmoil 
and  seceaflionlst  pressures  In  the  repubUcs 

To  the  extent  that  the  end  of  the  Cold  War 
aUows  a  reduction  of  U.3.  resources  devoted 
to  intelligence  capabilities  focused  on  mill 
taiy  capabilities  of  countries  on  the  terri- 
tory of  the  former  Soviet  Union,  the  US 
should  reallocate  the  gained  rosooroes  to 
strengthen  Intelligeooe  capabilities  to  deal 
with  growing  risks  to  America's  Interests. 
The  U.S  should  make  such  resonices  avail- 
able for  strengthened  Intelligence  capabili- 
ties focnaed  on  the  problems  with  which  the 
U.S.  Oovemment  moflt  deal  in  the  coming 
decades,  including  proliferation  of  weapons 
of  maaa  destruction,  terrorism.  International 
narcotics  trafMcklng.  and  the  illegal  transfer 
of  U.S  high  technology  In  many  Intel- 
ligence disciplines.  Investment  In  research 
and  development  is  needed  now  to  yield  In- 
telligence capabilities  a  decade  from  now. 
Absent  needed  Investment,  capabilities  will 
not  be  available  when  needed  and  existing 
capabilities  will  erode. 

At  the  same  time  as  risks  to  U.S  mcerent 
grow.  U.3  military  power  will  decline  as  the 
U  3  draws  down  substantially  the  size  of  ite 
armed  forces  following  victory  In  the  Cold 
War.  With  a  diverse  and  growing  array  of 
risks  to  U.S.  Interesta  and  a  reduced  com- 
mitment of  resources  to  the  Nation's  de 
fsuse.  the  US  will  grow  Increasingly  de- 
pendent for  its  security  and  the  protection  of 
its  Interests  abroad  open  its  Intelligence  ca 
pabillties— the  Nation's  eyes  and  ears.  In- 
deed, the  substantial  cuts  of  recent  years  in 
defense  budgets  have  been  premised  directly 
upon  the  strengthening  of  Intelligence  sup- 
port to  the  remaining,  smaller  aimed  forces 
Reducing  the  Nation's  intelligence  capablll 

ties  magnlllee  slgnincantly  the  nsks  attend- 
anlj  to  reductions  io  rsaooicos  devoted  to  the 
Nation's  defense.  As  thiw  Comnalttee  noted  In 


dlBCOSs-jig  -.oglslation  to  asalst  m  managing 
the  personnel  reduooons  at  the  Central  In- 
telligence Agency,  '.  -  maintaining  a 
strong  intelligence  capability  la  particularly 
iraBortanl  when  mlltUry  forces  are  being 
substantially  reduced  .  .  ."  <s.  Kept.  103--13. 

""  The  U-3-  will  depend  on  efTecuve  foreign 
intelligence  in  allocating  scarce  U.S.  na- 
tional security  resources  effectively.  To  pro- 
tect America's  interests  In  Umes  of  peace 
and  of  conniot.  US.  poUcymakers  and  mili- 
tary commanders  will  depend  heavily  upon 
sarly  warning  of  trouble  and- early  and. ex- 
tensive knowledge  of  the  activities,  capabili- 
ties and  intentions  of  foreign  powers.  Kflec- 
trve  intelligence  will  multiply  eubetintiaUy 
the  etrectlvenees  of  the  smaller  u  S.  mlUtary 

tOTOe,  ,  .      ^  *v      n  c 

A  sampling  of  the  deployment  of  the  u  a. 
armed  forces  abroad  in  the  past  foor  years  il- 
luetrates  nsks  to  Air.erioan  Intercsto  In  the 
poet-Cold  War  world,  likely  uses  of  U.S.  mUl- 
tary  forces  In  the  future,  and  the  importance 
of  effective  InteUlgenoe  In  supporting  mili- 
tary operauons  In  late  1969.  American 
troops  in  operation  JUST  CAUSE  liberated 
Panama  from  the  Nortega  dlctatorahlp  that 
suppressed  Panamanian  democracy  and 
threatened  U  S.  personnel.  In  1890  and  1991  In 
Operations  DBSERT  SHIELD  and  DESEET 
STORM  American  and  coalition  forces  liber- 
ated Kuwait  from  Iraqi  occupation,  and 
those  forces  remain  on  station  in  and  around 
the  Fabian  Peninsula  to  enforce  United  Na 
tlons  sancnons  on  Iraq.  American  forcss 
have  rescued  American  diplomats  caught  In 
civil  inaurrecttons  abroad.  U.S.  forces  have 
ajKlsted  In  stemming  the  flow  of  lllsgal  im- 
migrants Into  the  United  States  U.S.  forces 
have  undertaken  humanitarian  relief  oper 
atlons.  to  feed  hungry  people  and  provide 
them  medical  care.  The  U.S.  hae  assigned  Its 
forces  as  part  of  or  in  support  of  United  Na 
tlonfl  peacekeeping  forces  in  many  countrlea. 
Including  Bosnia.  Macedonia.  Somalia,  and 
Cambodia-  In  every  one  of  these  operatlon-- 
from  massive  operations  on  the  scale  of 
DESERT  STORM  to  the  smallest  humani- 
tarian relief  operations— the  auccasaful  ac 
compllshment  of  missions  by  tie  U.S  armed 
forces  and  the  protection  of  American  troops 
have  depended  directly  upon  the  high  quality 
and  timeliness  of  the  IntelUgence  available 
to  American  forces 

Bed-actions  In  US  intelligence  capabilities 
in  this  period  of  international  inaUbl'Jty  are 
unwise  and  do  not  serve  the  Nation's  long 
term  security  Intereots.  Defense  of  America 
aod  America's  interesta  abroad  requires  a 
greater  commitment  of  reaonrcea  to  U  S.  In 
telligence  capabilities  than  the  fiscal  year 
1994  Intelligence  authorization  bill  providee 
John  WAiUES 
John  C.  Danforth. 

TED  aTEVBNS. 

Richard  Q  luoar. 

MALCOLM  WaI-LOP 

Mr.  WARNER.  I  have  the  repoiT^  Chat 
aocompanled  the  1994  bUl  This  wfts 
written  in  July  of  1993.  This  report  cov- 
ered the  ensuing  QsoaJ  year.  I  wrote 
the  minority  views,  which  were  joined 
m  by  other  colleagues  an  the  com- 
mittee at  that  time:  Senator  DanTorth. 
who  Is  cow  our  Ambassador  to  the 
United  Nations;  Senator  STEt'ENS.  who 
is  currentl.v  chairman  of  the  Senate 
Appropriations  Committee.  Senator 
Luoar.  who  is  cjrrently  chairman  of 
the  Foreign  Relations  Oommittee:  and 
our  former  colleague.  Senator  Wallop. 

Here  is  what  we  had  to  say.  and  1  do 
not  think  this  Is  dysfunctional  partlcl- 
paMon,  but  I  will  let  my  colleagues 


judge  for  themselves  after  I  have  read 
portions  of  Sills  report. 

The  mlEonry  views  of  the  followinr 
Senators: 

The  United  States  must  mamtain  and 
strengthen  US  intelligence  capabilities  to 
provide  for  Che  future  security  of  the  Nation 
and  for  the  protection  of  Its  Interesta  around 
the  globe  The  U.S.  should  comirat  more,  re- 
sources to  achievement  of  that  objective 
than  the  Hscal  year  19S4  intelligence  anthor- 
Izatlon  bill  Imported  by  the  Select  Com- 
mittee on  Intelligence  would  provide. 

We  were,  of  course,  members  of  that 
select  committee. 

The  n  S  faced  grave  security  risks  during 
the  Coid  War.  but  it  faced  them  m  an  inter- 
national environment  that  was  campara- 
tiveU  staljle  and  predictable  With  the  end  of 
the  Cold  'War  and  the  dissolution  of  the  So- 
viet Union  and  its  Warsaw  Pact  military  al- 
liance, the  U  S.  had  hoped  for  a  "New  World 
Order  "  with  stable  and  steady  progress  to- 
ward greater  democracy,  freedom  and  Hve 
enterprise.  What  the  US  faces  in  the  post^ 
Cold  War  era.  however,  is  a  more  chaotic  en- 
vironment with  multatads  challenges  to  U.S. 
interests  that  complicate  the  efforts  of  Che 
U.S.  and  cooperating  nations  to  achieve  the 
desired  progress.  In  an  unstable  world  of  di- 
verse and  increasing  challenges,  the  need  for 
robust  and  reUable  US.  intelligence  capa- 
bUlties  has  grown  rather  than  dlmmlflhed. 
America  faces  a  world  m  which;  Ethnic,  reli- 
gious and  social  tensions  spawn  regional  coc- 
fUcts:  a  number  of  uaUons  poseeas  nuclear 
weapons  and  the  means  to  deliver  them  on  a 
target;  other  nations  seek  nuclear,  chemical 
or  biological  weapons  of  mass  destruction 
and  the  means  to  deliver  them;  terrortat  or- 
gaaizationa  continue  tc  operate  and  attack 
US  interesta  (including  here  at  home,  as 
the  bombing  of  the  World  Trade  Centar  in 
New  York  rer.ec',«)— 

This  is  1993.  It  13  interesting.  It  was 
June  30.  just  about  this  time — 
International  drug  organlzatione  continue  on 
a  vBAt  scale  to  produce  Illegal  drugs  and 
smuggle  them  into  the  U  s  .  and  U.S  eoo- 
nonuc    Interesta   are    under   coiistanc    ohal- 

To  the  extent  that  the  end  of  the  Cold  War 
allows  a  reduction  of  U  S  resources  devoted 
to  Intelligence  capabilities  focused  on  mill 
tary  capabilities  oC  countries  on  the  terri- 
tory of  the  former  Soviet  Umon.  the  U  3. 
should  reallocate  the  gained  reeouioee  to 
strengthen  Intolligenoe  oapabiUtles  to  deal 
with  growing  risks  to  America's  lnt«reetB. 
The  U.S.  ahould  make  such  resources  avail- 
able for  strengthened  intelligence  capablli- 
tiee  focused  on  the  problems  with  which  the 
U  3.  Crovomment  must  deal  in  the  coming 
decades.  Including  proliferation  of  weapons 
of  mass  destruction,  terrorism,  international 
narcotics  trafficking,  and  the  illegal  transfer 
of  US  .high  technology 

I  shall  not  read  further  because  I  WJl 
put  It  in  the  REGoaD 

ThlE  is  not  dysfvmctional  action  by 
leglslatore:  this  is  legislators  looking 
Into  the  future  and  seeing  much  of 
what  is  occurriEg  today  I  only  wish  we 
had  the  opportunity  to  advise  the  9/U 
Commission  of  this  and  other  contrlbu- 
Uons  by  many  others  In  this  Chamber 
at  that  period  of  tune  who  were  In  the 
service  of  Che  Senate  and  their  States. 
This  was  not  dysfunctional. 

In  the  days  ahead,  we  do  need  to  look 
at  how  best  to  organize  the  IntelllKonce 
elements  of  our  national  security 
structure,  along  with  many  other  com- 
ponents. We  must  not,  however,  do 
anything  precipitously. 


42 


In  the  flpeclfic  &re&  of  iBtelligence, 
our  Lntelllg'ence  services,  even  with  tlie 
flaws  that  have  been  recently  pointed 
out.  are  the  beat  in  the  world,  by  far. 
They  are  not  perfect,  and  their  busi- 
ness is,  by  definition,  one  of  uncer- 
tainty— beat  Judgments  made  with  the 
information  that  Is  currently  in  hand. 
Any  changes  we  make  must  be  care- 
fully constructed  to  preserve  existing 
excellence,  while  improving  other  func- 
tions. 

Afi  we  consider  any  changres,  we  must 
remember  that  intelligence  la  an  inte- 
gral part  of  military  operationfi,  Re- 
cent military  operations  by  our  forces 
In  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  have  been  ex- 
traordinarily succesaful.  In  large  part 
because  of  excellent  intelligence,  and 
because  of  the  close  relationship  be- 
tween military  operationfi  and  intel- 
ligence that  has  been  so  carefully  built 
over  the  years.  Intelligence  is  part  of  a 
whole  I>epgirtment  of  Defense,  as  well 
as  part  of  a  larger  Intelligence  commu- 
nity. Moving  defense  Intelligence  func- 
tions under  the  authority  of  another 
cabineHevel  official  could  have  unin- 
tended consequences— we  must  move 
with  careful  deliberation. 

I  yield  the  floor,  and  I  sugg-est  the  ab- 
sence of  a  qaorum . 


Senator  Roberts.  As  always,  your  humble  servant,  sir. 

Let  me  just  say  that  if  I  can  sum  up  the  testimony — and  I  know 
that  I  should  not  do  this  with  Senator  Collins  being  present,  who's 
doing  an  outstanding  job,  along  with  Senator  Lieberman,  on  the 
Governmental  Affairs  Committee — but  the  three  of  the  witnesses 
there  pretty  much  got  on  the  NID  stage  and  the  counterterrorism 
stage  and  left  town.  Now,  they  didn't  leave  town,  but  at  least  that 
was  their  recommendation.  From  what  I  hear  of  the  witnesses,  I'm 
not  sure  if  you're  on  the  NID  stage,  or  not. 

Do  you  support  really  granting  the  NID  direct  supervision  and 
control  over  the  DOD  elements  of  the  NFIP?  Now,  saying  that, 
there  are  15  agencies;  there  are  4  of  them  under  the  DOD;  then 
you  have  the  4  Services,  that's  8;  and  then  the  rest  of  them  are 
under  the  Intelligence  Community,  as  all  3  of  you  well  know.  The 
suggestion  has  been  made  by  the  distinguished  chairman  that 
somehow  we  could  work  out  some  kind  of  an  arrangement  whereby 
there  is  better  coordination.  But  it  was  just  like  Senator  McCain 
said,  I  think,  with  the  9/11  Commission,  with  a  lot  of  support  in 
this  town,  and  with  the  administration  moving  toward  that  goal, 
and  it's  not  a  set  policy  yet  that  they  are  for  the  NID,  and  they 
are  for  this  NCTC.  Yes/no,  are  you  for  it  or  against  it? 

We'll  start  with  you,  Jim.  Pardon  me.  Secretary  Schlesinger?  And 
K  State  fan. 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Now,  we  used  to  have  greater  uniformity  in  that,  prior  to  the 
1970s,  the  CIA  was  under  the  control  of  the  Armed  Services  Com- 
mittee. So  what  we  have  been  doing  on  the  Hill  has  been  to  split 
those  authorities,  reflecting  the  public  reaction  to  the  so-called 
"scandals"  of  the  1970s. 

No,  I  don't  think  that  the  authorities  in  the  DOD  should  be 
placed  under  the  NID. 

Senator  ROBERTS.  Secretary  Carlucci? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  agree  with  the  concept  of  an  NCTC.  I  do  not 
favor  an  NID.  If  we're  going  to  have  an  NID,  I  don't  think  he  ought 
to  have  line  management  over  the  CSAs. 


43 

Senator  Roberts.  Dr.  Hamre. 

Dr.  Hamre.  Sir,  I  do  not  favor  the  9/11  Commission  recommenda- 
tion that  gives  the  NID  authority  over  DOD  agencies.  If  you're 
going  to  have  an  NID,  you'll  want  a  strong  one.  If  you're  going  to 
have  a  strong  one,  I  think  you're  going  to  have  to  give  him  some 
real  things  to  manage,  other  than  just  interagency  coordination 
processes. 

Senator  Roberts.  Let  me  give  you  the  counter-argument.  I  have 
noted  what  appears  to  be  very  redundant,  often  wasteful,  procure- 
ment of  intelligence  system,  in  my  own  view  as  chairman  of  the  In- 
telligence Committee,  shared  by  many  across  the  several  intel- 
ligence budgetary  mechanisms  down  through  the  years,  different 
agencies  and  different  congressional  committees — obviously,  that's 
no  surprise.  You  have  the  entrenched  interest  of  several  of  these 
bureaucracies.  We  may  see  that,  when  an  intelligence  requirement 
is  levied,  the  NRO  always  finds  one  of  its  satellites  to  be  the  best 
solution,  if  not  all  of  them.  The  NGA  will  feel  its  imagery  is  the 
best.  The  NSA  may  offer  signals  intelligence.  The  Air  Force  may 
prefer  its  unmanned  aerial  vehicle  (UAV).  The  CIA  may  obviously 
feel  an  agent  collecting  information  is  the  best,  not  to  mention  a 
poor  marine  who  would  just  want  new  tires  on  his  high  utility  mo- 
bile mechanized  vehicle. 

Sadly,  all  of  these  programs  may  be  funded  to  meet  similar,  or 
even  redundant,  needs.  Yet  the  SECDEF  cannot  do  all  that.  We 
have  an  Under  Secretary  of  Intelligence  now  who  has  his  hands 
full.  The  SECDEF  certainly  has  his  hands  full.  Would  an  NID, 
with  more  powerful  authorities,  be  able  to  make  the  tough  and  un- 
popular decisions  that  fiscal  responsibility  requires?  It  doesn't  have 
to  mean  that  you  put  the  whole  agency  out  of  the  DOD  over  to  the 
NID,  but  at  least  that  person  would  have  funding  authority,  hiring 
and  firing  authority,  shifting  personnel  authority,  and  also  transfer 
authority  in  regards  to  funds. 

What  I'm  trying  to  say  is  the  reprogramming — is  your  answer 
still  no? 

Jim? 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  I  think  that  the  NID  can  do  much  more  in  the 
area  of  centralizing  collection,  which  is  the  big  money  area,  as  your 
question  raises.  The  NID  should  not  be  engaged  in  suppressing 
competition  among  the  agencies.  The  SECDEF  and  the  Joint  Chiefs 
should  have  their  own  DIA. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  The  way  you've  described  it,  I  can  see  an  NID 
building  a  huge  staff  right  now,  and  that  would  be  just  another 
layer.  So  I  think  we  have  to  be  cautious  about  giving  him  all  this 
authority.  Either  he  builds  his  staff  or  he  yanks  something  out  of 
DOD.  There's  no  in-between. 

Senator  Roberts.  Dr.  Hamre? 

Dr.  Hamre.  I'd  agree  with  what  Dr.  Schlesinger  just  said  to  you. 

Senator  Roberts.  Okay.  My  time  is  expired,  and  I  thank  you, 
Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you,  Senator  Roberts. 

Senator  Lieberman. 

Senator  Lieberman.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  Thanks  to  you 
and  Senator  Levin  for  these  hearings. 


44 

As  has  been  indicated,  Senator  Collins  and  I  have  been  involved 
in  holding  some  hearings  and  we  welcome — there's  a  lot  of  overlap 
between  our  two  committees,  Mr.  Chairman.  We  look  forward  to 
working  with  you  as  our  committee  produces  the  legislation  that 
Senator  Frist  and  Senator  Daschle  have  asked  us  to  produce  some- 
time in  September. 

I  want  to  pick  up  on  the  questioning  of  Senator  Roberts  and 
some  of  the  others,  the  line  of  questioning  that  they've  been  follow- 
ing. 

You  can't  read  the  9/11  report  without  concluding  that  it's  an  in- 
dictment of  the  status  quo,  in  some  measure.  They  don't  quite  say 
this,  but  it  certainly  left  me  with  the  impression  that  if  the  kind 
of  reorganization  they  recommend  was  in  place  prior  to  September 
11,  maybe  it  wouldn't  have  happened.  It  goes  to  the  connecting  of 
the  dots,  to  the  focusing  of  resources  where  they  were  necessary. 
The  bottom  line  seems  to  be,  no  one  was  in  charge.  The  Commis- 
sion says  that.  Mr.  Zellico,  the  executive  director,  testified  to  the 
Governmental  Affairs  Committee  that  that  remains  the  case.  No 
one's  in  charge  of  the  American  IC.  As  a  result,  there  is 
stovepiping,  there's  not  an  overview  by  somebody  at  the  top  of 
where  priorities  are  and,  therefore,  where  the  money  should  go. 

In  that  report,  I  believe  it  says  that  our  IC  is  organized  according 
to  the  best  management  principles  of  the  1950s,  which  is  not  sur- 
prising, because  it  came  into  being  in  the  late  1940s,  when  the 
world  was  very  different  and  the  enemy  was  very  different — Soviet 
Union,  as  opposed  to  all  the  diffusion  of  terrorism. 

Incidentally,  we  know  the  toughest  part  of  this  is  what  to  do 
about  the  Defense  intelligence  budget.  Questions  have  been  raised. 
It's  true  that  a  lot  of  the  criticism  in  the  9/11  Commission  Report 
was  focused  on  other  agencies,  particularly  the  failure  of  CIA,  FBI, 
et  cetera,  to  cooperate.  But  there  is  some  criticism  of  the  NSA, 
which  is  in  the  DOD,  obviously. 

I'll  just  read  from  the  Commission  report,  page  80,  "The  NSA 
began" — let  me  start  with  page  87 — "An  almost  obsessive  protec- 
tion of  sources  and  methods  by  the  NSA  and  its  avoidance — its 
focus  on  foreign  intelligence  and  its  avoidance  on  an3rthing  domes- 
tic would,  as  will  be  seen" — in  the  report — "be  important  elements 
in  the  story  of  September  11."  Basically,  an  accusation  that  the 
considerable  assets  of  the  NSA  were  not  being  focused  on  the  war 
on  terrorism. 

They  say,  "The  NSA  began  putting  caveats  on  its  bin  Laden-re- 
lated reports  that  required  prior  approval  before  they're  sharing 
their  contents  with  criminal  investigators  and  prosecutors.  These 
developments  further  blocked  the  arteries  of  information-sharing." 

Finally,  from  page  417,  "In  the  September  11  story,  for  example, 
we  see  examples  of  information  that  could  be  accessed,  like  the  un- 
distributed NSA  information  that  would  have  helped  identify 
Nawaf  al  Hazmi,  in  January  2000."  It  goes  on. 

So  there  is  some  direct  connection  in  the  report  to  failures  of  co- 
operation by  intelligence  assets  now  under  the  control  of  the  DOD. 

Senator  Roberts  asked  about  whether  you  were  for  the  NID,  and 
there  was — as  recommended,  I  think  you  generally  said  no.  Bob 
Gates,  former  DCI,  said  in  testimony  he  submitted  to  our  commit- 
tee this  morning — strong  statement — "The  new  intelligence  direc- 


45 

tor,  as  described" — he  actually  talks  about  the  White  House.  He 
says,  "The  President  recently  announced  his  initial  decisions  in  re- 
sponse to  the  Commission  recommendation.  I  hope,  as  the  White 
House  spokesman  has  suggested,  that  these  decisions  are  only  a 
first  step,  because  the  new  intelligence  director,  as  described,  will 
impose  a  new  layer  of  bureaucracy,  but  has  no  troops,  no  budget 
authority,  and  no  power.  Therefore,  the  new  position  would  be 
worse  than  the  current  arrangement." 

So  what's  my  question?  [Laughter.] 

My  question  is  this.  You've  answered,  in  part.  Let  me  go  at  it 
this  way.  You've  had  the  extraordinary  experience  in  administra- 
tion, both  in  the  public  and  the  private  sector.  How  can  we,  in 
something  so  fundamental  as  this  war  on  terrorism,  go  on  without 
having  somebody  in  charge?  If  you  put  somebody  in  charge,  doesn't 
that  mean  they  have  to  have  budget  authority  over  the  DOD — or 
at  least  significant  non-TIARA,  non-tactical  parts  of  the  DOD  intel- 
ligence budget? 

Secretary  Carlucci? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  think  we  can  do  that  without  creating  another 
layer.  That's  the  point  I  tried  to  make,  that  we  ought  to  look  at  the 
DCI's  authority,  and  where  they  are  found  wanting,  let's  change 
that.  But  to  create  another  layer  with  a  whole  staff,  I  agree  with 
Bob  Gates,  that  either  he's  toothless,  in  which  case  it's  a  useless 
layer,  or  he's  a  nuisance  because  he's  intervening  in  the 
warfighting  process  of  DOD. 

Senator  LlEBERMAN.  Okay,  so  that's  helpful  for  me  to  under- 
stand. In  some  ways,  you're  saying  if  there's  need  for  coordination 
and  more  strength,  including  some  budget  authority,  give  it  to  the 
DCI 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Absolutely. 

Senator  LlEBERMAN. — instead  of  creating  an  NID. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Absolutely. 

Senator  LlEBERMAN.  Secretary  Schlesinger? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  The  first  point  that  I  make  is  that  the 
stovepiping  that  has  so  badly  damaged  our  ability  to  deal  with  Sep- 
tember 11,  evidenced  beforehand,  was  basically  between  the  FBI 
and  the  CIA,  and  that  if  that  is  the  area  that  you  must  bring  great- 
er integration,  how  far  the  TTIC  does  in  bringing  FBI  information 
to  the  benefit  of  the  counterterrorism  area,  I  don't  know.  The  FBI 
has  historically  been  outside,  really,  of  the  IC. 

Second  point,  you  mentioned  that  the  NSA  was  obsessive  about 
protecting  its  sources  and  methods  and  information,  and  the  reason 
that  it  was  obsessive  was  that  during  the  1970s  and  1980s,  we  told 
the  NSA,  "Never  eavesdrop  on  an  American  citizen."  If  you  tell  peo- 
ple not  to  hear  things,  and  then,  certainly,  if  they've  heard  things 
inadvertently,  not  to  pass  them  on,  they  will  be  obsessive. 

Senator  LlEBERMAN.  As  you  know  better  than  anybody. 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  Yes. 

Senator  LlEBERMAN.  You'd  say  it  yourself,  we're  not  in  the  1970s 
and  1980s  anymore;  we're  in  a  new  century  with  a  new  enemy, 
about  whom  we 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  Absolutely. 

Senator  LlEBERMAN. — need  to  know  ever5^hing  there  is  to  know. 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  Absolutely. 


46 

Those  restrictions  should  be  dropped,  and  they  have  been 
dropped. 

Senator  Lieberman.  Dr.  Hamre? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Senator  Lieberman,  you  really  don't  need  to  add 
more  authority  to  the  DCI  on  budget.  He  already  has  very  strong 
authority,  but  he  doesn't  really  use  it.  The  reason  is,  he's  up 
against  very  strong  Cabinet  Secretaries. 

Senator  Lieberman.  So  how  do  we  deal  with  that?  Because  we 
know  the  SECDEF  has  a  lot  of  authority  and  power.  How  are  we 
going  to  equalize  that  competition,  that  tension,  in  a  way  that  gives 
more  resources  to  the  war  on  terror? 

Here  we  have,  "George  Tenet  declares  war  on  terrorism  as  DCI 
in" — as  the  Commission  report  said,  "in  1998."  Nobody  responds  to 
him.  Maybe  it's  because  they  didn't  think  it  mattered,  because  he 
didn't  have  any  budget  authority  over  them. 

Dr.  Hamre.  But,  Senator,  it's  not  the  only  war  we're  fighting.  We 
have  a  lot  of  things  we're  having  to  do  besides  war  on  terrorism. 
It  is  not  the  only  focus.  I  think  that's  the  primary  worry  I  have: 
we're  going  to  organize  around  just  that  one  concept.  I  think  that's 
where  I  have  to  ask  you  to  be  careful. 

Senator  Lieberman.  My  time's  up.  But,  obviously,  we're  not 
going  to  organize  just  around  that  one  concept.  The  problem — my 
fear  is — and  this  report  documents  it — this  is  the  great  threat  to 
the  security  and  lives  of  the  American  people,  and  we're  not  devot- 
ing enough  of  our  intelligence  resources,  in  a  coordinated  way  with 
somebody  in  charge,  to  it. 

Thanks,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you.  Senator  Lieberman. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  May  I,  Mr.  Chairman? 

Chairman  Warner.  Yes. 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  There  are  bureaucratic  problems  within  the 
CIA,  and  when  George  Tenet,  quite  rightly,  said,  "We  are  at  war," 
even  within  the  CIA,  there  was  not  the  resource  shifts  that  should 
have  come,  given  the  fact  that  we  were  at  war. 

Senator  Lieberman.  It's  a  point  well  made. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you. 

Senator  Sessions. 

Senator  Sessions.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

We're  talking  about  the  problems,  and  I  think  the  panel  has 
dealt  with  the  problems,  the  deficiencies  we  had  at  the  time  of  Sep- 
tember 11.  But  a  lot  has  happened  since  September  11,  for  heaven 
sakes.  The  NCTC  that's  been  established,  with  CIA  as  the  head  of- 
ficer— I  think  it's  in  the  FBI  building,  supported  fully  by  FBI — and 
every  bit  of  intelligence  involving  terrorism  is  filtered  through 
there  so  it  can  be  properly  analyzed.  I  guess,  first  of  all,  that's  a 
big  step  forward,  I  think,  and  it's  the  kind  of  thing  that  was  not 
happening  before  September  11.  Also,  I  notice  in  the  Commission's 
report  that  our  expenditures  for  intelligence  fell  every  year  from 
1990  to  1996.  From  1996  to  2000,  it  was  flat,  except  for  a  Gingrich 
supplemental,  they  note. 

But  since  then,  we've  been  spending  a  lot  more  money  on  intel- 
ligence, particularly  HUMINT  and  other  things  that  we  know  we 
were,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  disaster  of  September  11,  to  do  better 
about. 


47 

Do  any  of  you  doubt  that  there  is  a  great  deal  more  cooperation 
within  the  agencies  now,  a  great  deal  of  effort  to  knock  down  the 
stovepiping,  that  obviously  existed  before  September  11,  in  the 
months  since  September  11?  Secretary  Hamre,  I  guess  you're  the 
most  recent 

Dr.  Hamre.  Sir,  just  by  way  of  disclosure,  I  serve  on  an  advisory 
board  to  both  the  FBI  and  the  NSA,  and  there  is  more  cooperation 
than  I  have  ever  recalled  between  these  agencies  and  with  the  NSA 
and  with  the  CIA.  There  is  dramatically  more  cooperation.  There 
still  are  organizational  impediments.  The  law  enforcement  perspec- 
tive is  constraining,  from  an  intelligence  standpoint,  to  be  candid. 
So  there  are  issues  like  that. 

But,  as  you  pointed  out,  lots  has  happened.  Lots  of  good  things 
have  happened. 

Senator  SESSIONS.  Secretary  Hamre,  I  know  you  served  as  Dep- 
uty Secretary  and  also  as  the  Comptroller  to  the  DOD  under  Presi- 
dent Clinton's  administration,  but  let  me  ask  you  about  this.  It's 
the  "Central"  Intelligence  Agency.  I  presume  that  means  it's  sup- 
posed to  be  the  central  source  of  intelligence  for  the  country.  Was 
that  the  purpose  of  the  founding  of  this  agency,  or  one  of  the  pur- 
poses of  it? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Sir,  it's  supposed  to  be  the  one  and  only  all-source 
intelligence  center  that's  supposed  to  provide. 

Senator  Sessions.  So  if  we  create  another  one  now,  we're  putting 
layer  on  layer.  Is  that  what  you're  concerned  about? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Sir,  I  think  the  proposal  that  the  Commission  is  rec- 
ommending is  not  to  duplicate  the  CIA,  but,  indeed,  to  split  off  the 
central  coordination  role  of  the  DCI  from  the  CIA.  That's  where  my 
concern  lies,  is  that  I  think  that  recommendation,  if  left  at  that, 
will  actually  weaken  both,  and  that's  not  a  good  idea. 

Senator  Sessions.  I  had  an  opportunity  to  have  dinner  with 
some  CIA  agents  and  station  chiefs  and  it  was  8  o'clock.  They  said 
that  was  the  earliest  they  had  been  at  home.  They're  working  7 
days  a  week  to  serve  this  country.  I  don't  think  they  think  that  this 
Congress  or  the  American  people  have  any  idea  of  what  they  do. 
My  impression  was,  they  simply  felt  that  what  they  were  doing  was 
critical  to  this  country,  and  they  were  doing  it  because  they  love 
this  country. 

Mr.  Carlucci,  you  mentioned  "disruption"  and  Secretary  Schles- 
inger,  "do  no  harm."  Isn't  it  important  that  we  not  do  anything  that 
damages  the  morale  and  the  motivation  of  those  agents  in  CIA  and 
DIA  around  the  world  who  are  at  risk  for  us  this  very  moment? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I'm  glad  you  raised  that,  Senator  Sessions,  be- 
cause I  don't  think  enough  focus  has  been  given  to  the  recruitment 
of  human  assets  around  the  world.  I  have  worked  with  these  people 
throughout  a  26-year  Foreign  Service  career.  I  have  seen  them  do 
their  day  job  during  the  day,  do  their  CIA  work  all  night.  I've  seen 
the  strain  on  families.  I've  seen  the  dedication.  There's  no  recogni- 
tion. They  can't  become  ambassadors.  They  just  do  it  out  of  pure 
dedication.  We  need  to  support  them.  The  name  Dewey  Claridge 
probably  doesn't  mean  much  these  days,  but  there  is  a  man  who 
was  indicted  for  carrying  out  his  professional  responsibilities.  We 
don't  treat  them  well.  We  need — one  of  the  things — people  say, 
"Well,  we're  not  recommending  change."  I'm  recommending  a  very 


48 

serious  change,  that  we  make  sure  we  support  our  intelUgence  offi- 
cers in  the  field.  Recognize,  sure,  there  are  mistakes,  there  are  in- 
telHgence  faiUngs,  but  there  are  a  helluva  lot  of  dedicated  people 
out  there  doing  a  fine  job. 

Senator  SESSIONS.  Perhaps  what  Mr.  Tenet  meant  when  he  said 
it  would  take  5  years  to  get  this  thing  back  on  a  level  we'd  like 
to  see  it  move  to,  he  was  talking  about  the  delays  that  occur  when 
you  establish  HUMINT.  You  just  can't  do  that  overnight,  isn't  that 
correct,  Mr.  Carlucci? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  You  have  to  organize  some  cover.  You  have  to 
train,  you  have  to  organize  cover.  You  don't  just  go  out  and  hire 
an  Arab-speaking  officer  and  send  him  into  Iraq  or  Afghanistan 
and  say,  "Recruit."  It  takes  years  to  get  good  cover,  non-official 
cover.  You  can  do  embassy  cover  very  quickly.  But  non-official 
cover,  which  is  what  you  have  to  do  against  the  terrorist  target,  or 
against  hard  targets,  like  North  Korea  or  Iraq,  takes  years  to  de- 
velop. 

Senator  SESSIONS.  Secretary  Schlesinger,  you've  headed  two  cabi- 
net agencies.  I  happened  to  be  a  prosecutor  when  we  did  the  drug 
czar.  That  was  supposed  to  coordinate  all  the  Federal  agencies  on 
the  drug  front.  I'm  not  saying  it  did  not  have  some  positive  bene- 
fits, but  it's  pretty  hard,  is  it  not,  to  have  some  non-cabinet-level 
official  order  cabinet-level  officials  around? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  My  observation  is  that,  unless  a  czar  is  given 
an  agency,  that,  sooner  or  later,  like  Nicholas  II,  he  winds  up  at 
Ekaterinburg  with  a  bullet  in  his  head.  [Laughter.  1 

Two  quick  points,  Senator.  First,  the  disruption  that  Frank  re- 
ferred to  does  not  just  affect  our  ability  to  recruit  agents;  it  affects 
the  morale  of  the  people  in  the  Department.  When  you  shuffle 
around  agencies,  you're  going  to  pay  at  least  a  short-term  price,  be- 
cause individuals  in  the  system  will  be  concerned  about  where  they 
fit  into  the  new  system. 

Second  point,  we  are  now  dealing  with  a  different  kind  of  con- 
flict, and  the  CIA  was  established  to  bring  together  all  of  the  infor- 
mation that  came  from  the  then-Army  and  Navy  that  was  lost  dur- 
ing the  runup  to  Pearl  Harbor.  It  was  not  designed  to  bring  in  the 
FBI. 

When  I  joined  the  government  in  1969,  the  Director  of  the  FBI 
was  Herbert  Hoover,  who  had  given  orders  to  all  FBI  personnel 
never  to  speak  to  anybody  in  the  CIA.  Now,  that  is  real 
stovepiping.  Of  course,  there  were  all  these  clandestine,  if  I  may 
use — these  exchanges  of  information,  because  the  people  in  both 
the  FBI  and  the  CIA  recognized  that,  to  some  extent,  they  had  to 
work  together. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much,  Senator. 

Senator  Reed. 

Senator  Reed.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Thank  you,  gentlemen,  not  only  for  your  testimony,  but  for  your 
service  to  the  Nation  over  many  years. 

It  seems  to  me  we've  had  two  extraordinary  failures  in  intel- 
ligence, both  September  11  and  Iraq.  There  were  failures  in  collec- 
tion, analysis,  distribution  of  information,  and,  ultimately,  decision- 
making. They  represent — if  not  two  sides  of  a  coin,  slightly  dif- 
ferent phenomenon.  I  would  suspect  that  if  we  focus  only  on  Sep- 


49 

tember  11,  we  might  not  fully  realize  all  the  changes  that  we  have 
to  make. 

The  September  11  problem  has  a  domestic  component,  which  is 
not  the  case  if  we  look  at  North  Korea,  we  hope,  or  Iran.  Those  are 
strategic  problems  we  have  to  deal  with.  In  September  11,  it  was 
more  of  a  failure  of  warning.  In  Iraq,  it  certainly  wasn't  a  failure 
of  warning. 

Consistent,  though,  were  belief  structures.  We  believed,  before 
September  11,  they  could  never  do  an3d;hing  like  this.  With  respect 
to  Iraq,  we  believed  they  were  going  to  do  something  the  next  day. 

So,  again,  a  very  general  question,  but  in  terms  of  collection, 
analysis,  distribution,  decisionmaking,  what  specific  advice  would 
you  have  for  us?  Also,  what  about  this  notion  of  belief  structure, 
about — we  fool  ourselves  sometimes — not  the  bad  guys,  but  we  fool 
ourselves. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Let  me  comment  on  WMD,  if  I  may. 

Senator  Reed.  Yes,  sir. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Given  the  information  that  the  analysts  had, 
theirs  was  not  an  unreasonable  conclusion,  that  Saddam  Hussein 
had  WMD,  given  his  history.  The  problem  with  the  intelligence 
that  went  public  was  that  it  did  not  include  the  caveats  that  should 
have  been  included,  all  of  the  doubts,  all  of  the  holes. 

The  real  problem  with  intelligence  on  WMD  was  not  the  ana- 
lysts; it  was  the  failure  to  have  effective  HUMINT  from  inside  Iraq, 
which  is,  unlike  the  Soviet  Union  or  China,  more  readily  penetra- 
ble. That  we  had  no  solid  information.  The  analysts  were  working 
on  the  basis  of  inferences,  and  that's  all  they  had,  and  the  infer- 
ences are  not  unreasonable. 

Senator  Reed.  Mr.  Hamre? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Sir,  I  think  you've  identified  a  very  central  problem, 
which  is  this — as  you've  talked  about,  belief  structure,  or  some  peo- 
ple call  it  "group  think,"  which  sets  in.  I  can  only  think  of  one  real- 
ly structural  solution  to  that,  and  that's  to  make  sure  that  the  var- 
ious elements  of  the  government  that  have  to  come  together  to 
make  a  decision  in  the  executive  branch  have  to  report  to  different 
oversight  committees  up  here  on  the  Hill  and  explain  it  to  people 
with  different  perspectives.  That's  the  only  way  I  can  think  you  can 
do  that.  Therefore,  they  need  to  keep — retain  intelligence  capabili- 
ties for  assessment  purposes  and  for  their  own  department. 

Senator  Reed.  That  presupposes  that  our  oversight  will  be  vigor- 
ous and  consistent. 

Dr.  Hamre.  Yes,  sir,  and  I  hope  it  will. 

Senator  Reed.  Thank  you. 

This  issue  of  stovepipes  is  interesting.  We  all  understand  about 
stovepipes,  but  eventually  they  end,  and  that's  in  the  National 
Command  Authority,  where  the  President — not  just  this  President, 
but  any  President — has  to  challenge  these  agencies. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Usually  stripped  of  their  caveats. 

Senator  Reed.  Caveats,  yes.  But  that's  where  the  President  will 
ask  about  the  caveats,  one  would  hope,  because  to  assume  that  this 
is  all  simple  stuff,  I  think  misses  point  from  the  beginning,  which 
raises  a  question.  Maybe  it's  a  mundane  question,  but  with  all  this 
anticipated  moving  around  of  institutions  and  organizations  and 
analysis,  how  will  that  help  the  President  and  the  White  House 


50 

make  better  decisions?  I  think  it  is  really  one  of  the  fundamental 
questions,  and  I'd  appreciate  your  comments. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Look  at  the  issue  of  the  WMD  once  again.  My 
problem  with  that  is  that  the  agency  that  had  the  best  technical 
knowledge  was  disregarded.  The  Department  of  Energy  said,  "All 
of  our  people  who  have  looked  at  it  said  that  these  particular  tubes 
are  not  intended  for  centrifuges,"  and  that,  in  the  overall,  was 
pushed  aside.  You  have  to  have  a  system  that  has  respect  for  those 
who  have  the  closest  technical  knowledge. 

Senator  Reed.  Again,  I  think  that  kind  of  nuance  and  detail  is 
not  being  captured  in  the  discussion  of  creating  an  NID  and 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  No. 

Senator  Reed. — the  TTIC.  But  that's  really  where  it — eventually, 
you  make  the  judgment,  which  is,  basically,  giving  the  experts 
their  play,  letting  them  give  you  the  analysis.  In  that  case,  they  did 
connect  the  dots. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Yes. 

Senator  Reed.  But  they  were  ignored.  So  it's  not  all  the  time 
about  just  connecting  the  dots;  it's  having  decisionmakers  who  are 
willing  to  listen  and  to  probe  the  analysis. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  We  not  only  want  to  connect  the  dots,  we  want 
to  connect  them  correctly. 

Senator  Reed.  It  looks  as  if  we  will  do  something.  I  would  ask 
you,  what  do  you  think  is  the  minimum  we  should  do,  Mr.  Carlucci 
and  Dr.  Schlesinger  and  Dr.  Hamre?  Then  what  things,  specifically, 
we  might  defer  because  they're  hard  and  they  require  more  cogent 
thought  and  they  require,  perhaps,  just  more  time? 

Did  you  have  any  thoughts  in  that  regard? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Let  me  start.  I  think  we  ought  to  go  ahead  and 
create  the  NCTC  with  the  operational  planning  component  in  it. 
I'm  a  little  nervous  about  putting  operational  planning  too  close  to 
intelligence,  but  I  think,  given  the  changed  circumstances — Senator 
Lieberman,  you  said,  "It's  not  the  1970s" — we  ought  to  do  that.  We 
ought  to  find  ways  to  tighten  up  cooperation  between  domestic  and 
foreign  intelligence.  I  would  do  that  by  looking  at  the  DCI's  author- 
ity, seeing  if  that  could  be  enhanced,  seeing  what  kind  of  participa- 
tion the  FBI's  going  to  have  in  the  NCTC. 

I  would  defer  the  question  of  an  NID  until  we've  had  opportunity 
to  give  it  more  study. 

Senator  Reed.  Dr.  Hamre?  Dr.  Schlesinger? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Jim? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  Go  ahead. 

Dr.  Hamre.  As  I  said,  I  think  that  the  9/11  Commission  rec- 
ommendation would  give  us  too  strong  an  NID  for  what  we  want, 
and  I  think  the  President's  recommendation  is  too  weak  an  NID. 
So  if  we're  going  to  have  an  NID,  I  think  you  have  to  ground  him 
with  enough  institutional  heft  so  he  can  carry  out  the  duties  that 
I  think  Secretary  Carlucci  just  outlined.  He's  not  going  to  become 
a  strong  coordinator  if  he  has  no  underlying  institutional  base  for 
it. 

Senator  Reed.  Dr.  Schlesinger? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  I  agree  with  what  Frank  said,  and  partially 
agree  with  what  John  said. 


51 

The  point  to  keep  in  mind  is  that  one  can  estabUsh  a  czar  who 
has  a  sunset  provision,  not  at  any  fixed  date.  But  the  power  of  a 
czar  tends  to  fade  over  time.  So  when  it's  first  estabUshed,  there's 
great  fanfare,  and  so  on. 

Two  things  that  the  NID  could  do.  One  is  to  break  down  the  im- 
pediments to  the  flow  of  information  that  are  represented  by  each 
agency  having  its  own  special  classification  system.  There  is  no 
way  that  much  of  the  agency  material  cannot  pass  from  one  to  an- 
other, and  somebody  with  the  authority  of  the  President,  whether 
in  the  White  House  or  out  of  the  White  House,  can  break  down 
those  classification  barriers. 

The  second  point  that  I  would  make  is,  going  back  at  least  to  the 
time  of  Henry  Kissinger,  the  National  Security  Advisor  has  done  a 
lot  of  coordinating  for  the  President.  We  can  have  that  coordination 
formally  established  through  an  NID.  But  if  the  NID  does  not  have 
large  number  of  troops  under  his  control,  sooner  or  later  his  power 
will  fade. 

Senator  Reed.  Thank  you. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you.  Senator. 

Dr.  Schlesinger,  for  the  record,  you  replied  to  an  earlier  question 
by  Senator  Reed  comparing  the  former  Soviet  Union,  China,  and 
Iraq  with  regard  to  the  ability  to  get  HUMINT  in.  Would  you,  once 
again,  repeat  that?  Because  I  understood  you  to  say  it  would  be 
easier  to  get  into  Iraq  than  China  or  Russia. 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  That  would  be  correct. 

Chairman  Warner.  All  right.  Then  the  record  is  correct. 

Senator  Collins. 

Senator  Collins.  Thank  you. 

I  want  to  return  to  the  issue  that  was  raised  by  Senator 
Lieberman  and  Senator  Levin,  albeit  from  different  perspectives, 
about  whether  there  is  a  link  between  the  failures  prior  to  Septem- 
ber 11  and  the  issue  of  budget  authority  for  the  NID.  I  want  to  re- 
turn to  this,  because  I  think  there  is  a  link,  and  that  there  is  an 
important  link,  which  the  9/11  Commission  revealed. 

The  Commission  talks  about  DCI  Tenet  issuing  a  directive  in  De- 
cember 1998  in  which  he  says  the  following,  "We  are  at  war.  I  want 
no  resources  or  people  spared  in  this  effort,  either  inside  the  CIA 
or  in  the  community."  But  the  Commission  goes  on  to  note  that 
nothing  really  happened  after  that  directive  was  issued. 

To  me,  that  is  directly  attributable  to  the  fact  that  the  DCI  does 
not  have  the  authority  to  mobilize  resources  across  the  govern- 
ment, and  that's  why  I  do  think  the  idea  of  an  NID  with  significant 
authority  is  part  of  the  answer. 

Secretary  Carlucci,  you  mentioned  this  morning  Stansfield  Turn- 
er testifying  before  the  Governmental  Affairs  Committee.  He  en- 
dorsed the  creation  of  an  NID.  He  tells  a  story  about  how,  shortly 
after  he  took  over  as  DCI,  you  came  into  his  office,  as  deputy,  and 
said  something  to  the  effect  of,  "We  have  a  lot  of  levers  in  this  of- 
fice, but  I've  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  wires  have  been  cut 
and  that  they  aren't  actually  connected."  I  love  that  quote,  because 
I  think  it  sums  up  what's  wrong,  that  we  have,  on  paper,  a  position 
that  looks  like  he  would  have  considerable   authority,   but  that 


52 

when  it  comes  to  mobilizing  the  entire  IC,  the  powers  that  are 
needed,  the  authority's  simply  not  there. 

Secretary  Carlucci,  I'll  start  with,  could  you  respond  to  that, 
since  I'm  quoting,  or  trying  to  quote  you? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I've  not  had  the  opportunity  recently  to  do  an 
analysis.  Certainly,  I  felt  that  Stan  had  ample  authority,  and  exer- 
cised that  authority. 

My  point  is  that  if  you  don't  have  the  requisite  authority  with 
the  DCI,  don't  create  another  layer.  Give  the  requisite  authority  to 
the  DCI.  Let's  analyze  that,  see  what  he  needs — he  or  she — and 
make  sure  that  that  person  has  the  tools  to  do  the  job.  I'm  very 
much  afraid  of  the  disruption  that  goes  with  creating  another 
layer,  and  the  impact  that  might  have  on  our  warfighting  capabil- 
ity, as  well. 

Senator  Collins.  Dr.  Schlesinger? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  When  DCI  Tenet  made  that  observation  in 
1998,  that  we  are  at  war,  he  certainly  had  authority  within  the 
CIA,  which  has  large  numbers  of  people.  Every  element  of  the  CIA 
said,  "That's  right.  Just  don't  take  any  resources  away  from  me," 
so  that  you  wound  up  with  6  or  8  or  10  people  being  assigned  to 
Osama  bin  Laden.  It  wasn't  that  he  did  not  recognize  the  problem. 
It  was  that  there  was  bureaucratic  resistance,  or  lethargy,  what- 
ever you  want  to  call  it. 

I  am  sure  that  if  the  DCI  talks  to  the  Director  of  NSA  and  says, 
"This  is  our  problem.  Listen  carefully,"  that  the  Director  of  NSA 
will  respond  to  that.  If  he  doesn't,  a  conversation  with  the  SECDEF 
would  have  been,  should  have  been,  sufficient. 

The  problem  was  that  DOD  was  not  responsive  in  that  period. 
There  was  reluctance  to  get  involved.  Secretary  Cohen,  as  John 
Hamre  will  remember,  talked  about  the  threat  of  WMD  on  U.S. 
soil,  but  DOD  did  not  devote  the  resources,  and  was  certainly  op- 
posed to  any  military  action  to  go  after  al  Qaeda. 

Senator  Collins.  Dr.  Hamre? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Senator  Collins,  I  think  if  you  were  to  look  at  the 
statute  that  currently  gives  authority  to  the  DCI,  you'd  find  it  real- 
ly gives  the  authority  that  you're  seeking  in  the  NID.  So,  to  Sec- 
retary Carlucci's  point,  you  could — you  really  could — it's  already 
there.  The  authority  is  there.  I  think  you  have  to  ask,  why  hasn't 
it  worked?  Why  hasn't  it  happened?  I  think  the  candid  reaction  is 
that  the  DCI  bucks  up  against  big,  powerful  Cabinet  Secretaries, 
and  there's  always  compromise  in  all  that.  I  don't  want  to  quarrel 
about  the  priorities  of  the  1990s,  but  we  were  fighting  other  wars 
at  the  same  time,  and  so  you're  using — you're  always  apportioning 
your  scarce  resources — your  intelligence  resources,  your  military 
resources — for  a  range  of  things,  and  you're  making  a  judgment  as 
to  where  you  have  to  put  them  at  the  time.  I  don't  think  anybody 
consciously  said,  "Well,  we  know  there's  a  big  terrorist  threat  out 
there.  We're  just  going  to  ignore  it."  Nobody  ever  said  that.  I  think 
there  was  a  consciousness  change  on  September  11  that  made  all 
of  our  decisions  on  September  10  irrelevant.  I  think  that's  now 
what  we're  looking  at.  We're  looking  back  at  that  period  with  the 
consciousness  we  now  have,  on  September  11,  that  we  didn't  have 
before.  Now,  you  have  to  ask  yourself,  "What  do  I  do  about  that," 
in  terms  of  changing  the  government. 


53 

Senator  COLLINS.  That's  true.  But  it  seems  to  me  that  when  you 
have  a  call  to  action  that  is  as  stark  as  George  Tenet's  was  in  1998, 
when  he  says,  "We  are  at  war.  I  want  no  resources  or  people 
spared  in  this  effort  throughout  the  entire  IC,"  and  yet  little  hap- 
pens, that  suggests  to  me  a  flaw  in  our  structure,  and  that's  why 
we're  striving  so  hard  to  fix  that. 

I  see  my  time  has  expired.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Senator  Collins,  your  question,  to  me,  it  goes 
to  the  heart  of  a  point  that  I  raised  in  my  opening  statement.  Dr. 
Hamre  said  that  the  DCI  has  all  the  authority  he  feels  he  needs 
now;  it's  a  question  of  whether  to  exercise  it.  I  wondered,  did  the 
other  two  witnesses  concur  that  the  DCI,  under  current  law,  has 
sufficient  authority  to  do  those  things  that  we  envision  an  NID  will 
do? 

Mr.  Carluccl  I  haven't  made  a  study  of  it,  but  I  think  he  does. 
Certainly  he  did  when  I  was  in  the  CIA. 

Chairman  WARNER.  I  don't  think  the  law  has  been  changed  that 
way. 

Dr.  Schlesinger? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  I  think  that — I  don't  know  whether  he  has  all 
the  authority.  He  certainly  has  a  great  deal  more  authority  than 
was  exercised. 

I  might  observe,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  we  had  national  compla- 
cency in  that  period.  It  is  important  not  to  blame  national  compla- 
cency on  the  failure  of  the  IC.  It  was  a  general  national  failure. 

Mr.  Carluccl  Moreover,  we  don't  know  what  actions  George 
Tenet  tried  to  take  where  he  was  blocked.  I've  not  heard  any  evi- 
dence to  that  effect.  He  issued  the  warning.  Did  he  do  anything  to 
follow  up  on  the  warning?  I  don't  know. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you. 

Senator  Ben  Nelson? 

Senator  Ben  Nelson.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I'm  intrigued  by  the  discussion  about  solving  the  right  problem, 
because  I  think  that  the  tendency  in  Washington,  or  in  other  areas 
of  government  and  in  the  States  is,  typically  if  there's  a  problem, 
we  need  more  money,  a  reorganization,  some  other  layer  of  bu- 
reaucracy to  solve  it,  and  that's  what  we  typically  do.  So  I'm  hope- 
ful that  we  will  avoid  doing  that  here. 

In  that  regard,  I  also  hope  that  we  will  solve  the  current  prob- 
lem, rather  than  the  problem  on  September  11.  Let  me  be  clear  on 
that.  I  get  the  impression  that  maybe  some  of  the  circumstances 
that  existed  on  September  11  have  either  been  self-correcting  or 
have  had  some  correction  along  the  way  with  subsequent  knowl- 
edge and  experience.  If  that's  the  case,  isn't  it  important  that  we 
make  sure  that  the  recommendations  that  the  9/11  report  have  are 
for  the  current  situation,  versus  the  prior  situation?  I'd  like  to  get 
your  thoughts  about  that. 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  I  think  that  the  first  act  of  this  committee 
might  well  be  to  make  an  inventory  of  the  changes  that  have  actu- 
ally occurred  in  the  IC  and  beyond  the  IC  since  September  11. 
Then  you  will  be  able  to  deal  with  the  situation  as  you  see  it  today 
rather  than  the  defects  of  the  period  before  September  11. 

Mr.  Carluccl  I  think  your  point  is  right  on,  and  endorse  what 
Jim  said. 


54 

Dr.  Hamre.  I  agree. 

Senator  Ben  Nelson.  Now,  in  that  regard,  holding  back,  per- 
haps, on  the  NID  might  make  a  lot  of  sense,  because  if  you're  going 
to  put  somebody  in  a  position  to  be  part  of  the  solution,  you're 
going  to  have  to  deal  with  the  authority  issue.  That'll  relate  to 
budgeting,  hiring  and  firing,  policy  relating  to  implementation. 
Would  that  also  require  an  inventory  of  what  really  needs  to  be 
within  the  power  of  that  NID  if  we  choose  to  make  that  part  of  the 
solution? 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  I  think  that  you  might  well  indicate  to  that 
NID  the  priority  tasks,  because,  otherwise,  you  have  an  endless  list 
of  things  that  might  be  done,  and  there  are  certain  things  that  are 
high  priority  that  should  be  done. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  now  have  visions  of  an  enormous  bureaucracy 
turning  itself  inside  out  to  reorganizing,  everybody  writing  a  job 
description,  trying  to  figure  out  where  they're  going  to  be  the  next 
day,  figuring  out  what  pieces  of  the  CIA  should  go  to  the  new  NID, 
how  we  ought  to  intervene,  what  kind  of  command-and-control  ar- 
rangements he  ought  to  have  over  the  CSAs.  I  think  we  may  be 
creating  a  real  confusing  mess. 

Senator  Ben  Nelson.  I  was  about  to  say  that  that's  what  we  had 
with  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security,  but  I  would  suggest 
that  we're  still  having  it. 

Dr.  Hamre? 

Dr.  Hamre.  I'd  agree  with  what  you  just  said,  and  I  would  agree 
with  what  my  colleagues  said. 

Senator  Ben  Nelson.  Well,  what  an  agreeable  group.  [Laughter.] 

I  really  appreciate  that. 

As  we  relate  to  the  executive  branch,  with  the  oversight  from  the 
legislative  branch,  can  you  give  us  some  enlightenment,  your 
thoughts,  about  how  we  exercise  oversight  in  this  particular  area, 
with  a  number  of  committees  having  some  degree  of  oversight, 
some  of  it  overlapping?  Is  there  a  way  to  help  straighten  out  the 
relationship  between  the  executive  and  legislative  branches?  Hav- 
ing served  in  both,  myself,  at  the  State  level,  and  then  here  now, 
in  the  legislative  branch — is  that  a  bigger  question  than  we  have 
time  for? 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Senator,  if  you  can  persuade  your  colleagues 
to  put  protection  of  turf  further  down  their  priority  list,  you  will 
have  accomplished  a  great  deal. 

Senator  Ben  Nelson.  Are  you  going  to  touch  that  one,  Mr.  Car- 
lucci? 

Mr.  Carluccl  I've  never  been  on  the  Hill,  so  I'll  bow  out  of  that 
one. 

Dr.  Hamre.  Sir,  I  worked  up  here  for  10  years,  and,  frankly,  con- 
gressional oversight  amplifies  the  stovepipes  in  the  executive 
branch. 

Senator  Ben  Nelson.  Do  you  think  it  also  can — when  you  say 
"amplifies,"  it  just  creates 

Dr.  Hamre.  It  reinforces 


Senator  Ben  Nelson.  Reinforces  them? 

Dr.  Hamre. — reinforces  the  parochialism  inside  the  executive 
branch.  The  hearings,  Congress  tends  to  hear  from  its  favorite  de- 
partments and  agencies,  and  that  gets  reinforced  in  the  bureau- 


55 

cratic  fights  that  we  take  into  the  executive  branch.  So  it's — there 
does — it  really  does,  in  many  ways,  start  here.  I  would  think  that 
spending  some  time  figuring  out  some  reform,  bringing  yourselves 
together  in  a  cleaner  oversight,  would  help  a  great  deal. 

Senator  Ben  Nelson.  Probably  we'd  have  to  have  some  outside 
suggestions  brought  to  us,  because  it's  probably  not  easy  to  reform 
ourselves,  when  we  have  our  own  interests.  But  I  do  think  that 
that  will  have  to  be  part  of  the  solution  when  we  put  together 
whatever  the  recommendations  and/or  legislation  that  might  be 
forthcoming. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you,  Senator. 

I  believe,  under  the  leadership  of  Chairman  Roberts  and  Vice 
Chairman  Rockefeller,  that  that  is  the  subject  of  review  of  the  In- 
telligence Committee  on  which  I  serve. 

Senator  Ben  Nelson.  I  don't  believe  the  process  will  work  with- 
out reform  on  the  inside  here,  as  well. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you. 

Senator  Talent. 

Senator  Talent.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  really  want  to 
thank  you  for  holding  this  hearing.  It's  been  one  of  the  best  I've 
attended.  I  came  in  here  really  leaning  towards  this  whole  idea  of 
an  NID,  and,  I  have  to  say,  you've  made  a  very  powerful  case 
against  it,  which,  in  all  candor,  I  don't  think  has  been  shaken  very 
much  by  those  who  have  questioned  you  and  who  support  it. 

It  seems  to  me — and  tell  me  if  I'm  wrong — that  what  you're  basi- 
cally saying  is,  if  we  create  this  NID  and  he's  too  weak,  it's  just 
another  layer  of  bureaucracy,  which  nobody  wants;  and  if  he's  too 
strong,  there  is  a  considerable  risk  that  he  will  disrupt  the  actions 
of  his  new  directorate,  will  disrupt  the  considerable  amount  of  good 
work  that  is  going  on  within  the  agencies,  certainly  within  the  De- 
partment, without  fixing  what,  in  your  judgment,  really  went 
wrong.  Because,  I  take  it  from  your  testimony,  that  you  just  think 
there  is  no  substitute  for  getting  good  people  on  the  ground  who 
are  exercising  good  analytical  judgment  on  the  basis  of  both  good 
technical  and  human  intelligence.  Is  that  a  pretty  fair  summary  of 
what  you're  saying? 

Mr.  Carluccl  Perfect. 

Senator  Talent.  Perfect.  Mr.  Carlucci,  I  was  going  to  raise  a  lot 
of  issues  and  try  and  think  of  some  hypothetical  about  why  an 
agency,  let's  say,  station  head  or  an  agency  official  might  not  al- 
ways share,  in  order  to  protect  his  sources.  But  I  think  the  one  you 
came  up  with  in  your  testimony  about  the  hypothetical  Iraqi  offi- 
cial who  you're  trying  to  recruit,  and  if  he  knows  the  watchword 
of  the  day  throughout  the  Government  of  United  States  is  "share 
everything,"  he  might  be  a  little  bit  disinclined  to  put  his  neck  on 
the  line,  wouldn't  want  that  floating  up  in  every  discussion  that 
goes  on  in  Washington. 

Mr.  Carluccl  Back  in  the  days.  Senator  Talent,  when  we  could 
protect  sources  and  methods,  I  can  remember  as  an  FSO  having  a 
particularly  important,  but  highly  sensitive  contact.  I  deliberately 
turned  him  over  to  the  agency  because  they  could  run  him  in  a  cov- 
ert way,  and  that  would  better  benefit  the  U.S.  Government,  even 
though  it  would  not  help  my  career. 


56 

Senator  Talent.  So  you  turned  him  over  to  the  agency  because 
you  knew  they  could  stovepipe  it. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Yes,  I  knew 

Senator  Talent.  Put  it  that  way. 

Mr.  Carluccl  Exactly. 

Senator  Talent.  They  could  protect  that  source. 

Mr.  Carluccl  They  could  protect  that  source,  and  he  went  on 
being  protected  for  years. 

Senator  Talent.  All  right.  So  it  seems  to  me — and  tell  me  if  I'm 
wrong — that  you're  recommending  several  things.  One  of  them — 
and  I  think  I  heard  you  all  very  strongly  on  this,  and  I'm  really 
inclined  to  agree  with  this — that  there  has  been  no  effective  case 
made,  either  by  the  9/11  Commission  or  otherwise — and  certainly 
sitting  on  this  committee,  both  here  in  the  Senate,  and  in  the 
House,  I  agree  with  this — there's  been  no  case  made  that  the  collec- 
tion and  dissemination  of  intelligence  within  the  Department,  for 
the  purpose  of  supporting  tactical  military  operations  in  theater,  is 
broken.  That  is  working,  and  working  because  of  efforts  made 
throughout  the  Department  ever  since — well,  for  the  last  20  years, 
and  certainly  since  Operation  Desert  Storm.  So  we  must,  at  all  ac- 
counts, not  break  that.  In  other  words,  it  took  a  lot  of  effort  to  get 
that  to  where  it  is,  and  we  have  to  be  careful  we  don't  break  it. 
Is  that  a  fair  statement? 

Mr.  Carluccl  Jim  made  the  case  very  well,  I  thought. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  May  I 

Senator  Talent.  Yes,  go  ahead.  Please. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER. — go  back  to  your  first  statement?  It  was  per- 
fect, except  in  one  respect 

Senator  Talent.  Yes. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER. — that  NID  can  be  too  strong  and  too  weak  at 
the  same  time.  [Laughter.] 

Senator  Talent.  Having  only  5  minutes,  I  don't  know  that  I'll  go 
into  it;  besides  which,  I  understand  in  the  less  nuanced  way  that 
you've  presented  it  to  this  point,  and  I  don't  know  that  I  want  to 
mess  up  my  understanding. 

I  feel  strongly  about  that,  also.  I  have  seen  this  work — I  think 
we  all  have — in  classified  settings,  and  I  know  that  commanders  in 
theater  now  have  confidence  in  this.  I  think  if  we  turn  this  over 
to  a  directorate,  I  think  you're  absolutely  right.  Dr.  Schlesinger, 
there's  a  tremendous  danger  that  either  it  won't  work,  or  they'll  be- 
lieve it  won't  work  in  theater,  and  that  could  cost  us  lives.  The 
funny  thing  is,  if  it  does  cost  us  lives,  and  there's  some  huge  fail- 
ures, we'll  probably  appoint  some  commission  and  then  have  a 
bunch  of  hearings  after  that,  and  go  back  and  ask  ourselves  why 
that  happened,  and  it  will  have  been  the  result  of  not  being  careful 
not  to  fix  what  isn't  broken. 

The  second  point  I  hear  you  saying  is,  look,  if  there  are  further 
obstacles  to  prevent  sharing  between  FBI  and  CIA,  we  ought  to  get 
rid  of  them.  Now,  to  utter  a  little  dissenting  point  of  view.  I  re- 
member some  of  the  abuses  in  the  1970s  that  were  the  reason  why 
those  Chinese  walls  were  set  up.  Can  we  do  the  sharing  without 
the  abuses?  I  guess  this  isn't  any  of  your  field  of  expertise,  but  do 
you  want  to  comment  on  it? 


57 

Mr.  Carlucci.  One  thing  that  that  ignores  is  the  degree  of  over- 
sight that  you  currently  have. 

Senator  Talent.  Yes. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Jim  Angleton  couldn't  perform  today  the  way  he 
had  performed — the  way  he  performed  back  in  the  1970s.  Congress 
would  have  full  knowledge  of  the  activities.  So  I  think  oversight 
takes  care  of  that  problem. 

Senator  TALENT.  Okay.  So,  again,  yes,  allow  the  sharing,  encour- 
age the  sharing,  but  have  effective  and  honest  people  in  charge  to 
do  the  oversight. 

Mr.  Chairman,  that's  all  I  have  to  say.  I  had  more  coming  in.  I 
think  they've  made  a  pretty  strong  case.  I  appreciate  your  holding 
the  hearing. 

Thank  you. 

Chairman  WARNER.  I  appreciate.  Senator,  your  arranging  your 
schedule  to  be  back  here  for  today  and  tomorrow,  and  your  partici- 
pation. Thank  you. 

Senator  Dayton. 

Senator  DAYTON.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  join  with  the  oth- 
ers in  thanking  you  for  convening  this  and  tomorrow's  hearings. 
Gentlemen,  thank  you  for  your  appearance  and  your  service. 

I  want  to  focus  on  a  different  set  of  failures  that  were  disclosed 
in  the  9/11  Commission  Report,  which  were  the  failures  to,  as  I 
read  it,  follow  some  of  the  existing  protocols  and  procedures,  and, 
thereby,  a  failure  to  the  respond  to  the  actual  attack,  on  September 
11.  Given  especially  your  experience  at  the  very  top  of  the  civilian 
chain  of  command,  I'd  just  like  to  see  whether  what  strikes  me  as 
some  egregious  disconnects  were,  in  fact,  what  I  perceive  them  to 
be. 

Because  we  talk  about  this  need  for  fundamental  reorganization 
or  reform  and  these  different  words  at  these  levels  of  sophisticated 
intelligence  gathering,  coordination,  et  cetera,  which  I  don't  dis- 
pute. We've  spent  now  this  morning  in  another  committee  hearing 
and  this  afternoon.  It's  about  6  hours  well  spent  on  these  various 
aspects. 

But  according  to  the  Commission  report,  at  least  two,  and  prob- 
ably three,  orders  from  the  Vice  President  of  the  United  States, 
through  a  military  aide,  to  North  American  Aerospace  Defense 
Command  (NORAD)  to  communicate  to  the  fighter  planes  that 
were  in  the  air  at  that  time,  the  authority  to  shoot  down  an  incom- 
ing enemy  plane,  a  hijacked  plane,  were  not  passed  on  to  the  fight- 
er pilots  by  the  mission  commander.  On  page  83,  both  the  NORAD 
mission  commander  and  the  senior  weapons  director  indicated  they 
did  not  pass  the  order  to  the  fighters  circling  Washington  and  New 
York  because  they  were  unsure  how  the  pilots  would  or  should  pro- 
ceed with  this  guidance.  Leaving  aside  that  this  authorization  from 
the  Vice  President,  based  on,  as  he's  communicated,  his  conversa- 
tion with  the  President  occurred  2  hours  after  the  first  hijacking 
began,  and  10  minutes  after  the  last  plane  actually  had  crashed  in 
the  fields  of  Pennsylvania,  the  fact  that  it  was  not  passed  on  by 
NORAD  to  the  pilots,  to  me,  just  is  astonishing. 

The  Commission  goes  on  in  the  next  paragraph  to  say,  "In  most 
cases,  the  chain  of  command  authorizing  the  use  of  force  runs  from 
the  President  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  and  from  the  Secretary 


58 

of  Defense  to  the  combatant  commander."  The  President  appar- 
ently spoke  to  Secretary  Rumsfeld  the  first  time  that  morning 
shortly  after  10:00.  No  one  can  recall  the  content  of  this  conversa- 
tion, but  it  was  a  brief  call  in  which  the  subject  of  shoot-down  au- 
thority was  not  discussed. 

Then  the  SECDEF,  who  I  give  full  credit  for  going  courageously 
to  the  site  of  the  Pentagon  explosion,  returned  at  10:39 — this  is  2V2 
hours  now  after — almost  2  hours  and  25  minutes  after  the  first  hi- 
jacking commenced — and  the  Vice  President  is  understandably  of 
the  belief  that  he's  passed  on  these  orders  and  that  they're  being 
carried  out,  and  the  SECDEF  seems  to  be — very  appropriately  is 
saying,  "Who  did  you  give  the  direction  to?" 

The  SECDEF,  "Let  me"— you  know,  "Has  that  directive  been 
transmitted  to  the  aircraft?" 

The  Vice  President,  'Tes,  it  has." 

Secretary  of  Defense,  "Just  to  be  clear,  so  you  have  a  couple  of 
aircraft  up  there  that  have  those  instructions  at  the  present  time." 

Vice  President,  "That  is  correct.  It's  my  understanding  they've  al- 
ready taken  a  couple  of  aircraft  out." 

Now,  if  you  were  the  SECDEF  in  this  situation,  and  that  order 
from  the  Vice  President  of  the  United  States,  transmitted  that  way 
to  the  defense  of  this  country  has  not  been  communicated  to  the 
pilots  up  there?  I  mean,  is  that  an  acceptable  procedure,  or  is  that 
as  egregious  a  failure  to  defend  this  country  as  it  appears  to  me? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  It's  certainly  not  acceptable.  Defense  never 
trained  for  this  kind  of  circumstance. 

Senator  Dayton.  Well,  but 

Mr.  Carlucci.  But  that's  no  excuse.  But  that's  a  fact. 

Senator  Dayton.  They  trained  to  follow  out  the  command — I 
mean,  that's  what  I'm  trying  to  understand.  Is  it  a  failure  to  estab- 
lish the  proper  chain  of  command?  If  the  SECDEF  had  given  a 
command  from  the  President  of  the  United  States,  would  that  have 
been  carried  out  without  question?  Or,  in  this  case,  given  that  it 
came  from  the  Vice  President,  based  on  a  verbal  conversation  with 
the  President,  who's  up  on  Air  Force  One,  understandably — is  up 
there  and,  by  his  own  testimony,  is  having  difficulty  with  the  com- 
munications system  there,  which  is  another  concern,  to  commu- 
nicate in  an  ongoing  line  of  communication  with  the  Vice  President. 
The  Vice  President  transmits  an  order  from — or  an  instruction 
from  the  President  to  NORAD,  and  it's  not  passed  on.  Where  is  the 
breakdown  here?  Just  because  it  hasn't  been  rehearsed? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  can't  answer  that. 

Senator  DAYTON.  No,  I  mean,  I — is  it — I  mean,  I'm  aston- 
ished  

Dr.  Hamre.  Sir,  I'm  not  going  to  try  to  answer  it.  But  for  some- 
thing of  this  nature,  there  are  procedures  that  an  action  officer  in 
a  command  center  will  check  that  he's  received  a  valid  order.  Very 
few  action  officers  actually  are  talking  to  the  Vice  President  on  the 
other  end.  So  there  is  a  procedure  and  a  set  of  very  specified  direc- 
tions so  that  you  get  a  validated  order,  so  you  know  you  are  under 
the  authority  of  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  United  States  to 
taken  an  action. 

I  surmise  that  those — that  that  wasn't  in  place.  It  was  happening 
so — in  such  a  chaotic  way,  and  it  just  wasn't  there.  People  said. 


59 

"Well,  wait  a  minute,  we  don't — we  didn't  get  X,  Y,  Z  kind  of  a  mes- 
sage from  such  and  such,"  and  they  probably  said,  "Well,  how  do 
you  know  this  is  real?" 

I'm  speculating  here,  sir,  but  I — we  need  to  be — we  know  now 
that  we  have  to  be  ready  for  this.  We  didn't  have  that  conscious- 
ness on  September  11,  and  my  guess  is,  is  that  they  didn't  have 
the — they  didn't  follow  a  predesignated  format  for  authenticating  a 
communication  from  the  President  of  the  United  States.  We  know 
how  to  do  that  for  nuclear  war.  We've  never  had  that  for  an  episode 
like  this.  So  before  we  just  say  that  there  was  an  egregious  failure 
of  duty,  my  guess  is  there  are  some  operational  details  I  need  to 
understand  better  before  I  could  jump  to  the  conclusion  that  said 
that  it  was  a  dereliction  of  duty. 

Senator  DAYTON.  I'm  not  suggesting  that  at  all.  I  think  people 
were  individually  responding  according  to  their  own  judgment.  Cer- 
tainly, the  Vice  President  was  running  the  command  post  there. 

Dr.  Hamre.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  DAYTON.  The  fact  that  we  didn't  receive — weren't  receiv- 
ing the  kind  of  incoming  enemy  attack  that  we  thought  we  would 
be  receiving 

Dr.  Hamre.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Dayton. — in  some  other  circumstance 

Dr.  Hamre.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Dayton. — obviously,  is 

Dr.  Hamre.  I  certainly  understand  your  question.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Dayton.  The  other  point  I  would  just  make,  because  it 
leads  to — and  I  know  I'm  out  of  time  here — but  due  to  the — I  think, 
the  good  graces  of  the  chairman  of  the  committee  and  his — the  lo- 
cation of  the  National  Airport  at — in  the  State  of  Virginia,  we're 
operating  that  with  some  risk  to  the  Capitol,  to  the  White  House, 
and  the  like.  We  had  a  situation  with  the  Governor  of  Kentucky 
which  has  been  largely  overlooked  by  Congress  and  by,  I  think,  the 
powers  that  be  in  the  last — about  2  months  ago  that  says  to  me, 
if  you  look  at  the  failure,  again,  of  communications — we  evacuated 
this  entire  complex.  A  couple  of  thousand  people  were  literally  run- 
ning for  their  lives  out  of  the  buildings  because  of  a  failure  again — 
and  I  can't  get  into  this  all — of  the  Federal  Aviation  Administration 
(FAA)  to  communicate  with  NORAD,  to  communicate,  in  this,  with 
the  Capitol  Police.  So,  the  axiom,  what  is  condoned  continues — yes, 
we  were  caught  very  much  by  surprise  on  September  11,  but  I  see 
continuing  evidence  of  a  failure  of  the  established  procedures  to  be 
followed  in  a  situation  2  months  ago.  Fortunately,  it  was  the  Gov- 
ernor of  Kentucky  in  a  propellor  plane  rather  than  some  other  kind 
of  attack.  But  it  really  alarms  me. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  just  would  submit  that  I  hope  we  can  pursue 
this,  because  we  can  do  all  the  intelligence  reorganization,  and  we 
can  spend  billions  more,  or  billions  differently,  but  if  we  don't  have 
basic  lines  of  authority  that  we're  going  to  follow  in  those  situa- 
tions of  a  national  emergency,  it  doesn't  matter,  frankly,  how  much 
we  spend,  it's  going  to  fail  again. 

Thank  you. 

Chairman  Warner.  Senator,  your  point  is  well  taken.  The  Sen- 
ator's point  is  well-taken. 

Dr.  Schlesinger? 


60 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  I  can  well  understand  why  you  are  per- 
turbed  

Senator  Dayton.  Stunned. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER. — but  not  astonished.  The  order  to  shoot  down 
a  passenger  airliner  is  met  with  a  certain  incredulity,  and  we  were 
not  prepared  for  this  occasion.  A  fundamental  point  to  bear  in  mind 
is,  we  had  a  clear  chain  of  command,  and  yet  there  was  a  failure. 
Reorganization  is  not  going  to  solve  that  problem. 

Senator  Dayton.  Right.  Thank  you. 

Thank  you. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Senator  Chambliss. 

Senator  Chambliss.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Gentlemen,  you  bring  a  wealth  of  experience  and  knowledge  to 
this  particular  issue.  By  being  here  today,  you're  again  performing 
a  great  public  service  to  your  country,  so  we  thank  you  for  your 
service  here  today. 

I'm  one  of  the  folks  who  started  out  not  being  supportive  of  an 
NID,  and  for  a  lot  of  the  same  reasons  that  you  have  enunciated 
here  today;  particularly,  Secretary  Carlucci,  your  statement  regard- 
ing another  level  of  bureaucracy  continues  to  bother  me  today,  even 
though  I've  come  around  to  thinking  we  need  this  position.  But  if 
we  create  simply  another  level  of  bureaucracy,  we're  going  to  do  a 
lot  more  harm  than  we're  going  to  do  good,  and  the  next  9/11  re- 
port's going  to  be  twice  as  thick,  say  the  same  thing,  and  yet  we're 
going  to  have  another  incident  that  has  occurred. 

But  the  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  there  are  a  number  of  agencies 
involved.  We've  talked  about  a  lot  of  them  here  today.  We've  been 
primarily  concentrating  on  DOD,  but  there  are  a  number  of  depart- 
ment heads  that  we've  not  even  alluded  to  today,  some  of  which  are 
scratched,  from  a  surface  standpoint,  in  the  9/11  report.  For  exam- 
ple, the  Department  of  Transportation.  We  were  just  talking  about 
the  FAA  here.  You  have  Amtrak  involved.  You  have  all  of  our 
major  transportation  systems  in  every  major  city  in  the  country 
that  would  have  to  be  involved. 

The  one  major  issue  that,  again,  is  touched  on  by  the  9/11  Com- 
mission Report  that  complicates  this  issue  even  further  is  the  im- 
migration issue.  We're  in  the  process  right  now,  Senator  Kennedy 
and  I,  of  trying  to  make  some  major  changes  relative  to  how  we 
deal  with  visas  and  who  comes  into  this  country.  You  have  to  have 
some  mechanism  for  tying  all  of  these  issues — whether  it's  defense, 
immigration,  transportation,  or  whatever — together  and  make  sure 
that  all  of  that  information  is  getting  into  one  funnel,  and  that  that 
funnel  is  where  it  ought  to  be,  and  it  can  get  there  in  real  time — 
and  not  just  get  in  the  funnel  in  real  time,  but  get  out  to  the  other 
people  that  need  that  information  in  real  time. 

Because  of  that,  I  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  an  NID  can 
act  in  the  same  manner  as  a  chief  executive  officer  of  a  major  cor- 
poration if  he  has  the  right  tools  with  which  to  do  it.  If  you  don't 
give  them  to  him,  then  he's  not  going  to  be  able  to  do  it. 

But  there's  nobody  out  there  right  now — even  with  the  powers 
that  the  DCI  has,  he  has  no  control  over  the  FBI.  Director  Mueller 
is  responsible  to  Attorney  General  Ashcroft,  he  should  be,  and  we 
can't  change  that  structure.  DIA  is  responsible  to  the  SECDEF.  We 


61 

can't  change  that  structure.  You  are  absolutely  right  that  the 
warfighter  who  is  on  the  ground  in  Iraq  has  to  have  the  confidence 
that  his  military  superiors  are  the  ones  who  are  going  to  give  that 
answer  to  him. 

So  there  has  to  be  somebody  out  there  to  get  all  of  this  informa- 
tion together,  and  get  their  arms  around  it,  and  make  sure  that 
these  folks  are  talking  to  each  other,  the  stovepipes  are  broken 
down.  The  Chinese  walls.  Dr.  Schlesinger,  that  you  referred  to,  be- 
tween law  enforcement  and  intelligence,  are — they're  down  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  Patriot  Act.  They  have  to  stay  down.  It's  absolutely  im- 
perative that  they  do.  Somebody  has  to  coordinate  all  of  that. 

I  guess  it's  our  job  to  try  to  figure  out,  taking  the  information 
that  you  and  other  folks  are  giving  us  as  to  how  we  do  that — there 
is  a  statement  that  you  made.  Dr.  Hamre,  which  I  appreciate,  and 
I  wrote  it  down,  where  you  said  that  an  NID  really  has  to  have  an 
institutional  base  if  he's  going  to  be  successful.  I  know  your  com- 
ments relative  to  moving  NRO  and  our  other  two  agencies  out  of 
DIA — or  DOD — under  an  NID  would  go  towards  doing  that.  But  I'd 
like  you  to  expand  a  little  bit  on  that. 

What  else  does  this  individual  need  to  have?  We  can  say  he 
ought  to  be  able  to  hire  and  fire,  he  ought  to  have  budget  author- 
ity, but,  as  you  and  I  were  talking  earlier,  from  a  practical  stand- 
point that  is  going  to  be  extremely  difficult,  and  we're  not  going  to 
be  able  to  do  this  by  the  October  1  deadline  that's  been  imposed 
on  us. 

But  would  you  expand  on  what  you  mean  by  that  institutional 
base  and  where  we  need  to  go? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Yes,  sir.  Senator  Chambliss.  The  reason  I  don't  want 
to  take  away  DIA  from  the  SECDEF  is  the  same  as  why  I  don't 
want  to  take  the  Bureau  of  Intelligence  and  Research  away  from 
the  Secretary  of  State.  They  need  those  things.  But  there  are  a  set 
of — the  large  collection  agencies,  the  factories — they  run  the  sat- 
ellites, they  run  the  listening  stations.  They're  in  the  business  of 
just  collecting  wholesale,  large  amounts  of  information  and  then 
distributing  it  to  the  analysts.  My  view  is  that  that  could  be 
brought  under  this  NID.  This  would  be  a  very  significant  institu- 
tion. These  would — this  would  be  tens  of  millions — or  tens  of  thou- 
sands of  people,  tens  of  billions  of  dollars  annual  budget.  It  would 
be  a  very  substantial  base,  and  he  would  be — or  he  or  she  would 
be  the  supplier,  then,  of  intelligence  to  the  analytic  agencies,  which 
would  remain  with  the  secretaries.  That  would  be  considerable  in- 
stitutional clout. 

Now,  it  also  means  that  everybody  else  in  the  government  is 
going  to  be  in  the  position  of  demanding  better  quality  from  him 
and  those  factories.  Those  factories  need  now  to  support  all  those 
people.  Right,  now,  in  DOD,  frankly,  we  tend  to  spend  more  time 
defending  them  because  they're  in  our  budget,  rather  than  demand- 
ing they  give  us  good  quality.  We  tend  to  do  that  through  different 
channels. 

So  I  don't  personally  believe  that  you  need  to  have  budget  control 
in  order  to  get  good  quality  out  of  those  agencies.  Frankly,  it  hasn't 
been  budget  tools  that  we've  largely  used  to  get  the  coordination 
at  the  tactical  level,  it's  been  direct.  It's  making  it  a  CSA.  I,  person- 
ally, would  be — would  want  to  make  sure  that  the  head  of  those 


62 

agencies  is  a  military  officer,  and  remains  under  military  command 
and  control.  I  think  there  are  ways  you  can  handle  that.  But  that 
way,  you'll  put  genuine  heft  underneath  that  NID.  If  you  don't 
have  that,  then  he  really — I  think,  a  little  like  Secretary  Schles- 
inger  said,  he's  a  czar,  with  power  for  the  first  half  a  year,  and 
then  it  starts  to  atrophy  quite  quickly. 

Senator  Chambliss.  Anybody  else  have  a  comment  on  that? 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  The  first  comment  is  that  any  reorganization 
is  going  to  have  advantages  and  it's  going  to  have  disadvantages, 
and  you  want  to  be  sure  that  the  advantages  outweigh  the  dis- 
advantages. 

The  second  point  is  this.  There  are  a  variety  of  ways  to  handle 
this.  You  could  raise  the  DCI  from  executive-level  two  to  executive- 
level  one.  You  could  double-hat  him  as  not  only  the  head  of  the  CIA 
and  DCI,  but  he  could  be  the — designated  as  part  of  the  executive 
office  as  advisor  to  the  President  without  splitting  the  analytic  ac- 
tivities in  a  way  that  simply  adds  another  layer  to  the  system.  You 
can  create,  by  legislation,  that  the  clandestine  services,  the  Direc- 
torate of  Operations  is  handed  off  to  a  deputy.  You  could  do  what 
has  happened  in  the  Department  of  Energy,  which  is  to  strip  out 
the  national  security  functions  and  put  it  under  a  quasi-independ- 
ent agency  known  as  the  National  Nuclear  Security  Administra- 
tion, in  which  the  clandestine  services  would  be  responsive  to  an 
administrator  of  clandestine  services,  whatever  you  call  it. 

So  there  are  a  whole  variety  of  things  that  can  be  done,  but  hav- 
ing a  DCI  and  an  NID  at  the  same  time,  it  seems  to  me,  is  going 
to  be  counterproductive. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Thank  you  very  much.  Senator. 

Senator  Clinton. 

Senator  Clinton.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  thanks  to  our 
witnesses  for  being  here  today. 

Mr.  Chairman,  it  seems  to  me  that  we're  struggling  with  two 
very  significant  questions  that  are  difficult  to  answer.  One  is,  in  a 
system  with  different  and  sometimes  competing  intelligence  agen- 
cies, both  for  collection  and  analysis,  how  do  we  ensure  accountabil- 
ity? The  second  is,  how  do  we  ensure  that  executive  branch  officials 
do  not  cherry-pick  the  intelligence  that  most  conforms  to  their 
views,  or,  I  think,  in  the  words  of  Secretary  Schlesinger,  the  con- 
cept of  reality  that  they  hold? 

We're  dealing  with  human  beings,  we're  dealing  with  politics, 
we're  dealing  with,  unfortunately,  partisan  politics.  You  had  a 
DOD  that  already  controlled  80  to  85  percent  of  the  intelligence 
budget,  and  yet  the  current  SECDEF  thought  it  necessary  to  create 
an  Office  of  Special  Plans,  and  go  and  find  even  more  intelligence 
to  be  used  for  whatever  concept  of  reality  existed.  You  had  a  Vice 
President  who  went  over  to  the  CIA — not  once,  but  enumerable 
times — to  find  out  what  he  could  find  out  that  would  fit  his  concept 
of  reality. 

So  we  need  a  system  that  can  ensure  accountability,  but  also  put 
some  checks  and  balances  back  into  this  system.  It  is  certainly 
clear  that  many  signals  were  missed.  There's  no  doubt  about  that. 
But  I  think  it  would  be  a  shame  and  a  tragic  indictment  of  all  of 
us  if  we  are  not  more  straightforward  and  honest  about  the  prob- 
lems we  face. 


63 

I  listened  with  great  interest  to  my  friend  Senator  Sessions  go 
on  and  on  about  the  questions  concerning  trade-craft  and  the  expo- 
sure of  people,  yet  I  have  not  heard  one  call  from  anyone  on  the 
other  side  of  the  aisle  to  conduct  a  congressional  investigation  into 
the  outing  of  Valerie  Plame.  Talk  about  an  example  that's  going  to 
send  Shockwaves  through  the  existing  CIA  and  any  of  our  friends 
and  allies  around  the  world.  There's  no  drumbeat  for  any  congres- 
sional investigation.  Why?  Because  it's  in  partisan  politics. 

So  I  think  we  can  rearrange  the  deck  chairs  on  the  Titanic  from 
now  until  doomsday,  but  we  need  to  reassert  a  sense  of  ethics  and 
responsibility  that  go  beyond  partisan  politics  again  to  get  back  to 
an  old-fashioned  American  patriotism  where  our  highest  obligation 
is  to  whatever  the  facts  lead  us  to.  I  don't  know  how  we  get  that 
by  changing  statutes,  laws,  and  rearranging  government  positions. 

I  also  think  it  would  be  irresponsible  of  our  committee  not  to 
take  a  hard  look  at  Defense  intelligence.  It  may  very  well  be — and 
I  think  the  arguments  are  quite  compelling — that  you  don't  want 
to  interfere  with  the  chain  of  command  or  in  any  way  upset  the 
tactical  intelligence  that's  needed  in  combat.  But  there  have  been 
mistakes,  and  there  have  been  missed  opportunities,  both  oper- 
ational and  tactical. 

I  still  don't  understand  what  happened  at  Tora  Bora.  I  don't  un- 
derstand what  happened  when  the  Predator  allegedly  had  bin 
Laden  in  their  sights  and  didn't  fire.  I  don't  know  what  happened. 
I  think  we  need  to  know  what  happened. 

So  even  if  we  conclude  that  it  is  not  prudent  to  put  any  over- 
arching authority  over  Defense  intelligence,  we'd  better  make  sure 
we're  doing  whatever  is  needed  to  improve  Defense  intelligence, 
both  collection  and  analysis,  and  not  act  as  though,  "Oh,  well,  we're 
not  going  to  mess  with  Defense  intelligence,  because  that  might 
possibly  interrupt  the  chain  of  command  and  tactical."  We  need  to 
make  sure  we're  doing  the  best  job  we  can  with  Defense  intel- 
ligence. 

There  was  an  example,  and  the  9/11  Commission  talks  about  it. 
They  call  it  "the  millennium  exception."  At  a  certain  point  in  time, 
all  the  forces  of  our  government  were  called  into  a  room,  day  after 
day  after  day,  run  by  the  National  Security  Advisor,  because,  after 
all,  all  of  these  decisions  ultimately  are  going  to  be  decided  in  the 
White  House.  I  don't  care  who  you  put  in  charge  anywhere  else. 
What  we  need  to  do  is  to  figure  out  how  to  have  a  system  that  rep- 
licates what  worked  the  one  time  in  our  recent  history  where  we 
think  it  worked,  and  that  required  literally  having  people  in  the 
same  room,  being  held  accountable,  having  their  information  vet- 
ted, asking  for  further  information  from  the  collection,  as  well  as 
the  analyst,  side. 

So  I  think  that  it's  important  that  we  take  seriously  the  need  to 
reorganize  if  it  is  necessary,  but  there's  a  much  more  important, 
deeper  issue  at  stake  here.  That  is  to  try  to  de-politicize  the  collec- 
tion, analysis,  cherry-picking  utilization  of  intelligence,  no  matter 
where  it  comes  from.  I  hope  that  that  won't  even  be  an  issue  post- 
September  11.  But,  as  I  say,  the  outing  of  Valerie  Plame  does  not 
give  me  a  lot  of  confidence  that  we  would  use  a  CIA  operative  for 
partisan  political  advantage. 


64 

So  I  guess,  from  my  perspective — and  I  take  very  seriously  what 
each  of  you  have  said;  I  have  high  regard  for  your  opinions,  based 
on  many  years  of  service — but  let's  focus  for  just  a  minute  in  the 
area  of  each  of  your  expertise.  Are  there  types  of  changes  that  you 
think  our  Defense  and  military  intelligence  need  to  make  to  im- 
prove on  its  performance,  going  forward,  in  both  battlefield  situa- 
tions like  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  and  with  respect  to  the  point  that 
my  colleague  Senator  Dayton  made?  He's  been  beating  this  horse 
quite  vigorously  in  every  hearing,  because  he  is — as,  I  think,  right- 
ly so — quite  appalled  by  what  the  ticktock  is  that  broke  down  the 
chain  of  command  under  unusual,  but,  nevertheless,  pressing  cir- 
cumstances. So  could  each  of  you  just  address  the  Defense  and 
military  intelligence  issue  for  a  moment? 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Several  comments.  The  first,  Senator  Clinton, 
is,  there  may  be  cherry-picking,  but  it  does  not  affect,  in  my  judg- 
ment, collection,  which  you  mentioned.  I  think  that  the  collection 
activities  go  on.  I  think  that  the  attempt — we  have  had  failures  in 
collection — most  obviously,  HUMINT,  in  Iraq — but  I  don't  think 
that  the  problem  of  collection  is  either  partisan  politics  or  cherry- 
picking.  Now,  the  interpretation  is  a  problem. 

The  second  point  that  I  would  make  is,  in  the  past,  we  have,  as 
you  indicated,  had  less  partisan  politics,  and  I  join  with  you  in 
wishing  that  we  could  return  to  those  days.  But  one  must  distin- 
guish between  partisan — problems  of  partisan  politics  and  the 
problems  of  real  policy  differences.  Real  policy  differences  are  ap- 
propriate, and  people  will  disagree  with  regard  to  what  should  be 
done,  given  certain  circumstances.  They  may  do  that  for  partisan 
reasons,  but  there  are  irreducible  level  of  policy  differences. 

The  third  point  I  would  make  is,  while  you're  here  on  Armed 
Services,  strengthen  the  DIA.  You  ask,  what  do  you  do  about  De- 
fense intelligence?  It  is  not  a  real  competitor,  in  my  judgment,  for 
the  CIA,  and  we  would  be  better  off,  analytically,  if  we  had  a 
stronger  DIA. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I'd  just  make — certainly,  I  think  we  can  all  agree, 
those  who  have  served  professionally,  that  partisan  politics  is  very 
damaging  to  our  intelligence  capability  and  to  our  military  efforts. 

I  think  the  one  area  that  requires  some  attention  is,  the  distinc- 
tion between  national  intelligence  and  tactical  intelligence  becomes 
increasingly  blurred.  You  mentioned  Tora  Bora.  That  fighter  in  the 
field  actually  has  to  know  everything  there  is  to  know  about 
Osama  bin  Laden,  his  whereabouts.  Things  that  used  to  be  consid- 
ered national  intelligence  now  have  to  get  into  the  tactical  area.  So 
that  argues,  once  again,  for  some  kind  of  closer  relationship  be- 
tween the  DCI  and  the  DOD  intelligence  agencies. 

Dr.  Hamre.  Senator,  I  would — lots  of  areas  that  we  need  to  work. 
Specifically,  I  think  the  need  in  DOD  is  for  what  we  call  "long 
dwell"  in  collection  capabilities.  We  have  two  types  right  now.  We 
have  collection  that  comes  from  airplanes  that  fly  around.  That's 
a  little  like  looking  over  an  area  with  a  spotlight.  So  it  doesn't — 
you  can  only  look  at  a  little  spot  for  a  period  of  time.  Then,  of 
course,  we  have  satellites,  and  they  have  huge  coverage,  big  flood- 
light-type thing.  But  they  last  for  10  minutes  and  then  they  won't 
be  back  for  another  hour  and  a  half. 


65 

What  we're  really  needing  in  the  Defense  world  is  what  we  call 
"long  dwell,"  the  capacity  to  get  broad-area  surveillance  that  can 
linger.  So  it  has  the  best  attributes  of  both.  It  has  the  capacity  to 
see  wide  areas,  but  stay  over  the  target  area  for  a  long  time. 

Now,  that's  going  to  be  done  with  a  new  generation  of — remotely 
piloted  vehicles,  largely,  is  going  to  be  the  way  we'll  do  this.  It's 
a  ways  away,  and  there  are  some  very  serious  technical  challenges 
associated  with  it.  They  should  be  military  assets,  in  my  view. 
They  should  be  funded  under  the  TIARA  and  Joint  Military  Intel- 
ligence Program,  because  you  want  them  integrated  into 
warfighting.  But  they'll  have  tremendous  capacity  in  the  national 
world,  as  well.  That's  a  very  good  example  of  where  the  tactical 
systems  will  feed  the  national  environment.  We  do  that  a  lot. 
That's  a  good  case-in-point,  where  you  would  not  want  to  break 
that  relationship,  and  you  probably  would  want  to  put  the  lead  on 
developing  that  inside  the  DOD.  But  that's  a  case-in-point,  and  we 
could  come  up  with  other  examples  like  that  for  you. 

Senator  Clinton.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Thanks,  Senator.  Senator,  I'm  sure  you're 
fully  aware,  because  of  your  interest  in  the  situation.  Ambassador 
Wilson's  wife — that  the  FBI  is  now  conducting  an  ongoing  criminal 
investigation.  It's  been  my  experience  that,  when  that  is  taking 
place,  should  a  parallel  investigation  begin  in  Congress,  it  could 
impede  or  imperil  the  work  of  the  FBI. 

Senator  CLINTON.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  remember  very  well  Federal 
grand-jury  investigations  that  had  congressional  investigations 
going  on  simultaneously. 

Chairman  Warner.  I  defer  to  your  recollection. 

Senator  Clinton.  I  have  personal  experience  with  that. 

Chairman  Warner.  Senator  Dole. 

Senator  Dole.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Let  me  say  to  each  of  you,  it's  a  privilege  to  have  you  testifying 
here  today.  I  certainly  appreciate  your  outstanding  service  to  this 
country.  I've  had  the  privilege  of  working  with  two  of  you  in  past 
lives,  so  I  particularly  want  to  welcome  you  here  today. 

I'd  like  to  follow  up  on  what  Senator  McCain  and  Senator  Nelson 
said  earlier.  Since  the  9/11  Commission  has  made  its  recommenda- 
tions, we,  as  lawmakers,  have  been  told  to  look  at  ourselves  in  the 
mirror.  Congressional  oversight  has  been  called  "Ieix,"  "uneven," 
and  "dysfunctional."  Critics  have  attested  that  overlapping  jurisdic- 
tion and  turf  battles  are  promoted,  rather  than  the  desired  result, 
which  is  accountability. 

I  think  we  can  point  to  the  recently  created  Department  of 
Homeland  Security  as  an  example  of  where  lessons  may  be  learned 
in  incorporating  a  government  overhaul  of  this  magnitude.  While 
we've  been  at  war.  Secretary  of  Homeland  Security  Tom  Ridge  and 
his  top  deputies  have  testified  at  290  hearings  in  the  past  year  and 
a  half.  They've  received  more  than  4,000  letters  from  Congress  re- 
questing information.  Furthermore,  88  committees  and  subcommit- 
tees assert  jurisdictional  interest  over  the  Department  of  Homeland 
Security. 

Is  it  not  instructive  to  look  at  this  most  recent  example  of  a 
major  government  overhaul  as  a  reality  check  for  a  realistic  time- 
table for  Congress  to  work  under,  and  perhaps  a  reason  to  exercise 


66 

prudence  and  discipline,  rather  than  rushing  to  judgment  in  con- 
sidering the  proposed  recommendations? 

Secretary  Hamre? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Yes,  absolutely. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  agree. 

Senator  Dole.  Anything  else  you'd  like  to  add,  utilizing  this  ex- 
ample? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  think  the  disruption  that  goes  with  a  large-scale 
reorganization  can't  be  overestimated. 

Senator  DOLE.  Right. 

Mr.  Carluccl  It's  very  harmful  to  performance.  So  I  think  your 
point  is  right  on. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Senator  Dole,  I'd  be  happy  to  submit  my  testi- 
mony to  the  House  Select  Committee  on  those  88  committees  of 
oversight  and  how  they  have  stretched  out  the  senior  officers  of  the 
Department  of  Homeland  Security.  I  fully  agree  with  your  observa- 
tions. 

[The  information  referred  to  follows:] 


67 


STATEMENT  OF  JAMES  SCHLESINGER 

PREPARED  FOR  AN  OVERSIGHT  HEARING  OF  THE 

SELECT  COMMITTEE  ON  HOMELAND  SECURITY 

SUBCOMMITTEE  ON  RULES 

U.  S.  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY  10,  2003 

Mr.  Chairman,  Members  of  the  Committee: 

I  thank  the  Committee  for  this  opportunity  to  discuss  the  challenges  of  creating  a  new 
department,  relevant  to  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security — as  the  House  of 
Representatives  considers  possible  adjustments  in  the  jurisdictions  of  its  standing  committees. 

Let  me  start  with  this  observation.  In  the  35  years  since  I  first  became  a  government 
official,  relations  between  the  Congress  and  executive  agencies  have  changed  markedly, 
indeed,  one  might  say  radically.  In  the  earlier  era,  a  senior  official  was  called  on  far  less 
frequently  to  testify.  There  would  be  a  number  of  budget  hearings — and  from  time  to  time 
testimony  on  some  prominent  issues.  To  an  extent  that  may  seem  surprising  today,  agencies 
were  left  to  manage  themselves.  Inquiries  about  specific  issues  tended  to  be  on  an  informal 
basis — rather  than  testimony  in  public  session.  When  I  was  Chairman  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission,  all  issues  were  handled  by  the  Joint  Committee.  When  I  became  the  Director  of 
Central  Intelligence,  the  director  was  rarely  called  upon  to  testify — at  least  up  until  the  time  of 
Watergate — and  that  was  primarily  in  closed  session.  In  the  intervening  years,  that  has 
changed  significantly,  as  congressional  committees  have  become  more  deeply  involved  in  the 
management  of  executive  agencies. 

When  we  created  the  Department  of  Energy,  in  contrast  to  those  older  conditions,  I 
found  that  half  my  time  or  more  was  spent  on  Capitol  Hill  testifying  before  various 
committees.  Of  course,  the  creation  of  the  Department  had  involved  the  jurisdictions  of 
several  standing  committees.  In  the  circumstances  of  the  day,  with  repeated  energy  events  or 


68 

"crises"  like  the  shutdown  of  oil  production  in  Iran,  rising  gasoline  prices,  the  nuclear  trauma 
at  Three  Mile  Island,  these  committees  legitimately  wanted  a  piece  of  the  action — and 
testimony.  Moreover,  in  these  last  twenty-odd  years,  the  continued  proliferation  of 
subcommittees  has  only  made  the  problem  worse. 

Subsequent  to  the  dramatic  terrorist  attack  on  the  United  States  in  September  of  2001, 
the  decision  has  been  taken  to  consolidate  a  whole  range  of  security-related  activities  into  the 
new  Department  of  Homeland  Security.  The  longer-term  benefits  should  be  substantial.  In 
particular,  it  should  gradually  reorient  the  cultures  of  the  agencies  coming  together  in  the  new 
department  towards  the  post-91 1  mission  of  homeland  security.  But  there  are  always  costs  of 
such  consolidation,  primarily  short-term  costs.  There  will  be  bureaucratic  resistance.  There 
are  inevitable  frictions  associated  with  the  movement  of  agencies.  There  is  a  clash  of  cultures 
that  have  to  be  adjudicated  and,  of  course,  the  reconciliation  of  contrasting  personnel  and 
acquisition  systems.  It  is  not  a  certainty  that  the  benefits  of  consolidation  will  outweigh  the 
costs.  \ 

For  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security,  however,  that  decision  is  behind  us.  It  is 
now  the  duty  of  all  of  us  to  do  our  best  to  make  this  crucial  consolidation  work  effectively.  It 
is  a  monumental  challenge  successfully  to  bring  together  these  rather  disparate  elements — and 
efficiently  combine  them  in  pursuit  of  the  conmion  mission. 

Here  is  the  crucial  point  to  bear  in  mind.  A  new  government  department  does  not 
spring,  like  Athena  from  the  brow  of  Zeus,  full  blown  and  ready  for  action.  Organizing  the 
department  is  not  instantaneous;  it  takes  time.  There  are  many  organizational  challenges  and 
organizational  gaps,  especially  in  the  early  days  of  a  new  department.  The  Department  of 
Homeland  Security  is,  in  a  sense,  a  start-up  organization.  Contrary  to  the  expectations  of  too 


69 


many,  there  will  be  unavoidable  growing  pains — as  the  overall  organization  gradually  comes 
together.  No  such  thing  as  immediate  and  complete  success  should  be  expected.  Inevitably, 
in  so  complicated  an  operation,  there  will  be  unresolved  problems  and  some  setbacks. 
Consequently,  for  those  inclined  to  be  critical,  there  will  be  all  too  many  targets  to  shoot  at. 
The  critics  can  have  a  field  day. 

In  the  case  of  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security,  there  are  all  too  many  platforms 
for  such  criticism.  At  last  count,  there  were  26  full  committees  with  jurisdiction — and  a  total 
of  88  committees  including  subcommittees.  As  problems  are  uncovered  or  lake  time  to  be 
resolved,  the  opportimities  for  criticism  will  mount.  Nonetheless,  since  the  stake  is  the 
security  of  our  homeland,  the  new  department  deserves  support — and  not  unnecessary 
carping.  To  whatever  extent  the  Congress  can  help  by  simphfying  the  overlapping  committee 
structure  that  oversees  the  department,  that  would  be  a  significant  contribution. 

By  comparison,  the  creation  of  the  Department  of  Energy  was  relatively  child's  play. 
The  Department  was  far  smaller.  Most  of  the  budget  came  fi"om  what  had  been  the  Atomic 
Energy  Commission.  The  incorporated  entities,  by  and  large,  had  a  common  mission  either 
producing  energy  or  weapons.  Additionally,  there  was  the  oversight  function  inherited  from 
the  Federal  Energy  Administration.  Yet,  all  in  all,  it  was  a  simpler  task.  To  be  sure,  the 
department  later  ran  into  difficulties.  Several  secretaries,  by  direction  or  personal  inclination, 
wanted  to  disestablish  the  department.  One  department  head  was  dismissive  of  the  national 
security  fiinctions  of  the  department.  All  that  contributed  to  later  and  unnecessary  disorder. 

Yet,  at  the  time  of  the  Department's  creation,  there  had  been  well-nigh  universal 
support,  hi  the  House,  the  Speaker,  to  facilitate  the  formation  of  a  national  energy  policy, 
established  a  Select  Committee,  which  brought  together  on  strict  time  lines  the  actions  of  the 


70 


standing  committees  with  jurisdiction.  That  resulted  in  quick  passage  by  the  House  of  the 
several  components  of  the  National  Energy  Act.  But  the  Senate,  which  had  no  similar 
mechanism,  took  a  long  time  to  decide  on  the  components.  Nonetheless,  when  the  Senate 
finally  acted,  and  the  bills  went  to  conference,  the  standing  committees  in  the  House  once 
again  were  empowered  to  assert  their  jurisdictions. 

Some  of  those  jurisdictional  problems  will  likely  afflict  the  new  Department  of 
Homeland  Security,  though  others  will  not.  I  underscore,  however,  that  we  all  have  an 
immense  stake  in  the  mission  and  the  success  of  this  new  department.  Any  weaknesses  in  the 
Department  likely  will  prolong  the  activities  of  potential  terrorists.  Rather  than  preserve  all 
the  perches  from  which  the  department  can  be  disparaged,  whatever  the  House  can  do  to  help 
the  new  department  would  serve  the  national  interest. 

Mr.  Chairman,  we  must  continue  to  keep  the  national  security  foremost.  It  is  a 
moniunental  challenge  to  overcome  cultural  differences  and  bureaucratic  resistance — and  to 
unite  in  a  single  department  the  many  agencies  that  are  being  brought  together  for  a  common 
mission.  But  it  will  also  be  a  continuing  challenge  for  the  Congress  to  continue  to  foster  that 
integration.  Unlike  energy  policy,  which  tends  to  divide  the  society,  homeland  security 
should  unite  us. 

Thank  you  for  your  attention.  I  shall  be  happy,  Mr.  Chairman,  to  answer  any 
questions  that  you  and  members  of  the  Committee  may  have. 


Senator  Dole.  Secretary  Schlesinger,  you've  stressed  the  neces- 
sity of  cautious  interaction  between  intelligence  and  policymaking. 
Secretary  Kissinger  has  said  recently— this  was  a  Washington  Post 
piece,  just  in  the  last  couple  of  days— "Intelligence  should  supply 
the  facts  relevant  to  decision.  The  direction  of  poHcy  and  the  ulti- 


71 

mate  choices  depend  on  many  additional  factors,  and  must  be  made 
by  political  leaders." 

How  effectively  would  the  administration's  proposal  allow  our  na- 
tional policymakers  to  direct  the  intelligence  efforts  without  com- 
promising the  independence  and  quality  of  analj^tical  products?  Are 
there  better  alternatives  in  this  regard? 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  I  think  that  this  adds  that  other  layer,  and 
that  it  compromises  what  Secretary  Kissinger  was  calling  for, 
which  is  that  the  facts  should  come  up  to  the  political  leaders.  The 
political  leaders  must  decide  on  a  policy.  Their  task  is  different 
from  that  of  intelligence;  and  the  division  of  authority  that  is  being 
proposed,  I  think,  compromises  what  he  outlined. 

Senator  Dole.  Secretary  Hamre,  since  September  11,  intelligence 
sharing  and  analysis  have  been  significantly  improved,  with  assist- 
ance from  both  the  legislative  and  executive  branches.  How  many 
of  the  Commission's  recommendations  would  you  estimate  have  al- 
ready been  addressed?  Could  you  highlight  the  major  ones?  Would 
implementing  any  of  the  Commission's  recommendations  require 
the  intelligence  agencies  to  fix  what  is  essentially  not  broken? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Senator  Dole,  forgive  me  for  not  having  that  at  the 
top  of  my  head.  Can  I  respond  to  you  for  the  record  on  that? 

Senator  Dole.  Surely. 

Dr.  Hamre.  I  don't  have  the  42  recommendations  under  my  belt, 
and  what's  been  done.  I've  heard  it  said  that  a  large  number  have 
been  implemented,  but  I  just  don't  know  that  personally,  and  I'd 
be  glad  to  get  back  to  you  on  that. 

Senator  Dole.  Fine.  Just  submit  it  for  the  record. 

[The  information  referred  to  follows:! 

I  have  reviewed  the  39  recommendations  contained  in  the  Commission  report. 
Some  of  them  are  rather  general  and  some  are  specific.  Some  are  easy  to  categorize 
and  some  are  not.  After  considerable  study,  I  would  assess  them  in  the  following 
categories: 

Completed  0 

Not  a  recommendation  but  an  observation  3 

To  be  decided  (e.g.  congressional  action  needed)  8 

Tried  and  (largely)  failed  2 

Nothing  or  very  little  has  happened  4 

Lots  of  rhetoric,  very  little  substance  11 

Significant  progress,  work  ongoing 11 

Senator  Dole.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Senator  Bill  Nelson. 

Senator  Bill  Nelson.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Chairman,  in  your  opening  remarks  you  made  reference  that 
the  committee's  purpose  in  this  examination  is,  in  many  ways,  to 
look  at  the  structure,  the  resources,  and  the  leadership  in  trying 
to  arrive  at  a  decision.  I've  heard  from  the  witnesses — and  thank 
you,  again,  as  to  what  has  been  said  over  and  over,  for  your  public 
service  over  the  years  to  your  country;  thank  you  for  that — I've 
heard  them  testify  to  basically  that  the  structure  they  think  that 
is  there  now  is  sound;  it  may  need  some  tweaking.  I've  heard  them 
say  that  the  resources — there  seems  to  be  the  resources  that  are 
committed  to  it,  but  I  haven't  heard  the  examination  of  the  third 
issue  that  you  raised,  Mr.  Chairman,  which  is  the  leadership. 


72 

So  what  I  would  like  to  ask  is  the  question  that  is  begged.  Do 
we  have  a  system  that  is  set  up  that  is  too  sensitive  to  the  person- 
alities of  the  people — the  personalities  of  the  President,  the 
SECDEF,  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  DCI,  the  Attorney  General? 
If  so,  how  do  we  fix  it? 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  The  second  question  is  a  lot  harder  than  the 
first.  Sure,  we  have  a  system  that  is  sensitive  to  the  personalities. 
That  is,  I  think,  unavoidable.  Some  of  those  are  elected  officials, 
some  of  them  are  appointed  officials.  The  appointment  of  officials 
comes  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  including  campaign  contributions,  in 
some  cases.  Obviously,  you're  going  to  have  different  levels  of  abil- 
ity, as  well  as  backgrounds,  that  may  or  may  not  be  appropriate 
for  the  jobs  to  which  these  individuals  are  appointed. 

I  can't  answer  the  second  question.  That's  the  nature  of  our  sys- 
tem. We  have  to — the  system,  in  part,  adjusts  to  weak  personalities 
in  different  executive-branch  positions,  and  they  lose  influence,  and 
others  take  over,  to  a  greater  extent. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  would  agree  that  the  system  is  very  sensitive  to 
personalities,  but  I  would  argue  that  that  may  not  be  totally  unde- 
sirable. That's  why  we  have  elections.  If  we're  not  satisfied  with 
the  personalities,  we  throw  them  out. 

It  is  true,  as  Senator  Clinton  pointed  out,  that  we  need  to  try 
and  insulate  intelligence  from  political  vagaries.  Some  thought 
could  be  given  to  a  fixed  term,  but  I  don't  know  that  that  totally 
insulates  the  DCI  from  politics. 

I  think  you  asked  a  very  fundamental  question,  but  I  don't  have 
a  ready  answer,  unlike  Jim. 

Senator  Bill  Nelson.  You  must  have  the  answer,  then. 

Dr.  Hamre.  No,  sir,  I  certainly  don't  have  the  answer.  But  I 
think — first  of  all,  I  think  the  collection  environment,  the  collection 
process  is  less,  I  think,  susceptible  to  personalities.  I  think  it  tends 
to  be  in  the  assessment,  how  do  you — what  do  you  make  of  what 
it  is  that's  in  front  of  you?  Here,  my  only  recommendation  is,  I 
think  that  you  want  lots  of  diversity  in  that,  and  you  want  those 
people  to  have  to  come  up  to  different  committees  in  Congress  and 
explain  why  they  think  that.  We  need  to  force  our  system — as 
much  diversity  and  perspective  in  our  system  as  possible,  and  I 
think  that's — use  more  open-source  material,  make  sure  that  the 
oversight  system  up  here  is  quite  rigorous,  that  there  is — I  have  a 
"long  dwell"  fly  here,  excuse  me — that  collection  is  available  to  ev- 
eryone, that  you  are  putting  us  through  a  process  of  explaining  our 
thinking,  both  in  classified  and  unclassified  hearings.  I  think  much 
more  rigorous  oversight  and  insistence  that  we  come  forward  and 
explain  what  we're  doing  would  be  good.  I  think  that  would  be  the 
most  helpful  thing  you  could  do,  sir. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Can  I  add  something  to  that.  Senator?  We 
have  something  called  "noise,"  and  each  of  these  agencies  takes  the 
signals — or  we  hope  it  takes  the  signals — and  forgets  about  what 
it  regards  as  noise.  But  some  other  agency  may  not  regard  that  as 
a  noise.  If  that  "noise"  were  disseminated — what  is  regarded  by  one 
agency  as  noise  selectively,  were  disseminated  more  generally,  we 
might  be  able  to  get  something  that  is  closer  to  the  truth. 

Senator  Bill  Nelson.  In  summary,  I  sense  that  there  are  two 
things,  two  ideas,  around  which  you  all  would  clearly  congregate. 


73 

that  came  out  of  the  9/11  Commission  Report  recommendations.  A 
number  of  them  that  you  disagreed  with,  which  we  appreciate  very 
much  your  input.  But  these  two,  I  think  you  would.  Obviously,  con- 
gressional oversight  and  direction  ought  to  be  much  more  robust. 
Then  the  other  one  is,  I've  heard  all  of  you  speak  favorably — and 
correct  me  if  I'm  wrong — about  an  NCTC,  that  being  the  place  that 
you  could  bring  together  all  the  collected  information  so  that  you're 
getting  analysis  of  it,  and  that  all  the  various  agencies  dealing  with 
intelligence  would  be  knowledgeable  of  that,  and  participate  in, 
that  analysis,  and  then  determine  how  to  use  it. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Agreed. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Those  in  the  community  who  keep  their  nug- 
gets to  themselves  and  refuse  to  share  them  should  be  removed 
from  the  community. 

Senator  BiLL  NELSON.  I  would  suggest  that  the  most  recent  ex- 
ample of  that — and  it  wasn't  specifically  defined  as  intelligence,  but 
it  was  certainly  critical  information — was  when  the  Governor  of 
Kentucky's  inbound  plane — the  transponder  wasn't  working,  and 
the  FAA  was  all  happy  with  it,  and  they  knew  about  it,  but  they 
forgot  to  tell  the  military.  Then  they  send  the  alert  to  the  Capitol 
Police.  Of  course,  we  get  this  emergency  announcement,  "You  get 
out  of  the  building  immediately.  There's  an  inbound  aircraft."  So 
there,  sadly,  is  another  example  of  where  one  hand  is  not  knowing 
what  the  other  hand  is  doing. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  There's  a  distinction  between  a  failure  of  com- 
munication and  a  deliberate  failure  of  communication;  and  the  lat- 
ter, I  think  that  we  should  be  able  to  cope  with. 

Senator  Sessions  [presiding].  The  Senator  from  Texas? 

Senator  CORNYN.  Thank  you. 

Thank  you,  gentlemen,  for  being  here,  and  for  hanging  in  there. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Senator,  Senator  Cornyn  has  been  very  pa- 
tient. 

Senator  CORNYN.  You  were  patient,  too,  to  wait  until  we  get  all 
the  way  down  at  this  end  of  the  table  for  questions.  I  appreciate 
that  very  much. 

I  especially  appreciate  all  three  of  you  talking,  at  the  outset, 
about  the  fact  that  solutions  must  logically  flow  from  problems 
identified.  In  other  words,  I  trust  that  we  will  be  on  guard  about 
a  solution  looking  for  a  problem. 

Indeed,  I  was  also  interested  to  hear  a  number  of  references  to 
the  fact  that  the  specific  causes  of  September  11,  as  identified  by 
the  9/11  Commission,  had  very  little  to  do  with  the  issues  that  we 
are  talking  about  when  we  talk  about  budget  authority,  and  par- 
ticularly the  role  of  the  DOD  in  supporting  the  warfighter.  But  I 
think  this  is  a  very  constructive  and  important  exercise,  and  I  com- 
mend the  members  of  the  9/11  Commission  for  doing  an  outstand- 
ing job.  But  I  think  it's  a  difficult  and  complex  subject. 

The  one  thing  that  I  think  cannot  be  overlooked  is  the  fact  that 
this  administration  and  this  Congress  have  not  waited  for  3  years 
for  the  9/11  Commission  to  issue  its  report  to  act  in  many  ways 
that  I  think  have  been  very  constructive,  and  designed  to  solve  the 
problems  that  we  all  know  have  existed.  For  example,  we've  talked 
some  about  the  creation  of  the  TTIC.  The  NCTC,  which  is  one  of 
the  9/11  Commission's  recommendations,  would  indeed  build  on 


74 

that  to  enhance  the  information-sharing  between  the  CIA  and  the 
FBI,  as  appropriate  under  the  law. 

We  also  need  to  identify  the  fact — as  Attorney  General  Janet 
Reno  and  Attorney  General  John  Ashcroft,  and  others  testified  to 
at  the  hearing — about  the  fact  that  it  was  the  Patriot  Act — some- 
times maligned,  but  frequently  misunderstood — that  was  respon- 
sible for  tearing  down  the  wall  between  law  enforcement  and  intel- 
ligence agencies,  and  allowing  the  kind  of  sharing  of  information 
that  has,  indeed,  I  believe,  made  America  safer.  Indeed,  of  course, 
the  creation  of  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security,  billions  of 
dollars  being  appropriated  to  first-responders — variety  of  potential 
targets  for  terrorists. 

But  I  believe,  of  the  recommendations  that  have  been  made  by 
the  9/11  Commission — the  NCTC  and  certainly  the  legislative  over- 
sight reform,  which  we  have  not  talked  about  much  here  today, 
other  than  to  avoid  the  subject  because  it  is  not  necessarily  the  role 
of  this  committee,  but  certainly  a  matter  of  interest — but  to  me  it 
seems  less  important  when  we  look  at  reform  to  try  to  see  how  we 
can  reorganize  the  wire  diagram  or  the  organizational  chart.  In- 
deed, as  I  think  has  been  alluded  to  several  times,  the  kind  of  au- 
thority that  some  have  proposed  giving  to  the  NID  already  exists 
since  1997,  when  Congress  passed  legislation  which  created  a  Dep- 
uty DCI  for  Community  Management,  and  gave  that  person  re- 
sponsibility for  coordination  of  all  intelligence  agencies.  I  hope  we 
wouldn't  give  too  much — we  wouldn't  elevate  the  anecdote  about 
DCI  Tenet  declaring  war  in  1998 — we  wouldn't  elevate  that  too 
much,  because,  indeed,  we  all  know  it  takes  more  than  a  declara- 
tion of  war  by  the  DCI  to  make  things  actually  happen.  That  is 
really  where  the  rubber  meets  the  road. 

But  let  me  ask  a  question  that,  I  think.  Dr.  Hamre,  you  alluded 
to,  but  we  haven't  seemed  to  talk  about  very  much.  I  don't  think 
the  9/11  Commission  Report  really  addresses  this.  In  addition  to 
the  failure  of  HUMINT,  which  has  literally  made  us  blind,  what 
happened  in  Iraq  since  1998 — and  I  fear  we  won't  talk  about  it 
here — but  I  fear  that  is  not  an  isolated  event — open-source  intel- 
ligence collection.  We  spent  a  lot  of  money  on  satellites  and  all 
sorts  of  interesting  gizmos  that,  indeed,  I  think  are  very  useful,  in 
terms  of  intelligence  collection.  But  are  you  familiar  with  any  effort 
in  our  IC  anywhere  to  have  a  systematic  and  comprehensive  open- 
source  intelligence  collection? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Sir,  there  are  procedures  that  the  IC  uses  to  survey 
the  thinking  in  the  private  sector  on  issues  as  they're  trying  to  de- 
rive an  assessment.  For  example,  the  National  Intelligence  Council 
will  routinely  go  out  and  pull  in  the  thinking  of  outsiders.  It  tends 
to  be  in  the  assessment  phase.  That's  a  little  different  from  open- 
source,  which  is  seen  as  a  collection,  as  well  as  an  assessment,  ac- 
tivity. 

I  think  you  will  find  that  there's  also  a  strategic  study  group  that 
works  for  the  Agency  which  routinely  goes  out  to  outside  of  govern- 
ment to  try  to  augment  its  classified  activities,  but  they  tend  to  be 
bringing  perspective  more  toward  to  the  tail-end  of  an  assessment, 
as  opposed  to  being  seen  as  a  routine  source  of  information-collec- 
tion.  I  think  the   advocates — and  I   certainly  do   advocate  wider 


75 

use — of  open  source  is  to  use  it  as  a  collection  modality,  as  well, 
not  just  simply  a  second  guess  on  the  assessment  phase. 

Senator  CORNYN.  Secretary  Schlesinger? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  I  think,  Senator,  if  you  look  at  the  fusion 
methods  of  the  Special  Operations  Command  down  in  Tampa,  that 
they  have  brought  together,  or  have  attempted  to  bring  together, 
open-source  information,  in  part  because  the  part  of  the  world  that 
they  deal  with,  you  have  basically  more  open-source  information 
than  you  have  secret  information.  A  problem.  It  is  a  long,  historic 
problem  of  the  CIA,  or  has  been,  that  if  something's  good,  it  has 
to  be  secret.  Sometimes  we  just  get  the  gems  out  of  open-source. 

Senator  CORNYN.  I've  sometimes  joked  among  my  colleagues  that 
I  have  learned  in  classified  briefing  sessions  since  I've  been  in  the 
Senate  as  much  by  reading  the  New  York  Times  and  Washington 
Post,  and  watching  cable  news.  I  wonder  whether  we  are  missing 
opportunities  as  hundreds  of  new  newspapers  and  news  sources 
arise  in  places  like  Iraq  and  all  around  the  world,  gleaning,  sys- 
tematically, information  we  could  obtain  from  non-classified  public 
sources  of  information,  and  do  that  on  a  more  systematic  and  rigor- 
ous basis. 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  We  should. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  May  I  comment.  Senator? 

Senator  CORNYN.  Secretary  Carlucci? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  We,  of  course,  have  FBIS,  where  we  monitor  all 
the  radio  broadcasts  around  the  world,  and  CIA  has  had  a  Domes- 
tic Collection  Division  for  some  time.  But,  more  fundamentally, 
what  you  describe  is  a  basic  responsibility  of  embassy  reporting.  It 
is  up  to  the  embassies  around  the  world  to  deal  with  open-source 
information,  to  tell  the  Department  of  State  what  the  press  is  doing 
in  Country  X  or  Country  Y,  what  the  politicians  are  saying.  That's 
why  we  have  political  sections  in  our  embassies. 

Senator  CORNYN.  Thank  you.  My  time  is  expired. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Warner  [presiding].  Did  you  wish  to  follow  up  on  Sec- 
retary Carlucci's  response  to  you? 

Senator  CORNYN.  Are  we  going  to  have  another  round,  Mr. 
Chairman? 

Chairman  Warner.  Yes. 

Senator  CORNYN.  I'll  reserve  any  other  questions. 

Thank  you  very  much. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Thank  you,  Senator. 

Senator  Levin  and  I  feel  that  we'll  just  take  a  brief  round  of 
questions  apiece  here.  Let  me  see  if  I  can  bring  some  conclusion  to 
this  very  important  contribution  that  each  of  you  has  made. 

It  seems  that  you  would  want  Congress  to  very  carefully  explore 
what  we  could  do,  by  way  of  law,  to  give  to  the  DCI  all  those  pow- 
ers needed,  such  that  he  or  she,  as  the  case  may  be,  would  then 
be  on  a  coequal  basis  with  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  Secretary  of 
Homeland  Security,  Secretary  of  State,  and  that  that  would,  in  my 
judgment,  require  less  disruption.  If  you  start  pulling  DIA  and 
NSA  out  of  DOD,  and  all  of  the  things  accompanying  that,  at  a 
critical  time  in  our  history  of  this  country,  when  we  are  on  the 
verge  of  a  presidential  election,  a  congressional  election,  with  the 
understanding  that  we'd  take  a  look  at  how  that  works  for  a  period 


76 

of  time,  and  then  perhaps  come  back  and  reexamine  the  need  to 
have  some  other  individual,  or  converting  the  DCI  to  the  NID  and 
then  bring  in  subordinates  under  him  to  do  the  work  of  the  agency, 
is  that  a  possible  thing  that  we  should  consider,  Secretary  Schles- 
inger? 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  I  think  so,  and  I  think  you  were  out  of  the 
room,  Mr.  Chairman,  but  we  were  elevating  the  DCI  to  executive- 
level  one,  which  makes  them  coequal. 

Chairman  Warner.  Yes,  I  heard  that  testimony. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Yes.  There  are  a  number  of  things  that  can  be 
done. 

Chairman  Warner.  Putting  him  on  a  total  par 

Mr.  Carlucci.  You  may  not  need  legislation.  It's  good  to  look  at 
the  possibility  of  legislation. 

Chairman  WARNER.  We'll  figure  that  out 

Mr.  Carlucci.  But,  as  Senator  Levin  pointed  out,  you  may  not 
need  it. 

Chairman  WARNER.  My  point  is,  use  that  as  an  interim  step. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Oh,  yes. 

Chairman  Warner.  With  the  extraordinary  confluence  of  events 
taking  place  in  the  United  States  now,  two  very  significant  elec- 
tions of  both  the  President  and  Congress 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Some  DCIs  have  been  very  timid  about  exer- 
cising the  community  power. 

Chairman  Warner.  Yes. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  I  think  that  a  strong  statement  from  Congress, 
that  we  expect  the  DCI  to  be  seriously  in  charge  of  the  community, 
would  be  helpful. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  With  oversight  followup  on  that. 

Chairman  Warner.  I  understand  that. 

Dr.  Hamre,  we  were  exploring,  as  you  stepped  out  momentar- 
ily 

Dr.  Hamre.  I  sure  did,  sir. 

Chairman  Warner. — whether  or  not  an  interim  step,  given  the 
confluence  of  the  events  facing  us — a  presidential  election  and  a 
congressional  election — but  if  Congress  desired  to  act  in  this  cur- 
rent Congress,  which  is  due  to  expire  here  in  October,  unless  we 
have  a  lame  duck — of  addressing  whether  it  needs  to  be  in  law,  or 
otherwise,  elevating  the  DCI  to  equate,  in  every  respect,  by  way  of 
authority,  emoluments,  and  ever5d;hing  else,  with  the  Secretaries  of 
Defense,  State,  and  Homeland  Security  as  an  interim  step,  and  see 
how  that  system  might  work,  and  that  would  be  less  disruption,  as 
envisioned  by  other  proposals  on  the  table. 

Dr.  Hamre.  I  think  I  agree  with  my  colleagues,  I  think  it  cer- 
tainly would  be  less  disruption.  I  think  it's  very  hard  to  keep  en- 
ergy behind  an  initiative  like  that  for  every  long.  Things  will  fall 
back  into  their  old  patterns  very,  very  quickly. 

Chairman  Warner.  So  then  your  conclusion,  we  have  to  go  to  the 
NID. 

Dr.  Hamre.  No,  sir.  I  think  you  need  to  take  time  to  make  sure 
we  get  this  right  and  I  know  you're  going  to  do  that. 

Chairman  Warner.  I'm  sure  the  leadership  of  Congress  will 
make  certain  we  do  take  the  time. 

Dr.  Hamre.  Yes,  sir. 


77 

It  isn't  the  sort  of  thing,  just  by  putting  emphasis  behind  it — will 
fade  quite  quickly,  so  you'll  need  to  decide  whether  or  not  you  want 
to  make  this  decision  or  take  other  structural  changes  to  increase 
the  standing  and  stature  of  the  DCI  if  you  want  to  stay  with  the 
current  structure. 

Chairman  WARNER.  I'm  not  suggesting  that  the  current  struc- 
ture— I  think  we  could  enhance  the  DCI  considerably  so  that  he's 
on  a  total  par.  Very  often,  in  your  testimony 

Dr.  Hamre.  Sure. 

Chairman  WARNER. — today,  you  feel  that  the  SECDEF — and  I'm 
not  suggesting  the  personality  of  the  current 

Dr.  Hamre.  No,  no 

Chairman  WARNER. — but  the  office  itself  is  overwhelming  of  the 
DCI,  and  that,  therefore,  he's  not  been  able  to  exercise  maybe  some 
of  the  current  authority  he  now  has  in  law. 

Dr.  Hamre.  The  DCI  actually  has  more  expansive  authorities 
than  the  SECDEF  does  in  oversight  and  use  of  funds  and  that  sort 
of  thing,  than — he  has  enormous  authorities,  authorities  that  the 
SECDEF  had  50  years  ago. 

Chairman  Warner.  All  right. 

Secretary  Schlesinger  said,  often  some  of  the  personalities  did 
not  fully  exercise  that,  for  whatever  reason. 

Dr.  Hamre.  Right.  They've  been  neutralized  through  the  process, 
the  interagency  process,  through  time. 

Chairman  Warner.  Do  you  all  think  that's  a  proposal  that  we 
should  at  least  consider? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Yes. 

Dr.  Hamre.  Yes. 

Chairman  Warner.  It's  worthy  of  consideration. 

I  thank  you. 

Senator  Levin. 

Senator  Levin.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  think  what  the  witnesses  are 
sajdng  is  that,  interestingly  enough,  that  if  you  put  the  SECDEF 
on  a  par  with  the  DCI,  or  whatever  the  successor  to  the  DCI  is, 
you  will  demote  the  DCI,  legally,  from  where  the  DCI  now  is,  le- 
gally, in  terms,  at  least,  of  developing  and  presenting  the  budget. 
Because  under  Title  50,  it  is  the  DCI  who  is  responsible  to  develop 
and  present  that  budget.  It's  not  par.  It's  the  DCI  who  has  respon- 
sibility. Now,  for  various  reasons,  which  our  witnesses  have  out- 
lined, that  has  been  watered  down  over  the  years,  for  interagency 
conflicts  and  whatever  the  reasons  are.  But,  by  law,  to  the  extent 
we  worry  about  such  things,  under  Title  50 — I'm  reading  it — I 
think  I'm  reading — and  this  is  an  exact  quote,  I  hope — "The  devel- 
opment and  presentation  to  the  President  of  the  annual  budget  for 
the  NFIP  is  the  responsibility  of  the  DCI."  I'm  not  sure  I  would 
want  to  change  that.  That  would  be  a  reduction  in  the  authority 
of  the 

Chairman  Warner.  I've  not  suggested  that  be  changed. 

Senator  Levin.  You  said  "par,"  though.  That  would  put  him  on 
a  par,  in  terms  of  that.  But  I  think  what  you're  suggesting,  Mr. 
Chairman,  if  I  can  be  a  little  technical  here  and  legalistic — which 
I  know  is  not  my  wont,  but  let  me  try  it  anyway — not  too  much 
laughter  here.  [Laughter.] 


78 

My  wife  may  be  watching  this.  When  it  comes  to  reprogramming 
and  the  execution  of  the  budget,  I  think,  what  the  chairman — and 
I  don't  want  to  put  words  in  his  mouth — would  Hke  to  see  is  a 
greater  equahty.  Because,  right  now,  that  really  belongs  to  the 
SECDEF,  rather  than  to  the  DCI,  when  we'd  come  to  the  re- 
programming. 

Now,  the  SECDEF  has  a  serious  responsibility  in  that,  because 
I  believe  that  there  must  be  concurrence  under  current  law  when 
it  comes  to  reprogramming.  Does  the  SECDEF  have  to 

Dr.  Hamre.  That  depends  entirely  on  where  the  dollars  are  ap- 
propriated and  what  part  of  fiscal  law  is  governing.  There's  enor- 
mous flexibility  in  the  intelligence  budget. 

Senator  Levin.  No,  but  in  the  law  itself 

Dr.  Hamre.  There's  very  little  flexibility 

Senator  Levin. — in  Title  50,  when  it  comes  to  the  reprogram- 
ming power 

Dr.  Hamre.  But,  sir,  it  all  depends  on  where  it's  appropriated  up 
here. 

Senator  Levin.  All  right.  Okay. 

Dr.  Hamre.  That's  what  is  governing. 

Senator  Levin.  But,  in  any  event,  I  think  that's  an  area  where 
we  ought  to  be  looking,  because  that's  a  very  critical  area. 

Then  when  it  comes  to  the  hiring  and  firing  point  there,  we  have 
in  the  DCI  in  effect,  the  power  now  to  veto  in  law,  except  for  the 
DIA.  But  for  these  other  three  agencies,  a  concurrence  of  the  DCI 
is  required  under  10  USC.  So  that's  a  pretty  powerful  position  that 
the  DCI  is  now  in.  He  doesn't  exercise  it,  apparently.  But  that's  not 
the  lack  of  authority;  that's  the  lack  of  a  will  to  exercise  it.  I  don't 
know  if  we  can  legislate  willpower,  but,  nonetheless,  that's  where 
the  current  law  is. 

So  I  think  that  the  one  area  where  we  really  have  to  focus,  in 
terms  of  where  the  chairman  is  discussing  this — at  least  from  my 
understanding  of  what  he's  saying,  or  perhaps  his  intent — is  that 
area  of  budget  execution,  or  the  reprogramming  area.  That's  where 
it  seems  to  me  there's  real  need  to  consider  this  power  question. 

Chairman  Warner.  Let  me  just  comment  on  that,  because  I  was 
addressing  this  question  of  how  the  Secretaries  of  the  many  De- 
partments— Defense,  Homeland  Security,  and  so  forth — which  con- 
tain the  affected  element  or  elements  of  the  IC,  does  not  object  to 
such  reprogramming  transfer.  Now,  it  seems  to  me  if  we  took  the — 
they  have  veto  power  now,  and  what  I  was  trying  to  do  is  to  make 
certain  that  the  DCI — I  didn't  mean  to  demote  him;  I  don't  know 
how  I'd  be  demoting  him  if  we  passed  laws  to  further  strengthen 
him 

Senator  Levin.  Developing  and  presenting  the  budget? 

Chairman  Warner.  That's  right,  and  also  to  eliminate  these 
vetos  over  his  reprogramming. 

Senator  Levin.  Now,  reprogramming,  I  misspoke.  Let  me  just  go 
back  to  the  reprogramming  issue. 

Chairman  WARNER.  At  some  point  we'd  want  to  hear  from  the 
witnesses. 

Senator  Levin.  Yes,  but  I  misspoke,  and  I'd  like  to  get  their  reac- 
tion to  see  if  I  want  to  correct  myself. 


79 

By  executive  order,  the  reprogramming  power  is  now  in  the 
DOD.  But,  as  Secretary  Carlucci  has  said,  when  he  was  the  deputy 
to  the  DCI,  and  as  Admiral  Turner  said  today,  when  he  was  the 
DCI,  President  Carter  put  that  power  in  the  DCI  so  that  by  execu- 
tive order,  with  the  stroke  of  a  pen,  Hterally,  that  power  on  re- 
programming  could  go  back  to  the  DCI  if  that's  what  President 
Bush  or  the  next  President  wants  to  do.  So  we  don't  even  need  a 
legal  change  for  that  one,  because  that's  an  executive  order  alloca- 
tion. That's  my  question.  Am  I  correct  on  that,  Mr.  Carlucci?  Then 
I'd  ask  the  others. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  That's  my  understanding. 

Senator  Levin.  Now,  do  our  other  witnesses  want  to  come  in  on 
that?  Then  I'll  be  done  on  that. 

Chairman  Warner.  That's  all  right.  Take  your  time. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  I'm  not  sure  I'm  answering  your  question  or 
the  Chairman's  observation,  but  it  would  really  help  if  the  senior 
leadership  got  together  every  once  in  awhile  and  just  talked — the 
head  of  NSA,  the  DCI,  the  head  of  DIA.  Right  now  you  have  people 
coming  to  what  used  to  be — is  now  the  foreign  intelligence  some- 
thing-or-other  board  and  their  representatives  of  their  agencies.  It 
would  help  enormously  if  we  had  the  principals  meeting. 

Senator  Levin.  That's  true.  But  I'm  being  very  precise.  There's 
an  executive  order,  number  12333,  which  now  designates  the 
SECDEF  the  power  to  provide  fiscal  management  for  the  NSA,  for 
defense  and  military  intelligence,  and  national  reconnaissance  enti- 
ties. That  means  that  by  executive  order,  the  SECDEF  is  given  the 
power  to  supervise  execution,  including  reprogramming,  of  that 
NFIP  budget.  That's  an  executive  order.  That  can  be  changed  back 
to  what  it  was  in  the  President  Carter  years,  when  it  was  the — 
if  we  want  to,  or  if  the  President  wants  to — not  me,  or  us — if  the 
President  wants  to,  he  can  give  that  power  right  back  to  the  DCI 
or  the  successor. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Right. 

Senator  LEVIN.  So  I  just  want 

Dr.  Hamre.  That's  true,  sir,  but  I'll  tell  you,  there's  remarkably 
thin  budget-justification  material  that  comes  with  the  intelligence 
budget.  It's  nothing  compared  to  what  you  insist  coming  from  us 
in  DOD.  I  remember  when  the  NRO  piled  up  $3  billion  worth  of 
cash  and  nobody  knew  about  it.  I  didn't  know  about  it.  I  was  the 
Comptroller,  I  didn't  know  about  it.  Okay?  I  mean,  this  happened. 
They  do  not  get  much  oversight.  They  have  tremendous  flexibility 
right  now. 

So  I'm  not  sure  that  this  is  really  the  panacea  that  you  think  it 
is. 

Senator  Levin.  What? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Moving  the  authorities  around  a  little  bit  for  more 
flexibility,  for  money.  They  have  so  much  flexibility,  they  don't  even 
know  where  the  money  all  is. 

Chairman  Warner.  My  simple  question  was,  if  we  did,  by  a  com- 
bination of  execution  order  and,  if  necessary,  statutory  change,  ele- 
vate the  DCI  to  level  one,  put  him  on  a  par — and  hopefully,  they 
would  meet,  Mr.  Secretary — would  that  be  an  interim  step,  avoid- 
ing a  lot  of  dislocation  at  this  critical  point  in  our 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  see  no  objection  to  that. 


80 

Chairman  WARNER.  Do  you  have  any  support  for  it? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  think  it  helps. 

Chairman  Warner.  All  right. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Gives  him  a  little  more  clout. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  I  think  that  it  might  be  desirable  to  establish 
a  committee  of  principals 

Chairman  Warner.  All  right. 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER. — and  force  the  heads  of  these  agencies  to  talk 
about  their  common  interests. 

Chairman  Warner.  That's  certainly  in  the  realm  of  the  Presi- 
dent. All  right,  thank  you  very  much. 

Senator  Sessions. 

Senator  Sessions.  Mr.  Chairman,  this  has  been  just  a  marvelous 
hearing  and  a  marvelous  discussion  about  government  and  respon- 
sibility and  how  to  improve  it.  We  have  some  of  the  finest  people 
that  I  know  of  that  work  in  our  government  agencies,  spent  15 
years  at  Department  of  Justice,  and  I  know  how  fine  the  FBI 
agents  are,  and  I've  worked  with  them.  But  bureaucracies  inter- 
cede, and  we  have  real,  real  problems. 

The  best  example  that  I've  seen  in  my  experience  of  change  in 
government  was  early  in  the  Reagan  administration,  when  he  put 
a  young  leader  in  charge  of  coordinating  law  enforcement  around 
America.  It  was  Rudi  Giuliani.  He  was  third  in  command  in  the 
Department  of  Justice,  but  everybody  knew  he  was  setting  the  pol- 
icy on  law  enforcement,  and  he  made  things  happen. 

The  drug  czar,  a  non-cabinet  agency,  which  we're  talking  about 
here,  under  Bill  Bennett's  leadership  for  several  years,  was  a  pret- 
ty significant  force  in  establishing  drug  policy  and  coordinating 
drug  efforts  for  a  number  of  years.  But  I'm  willing  to  bet  that  our 
drug  czar  today,  his  name  is  not  known  by  the  majority  of  the  Drug 
Enforcement  Agency  agents.  They  probably  don't  even  know  his 
name,  although  John  Walters  is  a  fine  person,  doing  a  good  job. 
But  as  Secretary  Hamre  said,  it  tends  to  fade.  They  have  150  peo- 
ple, and  they're  going  to  tell  the  Department  of  Justice  how  to  run 
their  business?  Somebody  with  200-300  people  is  going  to  order  the 
DOD  around?  It  just — over  time,  it  doesn't  seem  to  work. 

So  I  guess  I  am  intrigued  and  more  inclined  to  be  supportive  of 
your  views  that,  let's  take  the  system  we  have,  see  if  it  is  broken 
so  badly  we  need  major  reform,  or  maybe  the  better  approach  is  to 
see  if  we  can't  deal  with  the  problem  itself. 

Now,  we  talk  about  these  agencies,  and  they  deal  with  one  an- 
other as  if  they're  foreign  nations.  They  enter  memorandums  of  un- 
derstanding which  are  the  equivalent  of  treaties.  They — and  it 
takes  years  of  negotiating  these  things.  It's  worse  than  dealing 
with  the  Russians  to  get  an  agreement.  Sometimes  they  never 
agree  on  issues. 

It  seems  to  me  that,  really,  the  President  can  set  this  tone.  If  the 
President  says,  "The  CIA  is  going  to  coordinate  my  intelligence. 
Every  agency  is  going  to  back — and  if  they  don't,  I  want  him  to 
come  tell  me,  and  then  I'm  going  to  call  in  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
and  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  we're  going  to  have  a  prayer  meet- 
ing over  why  he  isn't  working  with  the  CIA  Director."  Am  I  off  base 
on  that? 


81 

Mr.  Carlucci.  Sir,  you're  absolutely  right.  The  one  thing  we 
haven't  really  talked  much  about  is  the  NSC  and  the  role  of  the 
NSC  in  implementing  that  kind  of  presidential  directive. 

Senator  SESSIONS.  I  know  the  President  has  really  stepped  up 
his  commitment  to  this.  The  whole  Nation,  bipartisan.  Republicans 
and  Democrats — since  September  11,  we  have  dealt  with  many  of 
the  problems  we've  talked  about  today  already,  and  made  a  lot  of 
progress.  Together  we've  done  that.  But  I  do  think,  ultimately,  that 
if  the  President  does  not  assert  himself  effectively,  we  won't  see  the 
progress  there,  because  these  agencies  will  retreat  to  their  turf. 

One  thing  that  still  I  believe  is  not  completely  fixed  with  the  Pa- 
triot Act — Senator  Cornyn,  you  might  correct  me — but  it  seems  to 
me  we  still  have  some  fear  on  the  part  of  the  foreign  intelligence 
agencies,  the  CIA,  that  if  they  are  involved  with  somebody  who 
may  be  a  citizen,  even  though  they're  connected  to  a  foreign  power, 
that  they  feel  somewhat  intimidated  and  reluctant  to  pursue  that. 
Shouldn't  we  make  sure  that  it's  crystal  clear  that  if  an  individ- 
ual— there's  probable  cause  to  believe  an  American  individual  citi- 
zen is  connected  to  a  terrorist  organization  or  a  foreign  power  hos- 
tile to  the  United  States,  that  they  ought  to  be  covered  under  the 
Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  (FISA)? 

Secretary  Schlesinger? 

Dr.  Schlesinger.  Yes. 

Mr.  Carlucci.  I  would  agree,  but  I'm  not  a  lawyer,  and  I  think 
you'd  have  to — well,  you  are — but  what  the  legal  constraints  on  the 
CIA  are  on  that  score,  I  don't  know. 

Dr.  Hamre.  Sir,  I  think  the  key  is  what  you  said,  probable  cause. 
That's  where  the  complication  comes  in,  is  what  does  it  take  to  es- 
tablish probable  cause  for  purposes  of  the  surveillance?  That's 
where  it  has  been  problematic  in  the  past.  It's  not  difficult,  once 
you  have  probable  cause,  to  get  a  FISA  court  order. 

Senator  Sessions.  No,  you're  correct. 

Dr.  Hamre.  It's  that  standard  of  probable  cause  that  has  been 
very  high. 

Senator  Sessions.  Dr.  Hamre,  you're  correct.  I  think — and  on  a 
normal  surveillance  of  a  foreign  operative,  you  don't  have  to  have, 
to  reach  the  level  of  probable  cause 

Dr.  Hamre.  Right. 


Senator  SESSIONS. — which  is  a  very  high  burden 

Dr.  Hamre.  High  burden. 

Senator  Sessions. — as  a  prosecutor,  I  know 

Dr.  Hamre.  Yes. 

Senator  SESSIONS.  But  maybe  we  ought  to  relax  that  when  there 
is  a  connection  to  terrorism  and  foreign  intelligence. 

Dr.  Hamre.  I  actually  think  there  have — there  actually  have 
been  some  changes  in  that  regard.  I'm  not  a  lawyer,  myself.  I'd 
want  to  defer  to  general  counsel  out  at  NSA.  I  think  they're  actu- 
ally, the  minimization  rules  are  still  in  place,  but  I  think  that  there 
are  some  greater  flexibilities.  We  use  them.  But  I'd  defer  to  them 
to  answer  that  for  you,  sir. 

Senator  SESSIONS.  It's  referred  to  some  in  the  Commission  re- 
port, but  I  should  study  it  more  carefully. 

Dr.  Hamre.  Yes,  sir. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much.  Senator. 


82 

Senator  Sessions.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  Warner.  Senator  Dayton. 

Senator  Dayton.  I  don't  really  have  any  more  questions,  Mr. 
Chairman.  When  I  was  in  Iraq  last  year  with  the  Chairman,  I  re- 
solved never  to  leave  a  room  before  he  did,  so [Laughter.] 

It's  held  me  in  good  stead. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Senator  Dayton.  Although  I  could  say,  if  you're  aware  of  any 
other  $3  billion  just  lying  around  any  of  these  entities,  if  you  could 
let  us  know,  that  would  be  great.  [Laughter.] 

Thank  you. 

Dr.  Hamre.  Yes,  I  was  pretty  surprised  to  find  it. 

Senator  DAYTON.  All  right. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much. 

The  distinguished  Senator  from  Texas  can  wrap  it  up. 

Senator  Cornyn.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  just  have  one  final  area  of  questioning,  and  that  has  to  do  with 
the  dangers  of  consolidation  in  the  IC.  The  best  analogy  I  can  think 
of  is  how  much  different  your  world  view  would  be  each  day  if  you 
only  read  one  newspaper  and  it  was  the  Washington  Post,  and  how 
much  different  it  would  be  if,  every  day  when  you  got  up,  instead 
of  the  Washington  Post,  you  read  the  Washington  Times.  I  worry 
that  if  we  are  consolidating  all  of  our  intelligence  collection  and 
analysis,  and  routing  it  up  without  the  caveats,  perhaps,  as  it  goes 
through  each  layer,  we  present  a  nice,  pretty  package.  We  claim  we 
have  now  consolidated  the  authority  in  one  person,  the  NID,  but, 
in  effect,  we  are  limiting  the  range  of  information  that  the  policy- 
makers really  need  in  order  to  make  the  best  possible  decisions.  Is 
that  a  poor  analogy? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  It's  a  good  analogy.  Too  much  uniformity  in  the 
intelligence  business  is  bad. 

Senator  CORNYN.  It  strikes  me  that  there's  some  benefit  to  hav- 
ing the  competition  or  the  diversity  of  voices.  I  know  sometimes 
people  wonder  how  in  the  world  can  you  find  out  what's  happening 
in  Washington  or  anywhere  else?  I  always  say  you  need  to  read  a 
lot  of  different  newspapers.  You  need  to  read  several  different  news 
magazines.  You  need  to  look  at  several  different  Internet  news  en- 
gines, like  Google  or  Yahoo  or  whatever.  Maybe  then  you  will  have 
some  concept  of  what  in  the  world  is  going  on.  But  if  you  limit 
yourself  to  one  source,  that  seems  like  that  is  fraught  with  danger. 

So  I  just  hope  that  during  the  debate  and  discussion,  as  you  have 
counseled  us  already,  that  we  look  for  those  things  that  are  going 
to  provide  us  better  intelligence  and  not  just  claim  that,  yes,  we've 
redrawn  the  organizational  chart,  we've  created  somebody  with  a 
new  title,  and  we  pat  ourselves  on  the  back  under  the  mis- 
impression  that  we've  actually  made  America  safer.  Thank  you 
very  much. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you.  Senator.  But  if  I  might,  just  to 
take  an  observation  from  your  very  important  observations  you 
made,  the  one  thing  that  goes  through  this  report  that  has  struck 
me  is  the  word  "imagination."  Is  not  imagination  the  direct  product 
of  competition  of  differing  intelligence  views? 

Dr.  Schlesinger? 


83 

Dr.  SCHLESINGER.  Yes.  It's  unquestionably  a — look,  there  were 
balls  that  were  dropped  here,  and  with — given  the  episode  in  Ma- 
nila, given  the  seizure  of  the  French  aircraft  that  was  supposed  to 
fly  into  the  Eiffel  Tower,  our  problem  was  a  failure  of  imagination, 
not  to  be  cured — not  to  be  cured — by  restructuring.  In  Manila,  it 
was  said — whoever  the  name,  I've  forgotten — he  said  that,  "We 
were  going  to  take  an  aircraft  and  drive  it  into  Langley  head- 
quarters of  the  CIA."  I  would  think  that  that  would  really  get  the 
attention  of  the  CIA. 

Chairman  WARNER.  I  expect  it  would,  too.  But  it  is  the  product 
of  competitive  intelligence  analysis.  Again,  going  back,  as  I  did 
with  my  colleagues  on  the  Intelligence  Committee,  and  looking  at 
the  problems,  the  DIA  was  very  skeptical,  as  was  the  Energy  De- 
partment, about  certain  aspects  of  the  findings  in  the  CIA. 

Again,  is  not  imagination  a  product,  Mr.  Carlucci? 

Mr.  Carlucci.  It's  a  problem — I  think  that  the  report  performs 
a  useful  service  in  pointing  that  out,  but  the  report  also  points  out 
that  the  policymakers  do  not  act  on  warning,  which  is  another 
issue  that  we  haven't  discussed  today.  That's  beyond  the  realm  of 
just  pure  intelligence.  But  the  interaction  between  the  IC  and  the 
policymaker  is  very  important. 

Chairman  Warner.  Dr.  Hamre? 

Dr.  Hamre.  Sir,  I  strongly  believe  that  you  want  competitive 
analysis- 


Chairman  Warner.  To  give  you  the  imagination 

Dr.  Hamre.  Absolutely. 
Chairman  WARNER. — as  a  product. 
Dr.  Hamre.  Absolutely. 

Chairman  Warner.  Gentlemen,  thank  you.  You  win  an  endur- 
ance contest.  We're  almost  at  4  hours.  Thank  you  very  much. 
The  hearing  is  adjourned. 
[Whereupon,  at  6:20  p.m.,  the  committee  adjourned.! 


IMPLICATIONS  FOR  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF 
DEFENSE  AND  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  OF 
PROPOSALS  TO  REORGANIZE  THE  UNITED 
STATES  INTELLIGENCE  COMMUNITY 


TUESDAY,  AUGUST  17,  2004 

U.S.  Senate, 
Committee  on  Armed  Services, 

Washington,  DC. 

The  committee  met,  pursuant  to  notice,  at  10:21  a.m.  in  room 
SR-325,  Russell  Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  John  Warner 
(chairman)  presiding. 

Committee  members  present:  Senators  Warner,  McCain,  Roberts, 
Sessions,  Talent,  Chambliss,  Graham,  Dole,  Cornyn,  Levin,  Ken- 
nedy, Lieberman,  Reed,  Bill  Nelson,  E.  Benjamin  Nelson,  Dayton, 
Bayh,  and  Clinton. 

Committee  staff  members  present:  Judith  A.  Ansley,  staff  direc- 
tor; and  Leah  C.  Brewer,  nominations  and  hearings  clerk. 

Majority  staff  members  present:  Charles  W.  Alsup,  professional 
staff  member;  Brian  R.  Green,  professional  staff  member;  Thomas 
L.  MacKenzie,  professional  staff  member;  and  Paula  J.  Philbin, 
professional  staff  member. 

Minority  staff  members  present:  Richard  D.  DeBobes,  Democratic 
staff  director;  Evelyn  N.  Farkas,  professional  staff  member; 
Creighton  Greene,  professional  staff  member;  and  Maren  R.  Leed, 
professional  staff  member. 

Staff  assistants  present:  Andrew  W.  Florell,  Nicholas  W.  West, 
and  Pendred  K.  Wilson. 

Committee  members'  assistants  present:  Christopher  J.  Paul,  as- 
sistant to  Senator  McCain;  Darren  M.  Dick,  assistant  to  Senator 
Roberts;  Lance  Landry,  assistant  to  Senator  Allard;  Lindsey  R. 
Neas,  assistant  to  Senator  Talent;  Steven  R.  Norton,  assistant  to 
Senator  Chambliss;  Aleix  Jarvis,  assistant  to  Senator  Graham; 
Russell  J.  Thomasson,  assistant  to  Senator  Cornyn;  Mieke  Y. 
Eoyang,  assistant  to  Senator  Kennedy;  Frederick  M.  Downey,  as- 
sistant to  Senator  Lieberman;  Neil  D.  Campbell,  assistant  to  Sen- 
ator Reed;  William  K.  Sutey,  assistant  to  Senator  Bill  Nelson;  Eric 
Pierce,  assistant  to  Senator  E.  Benjamin  Nelson;  and  Todd 
Rosenblum,  assistant  to  Senator  Bayh. 

OPENING  STATEMENT  OF  SENATOR  JOHN  WARNER, 
CHAIRMAN 

Chairman  Warner.  The  committee  meets  today  to  receive  testi- 
mony from  Secretary  of  Defense  Donald  Rumsfeld;  Acting  Director 

(85) 


86 

of  Central  Intelligence,  John  E.  McLaughlin;  and  Chairman  of  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  General  Richard  B.  Myers,  on  the  implications 
for  the  Department  of  Defense  (DOD)  and  current  and  future  mili- 
tary operations  of  proposals  to  reorganize  the  U.S.  Intelligence 
Community. 

We  welcome  our  witnesses.  I  see  that  you're  joined  by  Dr. 
Cambone.  We  welcome  you. 

First,  an  administrative  announcement  to  members  of  the  com- 
mittee. In  consultation  with  Senator  Levin,  we  have  scheduled  a 
hearing  of  this  committee  for  immediately  following  our  return  on 
September  9.  The  question  at  that  time  will  be  the  oversight  review 
of  our  committee  of  the  remaining  reports,  as  we  understand  it, 
concerning  the  prisoner  abuse  situation  in  Iraq.  Those  remaining 
investigations,  particularly  the  Fay-Jones  investigation  into  the 
role  of  the  military  intelligence,  and  the  Schlesinger-Brown  panel's 
overall  view,  should  be  completed  in  that  period  of  time — would 
that  be  correct,  Mr.  Secretary? — and  available  for  review.  Your  De- 
partment has  so  advised  me  of  that. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  That  is  the  current  schedule.  Whether 
something  would  come  up  that  would  cause  one  of  them  to  delay 
for  some  reason  or  another,  I  can't  know.  But,  at  the  moment — 
what  is  the  date  you're  planning  to  be  back? 

Chairman  Warner.  September  9. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  As  far  as  I  know,  those  two  that  you  men- 
tioned would  be  completed. 

Chairman  Warner.  We've  received  excellent  cooperation  from 
your  staff  on  this  in  the  scheduling,  and  I've  had  an  opportunity 
to  work  along  with  Dr.  Schlesinger  on  these  issues 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Good. 

Chairman  Warner. — so  I  thank  you,  Mr.  Secretary. 

Now,  the  views  of  our  witnesses  today  on  the  various  rec- 
ommendations for  reform  of  the  U.S.  Intelligence  Community,  par- 
ticularly the  recommendations  of  the  9/11  Commission  and  the  pro- 
posals of  President  Bush,  are  critical  to  this  committee's  under- 
standing of  how  those  recommended  changes  would  impact  the 
DOD  in  future  military  operations. 

The  impressive  work  of  the  9/11  Commission  has  given  America 
a  roadmap,  a  series  of  recommendations  on  how  to  move  forward. 
I  might  add  that  the  Governmental  Affairs  Committee  this  morn- 
ing is  hearing  from  the  families  and  some  survivors  of  the  trage- 
dies of  September  11,  and  I  think  I  join  with  all  my  colleagues, 
we're  very  impressed  with  their  contributions  into  this  national  de- 
bate. 

So  now  it's  time  for  Congress  to  thoroughly  examine  and  evalu- 
ate all  of  these  recommendations,  and  to  enact  such  changes  as  we 
deem  will  strengthen  our  Intelligence  Community. 

President  Bush  has  taken  swift  action  to  embrace  certain  ele- 
ments of  the  9/11  Commission's  recommendations  prior  to  the  9/11 
report.  We  must  be  mindful  of  that,  because  this  is  a  continuum 
of  steps  that  have  been  taken,  all  the  way  from  the  Patriot  Act  to 
the  establishment  of  the  Terrorist  Threat  Integration  Center,  those 
steps  to  make  our  Nation  safer  each  day  that  we  go  forward. 

Of  the  41  recommendations  made  by  the  9/11  Commission,  some 
have  already  been  enacted  over  the  past  3  years.  More  will  be  done 


87 

through  executive  order,  and,  quite  possibly,  Congress  will  provide 
legislation  in  the  very  near  future. 

But  as  the  9/11  Commission  noted,  in  nearly  3  years  since  Sep- 
tember 11,  Americans  have  become  better  protected  against  terror- 
ist attack.  But  none  of  us  can  rest.  We  must  constantly  work — each 
day,  each  week,  each  month — to  make  America  safer. 

As  our  witnesses  are  well  aware,  the  DOD  is  home  to  the  largest 
dollar — that  is,  budget  allocation — within  the  Intelligence  Commu- 
nity. DOD  is  the  largest  consumer  of  the  intelligence  produced  by 
the  Intelligence  Community.  We  must  not  lose  sight  of  these  facts 
as  we  consider  the  way  ahead. 

My  overriding  concern,  speaking  for  myself  as  I  examine  changes 
and  proposals  and  recommendations  to  the  Intelligence  Commu- 
nity, is,  what  changes  will  best  help  provide  the  strategic  warning 
we  need  to  protect  the  Nation,  to  keep  our  President  and  his  subor- 
dinates fully  informed  while  at  the  same  time  supporting  the 
warfighter — the  man,  the  woman,  the  sailor,  the  soldier,  the  air- 
man, the  marine — who,  at  this  very  moment,  is  taking  risks 
throughout  the  world  and  fighting  to  keep  the  terrorist  threat  from 
our  shores?  How  can  we  better  provide  the  necessary  intelligence 
to  all  of  these  consumers? 

It  was  not  long  ago  when  the  national-level  intelligence  support 
to  the  warfighter  was  inadequate.  All  of  us  on  this  committee  re- 
member very  well.  The  military's  experience  during  Operation 
Desert  Storm  was  a  watershed  event.  From  the  time  General  Nor- 
man Schwarzkopf  came  before  this  committee  in  June  1991  and  ad- 
vised us  that  responsive  national-level  intelligence  support  for  his 
mission  in  the  first  Persian  Gulf  War  was  unsatisfactory. 

The  Defense  Department,  together  with  other  elements  in  the  In- 
telligence Community,  has  painstakingly,  since  that  time,  built  the 
intelligence  and  operational  capabilities  that  we  saw  so  convinc- 
ingly demonstrated  on  the  battlefields  of  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  in 
the  recent  past.  As  we  examine  ways  to  reform  our  Intelligence 
Community,  we  must  ensure  that  we  do  nothing  to  undermine  the 
confidence  that  the  battlefield  commanders  have  in  the  intelligence 
support  on  which  they  must  depend. 

The  9/11  commissioners  correctly  pointed  out  that  our  overall  in- 
telligence structure  failed  to  connect  the  dots,  in  terms  of  observing 
and  then  fusing  together  the  indicators  of  a  significant  threat  from 
al  Qaeda  in  the  years  and  months  leading  up  to  the  actual  attack 
on  our  country  on  September  11,  2001.  The  recommended  solution, 
however,  is  to  reorganize  the  entire  community,  not  just  focus  on 
the  parts  that  were  unsatisfactory;  therefore,  we  must  examine  the 
reasons  for  these  dramatic  proposals  and  understand  how  the  rec- 
ommended solutions  address,  or  do  not  address,  the  problems  iden- 
tified in  the  9/11  Commission's  report. 

Clearly,  we  must  seize  the  opportunity  to  act — and  I,  personally, 
am  confident  that  Congress  can  and  will  do  something  in  the  bal- 
ance of  this  session — but  we  should  do  it  with  great  care.  I'm  ever 
mindful  of  the  legislation  to  our  national  security  structure,  the 
National  Security  Act  of  1947,  and  the  Goldwater-Nichols  Act  of 
1986,  which  many  of  us  on  this  committee  were  full  participants. 
These  were  not  considered  in  haste,  and  we  must  not  be  rushed  to 
judgment  in  this  case. 


88 

I,  personally,  as  I've  studied  all  the  recommendations,  feel,  first 
and  foremost,  that  we  must  be  mindful  that  this  Nation  is  at  war 
at  this  very  moment,  with  tremendous  risks  being  undertaken  by 
many  people.  We're  at  war,  Mr.  Secretary.  Were  we  to  try  and  do 
massive  dismemberment  of  the  DOD  at  this  point  in  time,  I 
think — and  I  listen  to  the  Secretary  and  our  witnesses — it  could  re- 
sult in  turbulence  that  might  degrade  this  level  of  intelligence  so 
essential  as  we  continue  to  fight  this  war,  as  we  continue  to  hear, 
almost  every  week  or  month,  of  the  threat  levels  against  this  Na- 
tion, quite  apart  from  the  conflicts  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan. 

So,  with  that  in  mind,  I,  personally,  want  to  proceed,  but  with 
great  caution,  and  do  what  we  can  to  strengthen  this  system;  at 
the  same  time,  cause  hopefully  no  turbulence  or  disruption  in  the 
intelligence  system  that  now,  I  think,  serves  this  Nation  reasonably 
well — can  be  better. 

I  look  at  the  proposal  by  which  we  could  take  the  current  posi- 
tion of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  elevate  it  to — in  every 
possible  way,  to  that  of  a  full  cabinet  status.  As  I  look  at  the  cur- 
rent body  of  law,  you  have  extraordinary  powers  already  on  the 
statute.  Perhaps  some  correction  could  be  made,  or  addition,  by 
Congress,  to  the  existing  powers  so  that  there  is  no  limitation  to 
your  ability  to  work  as  a  coequal  with  your  peer  group,  be  it  the 
Secretary  of  Defense,  Secretary  of  Homeland  Security,  Secretary  of 
State,  or  whatever  the  case  may  be. 

Perhaps  we  could  change  the  name,  call  it  the  National  Intel- 
ligence Director  (NID).  But  if  it's  desired  of  Congress  to  move  for- 
ward and  create  the  entire  new  entity  and  a  new  layer,  then  I 
think  we  ought  to  do  it  in  such  a  way  that  it's  a  partnership  rela- 
tionship between  the  Secretary  of  Defense  working  in  consultation 
with  the  NID  and  his  structure.  At  such  time  as  the  budgets  are 
brought  forward,  they  work  on  them  together  and  present  those 
budgets  jointly,  as  they  would  present  jointly  to  the  President  any 
recommendations  for  key  personnel  to  serve  in  the  various  intel- 
ligence agencies. 

So  those  are  two  approaches  that  this  Senator  is  considering, 
such  that  we  minimize  any  disruption  to  the  essential  collection  of 
intelligence  today. 

Senator  Levin. 

STATEMENT  OF  SENATOR  CARL  LEVIN 

Senator  Levin.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Let  me  join  you  in  welcoming  our  witnesses  today.  This  is  our 
committee's  second  hearing  on  the  recommendations  of  the  9/11 
Commission  to  reorganize  the  Intelligence  Community  and  the  im- 
plications of  such  reorganization  for  the  DOD  and  military  oper- 
ations. 

We  have  suffered  from  two  different  types  of  intelligence  failures 
in  recent  years.  The  first  was  the  failure  of  agencies  to  share  infor- 
mation necessary  to  connect  the  dots  before  the  September  11  at- 
tacks. That  failure  is  attributed,  by  the  9/11  Commission,  mainly 
to  problems  in  the  organization  and  management  of  the  Intel- 
ligence Community. 

The  second  failure,  the  massively  erroneous  intelligence  assess- 
ments relied  on  before  the  war  in  Iraq,  appears,  in  significant  part. 


89 

to  have  been  the  result  of  the  shaping  of  intelHgence  by  the  Intel- 
hgence  Community  to  support  the  poHcies  of  the  administration. 

As  we  consider  legislation  for  the  reorganization  of  the  Intel- 
ligence Community,  we  should  recognize  the  significance  of  both 
types  of  failures:  those  resulting  from  poor  organization  and  man- 
agement, and  those  resulting  from  politicizing  intelligence.  Chang- 
ing the  organization  of  the  Intelligence  Community,  as  proposed  by 
the  9/11  Commission,  may  help  address  intelligence-sharing  prob- 
lems, but  does  not  address  politicizing  intelligence,  and  could  even 
make  that  problem  worse. 

Relative  to  the  failure  number  one,  the  9/11  Commission  made 
major  recommendations  to  reorganize  the  Intelligence  Community 
that  could  have  significant  implications  for  our  military  which  we 
want  to  explore  today. 

One  recommendation  is  to  create  the  new  position  of  a  National 
Intelligence  Director  who  would  have  greater  authority  over  the  na- 
tional intelligence  budget  and  programs  and  over  hiring  and  firing 
people  to  head  the  national  intelligence  agencies,  including  agen- 
cies that  are  currently  located  within  the  Defense  Department, 
such  as  the  National  Security  Agency  (NSA),  which  is  responsible 
for  collecting  signals  and  breaking  codes,  and  the  National  Recon- 
naissance Office  (NRO),  which  is  responsible  for  building  satellites. 

Another  recommendation  is  to  create  a  new  National  Counter- 
terrorism  Center  (NCTC)  which  would  combine  all-source  fusion 
and  analysis  of  terrorist  intelligence,  similar  to  what  the  Terrorist 
Threat  Integration  Center  (TTIC)  now  does,  but  with  the  additional 
function  of  planning  and  tasking  counterterrorist  operations,  in- 
cluding those  conducted  by  military  forces  under  the  DOD. 

Another  recommendation  is  to  transfer  the  lead  responsibility  for 
all  paramilitary  operations,  both  overt  and  covert,  to  the  DOD. 
Currently,  the  CIA  is  responsible  for  covert  operations,  which  re- 
quire a  presidential  finding  and  a  prior  notification  to  Congress. 

These  recommendations  raise  a  host  of  questions  that  need  to  be 
considered  as  we  reform  our  Intelligence  Community.  The  relation- 
ship between  intelligence  and  defense  entities  and  their  specific  re- 
sponsibilities and  authorities  are  not  questions  of  turf.  They  are  vi- 
tally important  to  both  the  security  and  well-being  of  our  Nation 
and  the  safety  of  our  troops. 

I  would  hope  that  our  witnesses  will  address,  in  their  opening 
statements,  whether  they  agree  with  the  following  five  rec- 
ommendations of  the  9/11  Commission.  I'm  quoting  these  rec- 
ommendations. 

Recommendation  number  1:  The  National  Counterterrorism  Cen- 
ter should  perform  joint  planning.  The  plans  would  assign  oper- 
ational responsibilities  to  lead  agencies,  including  Defense  and  its 
combatant  commands. 

Recommendation  number  2:  The  National  Intelligence  Director 
should  have,  "the  authority  to  reprogram  funds  among  the  national 
intelligence  agencies  to  meet  any  new  priority." 

Recommendation  number  3:  The  National  Intelligence  Director 
should  approve  and  submit  nominations  to  the  President  of  the  in- 
dividuals who  would  lead  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA), 
Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA),  NSA,  National  Geospatial-Intel- 
ligence  Agency  (NGA),  NRO,  and  other  intelligence  capabilities. 


90 

Recommendation  number  4:  Again,  I'm  quoting,  "Lead  respon- 
sibility for  directing  and  executing  paramilitary  operations,  wheth- 
er clandestine  or  covert,  should  shift  to  the  Defense  Department." 

Recommendation  number  5:  The  National  Intelligence  Director 
would  manage  this  national  effort,  managing  the  national  intel- 
ligence program,  and  overseeing  the  component  agencies  of  the  In- 
telligence Community  with  the  help  of  three  deputies,  each  of 
which  would  also  hold  a  key  position  in  one  of  the  component  agen- 
cies. 

Now,  if  we  fail  to  make  needed  reforms,  we  may  be  leaving  our- 
selves vulnerable  to  future  intelligence  failures.  But  if  we  unwit- 
tingly create  a  system  that  results  in  confused,  unclear,  or  duplica- 
tive lines  of  command  or  responsibility,  our  security  would  be  di- 
minished. So  we  need  to  proceed  urgently,  but  carefully,  as  we  con- 
sider reforming  our  intelligence  system. 

Regardless  of  the  responsibilities  that  we  might  choose  to  give  to 
the  proposed  National  Intelligence  Director  and  National  Counter- 
terrorism  Center,  and  wherever  we  decide  to  place  these  offices  on 
an  organization  chart,  we  must  take  steps  to  avoid  the  second 
major  intelligence  failure,  the  shaping  of  intelligence  assessments 
to  support  administration  policies — any  administration's  policies. 
Independent  and  objective  intelligence  is  a  matter  of  vital  national 
importance.  Objective,  unvarnished  intelligence  should  inform  pol- 
icy choices.  Policy  should  not  drive  intelligence  assessments. 

The  Intelligence  Committee's  report  of  July  9,  2004,  on  the  Intel- 
ligence Communitys  prewar  intelligence  assessments  on  Iraq  is  a 
multi-count  indictment  of  faulty  intelligence  assessments. 

For  example,  when  the  CIA's  unclassified  white  paper  said  that, 
"Most  intelligence  specialists  assess  that  Iraq  was  trying  to  obtain 
aluminum  tubes  for  a  centrifuge  program  for  nuclear  weapons,"  it 
did  not  explain  that  the  Department  of  Energy,  the  Intelligence 
Community's  nuclear  experts,  specifically  disagreed  with  the  as- 
sessment that  the  aluminum  tubes  were  intended  for  Iraq's  nuclear 
program. 

Similarly,  when  the  CIA's  unclassified  National  Intelligence  Esti- 
mate stated  that,  "Iraq  maintains  several  development  programs, 
including  for  an  Unmanned  Aerial  Vehicle  (UAV)  that  most  ana- 
lysts believe  is  intended  to  deliver  biological  warfare  agents,"  the 
CIA  eliminated  a  footnote  to  the  effect  that  U.S.  Air  Force  intel- 
ligence, the  Intelligence  Community  agency  with  primary  respon- 
sibility for  technical  analysis  on  UAV  programs,  did  not  agree  with 
that  assessment.  When  the  CIA's  unclassified  white  paper  included 
the  statement,  "potentially  against  the  U.S.  homeland,"  with  re- 
spect to  the  use  by  Iraq  of  biological  weapons,  it  did  not  acknowl- 
edge that  its  own  classified  National  Intelligence  Estimate  on  the 
same  subject  did  not  include  that  frightening  assessment. 

When  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence's  testimony  before  the 
Intelligence  Committee  addressed,  "training  in  poisons  and  gases," 
of  al  Qaeda  by  Iraq,  which,  "comes  from  credible  and  reliable 
sources,"  the  Director  did  not  mention  that  the  underlying  intel- 
ligence in  his  own  classified  statement  called  into  question  the  reli- 
ability of  the  sources  of  this  information. 

Now,  these  are  but  a  few  examples  from  the  highly  critical  intel- 
ligence report  of  the  Senate  Select  Committee  on  Intelligence  on 


91 

the  intelligence  failures  before  the  war  with  Iraq.  It  is  unacceptable 
for  the  senior  U.S.  intelligence  official,  whether  that  be  a  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence  or  a  National  Intelligence  Director,  to  exag- 
gerate the  certainty  of  intelligence  assessments  and  tell  the  Presi- 
dent, Congress,  the  American  people,  and  the  world  that  something 
is  an  open  and  shut  case,  "a  slam  dunk,"  when  it  isn't,  when  the 
underlying  intelligence,  in  fact,  has  uncertainties  and  qualifica- 
tions. Whatever  changes  we  make  to  the  organization  of  the  Intel- 
ligence Community,  we  must  do  all  that  we  can  to  ensure  that  the 
intelligence  upon  which  our  Nation  relies,  often  for  life-and-death 
decisions,  is  independently  and  objectively  analyzed  and  presented. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Warner.  Senator  Levin. 

Mr.  Secretary,  we  welcome,  again,  your  appearance  here.  I  would 
recognize  you  just  got  back  from  an  important  trip  to  our  forces 
abroad,  and  I  recognize  that  you've  been  in  consultation  this  morn- 
ing— at  the  White  House,  I  presume — perhaps  on  this  subject  and 
others,  and  we're  anxious  to  hear  your  views. 

May  I  courteously  ask  that  you  bring  the  microphone  up  as  close 
as  possible,  because  we  have  a  very  full  room,  and  the  acoustics 
somewhat  diminished. 

STATEMENT  OF  HON.  DONALD  H.  RUMSFELD,  SECRETARY  OF 
DEFENSE;  ACCOMPANIED  BY  DR.  STEPHEN  A.  CAMBONE, 
UNDER  SECRETARY  OF  DEFENSE  FOR  INTELLIGENCE 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  members  of  the 
committee. 

I  appreciate  this  opportunity  to  discuss  the  subject  of  strengthen- 
ing the  Intelligence  Community  in  the  United  States,  as  well  as 
some  of  the  recommendations  of  the  9/11  Commission. 

Needless  to  say,  some  of  what  I  will  be  saying  will  be  my  per- 
sonal views,  because,  while  the  President  has  made  a  number  of 
decisions — and  announced  them — that  he  believes  will  improve  the 
Intelligence  Community,  some  aspects  of  his  proposals  are  still 
under  discussion,  and,  in  that  case,  I  may  very  well  be  back  some- 
day to  discuss  those  decisions  as  they  arrive. 

He's  proposed  the  establishment  of  a  National  Intelligence  Direc- 
tor, as  the  9/11  Commission  recommended,  the  creation  of  an 
NCTC,  and  the  issuance  of  a  number  of  executive  orders  to  imple- 
ment other  recommendations  of  the  9/11  Commission,  such  as  re- 
form of  the  community's  information-sharing. 

I  think  what  I'd  like  to  do  is  to  ask  my  complete  statement  be 
put  in  the  record,  and  I  will  abbreviate  it  substantially. 

Chairman  Warner.  Mr.  Secretary,  a  very  wise  course.  All  state- 
ments by  the  three  witnesses  will  be  admitted  into  the  record. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  The  President  will  continue  to  listen  to  the 
debate  on  the  subject  of  intelligence  reform,  as  will  others  in  the 
executive  branch.  I  think  the  hearings  are  a  good  thing.  The  ex- 
perts that  have  been  testifying  have  a  lot  of  background  and  expe- 
rience and  knowledge,  and  certainly  add  dimension  to  the  discus- 
sion. 

The  objective  of  Intelligence  Community  reform  is  to  provide  the 
community  with  a  renewal,  to  refashion  it  to  better  succeed  in  this 
still  new  and  different  21st  century.  Those  objectives  include  im- 


92 

proved  indications  and  warning  of  impending  events  in  enough 
time  to  anticipate  them  and  to  permit  effective  action. 

This  requires,  in  my  view,  aggressively  breaking  down  the  stove- 
pipes within  and  between  domestic,  foreign,  and  mihtary  intel- 
ligence; integrating  domestic  intelligence  into  the  Intelligence  Com- 
munity while  providing  for  the  appropriate  protections  for  civil  lib- 
erties— and  that's  not  an  easy  task;  it's  a  big  issue  for  this  commit- 
tee and  for  the  country — authorizing  and  enabling  intelligence 
users  to  access  required  intelligence  data  wherever  it  may  reside; 
improved  analysis  of  the  environment  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of 
surprise,  especially  by  terrorists,  and  this  requires  conducting,  in 
my  view,  competitive  analysis  within  the  offices  of  the  NID  and 
within  and  among  departments  and  agencies  based  on  all-source 
intelligence;  seeking  to  avoid  "group  think,"  as  recommended  by  the 
9/11  Commission;  balancing  the  need  for  intelligence  and  warning 
against  the  current  threats  in  light  of  the  need  for  longer-term 
strategic  analysis;  improved  ability  to  use  intelligence  to  effectively 
deter  and  disrupt,  defeat,  and  defend  against  attacks  on  the  United 
States'  interests,  especially  by  terrorists — it  requires  ensuring  that 
departments  and  agencies  charged  with  deterring  and  defending 
U.S.  interests  possess  highly  capable  all-source  intelligence  capa- 
bilities, commensurate  with  their  missions;  developing  and  execut- 
ing integrated  joint  responses  by  executive  departments  to  effec- 
tively employ  the  instruments  of  national  power  appropriate  to  the 
task  or  mission;  maintaining  clear  lines  of  authority  and  respon- 
sibility between  the  President  and  the  heads  of  the  executive  de- 
partments and  those  operating  agencies. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  come  to  this  subject  with  a  background  of  inter- 
est in  intelligence  capabilities.  As  I  recall,  I  appeared  before  this 
committee  in  January  2001,  more  than  3V2  years  ago,  for  a  con- 
firmation hearing,  and  I  was  asked  by  one  of  the  members  of  the 
committee  what  subject  kept  me  up  at  night.  I  answered,  simply, 
with  one  word:  intelligence.  The  answer  remains  the  same. 

Adversaries  have  many  advantages  in  den5dng  information  too, 
and  deceiving  intelligence  analysts  and  policymakers,  alike,  about 
their  capabilities  and  their  intentions.  As  a  result,  they're  capable 
of  surprising  us,  as  well  as  surprising  friendly  foreign  countries. 
This  is  the  reality  our  country  faces  as  we  consider  various  propos- 
als for  improving  capabilities  to  the  U.S.  Intelligence  Community 
to  meet  the  21st  century  problems. 

A  variety  of  proposals  for  achieving  these  objectives  have  been 
advanced.  I'm  persuaded  that  the  attributes  we  seek  in  the  Intel- 
ligence Community — imagination,  intuition,  and  initiative — may 
best  be  encouraged  and  developed  by  organizations  where  planning 
is  centralized  but  the  execution  of  the  plans  is  decentralized.  An  In- 
telligence Community  organized  around  areas  of  substantive  exper- 
tise— for  example,  foreign,  domestic,  and  military  intelligence — 
would  possibly  be  more  likely  to  generate,  in  a  timely  fashion,  the 
indications  and  warning  of  crisis  and  provide  intelligence  support 
needed  by  the  executive  departments  of  government  in  the  per- 
formance of  their  respective  missions  than  is  one  organized  around 
a  single  or  preeminent  national  intelligence  organization. 

As  some  have  suggested,  organizing  the  U.S.  Intelligence  Com- 
munity around  national  collections  agencies,  like  NSA,  NGA,  and 


93 

NRO,  and  aligning  them  under  direct  NID  leadership,  could  con- 
ceivably lead  to  some  efficiencies  in  some  aspects  of  intelligence  col- 
lection, and  some  modest  but  indefiinable  improvement  in  support 
of  those  agencies  provide  to  other  elements  of  the  government.  At 
the  same,  however,  it's  possible  that,  by  their  sheer  size  and  the 
broad  extent  of  their  activity,  those  collection  agencies  could  come 
to  form  the  center  of  gravity  of  the  NID's  organization.  If  a  consoli- 
dation of  those  agencies  outside  DOD  were  to  be  considered,  we 
should  be  certain  that  it  would  actually  help  resolve  the  intel- 
ligence-related problems  and  difficulties  that  have  been  described 
by  the  9/11  Commission  and  that  we  face,  and  that  they  would  not 
create  additional  problems. 

As  an  example  of  the  latter,  we  would  not  want  to  place  new  bar- 
riers or  filters  between  military  combatant  commanders  and  those 
agencies  when  they  perform  as  combat  support  agencies.  It  would 
be  a  major  step  to  separate  these  key  agencies  from  the  military 
combatant  commanders,  which  are  the  major  users  of  such  capa- 
bilities. 

With  respect  to  solving  problems  that  have  been  identified,  my 
impression  is  that  the  technical  collection  agencies  collect  more 
than  we  can  analyze  today.  This  suggests  that  we  need  more  ana- 
lysts and  capacity  to  process  data. 

It's  also  my  conviction  that  we  must  repair  our  human  intel- 
ligence capabilities.  They  were  especially  hit  in  the  budget  cuts 
during  the  1990s.  It's  my  belief  that  any  changes  that  are  made  to 
meet  the  objectives  identified  earlier  need  to  focus  on  building  a 
community  for  the  21st  century  along  21st  century  lines, 
networked  and  distributed  centers  of  analysis  within  executive  de- 
partments and  agencies,  with  access  to  all  available  data,  focused 
on  employing  instruments  of  collection,  wherever  they  reside,  as 
tools  for  exploring  hypothesis  and  conducting  alternative  analysis — 
this  implies  a  National  Intelligence  Director  with  authority  for 
tasking  collection  assets  across  the  government — setting  analytic 
priorities;  and  ensuring  all-source  competitive  analysis  throughout 
the  Intelligence  Community.  Importantly,  the  personnel  manage- 
ment and  training  to  alter  the  culture  in  the  community — it's  not 
something  that's  been  discussed  extensively,  but  real  change — most 
people  are  discussing  organizational  changes,  and,  in  my  view,  we 
need  to  think  also  about  the  culture.  If  you  think  of  the  DOD  and 
the  number  of — almost  decades  it's  taken  to  instill  the  culture  of 
jointness  in  that  institution,  it  ought  to  remind  us  of  the  impor- 
tance of  culture  with  respect  to  the  Intelligence  Community's 
issues.  Information,  security,  and  access  policies,  information  tech- 
nology standards  and  architectures  across  the  community  are  also 
enormously  important.  Reallocating  resources  in  a  year  of  budget 
execution.  As  I  said,  the  precise  extent  of  such  authorities  and 
other  issues  are  still  under  consideration,  but  an  NID  likely  will 
need  some  authorities  of  these  types. 

The  Department,  through  the  Services  and  the  combatant  com- 
mands, has  worked  to  break  down  stovepipes  between  foreign  and 
military  intelligence  that  support  DOD  activities.  The  impetus  for 
this  effort  was,  as  you  pointed  out,  Mr.  Chairman,  the  lessons 
learned  from  Operation  Desert  Storm,  some  12  years  ago.  You  re- 


94 

called  the  disappointment  that  existed  with  the  timeliness,  speed, 
and  scope  of  intelligence  support  for  those  operations. 

The  result  of  a  decade's  effort  to  establish  a  timely  and  seamless 
interaction  between  DOD  and  CIA  activities  has  become  apparent 
in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  and  in  the  ongoing  war  on  terror.  I  sup- 
pose anyone  can  have  their  own  opinion,  but,  in  my  view,  we  are 
about  as  well-connected  as  we  ever  have  been,  although  we're  prob- 
ably not  as  well-stitched  together  as  we  conceivably  could  or  should 
be.  But  any  change  to  the  Intelligence  Community,  it  seems  to  me, 
should  be  designed  to  help  us  close,  further,  those  gaps  and  seams, 
not  to  reopen  them. 

The  9/11  Commission  has  focused  the  Nation's  attention — and 
very  usefully — on  questions  related  to  strengthening  the  commu- 
nity. I  think  it  would  be  unfortunate  if  we  were  to  lose  sight  of  the 
9/11  Commission's  reflections  on  the  nature  of  the  world  in  which 
we  live  and  the  recommendations  for  the  national  security  policies 
needed  to  protect  and  defend  the  country  and  the  American  people. 

In  addition  to  the  recommendations  offered  by  the  9/11  Commis- 
sion, we  could  usefully  consider  the  following: 

Further  improving  U.S.  domestic  intelligence  capabilities  while 
preserving  U.S.  civil  liberties.  I  think  that  is  one  of  their  most  im- 
portant recommendations,  and  it's  receiving  relatively  little  atten- 
tion and  discussion.  As  part  of  that  initiative,  I  would  just  mention 
that  the  DOD  appointed  a  panel,  headed  by  Newt  Minow,  to  look 
at  ways  and  means  of  achieving  our  domestic  intelligence  capabili- 
ties— the  defense  intelligence  capabilities — consistent  with  our  laws 
and  values,  to  help  counter  21st  century  threats.  It's  conceivable 
that  such  an  outside  panel  could  be  useful  in  this  instance. 

The  President's  been  actively  engaged  in  developing  initiatives 
that  engage  people  at  risk  to  subversion  by  extremist  ideologies.  In 
no  case  is  this  more  evident  than  his  broader  Middle  East  initia- 
tive. These  initiatives  could  be  embraced  by  Congress  so  that  edu- 
cational institutions  abroad  that  emphasize  religious  toleration  are 
supported,  including  provision  for  information  technologies  for 
schools. 

Foreign  scholarships  and  fellowships  for  exchanging  American 
and  foreign  students  and  scholars  are  established  to  improve  cul- 
tural understanding. 

Helping  to  mobilize  private  philanthropy  and  non-governmental 
groups  to  promote  ideas  and  amplify  those  local  voices  that  oppose 
transnational  terrorism  and  extremist  ideologies  and  provide  coun- 
terweights to  terrorist-related  organizations. 

Providing  the  executive  branch  with  the  necessary  flexibility  to 
manage  the  21st  century  war  of  terror. 

Congressional  approval  of  the  administration's  request  for  funds 
for  combatant  commanders'  use  in  the  field  to  aid  in  humanitarian 
relief  and  reconstruction.  Those  of  you  who've  visited  Iraq  and  Af- 
ghanistan know  that  our  combatant  commanders  believe  that  those 
dollars  are  as  powerful  as  bullets  in  the  work  they're  doing. 

I  think,  a  reexamination  of  the  train-and-equip  authorities  and 
missions  to  explore  opportunities  for  improving  the  efficiency  and 
effectiveness  of  such  assistance  programs. 


95 

Consider  conducting  an  interagency  roles-and-missions  study  to 
rationalize  responsibilities  and  authorities  across  the  government 
to  meet  the  21st  century  threats. 

In  pursuit  of  strengthening  our  Nation's  intelligence  capabilities, 
I  would  offer  one  cautionary  note.  It's  important  that  we  move  with 
all  deliberate  speed.  We  need  to  remember  that  we  are  considering 
these  important  matters,  however,  while  we  are  waging  a  war.  If 
we  move  unwisely,  and  get  it  wrong,  the  penalty  would  be  great. 

If  you  think  back,  the  National  Security  Act  of  1947  established 
the  DOD.  By  1958,  it  had  undergone  no  fewer  than  four  major  stat- 
utory or  organizational  changes.  Another  round  of  major  change 
was  inaugurated  with  the  Goldwater-Nichols  Act  in  1986.  I  doubt 
that  we  should  think  of  intelligence  reform  being  completed  at  a 
single  stroke. 

Intelligence  is  expensive.  The  community  suffered  substantial  re- 
ductions in  the  budget  in  the  last  decade  and  in  people.  Those  re- 
ductions were  made  on  the  theory  that,  the  end  of  the  Cold  War, 
U.S.  reliance  on  intelligence  for  security  would  not  be  as  substan- 
tial as  it  had  been.  Events  have  proven  otherwise,  and  we  need  to 
recognize  that. 

To  conclude,  let  me  return  to  where  I  began.  I'm  still  concerned 
about  our  country's  intelligence  capabilities,  but  that  concern  stems 
not  from  a  lack  of  confidence  in  the  men  and  women  in  the  Intel- 
ligence Community.  They  have  fashioned  important  achievements 
over  recent  years,  and  I  believe  our  country  owes  them  a  debt  of 
gratitude.  It  will  be  a  long  time,  if  ever,  that  many  of  their  achieve- 
ments are  fully  and  broadly  known  and  appreciated. 

The  DOD  and  its  counterparts  in  the  Intelligence  Community  are 
forging,  during  a  war,  a  strong  interlocking  relationship  between 
intelligence  and  operations,  between  national  and  tactical  intel- 
ligence, and  between  foreign  and  military  intelligence.  We've 
worked  hard  to  close  the  gaps  and  seams  that  these  terms  imply. 

Now,  my  concerns  are  rooted  in  the  new  realities  of  this  21st  cen- 
tury, and  certainly  the  Department  is  ready  to  work  with  you  to 
further  strengthen  our  ability  to  live  in  this  new  and  dangerous 
world. 

Thank  you. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Secretary  Rumsfeld  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  by  Hon.  Donald  Rumsfeld 
introduction 

Mr.  Chairman,  members  of  the  committee.  I  appreciate  the  opportunity  to  discuss 
the  broader  subject  of  enhancing  the  InteUigence  Community,  as  well  as  some  of  the 
9/11  Commission  recommendations. 

I  want  to  point  out  that  what  I  will  be  saying  represents  my  personal  views,  in 
that  I  am  appearing  before  the  President  has  made  his  final  decisions  on  many  of 
the  important  issues. 

As  members  know,  the  President  has  reached  a  number  of  decisions  that  should 
improve  the  capabilities  of  the  Intelligence  Community: 

•  Establishment  of  a  National  Intelligence  Director. 

•  Creation  of  a  National  Counterterrorism  Center. 

•  Issuance  of  a  number  of  executive  orders  that  will  implement  other  rec- 
ommendations of  the  commission,  such  as  reform  of  the  Intelligence  Com- 
munity's information  sharing. 

In  addition,  the  President  has  called  for  substantial  reform  of  congressional  over- 
sight. 


96 

The  way  Congress  decides  to  conduct  its  oversight  certainly  impacts  the  way  the 
executive  branch  does  its  business.  If  we  are  to  become  more  agile  and  flexible  in 
fighting  the  war  on  terrorism  and  rapidly  adjusting  to  meet  new  circumstances, 
Congress  will  likely  need  to  adjust  its  practices. 

The  President  will  continue  to  listen  to  the  debate  on  the  subject  of  intelligence 
reform.  He  will  continue  to  take  the  counsel  of  a  broad  range  of  experts,  including 
those  who  have  written  and/or  testified  before  you  and  other  committees,  on  this 
important  subject  as  he  considers  additional  details  relative  to  his  proposals  and 
frames  new  initiatives. 

OBJECTIVES 

The  objective  of  Intelligence  Community  reform  is  to  provide  the  community  with 
a  renewal,  to  refashion  it  to  succeed  in  this  still  new  and  different  21st  century. 
Those  objectives  include: 

•  Improved  indications  and  warning  of  impending  events  in  enough  time  to  an- 
ticipate them  and  permit  effective  action.  This  requires: 

•  Aggressively  breaking  down  the  stovepipes  within  and  between  domestic, 
foreign,  and  military  intelligence. 

•  Integrating  domestic  intelligence  into  the  Intelligence  Community  while 
providing  for  appropriate  protection  for  civil  liberties. 

•  Authorizing  and  enabling  appropriate  intelligence  users  to  access  re- 
quired intelligence  data  wherever  it  may  reside. 

•  Improved  analysis  of  the  environment  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  surprise,  es- 
pecially by  terrorists.  This  requires: 

•  Developing  an  integrated  and  authoritative  understanding  of  trends  and 
events,  at  home  and  abroad,  and  whether  and  how  they  might  evolve  into 
threats  to  U.S.  interests. 

•  Conducting  "competitive  analysis"  within  the  offices  of  the  NID  and  with- 
in and  among  departments  and  agencies,  based  on  all  source  intelligence, 
seeking  to  avoid  "group  think"  as  recommended  by  the  9/11  Commission. 

•  Balancing  the  need  for  intelligence  and  warning  against  current  threats 
in  light  of  the  need  for  longer-term  strategic  analysis. 

•  Improved  ability  to  use  intelligence  to  effectively  deter,  disrupt,  defeat,  and 
defend  against  attacks  on  U.S.  interests,  especially  by  terrorists.  This  requires: 

•  Ensuring  that  departments  and  agencies  charged  with  deterring  and  de- 
fending U.S.  interests  possess  highly  capable,  all  source  intelligence  capa- 
bilities commensurate  with  their  mission. 

•  Developing  and  executing  integrated,  joint  responses  by  executive  depart- 
ments to  effectively  employ  the  instruments  of  national  power  appropriate 
to  a  task  or  mission. 

•  Maintaining  clear  lines  of  authority  and  responsibility  between  the  Presi- 
dent and  the  heads  of  the  executive  departments  and  those  operational 
agencies. 

•  Improved  process  for  setting  national  goals,  priorities,  missions,  and  require- 
ments for  the  collection  and  analysis  of  intelligence.  This  requires: 

•  A  more  integrated  approach  to  setting  these  goals,  priorities,  missions, 
and  requirements. 

•  Enhancing  the  role  of  policy  makers  and  intelligence  analysts  in  this 
process;  and 

•  Ensuring  that  the  process  produces  intelligence  and  capabilities  to  deter, 
defeat,  and  defend  against  adversaries,  especially  terrorists  that  are  agile, 
flexible,  and  responsive. 

THE  NEED  FOR  A  RENAISSANCE 

Mr.  Chairman,  members  of  the  committee,  I  come  to  this  subject  with  a  record 
of  interest  in  the  Nation's  intelligence  capabilities. 

When  I  appeared  before  your  committee  in  January  2001,  more  than  3V2  years 
ago,  as  the  nominee  to  be  Secretary  of  Defense,  I  was  asked  what  subject  kept  me 
up  at  night. 

I  replied,  without  hesitation,  "intelligence." 

My  prior  experience  as  chairman  of  two  congressionally-mandated  commissions — 
one  on  the  ballistic  missile  threat  to  the  U.S.  and  the  other  on  the  organization  and 
management  of  national  security  space — had  impressed  on  me  how  difficult  it  is  to 
acquire  intelligence,  convert  it  into  useful  information  and  then  use  it  in  support 
of  operations. 


97 

In  our  global  environment,  adversaries  can  exploit  international  trade,  finance, 
and  communications  to  acquire  expertise,  technology  and  systems — often  on  the 
open  market — with  which  they  can  do  great  harm  to  the  American  people  and  the 
Nation's  interests. 

My  concern  back  in  2001  was,  and  remains  today,  that  a  combination  of  terrorists 
and  states  that  wish  us  harm,  will  exploit  that  global  environment,  and  gain  access 
to  or  develop  weapons  of  mass  destruction. 

The  efforts  of  the  Intelligence  Community  to  identify  such  threats  in  a  timely  and 
precise  way  that  permit  us  to  act  decisively  are  frustrated  by  the  reality  that: 

•  Our  adversaries  are  keenly  aware  of  our  vulnerabilities; 

•  They  need  to  succeed  only  occasionally  whereas  we  are  obliged  to  defend 
against  them  everywhere  and  at  all  times; 

•  Through  a  combination  of  espionage  against  the  U.S.,  irresponsible  leaks, 
demarches,  official  disclosures  and  the  general  advance  of  scientific  and 
technical  knowledge,  adversaries  have  learned  far  too  much  about  how  we 
collect,  analyze,  and  use  intelligence; 

•  Adversaries  have  many  advantages  in  denying  information  to  and  deceiv- 
ing intelligence  analysts  and  policymakers  alike  about  their  capabilities  and 
intentions;  and 

•  As  a  result,  they  are  capable  of  surprising  us  as  well  as  friendly  foreign 
countries. 

This  is  the  reality  our  country  faces  as  we  consider  various  proposals  for  improv- 
ing the  capabilities  of  the  U.S.  Intelligence  Community  to  meet  21st  century  prob- 
lems. 

It  is  a  reality  borne  out  by  the  work  of  the  9/11  Commission  and  by  the  continuing 
review  of  intelligence  prior  to  Operation  Iraqi  Freedom  by  the  Senate  Select  Com- 
mittee on  Intelligence,  as  well  as  the  good  work  done  by  this  committee,  the  House 
Armed  Services  Committee,  the  House  Intelligence  Committee,  and  other  commit- 
tees of  Congress. 

In  the  face  of  this  reality,  and  enlightened  by  the  experience  of  the  last  43 
months,  I  come  to  this  subject  with  a  healthy  respect  for  the  magnitude  of  the  task 
our  country  is  tackling. 

I  also  come  to  it  with  an  adage  in  mind  that  I  find  useful:  "To  those  who  would 
tear  down  what  is  falls  the  responsibility  of  putting  in  place  something  better."  I 
would  remind  that  it  is  far  easier  to  critique  and  find  fault  than  it  is  to  build. 

HOW  MIGHT  THOSE  RESULTS  BE  ACHIEVED 

A  variety  of  proposals  for  achieving  the  objectives  I  outlined  have  been  advanced. 

My  experience  as  Secretary  of  Defense  and  in  the  pharmaceutical  and  electronic 
industries  persuades  me  that  the  attributes  we  seek  in  the  Intelligence  Commu- 
nity— imagination,  intuition,  and  initiative — are  best  encouraged  and  developed  by 
organizations  wherein  planning  is  centralized  but  the  execution  of  plans  is  decen- 
tralized. 

An  Intelligence  Community  organized  around  areas  of  substantive  expertise — for 
example,  foreign,  domestic  and  military  intelligence — would  possibly  be  more  likely 
to  generate,  in  a  timely  fashion,  the  indications  and  warning  of  crises  and  provide 
the  intelligence  support  needed  by  the  executive  departments  of  government  in  the 
performance  of  their  respective  missions  than  is  one  organized  around  a  single  and 
preeminent  national  intelligence  organization. 

As  some  have  suggested,  organizing  the  U.S.  Intelligence  Community  around  the 
national  collection  agencies — NSA,  NGA,  and  NRO — now  located  in  the  DOD,  and 
aligning  them  under  direct  NID  leadership,  could  conceivably  lead  to  some  effi- 
ciencies in  some  aspects  of  intelligence  collection  and  some  modest  but  indefinable 
improvement  in  the  support  those  agencies  provide  to  other  elements  of  the  govern- 
ment. At  the  same  time,  however,  it  is  possible  that  by  their  sheer  size  and  the 
broad  extent  of  their  activity,  those  collection  agencies  could  come  to  form  the  "cen- 
ter of  gravity"  of  the  NID's  organization. 

If  a  consolidation  of  the  NSA,  NGA,  and  NRO  outside  DOD  were  to  be  considered, 
we  should  be  certain  that  it  would  help  resolve  the  intelligence-related  problems  and 
difficulties  we  face  and  not  create  additional  problems.  As  an  example  of  the  latter, 
we  wouldn't  want  to  place  new  barriers  or  filters  between  the  military  combatant 
commanders  and  those  agencies  when  they  perform  as  combat  support  agencies.  It 
would  be  a  major  step  to  separate  these  key  agencies  from  the  military  combatant 
commanders,  which  are  the  major  users  of  such  capabilities. 

With  respect  to  solving  problems  that  have  been  identified,  my  impression  is  that 
the  technical  collection  agencies — NSA,  NGA,  and  NRO — collect  more  than  we  can 
analyze  today.  This  suggests  we  need  more  analysts  and  capability  to  process  data. 


98 

It  is  also  my  impression  that  we  must  repair  our  human  intelHgence  (HUMINT)  ca- 
pabiHties.  They  were  especially  hard  hit  in  the  budget  cuts  beginning  in  the  early 
1990s. 

The  President  has  not  yet  made  a  decision  on  these  issues.  He  will  undoubtedly 
continue  to  listen  to  the  debate  and  take  different  views  into  consideration  in  reach- 
ing decisions.  He  has  not  ruled  anything  out. 

It  is  my  belief  that  any  changes  that  are  made  to  meet  the  objectives  identified 
earlier  need  to  focus  on  building  an  Intelligence  Community  for  the  21st  century 
along  21st  century  lines: 

•  networked  and  distributed  centers  of  analysis  within  executive  depart- 
ments and  agencies,  with  access  to  all  available  data; 

•  focused  on  emplo3dng  instruments  of  collection  wherever  they  reside  as 
tools  for  exploring  hypothesis  and  conducting  alternative  analysis;  and 

•  whose  activities,  priorities,  and  production  schedules  are  directed  by  the 
NID. 

This  implies  a  NID  with  authority  for: 

•  tasking  collection  assets  across  the  government, 

•  setting  analytic  priorities  and  ensuring  all  source,  competitive  analyses 
throughout  the  Intelligence  Community, 

•  the  personnel  management  and  training  to  alter  the  culture  in  the  com- 
munity, 

•  information  security  and  access  policies, 

•  information  technology  standards  and  architectures  across  the  commu- 
nity, and 

•  reallocating  resources  in  the  year  of  budget  execution. 

As  I  said,  the  precise  extent  of  such  authorities,  and  other  issues,  are  under  con- 
sideration by  the  President  and  Congress.  But  an  NID  likely  will  need  some  authori- 
ties of  this  sort. 

I  have  been  asked  about  the  commission's  recommendation  for  shifting  para- 
military operations  to  DOD.  We  will  give  that  recommendation  careful  consider- 
ation. This,  like  other  recommendations,  is  complicated.  The  executive  and  legisla- 
tive branches  will  need  to  be  comfortable  that  any  changes  that  might  be  made  take 
account  of  the  difference  in  the  authorities  and  capabilities  of  the  CIA  and  DOD  and 
the  changing  needs  of  a  President  for  access  to  a  broad  range  of  capabilities  to  meet 
the  various  challenges  the  Nation  will  be  facing. 

IMPLICATIONS  FOR  DOD 

The  Department  of  Defense  seeks  and  welcomes  changes  in  the  way  the  Nation 
does  its  intelligence  business.  It  is  greatly  to  the  advantage  of  the  U.S.  Armed 
Forces  that  the  Intelligence  Community  is  better  able  to  serve  it  and  the  other  exec- 
utive departments  of  the  government,  especially  those  associated  with  our  Nation's 
homeland  security.  If  the  government  as  a  whole  is  better  able  to  act  in  a  timely 
fashion,  the  frequency  and  duration  with  which  the  men  and  women  of  our  armed 
forces  will  be  called  for  combat  operations  abroad  might  be  reduced. 

I  believe  DOD's  experience  with  changing  the  way  it  does  its  business  over  the 
last  decade,  and  especially  since  2001,  might  help  inform  the  proposals  being  offered 
to  change  the  Intelligence  Community. 

For  example,  the  Department,  through  the  Services  and  the  combatant  com- 
mands, has  worked  hard  to  break  down  stovepipes  between  foreign  and  military  in- 
telligence that  support  DOD  activities.  The  impetus  for  this  effort  was  the  lessons 
learned  from  Operation  Desert  Storm.  You  may  recall  General  Schwartzkopfs  dis- 
appointment with  the  timeliness,  speed,  and  scope  of  intelligence  support  to  the  op- 
erations he  commanded. 

The  result  of  a  decade's  effort  to  establish  a  timely  and  seamless  interaction  be- 
tween DOD  and  CIA  activity  has  become  apparent  in  Afghanistan,  Iraq,  and  in  the 
ongoing  war  on  terror.  We  are  as  well  connected  as  we  ever  have  been,  but  we're 
probably  not  as  well  stitched  together  as  we  could  or  should  be;  gaps  and  seams 
may  still  exist.  But  any  change  to  the  Intelligence  Community  should  be  designed 
to  help  us  close  further  those  gaps  and  seams,  not  reopen  them. 

I  hope  that  the  change  in  the  relationship  between  foreign  and  military  intel- 
ligence and  operations  that  has  occurred  since  Operation  Desert  Storm  will  be 
matched  by  similar  changes  between  domestic  and  foreign  intelligence  as  the  result 
of  any  reform.  I  am  sure  much  has  been  done  since  September  11  to  improve  that 
relationship,  but  very  likely  more  can  and  should  be  done. 

Second,  DOD  is  pursuing  a  network-based  intelligence,  operations,  and  commu- 
nications capability  to  replace  its  hierarchical  and  serial  practices.  As  part  of  this 


99 

effort,  the  DOD  is  developing  and  deploying  new  sensors,  communications  systems 
and  establishing  new  standards  and  protocols  to  permit  the  secure  transmission  of 
a  high  volume  of  classified  and  unclassified  data  and  information  at  the  lowest  pos- 
sible levels  of  operations.  This  will  permit  the  armed  forces  to  conduct  highly  decen- 
tralized operations  in  response  to  centralized  direction. 

This  has  enabled  quicker  decisionmaking,  increased  the  prospect  for  immediate 
action  in  response  to  actionable  intelligence,  improved  the  precision  of  military  oper- 
ations, and  provided  combatant  commanders  at  all  levels  with  far  greater  situa- 
tional awareness.  A  similar  approach  to  networks  and  decentralized  execution  with- 
in the  Intelligence  Community  would  likely  yield  for  it  similar  results. 

Third,  as  part  of  the  effort  to  network  its  capabilities,  DOD  has  tightened  the  con- 
nection between  the  operating  forces  and  the  combat  support  agencies — NSA,  NGA, 
and  NRO.  I  know  General  Myers  will  say  more  about  this. 

This  connection  has  been  crucial  to  improving  the  effectiveness  and  capabilities 
of  the  U.S.  Armed  Forces  in  combat  against  enemy  conventional  forces,  unconven- 
tional forces,  and  terrorists. 

We  now  have  an  opportunity  to  create  government-wide  networks  that  can 
strengthen  the  connection  of  the  components  of  the  Intelligence  Community  located 
in  other  executive  departments — especially  on  the  domestic  side — to  NSA,  NGA,  and 
NRO.  Extending  access  to  the  network  infi^astructure  DOD  is  already  building  to 
other  Departments  would  help  in  this  regard.  The  NID  could  well  establish  the 
standards  and  protocols  governing  the  construction  and  use  of  the  resulting  net- 
works for  intelligence  purposes. 

OTHER  CONSIDERATIONS 

The  9/11  Commission  has  focused  the  Nation's  attention  on  questions  related  to 
strengthening  the  Intelligence  Community.  It  would  be  unfortunate  if  we  were  to 
lose  sight  of  the  commission's  reflections  on  the  nature  of  the  world  in  which  we 
live  and  the  recommendations  for  the  national  security  policies  needed  to  protect 
and  defend  the  Nation  and  the  American  people. 

In  addition  to  the  recommendations  offered  by  the  commission,  we  could  usefully 
consider  the  following: 

1.  Further  improving  U.S.  domestic  intelligence  capabilities  while  preserving  U.S. 
civil  liberties: 

•  As  part  of  this  initiative,  appointing  a  bipartisan,  blue-ribbon  panel,  not 
unlike  the  Minow  Panel  we  set  up  in  DOD,  to  look  at  the  ways  and  means 
of  enhancing  our  domestic  intelligence  capability,  consistent  with  our  laws 
and  values,  to  help  counter  21st  century  threats. 

2.  The  President  has  been  actively  engaged  in  developing  initiatives  that  engage 
peoples  at  risk  to  subversion  by  extremist  ideologies.  In  no  case  is  this  more  evident 
than  his  Broader  Middle  East  Initiative.  Those  initiatives  could  be  embraced  by 
Congress  so  that: 

•  Educational  institutions  abroad  that  emphasize  religious  toleration  are 
supported,  including  provision  of  information  technologies  for  schools 

•  Foreign  scholarships  and  fellowships  for  exchanging  American  and  for- 
eign students  and  scholars  are  established  to  improve  cultural  understand- 
ing. 

•  Economic  aid  and  assistance  programs  that  utilize  private-public  partner- 
ships are  more  widely  developed  to  encourage  small  business  development, 
banking  sector  development,  and  local  infrastructure  improvement,  and  to 
teach  skills  that  workers  will  need  in  the  21st  century. 

•  Private  philanthropy  and  non-governmental  groups  are  mobilized  to  pro- 
mote the  ideas  and  amplify  those  local  voices  that  oppose  transnational  ter- 
rorism and  extremist  ideologies,  and  provide  counterweights  to  terrorist-re- 
lated organizations. 

3.  Providing  the  executive  branch  with  the  necessary  freedom  to  manage  the  21st 
century  war  on  terror: 

•  Congressional  approval  of  the  administration's  requests  for  funds  for  the 
combatant  commanders  use  in  the  field  to  aid  in  humanitarian  relief  and 
reconstruction. 

•  Adoption  of  contracting  rules  to  streamline  contract  awards  while  retain- 
ing appropriate  oversight  to  the  circumstances  so  that  critical  projects  like 
equipping  local  security  forces  are  not  unduly  delayed. 

•  A  reexamination  of  "train  and  equip"  authorities  and  missions  to  explore 
opportunities  for  improving  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  such  assist- 
ance programs. 


100 

4.  Realigning  and  reorganizing  the  U.S.  Government's  functions  and  responsibil- 
ities to  meet  the  challenges  of  the  21st  century: 

•  Consider  undertaking  a  fundamental  re-look  at  the  roles  and  missions  of 
the  U.S.  Government  to  meet  the  national  security  challenges  of  the  21st 
century.  Consider  developing  a  new  National  Security  Act — not  simply  an- 
other incremental  update  of  the  1947  act.  This  new  organizational  design 
could  be  coupled  to  a  Unified  Executive  Branch  Plan,  outlining  responsibil- 
ities and  assigning  lead  and  supporting  responsibilities  among  departments 
for  national  security  tasks,  as  we  do  for  military  forces. 

•  Introduce  Goldwater-Nichols  type  reforms  to  increase  "jointness"  across 
Federal  agencies.  Consider  establishing  a  National  Security  University  (like 
National  Defense  University  for  the  Department  of  Defense)  to  educate  na- 
tional security  officials  and  an  interagency  training  exercise  process  to  build 
capacity  for  interagency  crisis  management  and  national  security  planning 
and  operations. 

•  Establishment  of  a  Reserve  Force  of  civilians  for  a  new  Office  of  Stability 
and  Reconstruction  Operations  in  the  Department  of  State,  including  incen- 
tives for  service  and  commitments  to  train  and  deploy  overseas  when  di- 
rected. 

•  Consideration  of  the  creation  of  Joint  Interagency  Task  Forces,  led  by 
statutory  members  of  the  National  Security  Council  (NSC),  to  conduct  inte- 
grated planning  for  the  employment  of  all  instruments  of  national  power  for 
particular  missions  (e.g.,  attacking/disrupting  terrorist  networks,  protecting 
homeland,  and  engaging  in  ideological  struggle). 

•  Consideration  of  the  conduct  an  Interagency  Roles  and  Missions  Study  to 
rationalize  responsibilities  and  authorities  across  the  U.S.  Government  to 
meet  21st  century  threats. 

MOVING  WITH  DELIBERATE  SPEED 

In  pursuit  of  strengthening  our  Nation's  intelligence  capabilities,  I  would  offer  a 
cautionary  note.  It  is  important  that  we  move  with  all  deliberate  speed;  however, 
moving  too  quickly  risks  enormous  error,  as  this  committee  has  heard  from  former 
senior  officials,  military  and  civilians,  with  broad  experience  in  this  matter.  We  are 
considering  these  important  matters  while  waging  a  war. 

National  security  is  not  easily  achieved  in  this  new  century.  If  we  move  too  un- 
wisely and  get  it  wrong,  the  penalty  will  be  great.  The  National  Security  Act  of  1947 
established  the  DOD.  By  1958  it  had  undergone  no  fewer  than  4  major  statutory 
or  organizational  changes.  Another  round  of  major  change  was  inaugurated  with  the 
Goldwater-Nichols  Act  in  1986.  We  shouldn't  think  intelligence  reform  will  be  com- 
pleted at  a  stroke,  either. 

Intelligence  is  expensive.  The  Intelligence  Community  suffered  substantial  reduc- 
tions in  its  budget  in  the  last  decade.  Those  reductions  were  made  on  the  theory 
that,  with  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  U.S.  reliance  on  intelligence  for  security  would 
not  be  as  substantial  as  it  had  been.  Events  have  proven  otherwise.  It  was  a  mis- 
take, and  we  are  pa3dng  the  penalty. 

It  was  with  that  in  mind  that  the  President  developed  his  "Strengthening  Intel- 
ligence Initiative."  It  seeks  to  increase  the  number  of  HUMINT  operators,  linguists, 
and  analysts  and  provide  them  with  needed  infrastructure  support.  The  first  incre- 
ment of  funding  for  the  initiative  was  included  in  the  fiscal  year  2005  budget  re- 
cently enacted  by  Congress.  Between  now  and  2009  that  initiative  seeks  to  add 
thousands  of  personnel  to  the  Intelligence  Community.  They  are  needed. 

George  Tenet  and  I  worked  over  recent  years  to  increase  the  numbers  and  capa- 
bilities of  HUMINT  operators  in  our  respective  areas  of  responsibility.  More  will 
need  to  be  done  in  this  area.  But  HUMINT  operators  are  not  created  overnight. 

CONCLUSION 

To  conclude,  let  me  return  to  where  I  began,  before  this  committee  in  January 
2001.  I  am  still  concerned  about  our  Nation's  intelligence  capabilities.  That  concern 
stems  not  from  a  lack  of  confidence  in  the  men  and  women  of  the  Intelligence  Com- 
munity. They  have  fashioned  important  achievements  over  recent  years.  Our  coun- 
try owes  them  a  debt  of  gratitude.  It  will  be  a  long  time,  if  ever,  that  many  of  their 
achievements  are  fully  and  broadly  known  and  appreciated. 

DOD  and  its  counterparts  in  the  Intelligence  Community  are  forging,  in  the  cru- 
cible of  war,  a  strong,  interlocking  relationship  between  intelligence  and  operations, 
between  national  and  tactical  intelligence,  and  between  foreign  and  military  intel- 
ligence. We  have  worked  hard  to  close  the  gaps  and  seams  these  terms  imply.  Our 


101 

people,  our  budgets,  and  our  activities  are  closely  intertwined.  That  close  relation- 
ship between  DOD  and  CIA  is  a  driving  cause  of  shared  successes. 

My  concerns  are  rooted  in  the  realities  of  the  21st  century.  Our  Intelligence  Com- 
munity will  need  to  improve  to  meet  the  challenges  we  face,  and  DOD  is  ready  to 
work  with  you  to  further  strengthen  our  ability  to  live  in  this  new  and  dangerous 
world. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Secretary. 
Director  McLaughhn? 

STATEMENT  OF  HON.  JOHN  E.  MCLAUGHLIN,  ACTING 
DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Chairman,  as  this  committee  considers  reorganization  pro- 
posals by  the  President,  the  Kean  Commission,  and  Congress,  I 
want  to  speak  for  a  moment  about  the  structure  and  capabiHties 
of  the  U.S.  Intelhgence  Community,  as  it  exists  today,  not  in  2001. 
I  think  it's  important  that  we  do  that  at  the  beginning  of  these  de- 
Hberations. 

I  beUeve  that  today's  Intelhgence  Community  provides  a  much 
stronger  foundation  for  any  changes  you  want  to  make  as  we  move 
forward  than  most  people  might  realize.  That  said,  there  is  no 
question  we  can  still  do  better,  and  I'll  close  with  some  thoughts 
on  how  that  can  be  accomplished. 

Three  years  of  war  have  profoundly  affected  the  American  Intel- 
ligence Community.  Since  September  11,  our  capacity  and  effective- 
ness have  grown  as  our  resources  have  increased — a  very  impor- 
tant point,  our  resources  have  increased  dramatically — and  as  we 
have  taken  steps  to  address  many  of  the  issues  that  others  have 
highlighted.  This  has  been  the  most  dramatic  period  of  change  in 
my  personal  memory. 

Some  examples: 

Our  policies — the  Nation's,  and  the  Intelligence  Community's 
have  changed  dramatically.  We're  on  the  offensive  against  terror- 
ists worldwide,  and  many  of  the  most  dangerous  are  captured  or 
dead. 

Our  practices  have  also  changed.  Intelligence,  law  enforcement, 
and  military  officers  serve  together  and  share  information  realtime 
and  on  the  front  lines  around  the  world.  Here  in  Washington,  I 
chair  an  operational  meeting  every  day  with  Intelligence  Commu- 
nity and  law  enforcement  officers  present.  Decisions  made  there  go 
immediately  to  officers  in  the  field — immediately — whose  penetra- 
tion and  disruption  of  terrorist  groups  yields  the  kind  of  increas- 
ingly precise  intelligence  you've  seen  in  the  last  couple  of  weeks. 

Our  worldwide  coalition  has  changed.  It  is  broader,  deeper,  and 
more  committed  than  before  or  at  September  11.  Where  terrorists 
found  sanctuary  before,  they  now  find  our  allies,  and  we  are  seeing 
the  results  from  Panama  to  Mexico  City. 

Our  laws  have  changed — the  Patriot  Act  has  given  us  weapons 
in  the  war  we  did  not  have  then — and  we've  saved  lives  because 
of  them. 

Our  institutions  have  changed.  The  Terrorist  Threat  Integration 
Center  did  not  exist  then.  It  enables  us  to  share  intelligence  col- 
lected abroad  with  law  enforcement  information  collected  at  home, 
and  plots  have  been  stopped  in  the  U.S.  because  of  that. 


102 

Twenty-six  different  data  networks  now  flow  there,  to  the  Terror- 
ist Threat  Integration  Center,  to  be  shared  by  officers  from  the 
widest  array  of  foreign  and  domestic  intelhgence  agencies  ever  as- 
sembled in  one  organization.  People  who  think  we  can't  break  down 
the  so-called  stovepipes  need  to  visit  the  Terrorist  Threat  Integra- 
tion Center. 

In  turn,  such  changes  affected  our  ability  to  wage  war,  and  the 
impact  of  change  has  been  striking.  It  was  imaginative  covert  ac- 
tion, CIA  officers  working  with  the  U.S.  military,  that  helped  drive 
military  operations  and  ousted  the  Taliban  from  power  in  Afghani- 
stan, and  broke  up  the  sanctuary  that  al  Qaeda  had  used. 

Terrorist  arrests  are  increasing  steadily.  You  see  that  in  just 
about  every  morning  newspaper. 

CIA,  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  (FBI),  Treasury,  and  other 
partners  at  home  and  abroad  are  starving  al  Qaeda  of  its  lifeblood: 
money. 

CIA  has  worked  with  the  FBI  as  it  has  taken  down  extremists 
in  Lackawanna,  Columbus,  and  New  York  City. 

Our  coalition  partners  include,  by  varying  degrees,  Libyans  and 
Russians,  Chinese  and  Hungarians,  Pakistanis  and  Saudis,  and 
more,  along  with  our  traditional  allies  in  Europe  and  in  Asia. 

In  short,  the  situation  has  changed  dramatically  from  where  the 
9/11  Commission  left  off.  Two  things,  however,  are  still  true:  al 
Qaeda  and  other  terrorists  remain  dangerous,  and  there  is  still 
room  for  improvement  in  the  Intelligence  Community. 

But  the  image  that  many  seek  to  perpetuate,  of  a  community 
that  doesn't  share  information  or  work  together,  a  community  of 
turf-conscious  people  competing  with  each  other  for  influence,  I 
must  tell  you,  that's  not  the  community  I  lead.  It's  a  caricature 
that  does  a  great  disservice  to  the  men  and  women  who  put  it  on 
the  line  every  day,  24/7. 

Because  of  this  committee's  special  responsibilities,  I  need  to  say 
a  word,  as  the  Secretary  did,  about  the  Intelligence  Community's 
support  for  the  warfighter.  As  we  discuss  various  proposals  for  re- 
structuring the  Intelligence  Community  today,  let  me  be  clear 
about  one  thing:  No  matter  what  course  the  administration  and 
Congress  choose,  intelligence  support  to  the  military,  especially  in 
time  of  war,  should  not  be  allowed  to  diminish.  I  believe  such  sup- 
port can  and  will  be  preserved  under  any  of  the  options  being  con- 
sidered. No  one  would  think  about  it  in  any  other  way.  Everyone 
in  the  Intelligence  Community  understands  that  NSA,  NGA,  NRO, 
all  vital  parts  of  the  National  Intelligence  Community,  are  also 
combat  support  agencies. 

Let  me  give  you  the  assurance  that  the  relationship  between  the 
Intelligence  Community  and  the  uniformed  military — and  the  mili- 
tary, in  general;  the  Defense  Department,  in  general — has  never, 
in  my  personal  experience,  been  closer.  The  Secretary  alluded  to 
this. 

Some  data  points: 

The  Secretary  of  Defense,  to  his  great  credit,  has  met  frequently 
with  George  Tenet  and  myself  to  coordinate  policies  across  the 
board  in  an  almost  unprecedented  manner,  in  my  experience. 

A  Navy  SEAL  three-star.  Vice  Admiral  Callon,  sits  right  across 
the  hall  from  me  at  CIA  headquarters  with  the  mission  of  ensuring 


103 

that  we  and  the  miUtary  are  connected  and  that  both  sides  are  get- 
ting what  they  need.  I  see  him  two  or  three  times  every  day. 

CIA  and  U.S.  mihtary  officers  have  been  hving  and  fighting  to- 
gether in  Afghanistan  for  3  years  in  the  mountains  and  plains, 
where  they  have  al  Qaeda  on  the  run.  Our  collection,  operational, 
and  analytic  support  to  military  efforts  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  is 
close  and  continuous,  as  I  think  most  of  you  have  seen  during  your 
trips  to  those  areas.  I  have  a  lot  of  data  here  about  the  number 
of  operations,  liaison  teams  that  we've  sent  to  U.S.  Central  Com- 
mand (CENTCOM),  and  so  forth. 

I  have  frequent  video  conferences  with  CENTCOM  Commander 
General  Abizaid  to  personally  assure  that  we  understand  his  per- 
spective and  his  needs. 

We've  upgraded  information  technology  support  to  the  military  in 
the  field  so  that  Intelligence  Community  products  are  now  avail- 
able in  80  military  intelligence  centers  around  the  globe. 

It  is  a  different  world  from  the  one  that  General  Schwarzkopf, 
I  think,  described  accurately  after  the  first  Gulf  War. 

Looking  ahead  now,  it's  important  to  note  that  the  terrorist 
threat  is  in  no  way  stagnant.  We've  had  victories.  But  these  organi- 
zations learn,  and  they  adapt.  It's  not  enough  for  us  to  keep  up. 
We  have  to  anticipate  and  keep  ahead. 

As  we  seek  to  build  on  the  improvements  we've  made  in  recent 
years,  we  should  keep  in  mind  a  few  of  what  I  would  call  "first 
principles." 

First,  speed  and  agility  are  the  keys  to  the  war  on  terrorism  and 
profoundly  important  to  the  Nation's  other  intelligence  challenges. 
We  sometimes  have  literally  only  minutes  to  react  to  a  lead  that 
allows  us  to  go  after  terrorists.  Speed  and  agility  are  not  promoted 
by  complicated  wiring  diagrams,  more  levels  of  bureaucracy,  in- 
creased dual-hatting,  or  inherent  questions  about  who  is  in  charge. 

Second,  as  in  architecture,  form  should  follow  function.  The  func- 
tions intelligence  must  perform  today  are  dramatically  different 
than  during  the  Cold  War.  Back  then,  we  focused  heavily  on  large 
strategic  forces — where  were  they,  for  example — and  where  coun- 
tries stood  on  the  bipolar  competition  that  characterized  that  era. 
Today,  the  focus  is  more  on  locating  people,  sometimes  one  person 
in  a  city  of  17  million,  tracking  shipments  of  dangerous  materials, 
understanding  politics,  now  down  to  the  tribal  level,  in  a  world 
where  the  only  constant  is  change. 

Third,  in  this  world,  clear  structure  and  a  clear  chain  of  com- 
mand is  better  than  the  opposite. 

Fourth,  most  important  to  knowing  how  and  what  to  change  is 
consensus  on  what  we  want  from  our  intelligence  agencies,  along 
with  constancy  in  resource  and  moral  support  for  them,  through 
good  times  and  bad,  and  patience.  The  9/11  Commission  says  that 
the  country  cannot  be  patient.  But  to  quote  a  saying  I  learned  dur- 
ing my  Army  years,  "If  you  want  it  bad,  you  will  get  it  bad." 

Drawing  on  these  principles,  I  believe  that  short,  clear  lines  of 
command  and  control  are  required  in  whatever  structure  you  estab- 
lish, regardless  of  what  you  call  its  leader.  Three  words  are  key: 
agility,  flexibility,  and  speed.  You  need  to  build  these  into  any  new 
structures  and  procedures. 


104 

No  matter  how  successfully  we  anticipate  future  challenges,  we 
won't  foresee  them  all,  so  we  will  need  the  ability  to  adapt  our  or- 
ganizations to  change  easily  and  quickly.  We  will  need  flexibility 
in  shifting  resources,  people,  and  money  to  respond  to  shifting  pri- 
orities. 

The  DCI  can  do  some  of  this  now,  with  existing  authorities;  but, 
frankly,  it's  too  complicated,  cumbersome,  and  ponderous.  It  in- 
volves more  negotiations  and  sign-offs  than  current  requirements 
permit. 

That's  why,  should  the  President's  proposal  to  create  a  National 
Intelligence  Director  be  adopted,  I  believe  that  that  individual 
should  have  the  clear  authority  to  move  people  and  resources,  and 
to  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  national  intelligence  agencies 
and  their  leaders.  This  should  be  accomplished  in  the  cleanest  and 
most  direct  manner  you  can  devise. 

People  often  remark  that  the  DCIs  allow  too  much  in  the  Intel- 
ligence Community  to  be — the  phrase  often  used  is,  "CIA-centric," 
whether  it's  the  staffing  of  centers  or  the  preparation  of  national 
estimates.  Well  the  reason  is  simple.  It's  because  a  DCI  can.  That 
is,  these  are  the  troops  he  directly  commands  and  can  task  and 
move  with  little  effort  or  resistance.  If  the  DCI  had  enhanced  au- 
thorities along  the  lines  I've  suggested,  or  if  you  create  a  National 
Intelligence  Director  like  that,  you  should  expect  to  see  much  more 
integration  of  effort  in  the  community,  and  a  greater  capacity  to 
create  cross-community  task  forces  and  centers  in  a  more  agile  and 
seamless  way.  You  should  also  see  more  progress  by  a  DCI,  or  a 
National  Intelligence  Director,  on  things  like  common  policies  for 
personnel,  training,  security,  and  information  technology. 

Now,  as  you  consider  all  of  this,  here  is  a  key  thing  to  think 
about: 

Who  will  you  hold  responsible,  not  just  when  things  go  well,  but 
when  something  goes  wrong  with  intelligence?  Today,  it's  the  DCI, 
even  though  his  authorities  over  the  rest  of  the  community  outside 
CIA  are  limited. 

If,  in  the  future,  it  will  be  a  National  Intelligence  Director,  what 
authorities  would  be  commensurate  to  that  kind  of  responsibility  if 
that's  the  person  you  choose  to  hold  responsible? 

What  would  that  person  actually  be  responsible  for?  What  the 
community  concludes  substantively  about  major  issues,  like  Iraq, 
North  Korea,  or  terrorism?  If  the  answer  is  yes,  that  person  will 
need  direct  access  to  sizeable  numbers  of  collectors  and  analysts, 
just  as  the  DCI  has  today.  The  question  then  arises  about  where 
those  people  will  come  from  and  with  what  impact. 

Or  would  the  National  Intelligence  Director  be  responsible  less 
for  substantive  matters  and  primarily  for  the  management  and  in- 
tegration of  resources?  Can  substantive  and  management  respon- 
sibilities be  separated?  If  they  can,  will  responsibility  and  account- 
ability be  harder  to  pin  down  than  it  is  now,  especially  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  the  person  you  now  hold  responsible,  the  head  of  CIA, 
would  then  be  at  least  a  layer  away  from  the  top? 

I  regret  to  close  with  a  series  of  questions,  but  I  believe  they  il- 
lustrate the  complexity  of  these  issues  and  the  need  to  proceed  cau- 
tiously and  with  care  as  we  contemplate  changes  to  an  intelligence 


105 

system  on  which  the  Nation  must  depend  more  than  ever  for  its 
security. 

Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman. 

[The  prepared  statement  of  Mr.  McLaughHn  follows:] 

Prepared  Statement  by  John  E.  McLaughlin 

Mr.  Chairman,  as  this  committee  considers  reorganization  proposals  by  the  Presi- 
dent, the  Kean  Commission,  and  Congress,  I  want  to  speak  to  the  structure  and  ca- 
pabiHties  of  the  InteUigence  Community  as  it  is  today,  not  as  it  was  in  2001.  I  be- 
lieve that  today's  Intelligence  Community  provides  a  much  stronger  foundation  than 
many  people  realize  for  whatever  changes  you  decide  to  make.  That  said,  we  can 
still  do  better,  and  I  will  close  with  some  thoughts  on  how  this  can  be  accomplished. 

intelligence  community  today 

Three  years  of  war  have  profoundly  affected  the  Intelligence  Community.  Since 
September  11,  our  capacity  and  effectiveness  have  grown  as  our  resources  have  in- 
creased and  as  we  have  taken  steps  to  address  many  of  the  issues  others  have  high- 
lighted. This  has  been  the  most  dramatic  period  of  change  in  my  memory.  Some  ex- 
amples: 

•  Our  policies — the  Nation's  and  the  Intelligence  Community's — have 
changed — we  are  on  the  offensive  against  terrorists  worldwide  and  many  of  the 
most  dangerous  are  captured  or  dead. 

•  Our  practices  have  changed — intelligence,  law  enforcement,  and  military  offi- 
cers serve  together  and  share  information  real  time  on  the  front  lines  at  home 
and  abroad.  In  Washington,  I  chair  an  operational  meeting  every  day  with  In- 
telligence Community  and  law  enforcement  elements  represented.  Decisions 
made  there  go  immediately  to  officers  in  the  field  whose  penetration  and  disrup- 
tion of  terrorist  groups  yields  the  kind  of  increasingly  precise  intelligence  you 
have  seen  in  the  last  2  weeks. 

•  Our  worldwide  coalition  has  changed — it  is  broader,  deeper,  and  more  com- 
mitted. Where  terrorists  found  sanctuary  before,  they  find  our  allies  now — and 
we  are  seeing  the  results  from  Manama  to  Mexico  City. 

•  Our  laws  have  changed — the  Patriot  Act  has  given  us  weapons  in  the  war  we 
did  not  have  and  we  have  saved  lives  because  of  them. 

•  Our  institutions  have  changed — The  Terrorist  Threat  Integration  Center 
(TTIC)  enables  us  to  share  intelligence  collected  abroad  with  law  enforcement 
information  collected  at  home — and  plots  have  been  stopped  in  the  U.S.  because 
of  that.  Twenty-six  different  data  networks  now  flow  there  to  be  shared  by  offi- 
cers from  the  widest  array  of  foreign  and  domestic  intelligence  agencies  ever  as- 
sembled in  one  organization.  People  who  think  we  can't  break  down  the  so- 
called  "stovepipes"  need  to  visit  TTIC. 

In  turn,  the  changes  affected  our  ability  to  wage  war  and  the  impact  of  change 
has  been  striking. 

•  It  was  imaginative  covert  action — CIA  officers  working  with  the  U.S.  mili- 
tary— that  helped  drive  military  operations  and  ousted  the  Taliban  from  power 
in  Afghanistan  and  broke  up  the  al  Qaeda  sanctuary. 

•  Terrorist  arrests  are  increasing  steadily.  That  evidence  comes  with  your 
morning  newspapers  nearly  every  day  now. 

•  CIA,  FBI,  Treasury,  and  other  partners,  at  home  and  abroad  are  starving  the 
al  Qaeda  of  its  lifeblood — money. 

•  CIA  has  worked  with  the  FBI,  as  it  has  taken  down  extremists  in  Lacka- 
wanna, Columbus,  and  New  York  City. 

•  Our  coalition  partners  include,  by  varying  degrees,  Libyans  and  Russians, 
Chinese  and  Hungarians,  Pakistanis  and  Saudis — and  our  traditional  allies  in 
Europe  and  Asia. 

In  short,  the  situation  has  changed  dramatically  from  where  the  9/11  Commission 
left  off.  Two  things,  however,  are  still  true:  al  Qaeda  and  other  terrorists  remain 
dangerous  and  there  is  still  room  for  improvement  in  the  Intelligence  Community. 
But  the  image  that  many  seek  to  perpetuate  of  a  community  that  does  not  share 
information  or  work  together,  a  community  of  turf-conscious  people  competing  for 
influence — that  is  not  the  community  I  lead.  It  is  a  caricature  that  does  a  great  dis- 
service to  the  men  and  women  who  put  it  on  the  line  every  day,  24/7. 


106 

SUPPORTING  THE  WARFIGHTER 

Because  of  this  committee's  special  responsibilities,  I  need  to  say  a  word  about 
the  Intelligence  Community's  support  to  the  warfighter.  As  we  discuss  various  pro- 
posals for  restructuring  the  Intelligence  Community  today,  let  me  be  clear  about  one 
thing:  no  matter  what  course  the  administration  and  Congress  choose,  intelligence 
support  to  the  military,  especially  in  time  of  war,  should  not  be  allowed  to  dimin- 
ish— and  I  believe  such  support  can  and  will  be  preserved  under  any  of  the  options 
being  considered.  Everyone  in  the  Intelligence  Community  understands  that  NSA, 
NGA,  and  NRO,  all  vital  parts  of  the  National  Intelligence  Community,  are  also 
combat  support  agencies.  Let  me  give  you  the  assurance  that  the  relationship  be- 
tween the  Intelligence  Community  and  the  uniformed  military  has  never  been  clos- 
er. Some  data  points: 

•  The  Secretary  of  Defense  has  met  frequently  with  George  Tenet  and  my- 
self to  coordinate  policies  across  the  board. 

•  A  Navy  Seal  Three  Star — Admiral  Calland — sits  right  across  the  hall 
from  me  with  the  mission  of  ensuring  we  and  the  military  are  connected 
and  that  both  sides  are  getting  what  they  need. 

•  CIA  and  U.S.  military  officers  have  been  living  and  fighting  together  for 
3  years  in  the  mountains  and  plains  of  Afghanistan  where  they  have  al 
Qaeda  on  the  run. 

•  Our  collection,  operational,  and  anal5rtic  support  to  military  efforts  in  Af- 
ghanistan and  Iraq  is  close  and  continuous. 

•  The  CIA  deployed  12  Crisis  Operations  Liaison  Teams  to  CENTCOM  spe- 
cifically tailored  to  work  side-by-side  with  Special  Operations  and  conven- 
tional forces  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq. 

•  I  hold  frequent  video  conferences  with  CENTCOM  Commander  Abizaid 
to  personally  assure  that  we  understand  his  perspective  and  needs. 

•  We  have  upgraded  information  technology  support  to  the  military  in  the 
field,  so  that  Intelligence  Community  products  are  now  available  in  80  mili- 
tary intelligence  centers  around  the  globe. 

THOUGHTS  ON  REFORM 

Looking  ahead  now,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  threat  from  terrorist  organiza- 
tions is  not  stagnant.  These  organizations  learn  and  adapt.  It  is  not  enough  for  us 
to  keep  up,  we  must  anticipate  and  keep  ahead.  As  we  seek  to  build  on  the  improve- 
ments we've  made  in  recent  years,  we  should  keep  in  mind  a  few  of  what  I  would 
call  "first  principles": 

First,  speed  and  agility  are  the  keys  to  the  war  on  terrorism,  and  profoundly  im- 
portant to  the  Nation's  other  intelligence  challenges.  Speed  and  agility  are  not  pro- 
moted by  complicated  wiring  diagrams,  more  levels  of  bureaucracy,  increased  dual 
hatting,  or  inherent  questions  about  who  is  in  charge. 

Second,  as  in  architecture,  form  should  follow  function.  The  functions  intelligence 
must  perform  today  are  dramatically  different  than  during  the  Cold  War.  Back 
then,  we  focused  heavily  on  large  strategic  forces  and  where  countries  stood  in  the 
bipolar  competition  of  the  day.  Today,  the  focus  is  more  on  locating  people,  tracking 
shipments  of  dangerous  materials,  understanding  politics  down  to  the  tribal  level 
in  a  world  where  the  only  constant  is  change. 

Third,  in  this  world  clear  structure  and  clear  chain  of  command  is  better  than  its 
opposite. 

Fourth,  most  important  to  knowing  how  and  what  to  change  is  consensus  on  what 
we  want  from  our  intelligence  agencies,  constancy  in  resource  and  moral  support  for 
them  through  good  and  bad  times,  and  patience.  The  commission  says  that  the 
country  cannot  be  patient.  But  to  quote  a  saying  I  learned  during  my  Army  years: 
if  you  want  it  bad;  you  will  get  it  bad. 

Drawing  on  these  principles,  I  believe  that  short,  clear  lines  of  command  and  con- 
trol are  required  in  whatever  structure  you  establish,  regardless  of  what  you  call 
its  leader.  Three  words  are  key:  agility,  flexibility,  and  speed.  You  need  to  build 
these  into  any  new  structures  and  procedures. 

No  matter  how  successfully  we  anticipate  future  challenges,  we  wiU  not  foresee 
them  all.  So,  we  will  need  the  ability  to  adapt  our  organizations  to  change,  easily 
and  quickly.  We  will  need  flexibility  in  shifting  resources,  people  and  money  to  re- 
spond to  shifting  priorities.  The  DCI  can  do  some  of  this  with  existing  authorities. 
But  frankly,  it  is  too  complicated  and  ponderous.  It  involves  more  negotiation  and 
signoffs  than  the  times  will  allow. 

That  is  why,  should  the  President's  proposal  to  create  a  National  Intelligence  Di- 
rector be  adopted,  I  believe  that  individual  should  have  the  clear  authority  to  move 
people  and  resources  and  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  national  intelligence 


107 

agencies  and  their  leaders.  This  should  be  accomplished  in  the  cleanest  and  most 
direct  manner  you  can  devise. 

People  often  remark  that  DCIs  allow  too  much  in  the  Intelligence  Community  to 
be  "CIA-centric" — whether  it  is  the  staffing  of  centers  or  the  preparation  of  national 
estimates.  Well,  the  reason  is  simple.  It's  because  the  DCI  "can" — that  is  these  are 
the  troops  he  directly  commands  and  can  task  and  move  with  little  effort  or  resist- 
ance. If  the  DCI  had  enhanced  authorities  along  the  lines  I've  suggested  or  if  you 
create  a  NID  like  that,  you  should  expect  to  see  much  more  integration  of  effort  in 
the  community  and  a  greater  capacity  to  create  cross-community  task  forces  and 
centers  in  a  more  agile  and  seamless  way. 

You  would  also  see  more  progress  by  a  DCI  or  NID  on  things  like  common  policies 
for  personnel,  training,  security,  and  information  technology. 

As  you  consider  all  of  this,  here  is  a  key  thing  to  think  about:  who  will  you  hold 
responsible  not  just  when  things  are  going  well  but  when  something  goes  wrong 
with  intelligence?  Today,  it  is  the  DCI  even  though  his  authorities  over  the  rest  of 
the  community  outside  CIA  are  limited.  If  in  the  future  it  will  be  a  National  Intel- 
ligence Director,  what  authorities  would  be  commensurate  with  that  kind  of  respon- 
sibility? What  would  that  person  actually  be  responsible  for?  What  the  community 
concludes  substantively  about  major  issues,  like  Iraq,  North  Korea,  or  terrorism?  If 
the  answer  is  yes,  that  person  will  need  direct  access  to  sizeable  numbers  of  collec- 
tors and  analysts,  just  as  the  DCI  has  today.  The  question  then  arises  about  where 
those  people  will  come  from  and  with  what  impact. 

Or  would  the  NID  be  responsible  less  for  substantive  matters  and  principally  for 
the  "management"  and  integration  of  resources — and  can  the  two  be  separated?  If 
they  can,  will  responsibility  and  accountability  be  harder  to  pin  down  than  it  is 
today — especially  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  person  you  now  hold  responsible — the 
head  of  CIA — would  then  be  at  least  a  layer  away  from  the  top? 

I  regret  to  close  with  a  series  of  questions,  but  I  believe  they  illustrate  the  com- 
plexity of  these  issues  and  the  need  to  proceed  cautiously  and  with  care  as  we  con- 
template changes  to  an  intelligence  system  on  which  the  Nation  must  depend,  more 
than  ever,  for  its  security. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much,  Director  McLaughlin, 
for  a  very  frank  and  candid  appraisal  of  this  situation,  drawing  on 
many,  many  years  of  experience  that  you've  had  at  the  Agency. 

General  Myers? 

STATEMENT  OF  GEN.  RICHARD  B.  MYERS,  USAF,  CHAIRMAN, 
JOINT  CHIEFS  OF  STAFF 

General  Myers.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  Senator  Levin,  and 
members  of  the  committee,  for  your  support  of  our  ongoing  efforts 
to  improve  our  intelligence  capabilities. 

Our  military  has  been  working  diligently  since  September  11  to 
break  down  intelligence  barriers  and  to  better  integrate  with  other 
agencies  of  our  government  and  our  allies.  We've  accomplished  a 
great  deal,  but  we  still  have  much  work  left  to  do.  I  can  think  of 
no  more  important  issue  to  our  national  security  and  to  the  men 
and  women  of  our  Armed  Forces  in  harm's  way  around  the  world. 

Reorganizing  the  Intelligence  Community  is  a  complex  and  dif- 
ficult task,  and  the  decisions  made  will  have  enormous  con- 
sequences far  into  the  future.  Opportunities  like  this  only  come 
along  once  in  a  long  time,  perhaps  in  a  lifetime.  The  last  intel- 
ligence reform  of  the  magnitude  we're  now  considering  was  in  1947. 
So  we  have  to  be  careful  as  we  proceed. 

While  I  support  the  concept  of  a  National  Intelligence  Director, 
I'd  like  to  articulate  what  I  think  are  some  critical  parameters  as 
we  move  forward. 

As  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff,  I  am  continually  mind- 
ful of  the  fact  that  the  DOD's  intelligence  capabilities  are  an  impor- 
tant part  of  the  Nation's  overall  Intelligence  Community,  and  these 
assets  support  national  security  in  the  broadest  sense. 


108 

At  the  same  time,  to  the  warfighter,  from  the  combatant  com- 
mander down  to  the  private  on  patrol,  timely,  accurate  intelligence 
is  literally  a  life-and-death  matter  every  day.  In  my  judgment,  the 
military's  dependence  on  intelligence  is  unique  and  on  a  scale  un- 
paralleled in  our  government.  In  fact,  in  today's  threat  environ- 
ment, we  no  longer  have  a  distinct  boundary  between  operations 
and  intelligence. 

Traditionally,  we  thought  of  intelligence  as  support,  a  support 
function.  That's  an  outmoded,  outdated  way  of  thinking.  DOD's  in- 
telligence people  are  an  integral  part  of  the  warfighting  team. 

When  coalition  forces  captured  Saddam  Hussein  in  December 
2003,  we  saw  this  integrated  team  in  action  as  they  turned  infor- 
mation into  action  quickly.  That's  just  one  example  out  of  thou- 
sands. But  intelligence  reform  initiatives  need  to  further  this  abil- 
ity to  integrate  operations  and  intelligence. 

As  we  move  forward,  we  cannot  create  any  institutional  barriers 
between  intelligence  agencies — and,  of  course,  that  would  include 
the  National  Security  Agency,  the  National  Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency,  and  the  National  Reconnaissance  Office — and  the  rest  of 
the  warfighting  team.  We've  made  great  progress  integrating  this 
team,  as  was  evident  in  our  military  successes  in  Afghanistan  and 
Iraq. 

I  share  the  concerns  of  the  Secretary  and  others  who  have  testi- 
fied on  this  issue,  that  we  proceed  with  caution  on  any  decision 
that  increases  centralized  control  of  intelligence.  In  some  areas, 
greater  centralization  might  improve  coordination,  create  resource 
efficiencies,  and  clarify  responsibilities.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
must  absolutely  protect  the  competition,  the  inherent  cross-check- 
ing function  that  comes  from  independent,  all-source  analysis.  The 
combatant  commanders  and  the  Joint  Chiefs  have  also  voiced  this 
same  concern. 

We  must  also  protect  the  dynamic  we  have  today  that  encourages 
innovative  thinking.  I  believe  the  more  you  have  centralized  con- 
trol, the  less  you  have  the  kind  of  entrepreneurial  spirit  and  agility 
that  I  see  in  our  service  men  and  women  every  day.  The  officers 
and  noncommissioned  officers  (NCOs)  and  civilians  in  the  field  who 
see  a  problem  and  create  a  solution  contribute  immeasurably  to  our 
overall  intelligence  capabilities. 

Traditionally,  we  have  used  the  terms  "national,"  "strategic,"  and 
"tactical"  to  define  intelligence  functions,  assets,  and  customers. 
Today,  I  believe  those  terms  highlight,  and  even  perpetuate,  stove- 
pipe thinking.  The  data  that  the  private  in  the  foxhole  needs  right 
now  might  be  the  same  information  the  President  needs,  and  the 
reverse  could  certainly  be  true.  The  same,  by  the  way,  is  true  of 
the  terms  "intelligence,"  "surveillance,"  and  "reconnaissance,"  or 
ISR.  I  often  challenge  people  to  convince  me  there's  a  functional 
distinction  between  them.  No  one  has  succeeded  yet.  I  point  it  out 
for  two  reasons.  One  is  to  show  that  there  are  still  stovepipes  out 
there  that  we  need  to  overcome,  but  also  to  highlight  the  challenge 
in  dividing  tasks  and  assigning  responsibilities  in  a  way  that  will 
be  productive  and  effective.  We  simply  haven't  caught  up  to  infor- 
mation-age warfare  in  this  new  national  security  environment  that 
we  find  ourselves. 


109 

Above  all,  intelligence  reform  must  further  result  in  better  infor- 
mation-sharing. We  have  to  get  beyond  the  thinking  that  intel- 
ligence is  proprietary.  This  really  is  a  cultural  issue.  Traditionally, 
the  producer  of  intelligence  has  been  considered  the  owner  of  that 
intelligence.  That's  clearly  unsatisfactory,  as  September  11  showed. 
As  Director  McLaughlin  said,  we've  made  a  great  deal  of  progress 
in  that  area,  as  well.  In  my  view,  we  still  have  more  to  do. 

We  have  to  move  from  the  thought  process  of  "need  to  know" 
that  dominated  our  Cold  War  mindset  to  a  "need  to  share"  mindset. 
We  need  to  reexamine  how  we  balance  risk,  from  a  security  and 
classification  perspective,  versus  the  benefits  that  come  from  shar- 
ing information. 

Right  now,  I  believe  we  depend,  in  large  measure,  on  personal  re- 
lationships and  memoranda  of  understanding  to  force  information- 
sharing  across  organizations  and  agencies.  In  fact,  I've  dropped  a 
roll  of  duct  tape  on  the  podium  during  a  speech  to  emphasize  this 
point,  because,  in  a  sense,  we're  duct-taping  together  organizations 
and  processes  that  weren't  designed  to  be  well-connected.  We've 
made  progress,  as  said,  but,  again,  there  is  more  to  do. 

We  have  to,  to  the  best  we  can,  institutionalize  information-shar- 
ing to  provide  a  much  greater  degree  of  transparency  for  all  intel- 
ligence customers.  I  think  that's  one  function  a  National  Intel- 
ligence Director  might  perform  very  well. 

We  also  tend  to  focus  on  vertical  information-sharing,  getting  in- 
formation up  and  down  the  chain  of  command.  We  have  much  room 
for  improvement,  not  just  in  sharing  information  between  the  head- 
quarters and  the  foxhole,  but  also  between  foxholes.  Here,  I'm 
using  the  term  "foxhole"  figuratively,  of  course.  It's  also  the  ship 
and  the  aircraft  and  the  guard-posts  of  the  front  gate  of  a  base. 

A  National  Intelligence  Director  should  also  oversee  needed  inte- 
gration of  intelligence  resources.  Competition  for  resources  is  a  big 
challenge  for  the  Intelligence  Community,  and  we  need  an  im- 
proved process  for  coordinating  intelligence  programs — and  here, 
I'm  thinking  of  the  major  procurement  programs — perhaps  modeled 
after  the  Joint  Requirements  Oversight  Council  that  we  use  in  the 
DOD.  This  process  must  be  transparent  within  the  entire  intel- 
ligence communities  and  those  departments  and  agencies  that  are 
concerned. 

I  appreciate  the  efforts  of  this  committee  to  stay  focused  on  intel- 
ligence reform  at  its  broadest  level.  Certainly,  the  terrorist  attacks 
of  September  11  and  the  struggle  to  defeat  violent  extremists  are 
at  the  forefront  of  this  debate.  But  we  can't  lose  sight  of  the  fact 
that  we  are  making  decisions  that  will  have  ramifications  well  be- 
yond the  war  on  terrorism.  We  don't  know  with  any  certainty  what 
the  next  threat  to  our  security  and  our  prosperity  will  be,  but  we 
do  know  we  can't  afford  to  be  taken  by  surprise.  That  was  the  most 
important  lesson,  of  course,  from  Pearl  Harbor  and  the  most  impor- 
tant lesson  of  September  11. 

As  Senator  Levin  said,  and  the  Secretary  said,  we  have  to  be 
very  thoughtful  and,  at  the  same  time,  proceed  with  the  proper 
sense  of  urgency.  As  we  get  more  and  more  clarity  on  the  gaps  and 
deficiencies  in  our  intelligence  today,  we  have  to  guard  against  cre- 
ating new  problems. 


110 

The  details  matter  very  much.  I  highly  recommend  an  inter- 
agency tabletop  exercise  to  work  through  any  recommended  options 
to  war-game  the  second-,  third-,  and  fourth-order  effects,  and  high- 
light problems  before  they're  institutionalized. 

Once  again,  on  behalf  of  the  men  and  women  in  uniform,  I  thank 
you  for  your  support.  This  is  a  sacred  responsibility  that  we  share, 
protecting  the  lives  of  our  service  men  and  women,  preserving  our 
way  of  life  for  future  generations.  I  look  forward  to  working  with 
you  in  this  important  work,  and  to  answering  your  questions. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much,  General,  for  an  im- 
portant contribution. 

We'll  now  proceed  to  a  round,  6  minutes  per  Senator. 

I  want  to  approach  my  questions  just  in  a  very  practical  way. 
Let's  face  the  realities  of  where  we  are — Congress,  the  executive 
branch  and,  indeed,  how  our  Government  is  functioning  at  this 
very  moment. 

We're  in  recess.  Nevertheless,  some  20  committees  have  come 
back — or  held  20  hearings.  I  think  that  shows  strong  participation 
by  Congress. 

The  President  has  indicated — and  I  read  his  statement  today, 
"Today,  I'm  asking  Congress  to  create  the  position  of  National  In- 
telligence Director."  Now,  that  person  will  serve  as  the  President's 
principal  intelligence  advisor  and  will  oversee  and  coordinate  the 
foreign  and  domestic  activities  and  intelligence.  This  is  a  broad 
mandate.  The  National  Security  Advisor,  in  response  to  a  question 
put  to  her,  said,  "We  expect  the  National  Intelligence  Director 
would  have  significant  input  into  the  development  of  a  budget." 
We're  awaiting  further  clarification  from  the  administration,  maybe 
actually  a  bill,  itself. 

Now,  it's  important  that  we  try  to  do  what  we  can,  given  the  re- 
alities that  we're  in  an  election  of  our  President,  we're  in  an  elec- 
tion of  the  entire  House  of  Representatives,  a  third  of  the  Senate, 
and  we  have  but  a  few  weeks  time  left  after  we  come  back  here 
in  September.  I,  personally,  think  something  can  be  done,  providing 
it's  constructive  and  adds  to  strengthening. 

But  I  pick  up  on  your  comment,  Secretary  Rumsfeld,  and,  I 
think,  a  very  wise  one,  as  you  recited  the  history  of  reforms  that 
this  country  has  had,  beginning  in  the  1947  Act,  the  Goldwater 
Act,  and  so  forth;  we  didn't  do  it  in  a  single  stroke. 

So  as  I  approach  my  individual  responsibilities — and,  of  course, 
our  committee  will  meet  and  decide  how  we  condense  the  informa- 
tion we've  received  and  forward  it  to  other  committees,  and  pos- 
sibly to  the  President — but  I'm  of  the  opinion  that  we  should  not 
try  and  do  the  whole  9/11  Commission  recommendation  in  a  single 
stroke.  That's  my  view.  If  you'll  look  at  the  one  provision,  which 
I  think  is  most  important,  here  on  page  412,  "Second,  the  National 
Intelligence  Director  should  manage  the  national  intelligence  pro- 
gram and  oversee  the  component  agencies  of  the  Intelligence  Com- 
munity, would  submit  a  unified  budget,"  and  it  goes  on. 

Now,  Mr.  Secretary,  I'd  have  to  ask  you,  very  bluntly  and  strong- 
ly, if  we  were  to  rubberstamp  that  provision  and  enact  it  into  law 
in  the  next  few  weeks,  would  that  put  at  risk,  in  your  judgment. 


Ill 

the  ability  for  this  country  to  perform  as  well  as  it's  performing 
today  in  its  intelligence  collection  activities? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Mr.  Chairman,  those  are  issues  that  are 
being  discussed  extensively  in  the  executive  branch,  as  well  as  here 
in  the  committee.  They're  important  questions.  Trying  to  find  that 
right  balance,  I  think  it  might  be  useful,  just  for  the  record,  if  we 
took  the  two  big  issues  with  the  National  Intelligence  Director,  per- 
sonnel and  budget 

Chairman  Warner.  Budget.  All  right. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  — and  explain  how  it  currently  works. 

The  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  today  has  very  broad,  exten- 
sive authorities  in  being.  They  may  be  executed  in  varying  ways  by 
different  DCIs  over  time,  but,  in  fact,  in  writing,  there's  tremen- 
dous authority.  I  wouldn't  think  of  suggesting  somebody  to  the 
President  for  the  NSA  or  the  NGA  or  for  the  NRO  without  develop- 
ing criteria  with  the  DCI,  without  discussing  candidates,  without 
interviewing  candidates,  without  each  agreeing  that  those  can- 
didates— this  individual  is  the  right  individual,  and  making  a  joint 
recommendation.  That's  how  it's  done.  With  respect  to  the  budget, 
the  current  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  does  develop  that  budg- 
et. The  issue,  I  think,  is  not  so  much  that  as  it  is  the  reprogram- 
ming  authority,  and  part  of  that  is  bureaucracy  in  the  Agency,  in 
DOD,  and  in  the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  (0MB),  and 
part  of  it's  bureaucracy  in  Congress.  John  McLaughlin  is  here  and 
can  comment  on  that.  But  the  role,  today,  on  both  budget  and  per- 
sonnel, for  the  DCI  is  extensive,  and  my  guess  is,  it  ought  to  be, 
for  a  NID. 

Chairman  Warner.  Then  one  route,  which  I  strongly  endorse, 
could  be  that  we  could,  if  necessary,  formalize,  in  statute,  what  ex- 
ists today  by  way  of  joint  cooperation  between  yourself  and  the  Di- 
rector of  Central  Intelligence  in  the  formulation  of  the  budgets,  and 
those  budgets  could  be,  in  a  sense,  jointly  submitted.  Am  I  not  cor- 
rect? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  would  have  to  go  back  and  refer  to  the 
statute  to  see  what's  already  in  there,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Warner.  I  think  you'll  find  that  that  is  the  spirit  of 
it.  I  think  if  we  did  that,  that  would  remove  some  of  the  concerns 
that  the  9/11  Commission  had.  If  we  did  the  same,  in  terms  of  ap- 
pointments, as  you  point  out,  you  wouldn't  think  of  putting  some- 
one in  there  that  was  not  acceptable  to  the  DCI — so  formalize  that 
and  have  a  joint  submission  of  the  nominations  of  the  heads  of  the 
various  departments  at  DIA,  NSA,  and  the  like.  Would  that  seem 
to  you  to  be  an  acceptable  advancement? 

Secretary  RUMSFELD.  It  is  the  practice  we're  using. 

Chairman  Warner.  Fine. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I've  found  it,  working  with  George  Tenet, 
that  it  worked  very  well.  We  communicated  extensively  about  these 
individuals,  and  made  the  recommendation  to  the  President,  saying 
that  each  of  us  agreed  that  this  was  an  appropriate  thing,  to  ap- 
point or  nominate  or  to  extend  the  term  of  any  one  of  those  individ- 
uals. Except  for  DCI,  less  formal  there.  Certainly  with  the  national 
collection  agencies.  With  the  Director  of  Defense  Intelligence,  with 
that  post,  we  had  the  same  discussion.  But  it  is  a  slightly  different 


112 

role,  and  I  don't  know  that  I  would  include  it  if  you're  going  to  be 
doing  something  with  a  statute. 

Chairman  Warner.  We  could  look  at  that.  But  if  this  sweeping 
proposal  here  of  the  9/1 1  Commission — and  I  don't  mean  to  be  criti- 
cal of  it;  I'm  just  being  bluntly  factual  about  it — if  that  were  to  be 
adopted  as  stated  here,  would  that  derogate  your,  I  think,  prime 
responsibility — namely,  the  Tactical  Intelligence  and  Related  Ac- 
tivities (TIARA)  budget — which  supports  the  warfighter? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Senator,  we  are  still  looking  at  these 
things.  They're  considerably  important,  and  I  am  not  in  the  posi- 
tion to  say  anything  other  than,  the  devil's  in  the  details. 

Chairman  Warner.  Right,  I  accept  that.  But  the  work  of  Con- 
gress is  moving  ahead.  We  have  some  momentum  in  these  commit- 
tees. We're  coming  up  with  ideas.  The  sooner  we  can  get  those 
guideposts  from  our  President  and  the  administration,  the  better 
we  will  be  able  to  form  our  work. 

I  would  ask  you.  Director  McLaughlin,  I've  suggested  possibly 
that  Congress  would  enact  such  laws  to  change  the  position  so  that 
the  Director  is  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  members  of  the  Cabi- 
net— most  particularly,  the  Secretary  of  Defense.  Could  you,  if  not 
now,  show  the  committee  your  recommendations  of  what  legislative 
actions  need  to  be  taken  to  strengthen  the  DC  I  such  that  he  can 
stand  on  an  equal  footing,  with  regard  to  budget  matters  and  other 
matters,  with  the  Secretaries  of  Defense  and  State? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I'm  not  mistaken,  the  cur- 
rent statute  really  accomplishes  that. 

Chairman  Warner.  I  think  it  does,  but  others  do  not  think  it 
does. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  The  existing  statute  gives  the  DCI  the  author- 
ity to  put  together  the  budget  for  the  Intelligence  Community.  In 
fact,  I  could  walk  you  through  the  steps  by  which  that's  done,  if 
you  wish.  So  that  exists  in  the  statute  currently. 

Chairman  Warner.  I  ask  you  to  examine  the  balance  of  the  stat- 
utes and  advise  the  committee.  In  the  first  place,  you're  a  level  two, 
which  is  one  step  below  the  level  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense.  Is 
that  correct? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  That's  correct.  But,  in  fact,  the  process  cur- 
rently works  as  the  Secretary  described.  The  DCI,  based  on  intel- 
ligence priorities  that  are  now  established  by  the  DCI  in  consulta- 
tion with  the  National  Security  Council,  puts  together  an  intel- 
ligence budget  by  suggesting  to  each  of  the  constituent  agencies 
what  their  budget  ought  to  include,  what  the  priorities  ought  to  be. 
Those  agencies  put  their  budgets  together 

Chairman  Warner.  My  time  is  going  along.  But  my  point  is, 
you're  a  level  below,  in  terms  of  protocol,  pay,  and  otherwise.  We 
could  raise  it  to  the  same  level  as  the  Secretary,  could  we  not? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  You  certainly  could. 

Chairman  Warner.  All  right.  That's,  I  think,  an  important  mat- 
ter. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Why  would  I  argue  against  that?  [Laughter.l 

Chairman  Warner.  Fine.  No,  no [Laughter.] 

I  understand  that.  But  yesterday's  panel — a  very  distinguished 
panel,  of  Dr.  Schlesinger  and  Frank  Carlucci,  who  know  a  great 
deal  about  these  issues  were  concerned,  together  with  Dr.  Hamre, 


113 

that  even  though  there  is  the  law  there,  because  of  your  level-two 
position,  not  level-one,  you  could  be — not  you,  personally,  but  that 
person  occupying — at  some  disadvantage  in  the  customary  competi- 
tion that  goes  on  among  the  cabinet  officers — I'm  not  suggesting 
you  become  a  cabinet  officer — but  the  cabinet  officers  as  they  work 
through  the  budget  and  the  personnel  appointments.  So  that's  my 
point.  Perhaps  we  could  change  it  so  you're  on  an  absolute  coequal 
status,  and  give  you  the  title  of  NID,  and  try  it  for  a  while,  and 
see  if  it  would  work.  Otherwise,  I  guess  we're  awaiting  further 
comments  from  the  administration.  [No  response.] 

All  right. 

Senator  Levin. 

Senator  Levin.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I'd  like  to  ask  the  Secretary  his  personal  view,  then,  on  some  of 
the  specific  recommendations  of  the  9/11  Commission  relative  to 
the  powers  of  the  National  Intelligence  Director  and  the  proposed 
National  Counterterrorism  Center.  It's  clear  to  me  that  we  should 
create  both.  We  will  create  both,  I  hope,  and  do  it  promptly.  The 
issue  is  going  to  be  the  powers  and  responsibilities.  I'd  like  your 
personal  view  on  those  issues. 

First,  should  this  proposed  National  Counterterrorism  Center  be 
able  to  assign  operational  responsibilities  to  combatant  commands? 
Your  personal  view.  Do  you  agree  or  disagree,  or  can't  you  answer 
one  way  or  the  other  simply? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Are  you  talking  about  the  center  or  the 
NID? 

Senator  Levin.  This  is  the  NCTC. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  The  NCTC.  Right  now,  the  folks  in  the 
interagency  process  are  working  hard  to  find  out 

Senator  Levin.  You  don't  have  a  personal  view  you  can  share 
with  us  now? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  think  that  the  statutory  responsibilities  of 
the  departments  and  agencies  pretty  much  establish  where  respon- 
sibility for  operations  ought  to  be,  and 

Senator  Levin.  There's  a  proposal 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  — number  one- 


Senator  Levin.  There's  a  proposal — I  just  want  to  know,  because 


Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Well,  I'm  doing 

Senator  Levin. — I  mean,  I'm  trying  to 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  — my  best. 

Senator  Levin.  Well,  I  know,  but  if  you  can't  give  us  "personally, 
you  agree,"  "personally,  you  disagree,"  or,  "it's  not  that  simple,"  I'll 
accept  that  you  can't  give  us  one  or  the  other.  That's  acceptable  to 
me.  You  can  either  agree,  or  you  disagree,  with  that.  I  mean,  that's 
a  specific  recommendation.  Mr.  Secretary,  we  got  specific  rec- 
ommendations  

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  understand. 

Senator  Levin. — from  the  9/11  Commission.  I'm  quoting  them.  I 
just  want  to  ask  your  personal  agreement  or  disagreement.  If  you 
can't  give  us  that,  that's  okay,  but  just  say  you  can't  give  us  a  per- 
sonal yes  or  no  from  your  perspective. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  can't  do  it  with  a  yes  or  no 

Senator  Levin.  Thank  you. 


114 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  — that's  for  sure. 

Senator  Levin.  Thank  you. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  It's  a  vastly 

Senator  Levin.  Now,  the  next 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  — more  complex  question. 

Senator  Levin.  Okay.  Well,  it's  a  very  specific  recommendation. 

Now,  by  executive  order  now,  the  reprogramming  authority  is  in 
the  Secretary  of  Defense.  That's  by  executive  order.  The  9/11  Com- 
mission is  recommending,  essentially,  that  we  give  the  new  Na- 
tional Intelligence  Director  the  budget  reprogramming  authority. 
Do  you  agree  or  disagree  with  that,  personally? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Certainly  an  effective  NID  would  need  to 
be  intimately  involved  in  reprogramming.  How  the  authority  ought 
to  work,  whether  DOD,  NID,  or  0MB,  is  something  that,  just  by 
its  very  nature,  requires  coordination  among  all  three  and  Con- 
gress. Quite  honestly,  Congress  has  been  one  of  the  biggest  difficul- 
ties with  respect  to  that  issue. 

Senator  Levin.  I'm  going  to  ask  that  the  five  questions  which  I 
asked  for  specific  agreement  or  disagreement  be  answered.  Mr. 
Chairman,  I'm  going  to  ask,  for  the  record,  that  our  witnesses  an- 
swer whether  they  agree  or  disagree  with  those  specific  rec- 
ommendations, because  of  the  time  requirements  here.  Is  that  all 
right,  for  the  record? 

Now,  this  is  for  Mr.  McLaughlin.  Whatever  the  reforms  are,  we 
must  promote  objectivity  and  the  independence  of  intelligence  as- 
sessments. The  9/11  Commission  said  that  the  report  of  a  meeting 
in  Prague  between  the  lead  hijacker,  Atta,  and  the  Iraqi  Intel- 
ligence Officer,  al  Ani,  was  not  supported  by  available  evidence. 
Yet  that  report  of  the  meeting  was  repeatedly  referred  to  in  public 
statements  of  the  administration  as  key  evidence  of  a  link  between 
Iraq  and  al  Qaeda.  CIA  had  doubts.  We  found  out  later,  because 
those  CIA  doubts  were  in  classified  documents.  The  CIA  had 
doubts  about  the  reliability  of  the  reports  of  that  meeting.  Why 
were  the  doubts  of  the  CIA  left  classified,  while  the  report  of  the 
meeting,  which  clearly  was  reported — there  was  a  report — was  just 
repeatedly  referred  to?  Why  were  your  doubts  classified  until  re- 
cently? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  This  is  a  story  that  evolved  over  a  long  period 
of  time. 

Senator  Levin.  Very  specifically,  though,  why  were  your  doubts 
left  classified  until  recently?  That's  my  question. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  They  were  spelled  out  very  explicitly  in  a  clas- 
sified paper 

Senator  Levin.  But  the- 


Mr.  McLaughlin. — published  on  January  29. 

Senator  Levin. — report  of  the  meeting  was  used  repeatedly  as 
evidence  of  the  link  between  al  Qaeda  and  Iraq.  That  report  of  the 
meeting  was  repeatedly  referred  to  by  administration  sources  as 
being  credible,  and  yet  your  doubts  about  the  meeting,  in  the  CIA, 
remained  classified.  My  question  to  you  is,  why  did  the  CIA,  in  its 
public  statements,  just  simply  say  that,  "Yes,  there  is  a  report 
which  can  neither  be  confirmed  nor  denied,"  but  why  did  you  leave 
the  fact  that  you  had  doubts  about  that  meeting  classified?  That's 
my  question. 


115 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  The  vast  majority  of  what  we  produce  is  clas- 
sified. It  goes  to  members  of  the  administration  and  it's  available 
to  Congress  so  that  people  have  a  very  clear  understanding,  at  any 
moment,  what  we 

Senator  Levin.  Not  the  public. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.— what  we  think. 

Senator  Levin.  But  the  public  did  not  know  that  you  had  doubts. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Our  job  is  to  make  our  views  available  as 
clearly  and  objectively  as  we  can  to  the  policymaker  and  to  Con- 
gress, frequently  in  classified — almost  always  in  classified  chan- 
nels, because  the  information  is  sensitive.  We're  dealing  with  liai- 
son sources  here.  We're  dealing  with  intelligence  collection  tech- 
niques. That's  why  it's  classified.  It's  then  there  for  anyone  who 
wishes  to  draw  on  it,  as  they  wish  to  draw  on  it,  in  shaping  their 
public  comments. 

Senator  Levin.  Mr.  McLaughlin,  the  CIA  said 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  But  the  9/11  Commission  was,  I  think,  careful 
in  saying  that  we  were  objective  on  this  point.  This  is  one  of  the 
points  where  the  9/11  Commission 

Senator  Levin.  No,  they 

Mr.  McLaughlin. — gave  us 

Senator  Levin. — they  didn't  say  that.  It  was  the  Intelligence 
Community  that  made  a  reference  to  that. 

Mr.  McLaughlin,  the  CIA  said,  in  a  classified  document,  that  as- 
sisting Islamic  terrorists  would  be  an  extreme  step  for  Saddam 
Hussein.  Why  was  that  left  classified,  when  the  administration  was 
saying  that  Saddam  Hussein  would  give  Islamic  terrorists  a  weap- 
on of  mass  destruction  at  any  day,  any  moment?  Why  did  you  leave 
that  critical  fact  classified? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  I  think  the  answer  to  that  is  simply  that — the 
one  I  gave  before,  that  our  job  is  to  say,  as  objectively  and  clearly 
as  we  can,  what  we  think  to  be  the  case — and  we  did  that — for  the 
benefit  of  both  polic3miakers  and  Congress.  It  was  there 

Senator  Levin.  Classified. 

Mr.  McLaughlin. — it  was  there  for  all  to  draw  on.  I  think  most 
of  our  work  is  classified. 

Senator  Levin.  Many  of  your  statements,  though,  however,  were 
unclassified. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  I  think,  on  that  point,  we  issued  one  or  two 
unclassified  statements 

Senator  Levin.  Right. 

Mr.  McLaughlin. — largely  in  response  to  questions  from  Con- 
gress. As  I  recall  without  consulting  them,  those  statements  were 
very  carefully  phrased,  in  terms  of  the  limitations  we  put  on  de- 
scribing that  relationship.  In  an  unclassified  form,  as  well. 

Senator  Levin.  And 


Mr.  McLaughlin.  I  believe,  in  response,  actually- 

Senator  Levin. — you  believe  it's  that 

Mr.  McLaughlin. — to  a  letter  that  you- 


Senator  Levin. — you  believe  that  statement,  when  it  was  finally 
unclassified,  that  it  would 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Levin.  Excuse  me.  When  the  statement  was  finally  un- 
classified, that  the  CIA  believed  it  would  be  an  extreme  step  for 


116 

Saddam  Hussein  to  give  a  weapon  of  mass  destruction,  you  believe 
that  that  was  consistent  with  what  the  administration  was  saying 
about  the  hkehhood  of  Saddam  Hussein  giving  al  Qaeda  a  weapon 
of  mass  destruction? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Well 

Senator  Levin.  Is  that  your  judgment? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  We've  talked 

Senator  Levin.  I'm  asking  you  a  direct  question. 

Mr.  McLaughlin. — we've  talked  about  this  before,  and  I  don't 
think  it's  our  job  to  comment 

Senator  Levin.  We've  never  gotten  a  clear  answer  to  that  ques- 
tion. Let's  get  it  now. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  I  don't  think  it's  our  job  to  comment  on  the 
public  statements  of  the  administration  or  of  Congress.  There  are 
times,  as  we've  explained  in  the  past,  when  we  will  take  someone 
aside — either  a  Member  of  Congress  or  a  member  of  the  adminis- 
tration— and  quietly  tell  them,  "That's — there's  new  information  on 
this,  and  I  would  describe  it  differently." 

Senator  Levin.  My  time  is  up. 

Thank  you. 

Chairman  Warner.  Did  you  feel  you  had  adequate  time  to  re- 
spond to  those  questions? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  I  do. 

Chairman  Warner.  Fine. 

Senator  McCain? 

Senator  McCain.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  I  thank  you  for 
announcing  that  we'll  have  the  hearing  in  September.  I  hope  that 
we  also  have  a  hearing  on  the  latest  administration  proposal  on 
troop  realignment. 

Chairman  Warner.  Yes.  We  will. 

Senator  McCain.  I'm  concerned  about  it,  and  I  hope  we  can  get 
as  full  an  explanation  as  possible.  I'm  particularly  concerned  about 
moving  troops  out  of  South  Korea  when  North  Korea  has  probably 
never  been  more  dangerous  than  any  time  since  the  end  of  the  Ko- 
rean War.  I  hope,  as  some  critics  allege,  this  is  not  a  retreat  to  For- 
tress America.  So  I'll  look  forward  to  hearing  from  the  administra- 
tion on  this  very  important  announcement. 

Chairman  Warner.  I  assure  you,  Senator  and  other  colleagues, 
Senator  Levin  and  I  discussed  that  yesterday,  and  we  will  promptly 
advise  the  committee  of  a  date. 

Senator  McCain.  Also,  I  think  we  need  a  hearing  on  this  latest 
mismanagement  identified  by  the  DOD  Inspector  General  of  $2.6 
billion  being  spent  on  C-130  aircraft  that  can't  be  used  in  combat. 
Remarkable.  Same  people  that  were  involved  in  the  Boeing  deal. 

Director  McLaughlin,  the  reports,  from  whatever  source,  indicate 
that  our  greatest — or  certainly  the  top  two  or  three  greatest 
failings  has  been  in  human  intelligence.  Mr.  Lindh,  from  Califor- 
nia, was  able  to  join  and  train  with  the  Taliban  and  fight  against 
the  United  States,  but  we've  never  been  able  to  insert  any  kind  of 
person  into  the  al  Qaeda  or  other  terrorist  organizations.  What,  in 
the  9/11  Commission  recommendations,  do  you  believe  will  help  us 
in  this  issue? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  First,  Senator,  with  all  due  respect,  I  would 
dispute  the  premise.  In  closed  session,  I  could  explain  that  we  have 


117 

been  able  to  achieve  what  you  suggest  we  haven't  been  able  to 
achieve. 

Senator  McCain.  It's  not  my  suggestion;  it's  the  suggestion  of  the 
9/11  Commission. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  I'm  talking 

Senator  McCain.  It's  a  conclusion  of  the  9/11  Commission. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  The  way  I  would  characterize  it  is,  at  the  time 
of  September  11,  we  clearly  had  human  sources  within  the  sanc- 
tuary, or  we  would  not  have  been  met  on  the  ground  on  September 
27  by  people  welcoming  us  into  Afghanistan.  So  we  had  a  network 
of  human  sources  in  Afghanistan  at  that  time.  I  believe  the  9/11 
Commission  notes  that. 

Senator  McCain.  I  only  have  6  minutes 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Since  September  11 

My  comment,  at  the  outset,  frankly,  was  more  about  the  post- 
September  11  period,  when  I  think  our  human  intelligence 
(HUMINT)  has  improved. 

Now,  in  terms  of  your  question  about  what,  in  the  9/11  Commis- 
sion recommendations,  would  help  us  acquire  better  HUMINT,  I 
think 

Senator  McCain.  I  guess  I  have  to  rephrase  my  question.  Do  you 
believe  that  we  need  to  improve  our  human  intelligence? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Absolutely.  Absolutely. 

Senator  McCain.  Then  what  is  it  that  needs  to  be  done? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Director  Tenet's  comment  before  the  9/11 
Commission,  that  it  would  take  5  more  years,  I  think,  was  mis- 
interpreted by  almost  everyone  who  heard  it.  He  was  not  saying, 
at  the  time,  that,  "We  are  starting  now,  and  5  years  from  now  we'll 
be  in  good  shape."  What  he  was  saying,  and  what  I  would  strongly 
endorse,  is  that  we  probably  need  about  5  more  years  to  get  to 
where  we  need  to  be. 

But  you  have  to  appreciate  where  we  started  from.  In  1997,  at 
the  end  of  those  reductions  of  about  25  percent  in  our  overall  capa- 
bility, I  would  say  we  were  in  Chapter  11.  We  were  only  training 
about  a  dozen  or  two  dozen,  what  we  call,  case  officers,  the  people 
who  recruit  human  spies.  Over  the  last  5  to  7  years  we've  rebuilt 
that  capability,  thanks  to  the  resources  that  Congress  and  the  ad- 
ministration have  provided — and  that's  extremely  important — to 
the  point  where  we're  now  graduating  the  largest  classes  of 
HUMINT  source  collectors  in  our  history.  We  now  have  an  array 
of  people  around  the  world,  and  an  array  of  HUMINT  sources,  in- 
cluding sources — the  very  people  who  are  allowing  us  to  capture 
people  like  Khalid  Sheikh  Mohammed.  That  was  a  HUMINT 
source  operation.  The  people  who  are  allowing  us  to  bring  forth  the 
kind  of  information  that  we  brought  forth  in  the  last  couple  of 
weeks  on  the  casing  reports  of  major  financial  institutions,  that 
came  about  as  a  result  of  HUMINT  source  operations. 

Are  we  where  we  need  to  be?  Absolutely  not.  We  need  more  core 
collectors — case  officers,  if  you  will — who  are  out  there  recruiting 
spies.  We  need  more  people  with  languages  that  help  them  do  that. 
We  need  more  people  in  our  clandestine  service,  who  don't  look  like 
me,  who  can  circulate  freely  in  parts  of  the  world  where  people  like 
me  would  stand  out. 


118 

So  bottom  line  here  is,  that's  what  we  need  to  get  to  the  point 
where  we  need  to  be  on  HUMINT  source  collection. 

Senator  McCain.  In  your  written  statement,  you  said,  "Should 
the — that's  why,  should  the  President's  proposal  to  create  a  Na- 
tional Intelligence  Director  be  adopted,  I  believe  the  individual 
should  have  the  clear  authority  to  move  people  and  resources,  and 
to  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  national  intelligence  agencies 
and  their  leaders."  Does  that  include  control  over  their  budgets? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  The  Secretary  said,  this  is  all  being  debated. 
If  you  want  my  personal  view,  I  would  say  yes. 

Senator  McCain.  Thank  you  very  much.  Director  McLaughlin.  I 
also  want  to  thank  you  for  your  outstanding  service  to  the  country 
for  many  years.  We're  very  appreciative  of  it,  and  we  know  it  will 
continue. 

Finally,  could  we  talk  about  stovepiping  again?  Do  you  believe 
that  the  recommendations  will  prevent  a  reoccurrence  of  such  has 
happened  when  FBI  agents  reported  that  people  were  taking  pilot 
training  in  Phoenix  and  the  information  never  got  to  the  right  peo- 
ple? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  I  think  we're  close  to  fixing  that  problem  now, 
and  I  think  some  version  of  a  National  Counterterrorism  Center 
would  take  us  even  further. 

The  reason  I  think  we're  close  to  fixing  that  now,  a  whole  series 
of  things  have  changed  since  September  11.  It  goes  to  the  kind  of — 
let  me  start  at  the  top — personal  relationship  that  exists  between 
the  Director  of  the  FBI  and  the  Director  of  the  CIA.  During  these 
last  2  weeks,  for  example,  when  we  were  struggling  with  the  ter- 
rorism alerts.  Bob  Mueller  and  I  were  on  the  phone  continuously 
with  each  other,  working  through  issues.  There's  no  impediment 
there. 

We  now  have  senior  FBI  officers  embedded  in  our  Counter- 
terrorism  Center.  One  comes  every  day,  a  senior  officer,  to  my 
meeting  at  5  o'clock,  where  we  work  through  terrorism  problems 
around  the  world,  and  that  person  is  responsible  for  making  sure 
that  everything  at  that  table,  the  most  sensitive  intelligence,  is 
available  back  in  the  FBI. 

In  the  Terrorism  Threat  Integration  Center,  it's  not  inconsequen- 
tial what's  going  on  there.  It's  not  built  yet,  entirely,  but  we  now 
have  FBI  officers,  CIA  officers,  officers  from  Homeland  Security, 
and  any  number  of  other  agencies  sitting  in  one  building,  a  stone's 
throw  away  from  each  other,  exchanging  information. 

So  I  actually  think — oh,  and  the  other  thing  I'd  point  out — and 
Bob  Mueller  needs  to  speak  for  himself  on  this,  but  I  work  closely 
enough  with  him  that  I  think  I  could  characterize  something  he's 
doing  that  relates  to  the  problem  you've  just  pointed  out.  He  has 
underway  a  vigorous  effort  to  develop  a  reporting  system  from  all 
of  his  constituent  field  offices  coming  into  a  central  hub  where  that 
reporting  would  then  be  funneled  out  to  people  who  need  it.  That's 
essentially  the  kind  of  reporting  system  we've  had  in  the  foreign 
intelligence  arena  for  many  years.  Case  officer  meets  someone  in 
a  back  alley  in  Egypt,  sends  in  a  report,  that's  distributed  to  people 
all  around  the  world  who  need  to  see  it.  That's  what  Director 
Mueller's  working  to  create,  and  making  progress  in  creating. 


119 

Not  to  say  there  aren't  problems  to  go  here,  but  we're  moving  in 
the  right  direction. 

Senator  McCain.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you.  Senator  McCain. 

Senator  Kennedy. 

Senator  Kennedy.  Thank  you  very  much.  Welcome,  gentlemen. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld,  you  referenced  that  civil  liberties — the  com- 
mission emphasized  by  the  9/11  panel — do  you  have  any  problems 
with  that  being  included  in  any  proposal  that  would  pass  Con- 
gress? [Pause.] 

I  want  to  keep  moving.  I  know  you  want  to  give  things  a  com- 
plete answer,  but  I 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  am  not  in  a  position  to  answer  yes  or  no 
to  questions  on  issues  that  the  President  and  the  interagency  proc- 
ess is  discussing. 

Senator  Kennedy.  Well,  I 

Secretary  RUMSFELD.  I  clearly  believe  that  the  issue  of  domestic 
intelligence  is  an  important  one  and  requires  that  we  address  the 
questions  of  privacy  and  our  values  as  a  society. 

Senator  Kennedy.  If  I  could  join  in,  perhaps  I'll  add  that  on  to 
Senator  Levin's  questions  for  the  panel  to  see  what's  your  reaction. 

Because  there  is  a  very  specific  proposal  on  that.  We're  looking 
at  these  proposals.  It's  a  matter  of  enormous  significance  and  im- 
portance no  matter  what  we  do  in  this  area.  We'll  have  more  of  a 
chance  to  deal  with  it  in  the  Judiciary  Committee  on  Thursday,  but 

I  did  want  to  get  your  response. 

As  the  Commission  Report — Lee  Hamilton — summarized,  we 
need  the  best  intelligence  we  can  for  our  troops.  But  as  September 

II  made  clear  with  3,000  Americans,  we  also  need  to  protect  the 
American  people  from  terrorists.  Clearly,  the  status  quo  is  not  suf- 
ficient. 

Now,  if  we  look  back  on  what  has  been  stated  by  the  intelligence 
agencies,  going  back  to  a  quote  that  was  mentioned  yesterday,  De- 
cember 4,  1998,  DCI  Tenet,  at  that  time,  issued  a  directive,  "We 
are  at  war.  I  want  no  resources  or  people  spared  in  this  effort,  ei- 
ther inside  the  CIA  or  the  community." 

Now,  that  was  on  December  4,  1998.  Coming  into  1999 — Feb- 
ruary 2,  1999 — George  Tenet  said,  at  the  worldwide  threat  briefing, 
"Let  me  mention  two  specific  concerns.  First,  there  is  no  slightest 
doubt  that  Osama  bin  Laden,  his  worldwide  allies,  his  sympathiz- 
ers are  planning  further  attacks  against  us."  He  continues,  "Bin 
Laden's  overarching  aim  is  to  get  the  United  States  out  of  the  Per- 
sian Gulf.  He'll  strike  whatever  in  the  world  he  thinks  we  are  vul- 
nerable." 

Then  he  continues  in  February  3,  2000,  "Osama  bin  Laden  is  still 
foremost  among  terrorists  because  of  the  immediacy  and  serious- 
ness of  the  threat  he  poses.  Everything  we  have  learned  recently 
confirms  our  conviction  he  wants  to  strike  further  blows  against 
America." 

Then  in  the  9/11  Commission,  you  were  noted — and  I  read  from 
page  208,  "Rumsfeld  noted  to  us  his  own  interest  in  terrorism 
which  came  up  after — in  his  regular  meetings  with  Tenet.  He 
thought  the  Defense  Department,  before  September  11,  was  not  or- 


120 

ganized  adequately  or  prepared  to  deal  with  the  new  threats,  like 
terrorism.  But  his  time  was  consumed  with  getting  new  officials  in 
place  and  working  on  the  foundation  documents  of  a  new  Defense 
policy,  the  Quadrennial  Defense  Reviews,  the  Defense  Planning 
Guidance,  and  the  existing  contingency  plans.  He  did  not  recall  any 
particular  counterterrorism  issue  that  engaged  his  attention  before 
September  11,  other  than  the  development  of  the  Predator  un- 
manned aircraft  system." 

That  is  the  problem.  That's  the  problem  that  the  9/11  Commis- 
sion is  dealing  with.  Evidently  Secretary  Scowcroft  believed  the 
same.  I'm  asking,  Mr.  Secretary,  will  you  support  the  request  of  the 
chairman  of  the  committee  and  Chairman  Roberts  to  declassify  the 
Scowcroft  Commission,  as  well,  since  it's  dealing  with  this  same 
issue  as  the  September  11,  in  terms  of  the  accountability  issue  and 
intelligence-gathering?  Will  you? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  have  been  briefed  on  the  Scowcroft  Com- 
mission Report.  I  don't  see  any  reason  why  there  shouldn't  be  a 
process,  going  through  and  see  what  portion  of  it  can  be  declas- 
sified. I  don't  know  who  classified  it  in  the  first  place.  It  wasn't  the 
DOD,  to  my  knowledge. 

Senator  Kennedy.  No,  it  was  a  presidential  request,  and,  there- 
fore, it's  a  presidential  decision  about  the  declassification,  not 
yours.  So  the  only  question  is — it's  right  on  target  on  the  issue  that 
we're  trying  to  consider  here  before  the  committee,  the  9/11  Com- 
mission, and  it  is  made  by  a  very  distinguished  figure  that's  served 
with  President  Bush-one,  serves  with  President  Bush-two,  served 
with  Republican  and  Democratic  Presidents,  and  also  understands 
the  importance  of  intelligence-gathering  and  that  the  current  sys- 
tem is  not  functioning. 

So  I  gather  that  you  will  at  least — it's  your  position  that  you 
would  welcome  the  Scowcroft  Commission  Report.  It's  been  re- 
ported in  the  newspapers.  It's  on  this  issue.  Do  you  think  it  would 
be  useful  for  us  to  have  that? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  As  I  say,  I've  been  briefed,  I  haven't  read 
it  recently,  and  it  would  have  to  be  declassified. 

Senator  Kennedy.  When  you  were  briefed,  was  there  an3rthing  in 
it  that  bothered — that  you  didn't  think  could  be  classified? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Not  that  I  can  recall. 

Senator  Kennedy.  Thank  you. 

Let  me  ask  a  question  about — we've  talked  a  good  deal  about 
what  is  the  actual  statutes  that  govern  the  allocation  of  respon- 
sibilities between  the  Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  head  of  the  in- 
telligence agency.  But  if  I  ask  the  head  of  the  intelligence  agency — 
if  you  had  a  dispute,  for  example,  with  the  DOD.  Say  it  was  on 
Syria.  You  wanted  to  have  a  program  to  find  out  about  the  penetra- 
tion of  al  Qaeda  in  S3rria,  and  DOD  wanted  to  have  a  report  on 
whether  the  Syrian  bridges  could  hold  American  tanks,  do  you  win 
on  that,  or  does  the  DOD  make  the  final  judgment  decision?  If  you 
wanted  to  have  a  satellite  to  gather  radioactive  information  tech- 
nology, in  terms  of  being  able  to  further  your  different  interests  in 
a  particular  targeted  area,  and  the  DOD  wanted  to  use  that  sat- 
ellite for  other  purposes,  who  makes  the  final  cut  on  those  kinds 
of  issues? 


121 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  In  truth,  now,  Senator,  it's  a  negotiation. 
When  we  have 

Senator  Kennedy.  Who  makes  the  final  cut? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  The 

Senator  Kennedy.  Who  makes  the  final  judgment?  Someone  has 
to  say 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  If  we 


Senator  Kennedy. — this  is- 


Mr.  McLaughlin. — if  the  two  of  us  can't  agree — and  typically  we 
do  come  to  an  agreement,  because  of  the  consultation  process — it 
goes  to  the  President  as  a  tiebreaker,  which  is  one  of  the  reasons 
why  a  DCI  has  always 

Senator  Kennedy.  Has  that  happened,  in  your  recent  memory? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  It  has  not.  It  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  a  DCI 
always  consults  with  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  because  no  DCI 
wants  to  put  the  President  in  the  position  of  being  the  tiebreaker. 

Senator  Kennedy.  My  time  is  up,  Mr.  Chairman.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Senator  Roberts? 

Senator  Roberts.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Let  me  just  say  again  that  Senator  Rockefeller  and  I  have  writ- 
ten to  Mr.  Scowcroft,  and  he  is  perfectly  willing  to  come,  I  think, 
before  Congress,  either  in  a  classified  setting  or  a  non-classified 
setting.  He  is  the  president  of  the  President's  Foreign  Policy  Advi- 
sory Group,  which  puts  him  in  a  category  that  does  not  permit  him 
to  come  before  Congress  and  make  a  classified  document  public. 
The  person  who  would  make  that  decision,  I  think,  is  the  National 
Security  Director,  and  we  are  working  on  that,  and  I  am  very  hope- 
ful that  we  can  have  his  testimony.  I  would  agree  with  Senator 
Kennedy,  it  would  be  very  helpful. 

Director  McLaughlin,  I've,  along  with  others,  tossed  a  few 
brickbats  over  in  your  shop,  and  then  I  asked  you  the  other  day 
if  you  could  provide  me  with  a  list  of  some  things  that  have 
changed  since  the  infamous  National  Intelligence  Estimate  (NIE)  of 
2000  and  also  since  September  11.  You've  done  that,  and  I  would 
like  to  ask  permission,  Mr.  Chairman,  to  put  this  list  of  nine  posi- 
tive changes  that  the  CIA  has  made  in  the  record  at  this  point. 

Chairman  Warner.  Without  objection. 

[The  information  referred  to  follows:! 


122 

Intelligence  Community  2001...InteIIigeoce  Community  Today 


Since  September  H,  2CX)l,  the  Intelligence  Community  changed  its  priorities,  its 
approach,  and  its  organization.  Many  of  the  names  on  the  organizational  boxes  look 
familiar,  but  their  contents  and  the  way  they  operate  are  dramatically  differenL 

Fighting  the  War.  The  most  important  change  since  9/11  is  that  the  United  States  is  on 
the  offensive  in  the  war  on  torroiism.  The  Intelligence  Community  joined  with  the  armed 
forces  as  the  point  of  the  offensivo  spear.  Intelligence  and  military  forces  live  together 
and  fight  together.  They  share  intelligence  on  the  battlefield. 

•  Predator  imagery  goes  directly  to  the  field  where  both  military  and  intelligence 
ofEcers  can  use  it  on  the  spot 

•  Human  intelligence  reports  go  directly  to  warfighters  in  the  field. 

•  Intelligwic©  Comrmmity  officers  task  collection  to  support  all  aspects  of  the  war. 

Managing  the  War.  Today,  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  persooaJly  and  directly 
drives  the  Intelligence  Community's  role  in  fighting  the  war.  Virtually  every  day  senior 
officers  from  the  Military,  Law  Enforcement,  and  Intelligence  Community  hear  the  latest 
intelligence  report*;  discuss  their  implications;  and  decide  what  to  do.  The  DCI  directs 
action  on  the  spot. 

Enforcing  the  Law.  The  Intelligence  and  Law  Enforcement  Communities  are  much 
more  closely  linked  than  they  were  before  September  1 1 .  They  work  together  from  the 
Oval  Office  to  the  streets  of  Lackawanna,  Columbus,  New  York,  and  Islamabad, 

The  number  of  FBI  officers  serving  in  CTC  has  doubled  since  9/1 1.  CIA  sent  officers  to 
Joint  Terrorism  Task  Forces  across  the  country.  When  the  FBI  needed  help  to  track 
terrorists  in  the  US,  CIA  sent  10  people  to  the  Foreign  Terrorist  Tracking  Task  Force. 
When  the  FBI  needed  help  in  establishing  a  reports  officer  cadre,  CIA  sent  experienced 
reports  officers  to  FBI  Headquarters, 

Protecting  the  Homeland.  The  best  intelligence  provides  little  protection  if  it  is  not 
linked  to  homeland  defense.  The  Terrorirt  Threat  Integration  Center  is  a  direct  response 
to  lessons  learned,  TTIC  fuses  foreign  intelligence  with  data  from  21  information 
networks  of  other  federal  agencies.  It  also  fuses  people — professionals  fi:t>m  CIA,  FBI, 
NSA,  State,  DIA.  DHS,  and  other  agencies  are  assigned  to  TTIC.  Several  hundred 
officers  from  CIA's  Coonterterrorist  Center  and  the  FBI's  Counterterrorist  Division  will 
work  together  in  a  new  building  in  order  to  Improve  collaboratioa.  TTIC's  information 
becomes  ammunition  to  support  our  defenses  from  the  visa  lines  at  embasaies  to  the  flight 
lines  in  the  US.  It  is  the  basic  data  for  our  watchlists.  It  tcUs  the  law  onforccmont  officer 
whether  he  is  lookbg  at  an  innocent  traveler  or  a  deadly  terrorist. 


123 


Changing  the  Intelligence  Community.  Most  of  the  names  are  the  same,  but  efter 
September  1 1,  the  missions  of  the  Community  members  are  substantially  different.  The 
President's  collection  priorities  are  the  IC's  collection  priorities.  Al-Qa'ida  and  other 
terrorist  groups  who  threaten  US  interests  are  at  the  top  of  tha  list.  The  IC  operates  under 
the  DCI'e  strategic  plan  and  its  budget  is  driven  by  that  plan.  Information  is  shared 
among  IC  agencies  through  community  computer  networks.  Security  standards  are 
designed  to  facilitate  rather  than  to  restrict  iirfonnation  sharing. 

Changing  the  CIA.  The  CIA*g  clandestine  senice  provides  the  Agency's  frontline 
troops  in  the  war  against  terrorism.  The  service  has  tripled  its  hiring.  It  is  growing  in 
numbers  and  in  capabilitios.  Its  methods  of  operation  also  have  changed.  The  DO  is  using 
innovative  strategies  and  technologies  to  bring  terrorists  to  justice  or  bring  justice  to 
them.  Since  9/11,  CTC  has  evolved,  too.  It  tripled  in  size  and,  as  a  result,  its  woridwide 
capabilitiea  grew  dramatically.  The  impact  of  its  expertise  and  reach  can  be  seen  in  the 
number  of  teiiorists  dead  or  captured  and  terrorist  attacks  disrupted.  The  Directorate  of 
Intelligence  also  changed.  It  shifted  entire  analytic  units  to  CTC  immediately  after  9/1 1 . 
It  sent  analysts  to  support  the  FBI  and  now  is  providing  another  60  analysts  to  TTIC  to 
augment  the  cadre  of  officers  already  assigned  there. 

Sharing  Information.  Much  of  the  change  since  9/1 1  involves  sharing  infonnaiion.  Part 
of  thai  comes  from  more  efficient  information  architecture;  part  of  it  from  integrated 
operations;  part  of  it  from  better  standards  and  attitudes.  But  all  of  it  is  integral  to 
fighting  the  war. 

Resources  for  the  War  and  the  Future.  The  Intelligence  Community  that  the  9/U 
Commission  studied  was  just  emerging  from  the  offocts  of  a  long  period  of  declining 
resources — both  money  and  people.  Today,  more  money  and  more  people  enable  the  IC 
to  help  fight  the  wax  and,  in  time,  to  win  it. 

Senator  ROBERTS.  I'm  not  going  to  read  them  all,  but  I  would  just 
simply  say  that  when  we  go  to  war,  why,  the  intelligence  and  the 
military  forces  do  now  live  together,  they  fight  together;  the  mili- 
tary, law  enforcement,  and  Intelligence  Community  does  hear  the 
latest  intelligence  reports;  and  the  acting  Director  does  direct  ac- 
tion on  the  spot.  The  intelligence  and  the  law  enforcement  commu- 
nities are  much  more  closely  linked  than  they  ever  were  before, 
and  that's  all  across  the  world.  The  number  of  FBI  officers  serving 
in  the  NCTC  has  doubled.  I  think  the  number  in  the  clandestine 
service  with  the  CIA  has  tripled.  You  sent  60  people  over  to  Terror- 
ism Threat  Integration  Center  (TTIC).  I  could  go  on  and  on,  but  I 
think  that's  a  good-news  story,  from  one  who  has  been  very  critical 
of  the  CIA,  more  especially  after  our  Senate  inquiry. 

Let  me  just  say  the  snapshot  that  we  are  taking  today  of  the  CIA 
is  a  different  snapshot  than  we  took  with  our  inquiry  and  dating 
back  to  the  NIE  2000  and  also  September  11. 

Now,  you  said,  on  page  12  of  your  testimony,  you  would  also  see 
more  progress  by  a  DCI  or  NID  on  things  like  common  policies  for 
personnel,  training,  and  security  and  information  technology.  My 
question,  does  the  current  structure  allow  the  DCI  to  set  common 
policies  for  personnel,  training,  security,  and  information  and  tech- 
nology? My  answer  to  you  is  that  it  does,  because,  in  1947,  the  Na- 


124 

tional  Security  Act,  you  and  your  predecessors  have  had  that  au- 
thority. But  my  question  to  you  is,  can  you  enforce  those  pohcies? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  You  put  your  finger  on  the  issue.  Senator.  We 
have  the  authority  to  set  the  pohcies,  but  it's  difficult  to  enforce 
them.  We  do  our  best,  and  we  have  a  process  for  making  progress, 
which  we  have  made,  but  the  enforcement  is  not  as  strong  as 

Senator  Roberts.  Then  all  this  talk  about  the  1947  National  Se- 
curity Act  and  you  have  all  the  authority  that  you  need,  if,  in  sim- 
plistic terms,  you  would  just  enforce  it,  everything — well,  it 
wouldn't  be  fine,  but  it  would  be  better.  I  don't  think  you  can  en- 
force it,  because  of  the  way — this  breakdown,  in  terms  of  TIARA 
and  National  Foreign  Intelligence  Program  (NFIP)  and  Joint  Mili- 
tary Intelligence  Program  (JMIP).  I'm  not  going  to  go  into  all  these 
acronyms,  but  that's  the  tripod  of  what  the  Intelligence  Community 
and  the  DOD  simply  has  now. 

Yesterday,  Mr.  Secretary — and  I'm  talking  about  Secretary 
Rumsfeld — we  had  two  former  Secretaries  of  Defense  and  a  key 
member  of  the  DOD.  I  asked  them,  do  you  support  a  NID?  Do  you 
support  a  NID  with  budget  authority  and  also  reprogramming  au- 
thority? Without  getting  into  the  fact  that  we  would  obviously  leave 
the  tactical  part  in  the  military — I  am  talking  more  about  the 
NFIP  and  the  CIA,  NSA,  DIA,  NGA,  NRO,  FBI— it's  a  real  mouth- 
ful— Homeland  Security,  State,  Treasury,  and  Energy — we  didn't 
talk  about  moving  those  agencies  over  to  the  NID,  just  whether  or 
not  he  had  the  authority  to  reprogram  and  hire  and  fire  and  have 
some  control  over  the  budget,  and  the  answer  was  no. 

Yesterday  morning,  why.  Senator  Collins  and  Senator 
Lieberman,  in  the  Governmental  Affairs  Committee,  had  three  wit- 
nesses— they  were  former  CIA  directors — asked  them  the  same 
question,  and  they  said  yes. 

Nobody  has  dared  to  wander  onto  the  thin  ice  on  how  we  reform 
our  own  situation  here  with  the  fractionalization  and  the  way  we 
handle,  say,  intelligence.  We  are  having  20  hearings.  I  think  we've 
had  eight;  12  more  to  come,  as  the  Chairman  has  indicated.  We'll 
have  one  tomorrow  in  the  Intelligence  Committee.  We  are  going  to 
have  a  lady  who  wrote  a  book  about  the  history  of  the  National  Se- 
curity Act.  Since  1947,  15  times  we  have  tried  to  implement  re- 
form— if,  in  fact,  it  is  reform — and  15  times,  we've  failed.  She's 
going  to  say  why.  We  have  David  Kaye  to  talk  about  intelligence 
centers.  Everybody's  talking  about  intelligence  centers.  The  Iraq 
Survey  Group  (ISG)  is  probably  a  good  one.  We  have  Charles  Boyd, 
who's  a  four-star  from  the  Air  Force,  and  somehow  got  Julian 
Bond,  Newt  Gingrich,  Gary  Hart,  and  Warren  Rudman  all  to  agree 
on  one  premise.  That's  almost  a  miracle.  He's  going  to  talk  about 
the  Bremer  Commission,  the  Gilmore  Commission,  the  CSIS  study, 
Aspen-Brown,  and  Hart-Rudman,  and  say  why  on  Earth  haven't  we 
moved  prior  to  this  time. 

The  Intelligence  Committee  is  drafting  legislation.  So  we're  going 
to  share  it  with  Susan  Collins  and  with  Joe  Lieberman,  and  we're 
going  to  share  it  with  this  committee.  We  have  already  started  the 
business  of  sharing  it  with  the  administration.  We  have  also 
shared  it  with  you,  sir.  We're  going  to  share  it  with  the  Armed 
Services  Committee.  We  think  that  it  follows  along  the  lines  like 
the  Chairman  has  indicated,  and  at  least  it's  a  step  forward. 


125 

Let  me  ask  you  a  question,  since  my  time  has  run  out  and  I've 
made  a  speech.  Practically  speaking,  how  could  a  National  Intel- 
ligence Director  who  did  not  possess  the  ability  to  control  execution 
of  the  budget  or  control  over  personnel  decisions,  effectively  break 
down  stovepipes  in  the  Intelligence  Community  and  improve  the 
sharing  of  information  across  the  community?  How  could  he  not  do 
that — I  mean,  how  could  he  do  that  if  he  didn't  have  that  author- 
ity? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  think  it's  possible  to  give  a  National  In- 
telligence Director,  or  a  Director  of  the  CIA,  the  authority  to  break 
down  stovepipes  and  give  that  direction  to  the  entire  community 
and  have  it  accomplished,  quite  apart  from  the  budget  question. 

It  seems  to  me  that — to  go  to  your  earlier  comment  on  budget 
flexibility — the  problem  we  have,  one  of  the  problems,  is  that  the 
budget  is  developed  in  1  year,  it's  worked  on  by  Congress  in  an- 
other year,  and  it's  executed  in  the  third  year.  It's  obvious  that  it 
doesn't  work  that  way.  The  world  changes  out  there.  Flexibility  is 
necessary. 

Now,  if  a  portion — a  same  piece  of  intelligence  can  simulta- 
neously be  a  piece  of  national  intelligence  and  a  piece  of  battlefield 
or  tactical  or  military  intelligence.  The  idea  that  either  the  DOD 
or  CIA  should  go  in  and,  without  consultation,  reprogram,  it  seems 
to  me,  would  be  unwise.  You  could  disrupt  things  because  of  not 
understanding  the  fact  that  that  same  piece  of  intelligence  is  si- 
multaneously national  and  military  or  battlefield.  Therefore,  it 
takes — simply  because  of  the  complexity  of  it,  it  takes  both  to  be 
involved  in  a  reprogramming  process.  That's  not  bad;  it's  prudent. 

Senator  ROBERTS.  I'm  not  advocating  anything  other  than  what 
you  have  said,  in  terms  of  the  cooperation.  If  you  had  a  Special 
Forces  trooper  in  Afghanistan,  and  he  was  involved  in  battle,  which 
they  are  today,  that's  tactical.  If  all  of  the  sudden  he  happens  to 
be  in  the  no-man's  land  where  Osama  bin  Laden  is,  that  becomes 
strategic,  and  then  the  NID  would  be  involved,  just  as  well  as  you 
would  be  involved  there.  There  has  to  be  a  way  to  put  this  to- 
gether. 

I  thank  you  all  for  coming. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you.  Senator  Roberts. 

General  Myers.  Senator  Warner,  can  I  just 

Chairman  Warner.  Yes,  of  course.  I  want  to  just  say  one  word. 
I  want  each  witness  to  feel  that  you  have  adequate  time  to  re- 
spond. Take  it,  and  if  you're  not  getting  it,  draw  the  attention  to 
the  Chairman.  I'm  tr3ring,  best  I  can,  to  give  that  opportunity  to  all. 

General,  please  proceed. 

General  Myers.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  would  just  like  to 
comment  on  Senator  Roberts'  question  to  the  Secretary  on,  really, 
how  you  force  change.  I  think  everybody  knows  this,  but  you  can't, 
just  by  moving  boxes  around  on  a  chart  or  appointing  a  National 
Intelligence  Director,  even  if  he  has  it  in  statute,  say  there  will  be 
change.  We're  talking  about  some  very  ingrained  cultural  issues 
with  a  diverse  group  of  organizations,  and  it's  going  to  take  more 
than  creating  that  position.  You're  going  to  think  very  seriously 
about  how  you  empower  him  and  what  tools  you  give  him  or  her 
to  do  their  task. 


126 

When  you  wanted  to  reform  the  mihtary  and  make  us  more  joint, 
in  Goldwater-Nichols — and  most  of  you  know  this  a  lot  better  than 
I  do — but  I  think  the  debate  went  on  for  3  years.  At  least  3  years. 
There  was,  obviously,  philosophical  debates  before  then,  but  the  de- 
bate here  on  Capitol  Hill  and  in  the  offices  of  Washington,  DC,  for 
3  years.  Then  you  created  some  new  offices — and  I  can  think  of  the 
Vice  Chairman  of  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff— and  some  new  proc- 
esses— and  I  can  think  of  the  Joint  Requirements  Oversight  Coun- 
cil. But  you  also  mandated  some  personnel  policies  that  we  have 
to  report  on  to  Congress  today — however  many  years  later  that  is, 
16-17  years  later — and  education.  You  mandated  certain  edu- 
cational matters,  as  well. 

So  I  don't  think  we  should — and  I'm  sure  everybody  understands 
this,  and  I  know  Senator  Roberts  understands  it,  but  for  those  who 
don't,  this  is  more  than  just  creating  somebody  and  saying,  "Okay, 
good,  we  got  that  done." 

This  is  going  to  be  a  tough  job.  This  is  leading  cultural  change, 
which  is  the  most  difficult.  We  have  a  community  that  is,  I  think, 
performing  very  well  today.  What  we're  trying  to  do  is  tune  it  up 
and  enhance  its  performance,  but  it's  going  to  take  some  of  those 
items,  I  believe,  if  you're  going  to  get  there. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Thank  you. 

Yes,  Mr.  Secretary? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  appreciate  your  inviting 
us  to  feel  that  we  have  been  able  to  respond  fully. 

I'd  like  to  comment  on  a  question  that  Senator  Levin  raised 
about  the  NCTC  and  operations,  and  make  very  clear  that  the 
President  has  indicated  that — not  in  public  announcements,  but  in 
private  comments,  internally — that  he  does  not  want  anybody  in 
between  him  and  operations.  So,  in  terms  of  the  operations  in  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency  or  operations  in  the  DOD,  the  Presi- 
dent would  not  have  that  NCTC  in  the  middle  of  that,  from  an 
operational  standpoint,  and  I  didn't  want  any  doubt  about  that. 

The  second  thing  I'd  like  to  clarify  is,  I  welcome  the  idea  of  hear- 
ings on  global  posture.  We  have  provided  extensive  congressional 
briefings.  We  have  had  extensive  briefings  with  our  allies  around 
the  world.  There  is  nothing  in  it  that  even  begins  to  approximate 
Fortress  America. 

The  Cold  War  is  over.  We  are  not  expecting  a  Soviet  tank  attack 
across  the  North  German  Plain.  It  is  appropriate  to  adjust  that 
force  posture.  We  have  met  with  a  great  deal  of  support  in  the 
briefings  we've  had  with  our  friends,  with  our  allies.  With  respect 
to  North  Korea,  I  would  not  want  the  implication  to  be  left  that  we 
would,  in  any  way,  weaken  that  deterrent. 

The  Korean  War  ended  50  years  ago.  South  Korea  has  a  gross 
domestic  product  (GDP)  that's  probably  25  or  30  times  the  North 
Korean  GDP.  We  have  been  working  with  the  South  Korean  Gov- 
ernment to  transfer  responsibilities  so  that  the  deterrent  would  re- 
main strong.  General  LaPorte  has  done  a  superb  job  in  working 
with  them.  They  are — over  a  period  of  years,  will  be  incrementally 
assuming  additional  responsibilities. 

The  Defense  Department  has,  in  addition,  been  investing  in,  and 
making  arrangements  for,  other  kinds  of  capabilities  to  be  avail- 
able, and  I  don't  think  there  will  be  any  doubt  but  that  the  com- 


127 

bined  capability  of  the  South  Korean  miUtary  and  the  United 
States  of  America  will  be  fully  adequate  to  the  task. 

I  would  say  one  of  the  things  that  we're  really  having  trouble 
with — change  is  hard  for  everybody,  and  I  understand  that.  There's 
a  great  resistance  to  it.  We're  just  going  to  have  to  work  our  way 
through  it.  But  I  think,  in  the  21st  century,  we  have  to  be  very 
careful  to  not  equate  quantities  of  things  with  capability. 

If  you  have  a  "smart  bomb"  that  can  do  the  work  of  8  "dumb 
bombs,"  the  fact  that  you  go  from  10  "dumb  bombs"  to  5  "smart 
bombs"  does  not  mean  you've  reduced  your  capability.  What  we  are 
doing,  we  have  incrementally  improved  our  capability  over  time  in 
that  theater.  We  intend  to  remain  with  a  presence  and  strength. 
I  think  there  will  be  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  people  in  that 
region  that  we  have  maintained  the  proper  balance  and  the  proper 
types  of  capabilities  that  fit  the  21st  century  and  the  cir- 
cumstances. We've  been  very  pleased  with  the  cooperation  of  the 
South  Korean  Government,  in  terms  of  that,  taking  over  some  of 
those  responsibilities — and  we'd  be  happy  to  come  up  and  have  a 
full  hearing  and  testify  on  it — and  have  benefitted  from  the  many 
briefings  that  have  been  given  to  the  staffs  and  offered  to  members 
over  a  sustained  period  of  time  on  this  subject. 

Senator  McCain.  Mr.  Chairman,  could  I  just  comment  very 
quickly?  I  have  neither  been  offered  nor  received  any  briefing,  nor 
do  I  know  of  any  member  of  this  committee  who  has. 

Chairman  Warner.  Senator,  I  think  that  we  can  show  you  that 
there  have  been  some  staff  briefings  on  this 

Senator  McCain.  There  have  been  staff  briefings.  No  member 
that  I  know  of  has  been  offered  a  briefing.  I  would  have  liked  to 
have  one — received  one,  with  alacrity. 

Senator  Sessions.  I  asked  for  one,  and  got  one,  and  several  of 
us  made  a  trip  to  Europe  to  look  at  the  bases  there. 

Chairman  Warner.  I  think  there's  been  a  record  of 

Senator  McCain.  I've  been  to  Europe  many  times,  too. 

Senator  Sessions.  We  went  down  to  look  at  bases  that  may  be 
closed  and  may  be  strengthened. 

Chairman  Warner.  Let  me  just  say,  for  the  record,  there  have 
been,  I  think,  communications  on  this  subject.  We  knew  it  was 
forthcoming.  You've  actually  made  public  pronouncements  on  it  on 
several  occasions,  am  I  not  correct? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  This  has  been  going  on  for  close  to  3  years. 

Chairman  Warner.  Correct. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I'll  be  happy  to  arrange  for  a  briefing  for 
any  Member  or  any  staff  person. 

Chairman  Warner.  Right. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  It  is  important.  It  is  just  in  its  early  stages 
of  beginning  discussions  with  foreign  countries,  in  terms  of  specif- 
ics. It  is  something  that  will  roll  out  over  a  period  of  probably  5 
to  10  years.  It  is  not  something  that's  going  to  be  done  precipi- 
tously. As  I  say,  we'd  be  happy  to  come  tomorrow  if  appropriate. 

Chairman  Warner.  I  think  we've  covered  it.  I  think  it's  impor- 
tant that  we  took  a  few  minutes  on  that. 

Senator  Reed. 

Senator  Reed.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman. 


128 

Mr.  Secretary,  you  have  carefully  avoided  any  opinions  about 
many  of  the  proposals  of  the  9/11  Commission,  but  I  think  it's  im- 
portant to  get  another  one  on  the  table,  and  that's  the  suggestion 
that  the  DOD  assume  all  the  covert  paramilitary  operations — those 
conducted  by  the  CIA,  as  well  as  operations  conducted  by  the  DOD. 
Do  you  have  an  opinion,  for  the  record? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I'll  say  this.  There  are  clearly  things  that 
the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  does  that  are  covert  that  the  DOD 
ought  not  to  do.  There  are  things  in  the  middle  where  we  both  do 
things  and  where  we  have  individuals  involved  in  teams  that  are 
led  by  them  or  led  by  us,  and  there  be  a  mixture  from  time  to  time. 
I  think  it's  a  subject  that  lends  itself  to  a  classified  hearing  better 
than  a  public  hearing.  But  the  short  answer  is,  I  have  not  proposed 
such  a  thing.  It  is  something  that  we've  asked  our  people  to  look 
at  and  the  agency  to  look  at,  but,  at  the  moment,  I  certainly 
wouldn't  recommend  it.  It's  something  that  is  being  discussed  inter- 
nally. 

Senator  Reed.  Now,  Mr.  Secretary,  are  some  of  your  concerns 
based  upon  the  different  frameworks  that  soldiers  operate,  vis-a-vis 
CIA  operatives — both  legal,  ethical,  and  cultural  dimensions — or  is 
this  simply  a — the  practical,  that  they  do  things  that  we  don't  want 
to  do? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  They  do  things  that  are  authorized  by  stat- 
ute and  by  findings  that  we're  not  organized,  trained,  or  equipped 
to  do,  and  don't  want  to  do.  There  are  things  that  involve  prepara- 
tion of  a  battlefield  which  are  not  public,  but  eventually  become 
public,  which  we,  in  the  DOD,  do  do,  as  we  should.  I  think  that, 
again,  that's  about  as  far  as  I'd  want  to  go  in  a  public  hearing. 

Senator  Reed.  Let  me  just — again,  the  final  point  is  that,  from 
your  answer,  there  are  things  that  they  are  authorized  to  do  by  law 
and  custom  that  the  DOD  is  not  authorized  to  do,  is  that  correct? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Absolutely. 

Senator  Reed.  So  this  consolidation  would  require  Congress  to 
change  the  law,  as  well  as  just  simply  authorizing  a  consolidation 
of  effort — or  change  several  laws. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  That,  I  don't  know,  because  I  don't  know 
what  anyone  would  propose  by  way  of  responsibilities.  We  have  re- 
sponsibilities that  are  authorized  by  law — preparation  of  the  battle- 
field— and  they  have  responsibilities  that — no  one  that  I  know  of 
is  suggesting  transferring  out  of  the  agency.  So  whether  or  not — 
I  doubt  that  a  law  would  have  to  be  changed,  but  I  simply  don't 
know,  because  I  don't  know  what  anyone  would  propose  to  change. 

Senator  Reed.  Mr.  McLaughlin,  do  you  have  comments  on  this 
topic? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Yes,  I  would — as  the  Secretary  has  pointed 
out,  this  is  being  discussed  in  the  administration,  and  we've  actu- 
ally been  asked  to  consult  on  it  and  come  up  with  a  position.  If  you 
want  a  personal  view,  I  would  not  accept  that  recommendation,  for 
a  couple  of  reasons.  I  mean,  this  is,  again,  personal  view.  I  think 
we  have  a  perfect  marriage  now  of  CIA  and  military  capabilities. 
CIA  brings  to  the  mix  agility  and  speed.  The  military  brings 
lethality.  That  was  the  combination  that  was  so  effective  in  Af- 
ghanistan. There  are  also  special  authorities  that  the  DCI  has  by 
statute — Section  8  authorities,  for  example — that  allow  the  DCI  to 


129 

do  things — for  example,  to  purchase  equipment  that's  useful  in 
paramilitary  operations,  without  competitive  bidding.  It's  a  small 
point,  but — actually,  a  large  point.  It  means  that  the  DCI,  under 
current  statute,  is  empowered  to  move  quickly  on  things  that  have 
a  paramilitary  nature. 

It's  important  to  realize  there's  a  vast  difference  in  scale  here. 
Without  giving  the  numbers,  we're  tiny  on  this  score.  DOD  is  large 
when  it  comes  to  special  operations.  So  we  have  a  niche  role  here 
that  I  think  is  very  important. 

The  other  thing  I  would  say  is  that — not  well  understood — is  the 
fact  that  our  paramilitary  capability  undergirds  our  whole  covert- 
action  program.  It  isn't  just  the  kind  of  image  that  comes  across 
in  the  movies  about  what  we  do;  it's  that  our  covert-action  pro- 
gram, across  the  board,  which  covers  many  different  areas,  has,  as 
part  of  its  infrastructure,  for  a  very  wide  array  of  things,  this  para- 
military capability. 

Senator  Reed.  General  Myers,  do  you  have  a  comment,  particu- 
larly from  the  perspective  of  a  uniformed-military  officer,  about  the 
blending  of  these  two  different  cultures? 

General  Myers.  I  think  my  advice  would  be  along  the  same  lines 
that  you've  heard  from  the  Secretary  and  from  the  acting  director 
in  that,  right  now,  we  have  well-defined  military  missions  in  the 
world.  This  would  change  some  of  that,  if  we  were  to  adopt  that 
recommendation.  I  think  we  have  to  think  very  carefully  about 
that. 

I  know  there  is — as  we  have  begun  to  consider  it,  there  is  not  a 
lot  of  enthusiasm  at  this  point  for  that  kind  of  change.  I  think  it's 
important  that,  as  people  see  the  military  uniform  around  the 
world — and  we  are  around  the  world,  we  work  with — over  a  couple- 
of-year  period,  we  probably  work  with  most  nations  in  this  world, 
in  one  form  or  another — and  that  they — that  we  maintain  that, 
that  we  are  the  U.S.  military,  and  we're  not  involved  in  other 
things. 

Senator  Reed.  Mr.  Secretary,  the  9/11  Commission  was  a  very 
intensive  review — after-action  report,  if  you  will — of  a  major  intel- 
ligence failure.  We've  had  similar  failures  with  respect  to  Iraq.  Has 
the  DOD  conducted  a  major  after-action  review  of  the  intelligence 
failures  in  Iraq?  If  so,  what  are  the  recommendations  for  change, 
not  only  within  the  DOD,  but  coordination  with  the  CIA  and  other 
agencies? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  The  DOD,  through  the  Joint  Forces  Com- 
mand, embedded  a  cluster  of  people  in  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
and  as  it  went  along  it  conducted  a  lessons-learned,  a  portion  of 
which  included  intelligence.  They  then  completed  that,  and  then 
initiated  a  series  of  interrogations  of  Iraqis  and  looked  at  lessons 
learned,  not  from  our  standpoint,  but  from  what  the  Iraqis  thought 
they  were  doing  and  what  they  thought  they  knew  or  didn't  know. 
That  was  then  completed. 

In  addition,  the  CIA  has  conducted  some  aspects  of  it  from  their 
perspective. 

Senator  Reed.  These  reports  are  available  and 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  We'd  be  happy  to  give  you  or  the  committee 
a  briefing  on  the  lessons  learned.  I've  found  them  fascinating.  I've 


130 

probably  spent  20  hours  being  briefed  on  those  two  lessons  learned 
that  the  DOD  did.  I  have  not  been  briefed  on  the  agency's  piece. 

Senator  Reed.  Thanks,  Mr.  Secretary. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Thank  you  very  much,  Senator  Reed. 

Senator  Sessions? 

Senator  Sessions.  Chairman  Myers,  can  you  share  with  us  how 
the  military  officers,  maybe  your  chiefs,  feel  about  the  new  Na- 
tional Intelligence  Director  proposal?  I  know  there's  some  frustra- 
tion. I  sense  that  we  wish  that  we  had  had  better  intelligence  on — 
I  guess  in  every  conflict  we've  ever  been  in.  But  how  are  your — do 
your  people  respond  to  this? 

General  MYERS.  One  of  my  responsibilities,  of  course,  is  to  rep- 
resent, to  the  Secretary  and  others  in  the  National  Security  Coun- 
cil, and  the  President,  of  course,  is  the  thinking  of  our  combatant 
commanders,  and,  for  that  matter,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.  Let  me 
start  out  by  saying,  we  clearly  have  the  greatest  military  in  the 
world.  Part  of  the  reason  it  is  the  greatest  military  in  the  world 
is  because  we  have  this  integration  of  operations  and  intelligence 
that  I  talked  about  earlier  in  my  opening  statement. 

So  with  that  as  a  backdrop,  we  have  talked  now,  on  many  occa- 
sions, with  our  combatant  commanders  and  to  the  service  chiefs  on 
intelligence  and  intelligence  reform.  I  think  they  would  sign  up  to 
my  opening  statement  and  some  of  the  tenets  in  there  and  some 
things  that  we  hold  very  important.  They're  clearly  in  favor  of 
breaking  down  any  bureaucratic  barriers  to  getting  information, 
and  information-sharing,  and  they  addressed  that.  As  we  had  this 
discussion,  that's  one  of  the  primary  topics  that  comes  up. 

They  strongly  believe  that  it's  hard  to  differentiate  between  the 
national,  strategic,  and  tactical  levels  of  intelligence.  They  under- 
stand that,  and  think  that  intelligence  needs  to  move  seamlessly, 
not  only  vertically,  but  horizontally  between  organizations,  serv- 
ices, analytical  elements,  whatever,  as  well  as  vertically.  So  they 
understand  that. 

They  would  make  a  big  point,  if  they  were  sitting  here,  about  the 
need  for  competitive  analysis.  I  mentioned  that  in  my  opening 
statement,  again.  But  they  think  all-source  analysis,  it's — with  sev- 
eral different  elements,  is  the  way  you  get  to  the — to  understand 
what  the  intelligence  probably  really  means  and 

Senator  Sessions.  In  other  words,  they  don't  want  to  be — to  have 
only  one  source  of  information.  They  prefer  that  other  entities  and 
agencies  would  be  able  to  share  information  directly  if  they  thought 
it  was  appropriate. 

General  Myers.  Senator  Sessions,  that's  absolutely  right.  The 
need  for 

Senator  Sessions.  The  other  Secretaries  of  Defense  that  testified 
yesterday  expressed  that  concern  quite  clearly,  also. 

General  Myers.  Competitive  analysis  is  certainly  to  all  our  bene- 
fits, and  then  we  can  make  whatever  judgments  we  have  to  make. 
But  that  would  be  important.  Then  as  they  get  into  the  details — 
and,  of  course  we  were — when  we  were  talking  when  I  was — the 
last  time  I  solicited  their  opinions,  we  were  talking  about  some  of 
the  fundamentals,  not  some  of  the  specifics,  of  the  9/11  Commission 
Report,    although   we   referred   to   that.    We    said   there    are   rec- 


131 

ommendations  out  there,  but  they  would  not  be  for  any  other  bu- 
reaucratic hurdles  that  removes  the  warfighter  or  the  com- 
mander— be  it  a  combatant  commander  or  a  joint  task  force  com- 
mander— from  the  intelligence  process — collection  and  dissemina- 
tion and  so  forth.  They've  worked  that  very  hard. 

In  my  opening  statement,  I  talked  about  the  entrepreneurial 
spirit  that  exists  at  the  other  end  of  this  intelligence  chain  as  being 
important  to  providing  our  best  intelligence,  not  just  to  the 
warfighter,  but  to  the  national  community,  as  a  whole.  They're  part 
of  that  entrepreneurial  spirit.  That's  where  it  resides,  and  further 
down,  as  well.  So  they'd  like  to  preserve  that.  I  think  those  were 
their  overall  concerns.  They're  very  engaged  in  this  process,  and 
will  follow  it  along. 

Senator  SESSIONS.  I  think  there's  a  pretty  firm  belief  on  this 
committee  that  we  ought  not  to  undermine  the  success  that  we've 
had  with  regard  to  intelligence,  and  we  should  strengthen  it,  not 
weaken  it. 

Director  McLaughlin,  thank  you  for  your  service.  I  think  you 
have  every  right  to  speak  aggressively  about  the  good  things  that 
have  occurred  since  September  11.  I  think  that  after  that  date  ev- 
erything changed  and  people  began  to  reevaluate  entirely,  whether 
it's  the  FBI,  the  DOD,  or  any  other  agency.  A  lot  of  policy  changes 
have  occurred.  Senator  Roberts  mentioned  nine  specific  ones  that 
I  think  have  dealt  with  many  of  the  problems  that  the  9/1 1  Com- 
mission has  referred  to,  or  at  least  attempted  to  deal  with  them. 

So  let  me  ask  you  briefly  just  your  opinion.  Do  you  feel  like,  with 
regard  to  the  9/11  Commission's  report  and  recommendations,  that 
many  of  those  recommendations  have  already  been  accomplished 
and  that — you  indicated  the  report  seemed  to  stop  as  of  September 
11.  Were  they  fully  informed  on  the  changes  that  have  occurred 
since  when  they  made  the  report? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  I  would  say.  Senator,  a  lot  of  the  things  that 
they  recommended  or  spotted  as  problems  have  been  dealt  with. 
My  sense  is  that  the  9/11  Commission  did  spend  some  time  looking 
at  post-September  11.  But  that  isn't  in  their  report,  particularly. 
Their  report  seemed  to  have  been  written  from  a  September  11  per- 
spective. 

There  is  still  more  to  do. 

Senator  SESSIONS.  I  know,  but  you  have  taken  care  of  a  lot  of 
those  things. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  But  I  don't  want  to — it's  important  that  I  not 
convey  a  sense  of  complacency  or  satisfaction  here,  because  in  this 
business  there  is,  frankly,  never  any  perfection,  and  there  never 
will  be.  The  nature  of  the  business  is  such  that  you're  constantly 
finding — as  you've  solved  one  problem,  another  one  comes  up  on 
the  horizon. 

Senator  SESSIONS.  Yes. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  So,  yes,  we've  made  a  lot  of  progress,  but 
there's  still  a  lot  to  go. 

Senator  SESSIONS.  I  was  present  during  the  time  we  did  the  drug 
czar.  The  drug  czar,  as  I  understand  it,  had  the  power  to  review 
the  budgets  of  all  agencies  affecting  narcotics.  It  establishes,  by 
consulting  with  the  agencies  involved  in  narcotics,  a  national  drug 
policy.  The  President  then  is  asked  to  sign  off  on  the  national  drug 


132 

policy.  Then  the  drug  czar  reviews  the  budgets  of  the  agencies  to 
make  sure  that  they're  spending  their  money  on  things  that  accom- 
phsh  the  agreed-upon  strategy. 

I  guess  my  question  would  be — in  some  sense,  that's  supposed  to 
be,  in  theory,  CIA's  role.  Some  suggest  that,  "Well,  you  can't  do  it, 
because  you  have  operational  responsibility,  as  well  as  oversight 
responsibilities."  Could  CIA  fulfill  that  role?  Can  it  today?  If  it 
needed  some  additional  legislation,  and  that  were  passed,  could  you 
do  it,  as  well  as  a  new  National  Intelligence  Director? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  To  make  sure  I  understand  your  question, 
Senator,  are  you  saying,  could  the  DCI,  with  some  augmentation, 
carry  out  the  duties  that  are  laid  out  in  the  report  for  a  National 
Intelligence  Director? 

Senator  SESSIONS.  Or  at  least  with  regard  to  the  powers  and 
compared  to  the  drug  czar. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  The  short  answer  would  be  yes.  The  DCI,  as 
many  people  here  have  noted,  has  extensive  authorities.  Some  of 
them — they're  all — the  ones  recorded  in  statute  give  the  DCI  the 
power  to  do  various  things  that  we've  talked  about  here.  To  some 
degree,  though,  any  DCI's  authority  stops  at  a  certain  point,  and 
persuasion  takes  over,  so  that  the  effectiveness  of  a  DCI  depends, 
to  a  large  degree,  on  the  personal  relationship  that  he  or  she  devel- 
ops with  leaders  of  the  community,  with  the  Secretary  of  Defense, 
and  just  how  he  runs  the  operation. 

I  meet  with — as  George  Tenet  did — all  of  our  program  managers 
every  couple  of  weeks  to  go  over  everything.  We  harmonize  policies. 
There  is  a  point,  though,  where  I  think  Senator  Roberts  was  lead- 
ing with  some  of  his  questions,  where  your  ability  to  enforce  these 
policies  drops  off.  So  you  can  coordinate,  you  can  improve,  you  can 
approve,  you  can  launch,  but  there  is  a  point  where,  as  DCI,  you're 
basically  in  a  negotiation  and  persuasion  mode. 

Senator  Sessions.  My  time  has  expired,  Mr.  Chairman.  But  I 
thank  you,  Mr.  Director. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Colleagues,  as  we  know,  the  Governmental  Affairs  Committee 
started  in  quite  early  this  morning  with  a  hearing.  It  would  be  my 
intent  now,  out  of  respect  to — Senator  Collins,  the  chairman,  and 
Senator  Lieberman  worked  to  schedule  our  hearings — I'd  like  to 
turn  to  Senator  Lieberman,  but  understand  a  colleague  has  a  very 
critical — Mr.  Nelson,  you  were  next.  Can  you  two  sort  it  out,  who 
would  go  first  here? 

Senator  Bill  Nelson.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  a  little  problem 
back  home,  called  Ground  Zero,  named  Punta  Gorda,  that  I'm 
going  back  to. 

Chairman  Warner.  Would  you,  then,  go  ahead — and  then  I'll  go 
to  Senator  Lieberman. 

Senator  Lieberman.  I'll  be  glad  to  yield  to  Senator  Nelson. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you. 

Senator  Bill  Nelson.  I  thank  you. 

Gentlemen,  thank  you  for  your  public  service,  and  thank  Senator 
Collins  for  her  graciousness  in  allowing  me  and  others  to  sit  in  on 
her  hearings,  of  which  we've  just  had  testimony  from  the  members 
of  the  families  of  September  11. 


I 


133 

Senator  Clinton  had  been  gracious  to  the  famihes  to  offer  to  ask 
questions,  and — that  the  famihes  would  like  to — and  since  I  was 
last  in  the  pecking  order,  a  family  member  passed  up  a  question 
to  me  that  I  think  gets  to  the  heart  and  soul  of  a  lot  of  this  discus- 
sion as  we  try  to  exercise  our  legislative  prerogative  under  the  Con- 
stitution and  our  congressional  oversight. 

If  I  may,  gentlemen,  direct  this  question  to  you  from  Carol  Ash- 
ley, who  is  a  member  of  the  Family  Steering  Committee. 

Chairman  Warner.  Senator,  would  you  yield? 

The  Chair  notes  that  a  number  of  the  families  have  joined  us 
here  at  the  conclusion  of  the  hearing  that  Senator  Collins  and  Sen- 
ator Lieberman  had. 

Please  proceed. 

Senator  Bill  Nelson.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  question  is.  General  Myers,  please  explain  why  giving  the 
National  Intelligence  Director  control  over  intelligence  funding 
causes  problems  with  an  effective  military  response  to  terrorism 
overseas. 

This  is  one  of  the  significant  policy  issues  that  we  are  facing  in 
deciding  with  regard  to  the  new  National  Intelligence  Director. 

General  Myers? 

General  Myers.  I  think  the  Secretary  has  talked  a  great  deal 
about  the  budget  and  the  implications  of  the  budget.  I  would  go 
back  to  the  fundamentals  that  I  had  in  my  opening  statement,  in 
that  it's  not  the  budget  authorities  that  are  the  problem  at  all. 
That  can  be  whatever  people  decide  it  is,  as  far  as  I'm  concerned. 

The  thing  that  you  have  to  maintain  through  this  is  the  fact  that 
we  now  have,  in  terms  of  overseas,  a  warfighting  team.  It's  a 
warfighting  team  that  operates  in  peacetime  or  wartime.  It  pro- 
duces intelligence  that  is  used  at  the  national  level  and  is  used  at 
the  tactical  level.  This  team  depends  on  all  the  different  depart- 
ments and  agencies  that  have  intelligence  responsibilities,  not  just 
those  that  are  in  the  DOD.  They  are,  as  Director  McLaughlin 
talked  about,  pretty  tightly  integrated  today.  So  I've  never  said, 
one  way  or  another,  where  the  budget  authority  should  be.  That  is 
still  being  debated  inside  the  administration;  it's  being  debated 
here  today. 

I  would  just  say,  as  we  look  at  placing  budget  authorities  we 
need  to  make  sure  that  this  extremely  important  element  of  our  in- 
telligence apparatus — and  I  will  call  it  "military  intelligence,"  but 
it  doesn't  really  do  it  justice  because  we're  so  tightly  linked  and  in- 
tegrated today — but  we  don't  break  that  apart.  That,  whatever  we 
do  budget-wise,  we  don't — that  everybody  has  a  voice  in  the  proc- 
ess. Today,  that  pretty  much  happens. 

So,  as  has  been  said  before,  the  first  thing  we  should  do  is,  do 
no  harm.  It's  a  lot  better  than  it  was  on  September  11.  As  I  said 
in  my  statement,  it's  pretty  good.  We  can  still  improve  that. 

Senator  Bill  Nelson.  As  a  uniformed  military  officer,  do  you 
think  that  giving  the  NID  budgetary  authority  is  going  to  cause 
you  a  problem,  militarily,  to  respond  to  terrorism  overseas? 

General  Myers.  The  devil's  in  the  details,  and  I  don't  think,  in- 
herently— inherently,  no,  I  don't  think  that  will  necessarily  cause 
a  problem.  But  the  devil  is  in  the  details.  In  this  town,  we  have 
people  that  have  certain  authorities,  but  there  is  no  czar  in  this 


134 

town.  That's  not  how  the  business  works.  It  is  a  town  where  we 
collaborate  and  coordinate.  That's  certainly  true  in  the  Intelligence 
Community,  where,  again,  there  are  many  different  agencies  and 
departments  that  are  involved  in  that  work. 

No,  I  have  no  problems  with  moving  budget  authority  around,  as 
long  as  we  work  through  the  details  to  make  sure  that  the  collabo- 
ration and  the  coordination  that  needs  to  take  place  recognize  the 
things  that  I  said  earlier. 

Senator  Bill  Nelson.  Secretary  Cambone,  same  question. 

Dr.  Cambone.  Sir,  the  question  is  how  the  budget  and  its  alloca- 
tion translates  into  front-line  capabilities,  and  that,  in  turn,  is  rep- 
resentative of  the  various  interests  that  are  at  play  in  building  that 
budget  at  the  direction  of  the  DCI  today. 

Within  the  DOD,  something  like  68  percent  of  personnel  in  the 
NFIP  budget  are  from  DOD,  so  the  budget  that  is  built  by  the  DCI 
is  68  percent  personnel  from  the  DOD.  Among  those  15  agencies 
that  everyone  talks  about,  83  percent  of  all  U.S.  intelligence,  NFIP/ 
JMIP/TIAEA,  the  personnel  are  DOD  personnel.  DOD  personnel 
are  integrated  across  all  of  the  activities  of  the  Intelligence  Com- 
munity, and  they  are  there  to  be  certain  that  two  things  happen 
simultaneously.  One  is  to  assure  national  support.  The  Secretary 
of  Defense  is  obliged,  under  title  50,  to  lend  that  support  to  the 
DCI.  They  are  obliged  to  be  assured  that  the  DCI — that  the  Sec- 
retary of  Defense  is  able  to  discharge  his  title  10  responsibilities 
relative  to  the  Armed  Forces  of  the  United  States. 

The  budget,  all  in  one  place,  with  all  of  those  decisions  being 
made  in  one  place,  Defense  or  the  DCI  or  the  NID,  would  probably 
be  changing  those  relationships  in  ways  that  we  don't  understand 
today.  That's  why  today  we  actually  have  a  bargain  here,  a  part- 
nership between  the  DCI  and  the  Secretary  of  Defense.  The  DCI 
builds  the  budget,  the  Secretary  of  Defense  is  expected  to  see  that 
it's  executed  against  those  priorities  that  were  set  for  national  in- 
telligence and  meets  the  military  intelligence  requirements.  So 
that's  the  bargain  we  struck. 

Senator  Bill  Nelson.  So  you  would  think  that  there  might  be 
a  problem  created  if  someone  outside  the  DOD — namely,  the  Na- 
tional Intelligence  Director — has  budgetary  authority  over  all  intel- 
ligence, which,  as  you  said,  huge  part  of  that  personnel  and  money 
is  within  the  DOD. 

Dr.  Cambone.  I'd  be  concerned  about  two  words,  Senator:  "sole" 
authority  and  "all"  activities.  So  you  have  to  work — again,  it's  a 
partnership,  and  it  was  designed  that  way,  by  Congress  and  by 
Presidents  and  DCIs  and  Secretaries  of  Defense  in  the  past,  to 
make  sure  it  is  a  partnership  so  that  no  one  has  sole  authority  or 
all  of  the  authority. 

Senator  Bill  Nelson.  Secretary  Rumsfeld,  would  you  care  to  re- 
spond? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  would  agree  with  what  I  said  earlier  and 
what  Dr.  Cambone  just  said. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much,  Senator,  particularly 
for  asking  the  question  on  behalf  of  the  families. 

Senator  Collins,  again,  we  commend  you  for  the  series  of  hear- 
ings that  you've  held  on  this  important  subject.  I've  been  able  to 


135 

attend  two  of  them  myself.  The  Chair  now  recognizes  you  for  pur- 
poses of  questioning. 

Senator  COLLINS.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  Thank  you,  Mr. 
Chairman.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  If  I  say  it  three  times — I'll 
get  it  loud  enough,  eventually.  [Laughter.] 

Director  McLaughlin,  I  know  there's  been  discussion  before  I  was 
able  to  join  the  panel  today  about  the  issue  of  budget  authority,  but 
I  want  to  probe  that  a  bit  further  with  you.  When  I  read  the  9/11 
Commission  Report,  I  was  struck  by  the  information  on  a  directive 
issued  in  December  1998  by  DCI  Tenet  in  which  he  said,  "We  are 
at  war.  I  want  no  resources  or  people  spared  in  this  effort,  either 
inside  CIA  or  the  Community."  The  9/11  Commission  concluded 
that — despite  that  call  for  action,  that,  in  fact,  very  little  happened 
within  the  Intelligence  Community,  that  there  wasn't  a  marshaling 
of  resources.  That's  one  reason  that  I  think  the  issue  of  budget  au- 
thority is  so  important. 

It's  my  understanding  that  the  National  Security  Act  gives  you 
the  authority  to  guide  the  Intelligence  Community  agencies  as  they 
prepare  their  budget  submissions  for  the  NFIP;  but  you  don't,  how- 
ever, have  budget  execution  authority  over  any  of  the  NFIP,  except 
that  portion  that  goes  to  the  CIA  and  the  Community  Management 
Program.  As  I  interpret  that,  that  means  that  you  help  set  the 
budget  levels  for  the  Intelligence  Community,  but  then  you  don't 
have  any  control  over  the  funds  once  they  are  appropriated,  except 
in  the  CIA  direct  control;  rather,  it's  the  DOD  that  has  that  con- 
trol, and  we  know  that's  more  than  80  percent  of  the  total  intel- 
ligence budget. 

The  9/11  Commission  recommends  that  budget  execution  author- 
ity— that  is,  the  control  over  the  funds  once  they've  been  appro- 
priated— be  given  to  a  new  National  Intelligence  Director,  as  you're 
well  aware.  Perhaps,  to  me,  the  strongest  rationale  for  this  rec- 
ommendation is,  it  would  allow  the  NID  to  marshal  the  resources 
in  a  way  that  George  Tenet  apparently  could  not,  according  to  the 
findings  of  the  9/11  Commission. 

Now,  ironically.  Dr.  Cambone  summed  up  the  rationale  for  giving 
this  authority  very  well  last  week  when  he  testified  before  the 
House  Armed  Services  Committee  (HASC).  He  was  talking  about 
the  need  for  the  National  Intelligence  Director  to  set  information 
technology  standards  for  the  entire  Intelligence  Community.  This 
quote  is  not  in  the  August  11  HASC  testimony. 

To  me,  that  sums  up  why  you  need  to  have  budget  execution  au- 
thority— not  just  the  ability  to  shape  the  budget  submissions,  but 
execution  authority  vested,  at  least  for  the  NFIP,  in  the  new  Na- 
tional Intelligence  Director. 

So,  with  that  rather  long  introduction,  I'd  like  to  ask  you  wheth- 
er you  believe  the  NID  does  need  to  have  budget  execution  author- 
ity if  our  goal  is  to  have  the  Director  successfully  be  effective  in 
overseeing  and  coordinating  the  Intelligence  Community.  As  Dr. 
Cambone  said,  when  talking  about  intelligence  standards,  if  the 
person  doesn't  have  the  ability  to,  "push  the  money  in  the  right 
places  to  get  it  done,  or  withhold  it,"  can  the  NID  truly  be  effec- 
tive? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  As  we've  said  several  times,  Senator,  discus- 
sions are  ongoing  within  the  administration  on  this,  and  nothing 


136 

is  off  the  table,  from  the  administration's  point  of  view.  So  I  can 
give  you  my  personal  view  on  that 

Senator  COLLINS.  That  is  what  I'm  seeking. 

Mr.  McLaughlin. — based  on  personal  experience,  but  without 
any  sense  that  that  is  "the  view"  that  would  prevail. 

There's  a  couple  of  things  you  have  to  say  at  the  outset  to  frame 
this  a  bit.  First,  I  think  we're  talking  principally  about  the  NFIP 
agencies,  not  about  all  15  of  the  agencies. 

Senator  Collins.  Right. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  A  number  of  the  agencies  in  that  15  fall  into 
the  TIARA.  We're  talking  about  the  service  intelligence  organiza- 
tions and  so  forth.  I  don't  think  that  the  National  Intelligence  Di- 
rector should  have  budgetary  authority  over  all  15  of  these  agen- 
cies. I  think  it  ought  to  be  narrowed  to  the  NFIP  agencies,  which 
would  be,  of  course,  NSA,  NRO,  NGA,  and  CIA.  So  when  you're 
looking  at  the  NFIP,  it's  that. 

Second,  another  thing  that  needs  to  be  said  is,  in  any  arrange- 
ment— and  I  mentioned  this  in  my  testimony — but,  fundamentally, 
in  any  arrangement  that  you  have,  whoever  has  this  authority 
would  have  to  accept  ironclad  accountability  for  support  to  military 
intelligence  requirements.  That  would  have  to  be  built  in,  either  by 
understanding  or  statute  or  executive  direction,  because  you  just — 
as  I  said,  these  agencies  are  combat  support  agencies,  and  everyone 
in  the  intelligence  business  realizes  that,  even  though  they  serve 
more  than  one  department,  which  is  what  makes  them  national. 

Against  that  backdrop,  a  third  point.  While  we  don't  have  execu- 
tion authority  in  the  year  of  the  budget,  we  do  have  the  authority 
to  reprogram.  I  think  you  and  I  have  talked  about  this  once  before. 
The  reprogramming,  as  it  currently  works,  works;  but  it  is  cum- 
bersome. It  requires  that  when  I'm — and  you  reprogram  for  a  num- 
ber of  reasons.  Sometimes  you  do  it  because  one  program  is  doing 
better  than  another,  another  time  because  someone  is  not  doing  as 
well  as  they  should,  another  time  because  something  else  is  more 
essential,  in  your  judgment.  Typically,  you  require  the  approval  of 
the  agency  that's  surrendering  funds;  you  require  the  approval  of 
the  department  head  who  oversees  that  agency,  usually  the  Sec- 
retary of  Defense;  you  require  the  approval  of  0MB;  and  you  re- 
quire the  approval  of  six  congressional  committees.  Typically  that 
takes  about  5  months.  So  you  can  see  that's  not  very  agile  to  the 
needs  of  today. 

So  what  does  all  of  this,  my  long  answer  to  you,  add  up  to?  My 
view  is  that  that  National  Intelligence  Director  ought  to  have  the 
authority  to  move  those  funds,  because — with  the  caveats  that  I 
built  into  this:  absolute  accountability  for  military  needs.  Frankly, 
even  in  that  circumstance,  with  that  authority,  a  National  Intel- 
ligence Director,  I  can  safely  predict,  would  consult  closely  with  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  as  funds  were  moved  around;  but  in  the  cir- 
cumstance that  you  and  I  have  just  discussed,  that  person  would 
have  the  final  decisionmaking  authority. 

I  think  if  you  look  within  the  NFIP,  the  National  Foreign  Intel- 
ligence Program — just  as  another  fact  to  put  on  the  table,  I  think 
about  30  percent  of  the  personnel  in  the  NFIP  are  military. 

So  all  of  that  has  to  go  into  the  mix.  Sorry  for  the  long-winded 
answer.  But  as  all  of  us  have  said,  this  is  complicated. 


137 

Senator  COLLINS.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much,  Senator. 

Senator  COLLINS.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  Warner.  I  feel  that  question  is  so  important  that  I'm 
going  to  ask  Senator  Lieberman  to  defer.  Frankly,  Mr.  Secretary, 
your  views  in  response  to  that  question  would  be  helpful. 

Again,  Senator  Roberts  has  drawn  up  a  bill,  you're  drawing  up 
a  bill.  Senator  Levin  and  I  may  contribute  some  language.  We  re- 
spect the  fact  that  the  President  hasn't  come  forward  as  yet.  He's 
not — he's  going  to  do  it.  I  suggested  that  he  wait  until  the  commit- 
tees work  through  their — this  was  my  own  personal  recommenda- 
tion yesterday — work  here,  these  20  hearings.  But  as  we  do  our 
work,  to  the  extent  we  can  get  some  of  the  personal  views  and 
guideposts,  I  think  it  would  be  very  helpful  to  us. 

So  the  question  propounded  by  our  distinguished  colleague  from 
Maine,  I  think,  Mr.  Secretary,  would  you  desire  to  have  an  oppor- 
tunity to  respond? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I'll  add  to  what  I've  already  said  in  my  re- 
marks. I've  pointed  out  that  the  role  of  an  NID  at  least  implies — 
although  the  administration's  not  come  forward  with  specifics — but 
it  implies  authority  for  tasking  collection  assets  across  the  govern- 
ment. The  DCI  currently  has  that.  It  implies  setting  analytical  pri- 
orities and  ensuring  all-source  competitive  analysis  throughout  the 
Intelligence  Community;  the  personnel  management  and  training 
to  alter  the  culture  in  the  community;  information,  security,  and 
access  policies;  information  technology  standards,  as  Dr.  Cambone 
mentioned  in  a  hearing,  and  architectures  across  the  community; 
and  reallocating  resources  in  the  year  of  budget  execution. 

Now,  what  does  the  DCI  currently  have?  He  currently  has  the 
authority  for  directing  collection  and  production,  currently  has  the 
responsibility  for  developing  the  budget,  and  currently  has  the  au- 
thority to  recommend  reprogramming,  which,  for  the  reasons  I  stat- 
ed earlier,  avoiding — I  mean,  the  principal  user  of  intelligence  is 
the  DOD;  that's  the  major  user.  So  reprogramming — once  the  budg- 
et's set,  reprogramming  is  difficult,  as  he  says.  It's  difficult  because 
government's  a  big  bureaucracy.  It's  difficult  because  the  congres- 
sional committee  system  is  what  it  is.  But  there  is  not — neither  the 
DOD  nor  CIA  ought  to  be  reprogramming  without  very  close  co- 
ordination, for  fear  of  disrupting  the  process  that  each  has  already 
agreed  to. 

Now,  the  real  problem  is,  as  I  said,  that  the  budget's  developed 
in  1  year;  it  takes  a  second  year  for  Congress  to  deal  with  it,  and 
a  third  year  for  its  execution.  Any  budget's  going  to  require  change. 
It  is  not  a  budget  to  be  executed;  it  is  a  plan  to  be  tested  against 
what  actually  happens  in  the  world,  and  then  adjusted  as  those 
changes  and  events  occur.  So  it's  going  to  take  the  ability  for  the 
DCI,  the  Defense  Department,  0MB,  which  is — the  ultimate  deci- 
sion-maker is  certainly  not  the  DOD  or  DCI,  currently;  it's  0MB — 
the  President  and  0MB  as  its  instrument. 

Now,  it  seems  to  me  that  this  is  very  important.  It  needs  to  be 
discussed,  as  it  is  being  in  this  committee.  I  think  it  merits  a  great 
deal  of  care  and  attention. 


138 

Chairman  WARNER.  I  assure  you,  I  think  Congress  is  giving  it  a 
great  deal  of  attention,  and  I  thank  you,  and  we're  trying  to  get 
such  guideposts  as  we  can  at  this  time. 

Now,  Senator  Lieberman? 

General  Myers.  Senator? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Could  General  Myers 

Chairman  Warner.  Oh,  General  Myers,  yes,  of  course. 

General  Myers.  Sir,  could  I  make  a  comment  to  the  budget  exe- 
cution business? 

As  I  tried  to  answer  with  Senator  Nelson,  I  think  you're  talking 
budget  execution  authority.  Again,  this  has  to  be  done  in  a  collabo- 
rative way.  Creative  tension  in  the  intelligence  business  is  the  only 
way,  I  think,  that  policymakers,  Congress,  or  people  are  going  to 
understand  the  situation.  There  cannot  be  a  czar  that  just  starts 
pointing  and  pulling  levers.  There  is  no  "Wizard  of  Oz"  here  that's 
going  to  solve  this,  in  my  opinion.  It  has  to  be  a  collaborative  effort. 
Creative  tension,  in  this  case,  is  good. 

I  would  add  one  other  thing  to  this  mix  in  budget,  and  it  goes — 
it's  not  execution  authority,  but  it  goes  back  to  the  budget  prepara- 
tion. 

I  think  that  anything  we  could  do  to  reform  the  process  by  which 
we  decide  on  major  systems  procurement  would  be  a  very  good 
thing  to  do.  In  the  DOD,  we  have  such  a  process.  A  major  part  of 
that  process  came  out  of  Goldwater-Nichols.  We  have  a  fairly  new 
process  in  the  Intelligence  Community,  but  it's  far  from  perfect,  in 
my  judgment,  and  it  needs  to  have  more  visibility  inside  the  com- 
munity, inside  those  departments  and  agencies  that  have  systems 
that  are  affected,  and  it  ought  to  be  end-to-end,  and  we  don't — we 
often  don't  think  about  the  end-to-end  pieces  of  this  system.  So 
when  we're  talking  about  major  systems,  major  procurement  of 
those  systems,  something  like  our  Joint  Requirements  Oversight 
Council  that  was  mandated  by  Goldwater-Nichols  would  be  a  fairly 
good  process  for  us  to — perhaps,  to  at  least  look  at  for  the  Intel- 
ligence Community. 

So  that's — but  it's  not  execution;  it's  planning  and  programming, 
more  appropriately.  But  I  make  that  comment. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much.  Any  further  com- 
ments to  that  important  series  of  questions? 

Senator  Sessions.  Mr.  Chairman? 

Chairman  Warner.  Yes? 

Senator  SESSIONS.  One  question.  With  regard  to  this  large 
amount  of  money  that  goes  to  Defense  for  intelligence,  General 
Myers  or  Dr.  Cambone,  does  that  include  every  military  officer  in 
the  military?  Do  you  know,  does  it  go  down  to  the  brigade  or  the 
military  intelligence  (MI)  units  out  there  or 

Dr.  Cambone.  Sir,  it  does. 

Senator  Sessions.  So 

Dr.  Cambone.  That's  how  we  get  to  such  a  large  fraction  of  the 
total. 

Senator  Sessions.  Yes,  that  explains  some  of  that. 

Dr.  Cambone.  But,  just  for  the  clarity,  as  Mr.  McLaughlin  says, 
there  is  the  NFIP,  in  which  there  are  U.S.  military  personnel  cov- 
ered. The  individuals  you  just  asked  about,  the  Service  people, 
doing  Service  jobs,  if  you  will,  are  in  either  the  TIARA  accounts. 


139 

or  in  a  JMIP,  which  are  inside  the  DOD  and  on  which,  by  regula- 
tion and  custom,  the  DCI  consults.  So  there  are  three  pockets  of 
dollars  here  that  we're  talking  about,  and  military  personnel  are  in 
all  of  them. 

General  Myers.  But  where  the  rubber  meets  the  road — and 
that's  with  combatant  commanders  and  joint  task  force  command- 
ers and  our  troops  out  there  doing  peacekeeping  to  combat — they 
don't  understand  these  budget  classifications  and  the  systems  they 
deal  with,  they  don't  care  where  the  intelligence  comes  from.  They 
don't  care  if  it's  an  NFIP,  a  JMIP  program,  a  TIARA  program.  In 
fact,  at  that  level,  they're  all  mixed,  and  the  people  are  all  mixed, 
and  they're  all  working  to  the  benefit  of  the  mission.  So  if  you  were 
to  pick  one  piece  of  this  up  here  and  say,  okay,  now  we  have  some- 
body with  budget  execution  authority,  and  thinking  that  that's  not 
going  to  have  some  impact  on  this  entrepreneurial  mix  that  we 
have  down  here  that's  really  making  things  happen.  That's  not 
benefitting  just  the  soldiers  in  the  foxhole,  that's  also  benefitting 
the  President,  because  it  enables  all  sorts  of  intelligence  capabili- 
ties. It's  something  that  has  to  be  considered  as  we  think  about 
this.  You  can't  separate  the  parts.  It's  not  as  easy,  if  you  go  to  al 
Dhofar,  if  you  go  to  Baghdad,  to  separate  these  parts.  They  don't 
care.  It's  easy  here  in  Washington,  I  think,  when  we  are  used  to 
looking  at  lines  in  a  budget. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Senator,  the  cryptologic  support  group  that 
might  be  in  Baghdad  belongs  to  the  NFIP  out  of  NSA,  supporting 
a  special  operations  team  that  isn't  in  the  intelligence  budget  at 
all,  working  with  the  tactical  HUMINT  team  member  from  the 
Army  down  in  the  TIARA  accounts,  working  to  bring  together  the 
information  from  a  satellite,  which  is  in  the  NFIP  account,  and  an 
airplane,  which  is  in  the  JMIP  account.  They  don't  see  any  of  that. 
It's  all  information  and  data  flow  down  to  the  point  of  operation. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  If  I  could  add  one  thing  as  I  notice  people 
are  thumbing  through  the  9/11  book,  it  seems  to  me  it's  important, 
when  we're  talking  about  a  possible  change,  that  we  connect  it  to 
a  problem.  If  you  think  about  it,  that  9/11  report,  it  talked  about 
communication  problems  between  CIA  and  FBI;  it  discussed  the 
law  enforcement  orientation  of  FBI;  it  talked  about  the  need  for  do- 
mestic intelligence-gathering;  it  talked  about  the  need  for  all-source 
intelligence;  it  talked  about  the  problem  of  stovepiping;  it  talked 
about  the  need  for  congressional  reform;  it  talked  about  the  need 
for  accelerating  the  clearance,  the  ethics  approvals,  the  security 
clearances,  and  the  confirmation  process  so  that  people  didn't  end 
up,  like  the  DOD,  with  15,  20,  25  percent  vacant  in  presidential  ap- 
pointees that  require  Senate  confirmation;  it  talked  about  group- 
think;  and  it  talked  about  deficiencies  in  human  intelligence. 

Now,  we  have  to  ask  ourself,  okay,  if  those  are  the  things  that 
they  identified — and  I  think  that's  probably  at  least  three-quarters 
of  things  they  identified — the  question  is,  what  reform  is  going  to 
fix  those  things?  What  reform  is  going  to  improve  the  situation? 
What  reform  or  change  is  going  to  add  more  value  than  it's  going 
to  cause  in  disruption  or  difficulty.  Those  are  tough  questions.  They 
really  are  tough  questions,  and  it's  hard  for  me  to  see  how  the 
question  that  has  been  elevated  here  is — necessarily  bears  on  any 
or  all  of  these  things. 


140 

Chairman  Warner.  I  think  your  observation  is  well  taken,  and — 
I  don't  mean  to  criticize  the  Commission — they've  also  suggested 
some  reforms  in  areas  in  which  they  have  not  identified  a  problem. 
Now,  do  you  concur  in  that? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I'm  trjdng  to  think  of  one. 

Chairman  Warner.  I  want  go  to  Senator  Lieberman,  and  we'll 
come  back  to  that. 

Senator  Lieberman? 

Senator  Levin.  If  Senator  Lieberman  would  just  yield  for  one 
second 

Senator  Lieberman.  Go  right  ahead. 

Senator  Levin.  As  I  indicated,  I  want  to  make  something  part  of 
the  record  at  this  point.  First  of  all,  that  yesterday  in  the  Senate 
Governmental  Affairs  Committee,  we  asked  former  DCIs  Webster, 
Woolsey,  and  Turner  that  very  question,  as  to  whether  there  was 
any  relationship  between  the  recommendation  relative  to  budget 
execution  and  the  problems  that  the  9/11  Commission  had  identi- 
fied. I  think  it's  fair  to  say  that  at  least  two  of  the  three  unequivo- 
cally said  there  was  no  relationship  between  that  recommendation, 
relative  to  budget  execution,  and  the  problems  which  had  been 
identified  by  the  9/11  Commission. 

What  I  would  like  to  make  part  of  the  record  is  not  just  that  ref- 
erence, which  I  think  reinforces  what  Secretary  Rumsfeld  was  just 
saying,  but  also  Executive  Order  12333,  because  it  is  that  executive 
order  which  allocates  the  budget  execution  to  the  DCI.  By  the 
stroke  of  an  executive  pen,  that  could  be — let  me  start  over  again. 

It  is  that  Executive  Order  12333  which  allocates  budget  execu- 
tion to  the  DOD.  Before  that,  as  one  of  our  witnesses  pointed  out 
yesterday,  the  budget  execution  authority  under  the  Carter  admin- 
istration was  in  the  DCI.  It  was  shifted  after  that  to  the  DOD.  It 
could  be  shifted  back,  if  that's  desirable.  With  all  of  the  qualifica- 
tions that  have  been  mentioned  here,  it  could  be  shifted  back  to  the 
DCI  or  to  the  new  Director  of  National  Intelligence,  if  we  adopt 
one,  by  an  executive  order,  by  the  stroke  of  a  pen. 

I  only  want  to  put  this  order  in  the  record  here  now  to  make  it 
clear  that  this  is  not  necessarily  a  legislative  issue,  since  that 
budget  execution  power  has  been  allocated  by  executive  order,  cur- 
rently to  the  DOD,  that  previously  had  been  in  the  intelligence 
agency,  and  could  be  reallocated  back.  So  that's  the  portion  of  the 
executive  order  that  I'd  like  made  part  of  the  record  at  this  point. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Without  objection. 

[The  information  referred  to  follows:] 

Executive  Order  No.  12333— Dec.  4,  1981,  46  F.R.  59941 

UNITED  STATES  INTELLIGENCE  ACTIVITIES 

Section  1.11  The  Department  of  Defense 

(j)  Direct,  operate,  control  and  provide  fiscal  management  for  the  National  Secu- 
rity Agency  and  for  defense  and  military  intelligence  and  national  reconnaissance 
entities; 

Chairman  Warner.  Senator  Lieberman. 
Senator  Lieberman.  Thanks,  Mr.  Chairman. 
Mr.  Secretary  and  witnesses,  thank  you  for  being  here. 
Mr.  Secretary,  I  wanted  to  share  this  experience.  As  I  arrived 
late  from  the  earlier  hearing,  I  said  to  a  few  of  my  colleagues. 


141 

"How  are  things  going?"  They  said,  with  a  certain  unease,  "The 
Secretary,  contrary  to  what  we  normally  expect  of  him — opinion- 
ated— refreshingly  opinionated,  quite  often — is  not  responding  to 
specific  questions  about  the  authority  of  the  National  Intelligence 
Director  proposal."  I  found  the  kind  of  unease  that  you'd  have  on 
a  day  when  your  dog  stopped  barking.  You'd  say,  "He's  not  feeling 
well." 

But  I  understand  the  reason  why  you're  doing  it,  and  I  want  to 
say  that  I  find  it  encouraging.  I  find  it  encouraging  in  that  you 
have  said,  and  others  at  the  witness  table,  that  the  administration, 
the  White  House,  has  not  finally  decided  where  it  is  on  some  of 
these  critical  questions. 

I  was  first  puzzled — I  was  pleased  when  the  President  endorsed 
the  National  Intelligence  Director,  Counterterrorism  Center,  puz- 
zled by  some  of  the  vagueness  of  the  language  used  that  day  about 
the  powers  of  the  NID,  troubled  when  Andy  Card  specifically,  I 
thought,  said  that  the  NID,  as  he  saw  it,  would  not  have  any  budg- 
etary authority  of  real  consequence.  I  was  encouraged  last  week 
when  the  National  Security  Advisor  Condoleezza  Rice  said  that,  in 
fact,  "It  seems  to  be  going  in  a  better  direction,  as  far  as  I'm  con- 
cerned," and  I'm,  in  that  sense,  encouraged  by  what  you  have  said 
about — and  the  others  have  said — about  where  the  process  is. 

Yesterday,  we  had  three  former  DCIs  at  our  committee,  one.  Bob 
Gates,  Acting  DCI  under  President  Reagan,  CIA  Director  under  the 
first  President  Bush — submitted  written  testimony,  because  he 
couldn't  be  there,  and  had  a  very  strong  statement,  "The  President 
recently  announced  his  initial  decisions  in  response  to  the  Commis- 
sion's recommendations.  I  hope,  as  the  White  House  spokesman 
has  suggested,  that  these  decisions  are  only  a  first  step,  because 
the  new  National  Intelligence  Director,  as  described,  will  impose  a 
new  layer  of  bureaucracy,  but  have  no  troops,  no  budget  authority, 
and  no  power.  In  its  present  form" — I  took  that  to  mean  in  the 
form  of  the  discussion — "the  new  position  would  be  worse  than  the 
current  arrangement." 

So  I  hope  that  we're  in  a  process  here  that  ends,  as  it  should, 
in  a  non-partisan  executive/legislative  branch  agreement  on  what 
should  happen  to  improve  our  intelligence  apparatus. 

I  think  you  spoke — incidentally,  in  the  list  of  budget  authorities, 
or  authorities  that  the  NID  would  have  that  you  read  from  your 
initial  statement,  you  mentioned  the  reprogramming  authority,  but 
the  Commission  clearly  recommends  much  greater  authority,  that 
the  whole  intelligence  budget  be  in  the  National  Intelligence  Direc- 
tor, almost  the  opposite  of  what  exists  now,  that  all — 95  percent, 
from  what  I  can  tell,  of  the  intelligence  budget  goes  through  the 
DOD,  including  the  CIA's  budget. 

So  let  me  ask  you  a  question  about  one  part  of  this  that,  after 
I  arrived,  you  did  speak  to,  and  that  is  the  National  Counter- 
terrorism  Center,  and  what  you  take  to  be  the  President's  clear  po- 
sition. I  believe  you  did  say  it,  that  they  announced  the  support  of 
these  recommendations,  that  there  not  be  anybody  between  himself 
and  the  Secretary  of  Defense  with  regard  to  operations.  I  under- 
stand that  completely. 

I  do  think  that  the  counterterrorism — that  the  Commission 
makes  a  strong  recommendation  about  these  counterterrorism  cen- 


142 

ters,  that  if  you  have  essentially  everybody  involved  around  the 
table  sharing  information  on  intelligence,  that  it  makes  sense  to 
have  them  work  together  on  planning  operations.  I  want  to  ask  you 
whether  there  isn't  a  way,  perhaps  borrowed  from  your  current 
joint  operations  with  CIA,  for  instance,  where  you  couldn't  have  the 
Counterterrorism  Center's  planning  operations — but  then  subject  it 
to  a  review  or  a  veto  by  the  Secretary  of  Defense  so  we  don't  lose 
the  plus,  the  synergy,  of  everybody  being  around  the  table  together. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Senator,  first,  the  reason  the  dog  didn't 
bark  is  clear.  Number  one,  the  executive  branch  is  wrestling  with 
these  issues 

Senator  Lieberman.  Right. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  — and  they  are  tough  issues,  and  the  Presi- 
dent has  not  come  to  final  conclusions  on  them.  Second  is,  I  have 
been  inviting  in  former  Secretaries  of  Defense,  former  DCIs,  former 
National  Security  Advisors,  as — I  met  at  lunch  with — Dick  Myers 
called  in  the  former  Chairman  and  Vice  Chairman  of  the  Joint 
Chiefs  of  Staff.  I've  called  people  to  talk  about  these  issues,  because 
they're  terribly  important.  I've  spent  a  lot  of  time.  I  have  not  devel- 
oped conviction  on  a  lot  of  the  details  that — and,  as  we  said,  the 
devil's  in  the  details — you  darn  well  better  get  it  right,  because 
we're  dealing  with  very  important  things  for  our  country.  I  just 
haven't  gotten  conviction  down  to  the  third  and  fourth  level  in  this 
yet,  to  feel  that  I  can  sit  here  and  say  authoritatively  something. 

Senator  Lieberman.  I  understand  that,  and  I  respect  it. 

Sir,  if  I  might,  Stansfield  Turner,  retired  admiral  and  former  Di- 
rector of  CIA,  DCI,  it  would  be  interesting  to  talk  to,  as  Senator 
Levin  suggested.  I  hadn't  realized  this,  but  he  testified  yesterday 
that  President  Carter,  by  executive  order,  essentially  made  him  an 
NID,  National  Intelligence  Director,  with  the  authorities  fun- 
damentally that  the  Commission  has  recommended  now.  The  com- 
bination of  his  military  background  plus  that  experience,  I  think, 
makes  him  somebody  interesting  to  talk  to. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  One  thing  that's  not  come  up  in  this  hear- 
ing, or  in  the — at  least  that  I  recall — in  the  9/11  report,  is  an  issue 
that  we  ought  to  think  about,  and  that  is,  has  this  government  lost 
the  ability  of  keeping  a  secret?  I  don't  know  the  answer  to  that. 
But  it  seems  to  me  it's  worth  asking  that  question  and  whether 
there  are  changes  or  reforms  that  we  ought  to  think  about  in  that 
connection.  Because  what's  taking  place  is,  we  are  systematically 
advantaging  the  enemy.  They  go  to  school  on  us,  they  learn  a  lot, 
and  we  help  them.  We  help  them  with  a  hemorrhaging  of  informa- 
tion from  the  United  States  Government  on  a  regular  basis,  and 
that's  a  problem. 

Senator  Lieberman.  I  agree  with  you.  I  want  to  quote  some- 
thing  

Chairman  Warner.  Senator,  I  must  say  that  in  the  time  allo- 
cated the  Senators 

Senator  Lieberman.  Yes. 

Chairman  Warner. — I  have  to  get  to  moving. 

Senator  Lieberman.  I  wonder  if  I  could  just  ask  for  a  quick 

Chairman  Warner.  All  right. 

Senator  Lieberman. — answer  to  the  question  that  I  posed  about 
the  Counterterrorism  Center,  whether  you'd  take  a  look  at  whether 


143 

it's  possible  to  create — to  not  lose  the  synergy  of  the  joint  operation 
planning,  but  still  protect  the  chain  of  command  from  your 
warfighters  to  you  to  the  President. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  The  idea  of  someone  planning  and  passing 
a  plan  off  to  the  executors,  I  think,  is  a  poor  idea.  Executors  need 
to  be  involved  in  the  planning. 

Second,  in  those  instances  where  more  than  one  agency  is  going 
to  be  involved  in  an  operation,  there  already  is  joint  planning. 
There  has  to  be. 

So  I  cannot  imagine  quite  how  that  would  work,  myself.  I  think 
that  once  you  get  down  to  the  point  where  you  have  a  plan  that's 
executable,  it  darn  well  had  better  have  been  intimately  crafted 
and  shaped  to  fit  the  circumstances  and  the  talents  and  the  skill 
sets  and  the  assets  and  the  circumstances  of  that  situation. 

Chairman  Warner.  I  thank  the  Senator. 

Senator  Chambliss. 

Senator  Chambliss.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Secretary,  I'll  tell  you,  that  issue  actually  did  come  up  yes- 
terday in  our  hearing.  Former  Secretary  Carlucci  cited  the  specific 
problem  that  you  just  alluded  to,  and  he  even  gave  an  example  of 
how,  when  he  was  Secretary  of  Defense,  he  was  able  to  protect  a 
source  that,  today,  he  did  not  think  he'd  be  able  to  protect.  You're 
exactly  right,  that's  one  of  the  major  problems  we  have.  We  lay  ev- 
erything out  in  public  hearings,  and  there's  no  town  in  the  world 
that  has  leaks  greater  than  what  comes  out  of  this  town.  So  that's 
an  entirely  separate  problem,  obviously. 

The  one  thing  that  I  have  gleaned  from  everything  you've  said 
thus  far  is  something  I  alluded  to  yesterday,  and  that  is  the  fact 
that,  whatever  we  do  relative  to  reorganization  or  changes  that  we 
might  make,  this  is  such  a  complex  issue  that,  if  we're  not  careful, 
we're  going  to  mess  this  thing  up  and  create  a  lot  more  problems 
if  we're  not  very  careful  in  the  direction  in  which  we  go. 

The  major  reform  that's  recommended  by  the  9/11  Commission  is 
the  total  restructuring  of  the  Intelligence  Community  relative  to 
the  creation  of  the  Director  of  National  Intelligence  and  who  re- 
ports to  him,  not  just  the  budget  authority.  So  I  want  to  stay 
away — you've  discussed  the  budget  issue,  I  think,  pretty  thor- 
oughly, and  I  think  we  all  have  a  general  idea  of  what  you're  talk- 
ing about  there.  But  in  this  reorganization  recommendation,  the 
chart  that  the  9/11  Commission  has  set  forth,  on  page  413  of  their 
report,  is  critically  important.  What  it  does  is  spell  out  who  reports 
to  who  under  the  National  Intelligence  Director. 

I'd  like  for  each  of  the  three  of  you  to  comment  on  this  and  re- 
spond in  this  way.  If  you  think  that  flow  chart  and  that  restructur- 
ing of  the  Intelligence  Community  will  work,  fine.  If  you  think  it 
will  not  work  or  there  are  problems  associated  with  it,  I  wish  you'd 
comment  on  that. 

Mr.  Secretary? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  don't  have  it  in  fi'ont  of  me,  but  I  can  re- 
call seeing  and  not  understanding  it  sufficiently. 

Chairman  Warner.  Let  us  take  a  moment  to  provide  it  to  the 
Secretary. 

Secretary  RUMSFELD.  Oh,  I  don't  need  it.  I  remember  looking  at 
it,  and  I  remember  that  a  chart  is  a  chart,  an  organization  chart. 


144 

and  I  could  not  tell  from  it — and  I  could  not  if  I  had  it  in  front  of 
me  now — how  it  would  work.  I  think  that  the — all  of  the  granu- 
larity that  is  necessary  underneath  that  is  what  either  makes  it 
work  or  not  work,  or — in  the  last  analysis,  frankly,  you  can  have 
the  best  organization  chart  and  bad  people,  and  you're  not  going 
to  have  much  of  an  organization;  and  vice  versa,  you  can  have  good 
people  and  a  lousy  organization  chart,  and  it  works  pretty  darn 
well.  But  I'm  uncomfortable  with  what  I  see  there. 

Senator  Chambliss.  General  Myers? 

General  Myers.  It's  one  of  those  issues  that  I  think  is  fundamen- 
tal as  you  decide  what  it  is — what  responsibilities  and  authorities 
you  want  this  National  Intelligence  Director  to  have.  This  organi- 
zation under  him  is  fundamental  to  that.  I  think  we're  wrestling 
with  the  first  part.  Until  you  decide  that,  I  think  it's  very  difficult, 
then,  to  start  plugging  in  the  boxes  underneath  that.  We  need  to 
wrestle  with  the  first  part  before  I'd  be  comfortable  saying  that 
particular  recommendation  in  the  9/11  report  is  the  right  rec- 
ommendation. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Senator,  I  think  Chairman  Myers  hit  the  nail 
on  the  head,  and  this  was  why  I  emphasized,  in  my  testimony,  that 
it's  critically  important,  at  the  outset,  for  form  to  follow  function 
here;  meaning  that  we  have  to  decide  what  we  want  this  NID  to 
actually  do.  As  an  acting  DCI,  I  have  a  list  of  about  30  things  long 
that  I  do. 

Would  you  want  this  person  to  be  the  person  who  walks  in  to 
brief  the  President  every  day?  Would  you  want  this  person  to  be 
the  person  who  came  up  here  and  sits  where  the  DCI  normally  sits 
to  brief  you  on,  say,  the  worldwide  threat  posture  each  year?  Would 
you  want  this  person  to  be  the  person  who  speaks  for  the  Intel- 
ligence Community  on  what's  happening  with  North  Korea's  weap- 
onry? Would  you  want  this  person  to  be  the  person  who  defines  the 
requirements  for  the  community? 

Those  are  currently  things  the  DCI  does.  If  you  had  this  person 
assigned  those  tasks,  the  person  sitting,  I  think,  a  layer  down  in 
that  chart,  heading  the  CIA,  would  have  more  limited  responsibil- 
ities for  all-source  analysis,  clandestine  operations  overseas,  covert 
action,  and  science  and  technology. 

So  if  you  were  to  choose  to  assign  all  of  those  responsibilities 
that  I  just  enumerated  to  this  National  Intelligence  Director — as 
distinct  from  a  more  limited  range  of  responsibilities  having  to  do 
more  with  the  czar  responsibilities  that  involve  basically  composing 
a  budget,  coordinating  it,  ensuring  that  it's  carried  out,  and  so 
forth — but  if  you  assigned  that  full  block  of  responsibilities  to  this 
individual,  as  General  Myers  says,  that  would  really  affect  that  or- 
ganizational chart.  My  reaction  to  it  is  similar  to  the  Secretary's. 
I'm  uncomfortable  with  it,  because,  first,  I  don't  know  exactly  what 
this  person  would  do  day-to-day,  in  a  practical  sense;  and,  second, 
if  you  had  this  person  doing,  day-to-day,  the  range  of  things  that 
I  just  laid  out,  I  think  it's  awfully  complicated,  and  it  would  make 
it  harder  to  do  those  things  than  it  currently  is,  because  a  number 
of  the  people  in  those  seats  down  there  are  dual-hatted;  it  wouldn't 
be  clear  what  the  reporting  chains  are,  and  so  forth. 


145 

I  have,  in  my  own  mind,  a  chart  that  I  would  draw  up  if  I  were 
doing  this,  but  I'd  leave  that  to  another  day,  because  I  think  we 
have  to  first  talk  about  what  this  person  actually  does. 

Senator  Chambliss.  I  think  it's  pretty  clear  that  what  the  rec- 
ommendation from  the  9/11  Commission  does  do  is  that  it  takes 
away  a  lot  of  the  jurisdiction,  a  lot  of  the  power  and  authority  of 
the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  and  it  gives  that  power  and 
authority  to  the  National  Director  of  Intelligence.  It  does  call  for 
reporting  requirements  to  go  from  the  NID  to  the  President,  as  op- 
posed to  the  CIA  to  the  President,  so  it  makes  drastic  changes  in 
who's  going  to  report  to  who.  I  know  my  time  is  up,  but,  just  very 
quickly,  John,  what  would  that  do  to  morale  in  the  agency?  Do  you 
have  any  thoughts  on  that? — if  the  role  of  the  Director  of  the  CIA 
is  diminished? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  I  speak  as  a  career  CIA  employee,  so  I  come 
here  with  a  certain  bias  that  I  can't  erase.  People  who  work  in  the 
Intelligence  Community — in  the  NFIP,  not  just  the  CIA — have 
grown  up  with  the  thought  that  the  DCI  is  the  leader  of  the  com- 
munity. I  think  an3rthing  that  diminished  the  role  of  the  person 
who  sits  in  that  chair  would  take  quite  a  bit  of  adjustment  on  the 
part  of  CIA  employees. 

Senator  Chambliss.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much.  Senator. 

Senator  Ben  Nelson. 

Senator  Ben  Nelson.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  want  to  go  back  to  the  movement  of  troops.  There's  merit  in 
moving,  I  believe,  troops  from  Germany  and  Europe,  realigning  our 
force  structure,  location  of  troops  in  that  area,  because  I  think  the 
threat,  we  all  understand,  of  communism  and  of  the  threat  of  the 
former  Soviet  Union  is  no  longer  what  it  once  was.  Also,  I  think 
it's  an  important  thing  to  design  a  personnel  structure  that 
lengthens  stays  at  a  particular  Army  or  Air  Force  base  or  a  naval 
station.  General  Schoomaker  has  already  talked  about  this,  and 
clearly  that's,  I  think,  desirable  to  the  families  of  almost  every  per- 
son in  uniform,  and  has  merit. 

But  moving  troops  from  South  Korea,  as  a  matter  of  interest,  I 
think  might  be  a  different  story.  South  Korea,  as  we  all  know,  faces 
a  conventional  threat  from  North  Korea,  just  as  Asia  and  the 
United  States  face  a  strategic  threat  from  North  Korea.  I  know 
that  you've  thought  about  this.  Although  our  forces  in  South  Korea 
are  not  as  large  as  those  in  Iraq,  I  worry  about  removing  any 
troops  at  this  time  so — to  avoid  having  it  viewed  as  a  sign  of  weak- 
ness or,  some  might  suggest,  a  reward  to  a  regime  that's  proliferat- 
ing weapons  and  weapons  technology  to  the  highest  bidder.  I  know 
that  we're  engaged  in  multiparty  talks  with  North  Korea,  and  it's 
important  that  we  keep  that  in  mind,  keep  in  mind  the  audiences 
of  South  Korea,  the  region,  and,  unfortunately,  Kim  Jong  II.  Be- 
cause of  his  insular  and  isolated  position,  I  am  very  concerned  that 
this  will,  in  some  way,  suggest  to  him  preemptive — as  I  think  re- 
tired Lieutenant  General  Daniel  Christman  said — some  sort  of  pre- 
emptive concession,  as  opposed  to  simply  a  realignment  of  troops 
and  reassessing  our  strength  needs/requirements  in  that  particular 
area. 


146 

I  wish  you  would  comment  on  that.  I  know  that  you've  thought 
about  it.  I  certainly  agree  that  moving  the  troops  from  Seoul  south 
to  another  location  so  they're  not  right  in  the  heart  of  the  city  has 
been  under  consideration.  I  assume  that  may  be  part  of  the  overall 
restructuring  there.  But  perhaps,  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General 
Myers,  you  might  be  able  to  share  your  thoughts  on  this. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I'll  be  very  brief.  The  deterrent  will  not  be 
weakened  in  any  way.  It  is  a  mistake,  in  my  view,  to  equate  num- 
bers with  lethality  and  capability.  Speed,  agility,  and  precision  are 
enormously  important — more  important  than  numbers — simply 
counting  up  numbers  of  people  or  numbers  of  bombs  or  numbers 
of  something  else — and  we're  going  to  have  to  get  our  thinking  ad- 
justed to  that. 

The  process  will  take  place  over  time.  It's  been  50  years  since  the 
end  of  the  Korean  War.  South  Korea  is  vastly  more  powerful  and 
more  capable,  from  an  economic  standpoint,  than  the  North.  We 
are  in  a  process  that  General  LaPorte  has  been  undertaking  of 
transferring  responsibilities  to  the  South  Korean  military.  They're 
accepting  those  responsibilities.  We  are  rearranging  our  forces  on 
the  peninsula,  and  we  are  adding  capability.  That  costs  money. 
That  adds  lethality.  That  is  not  trivial.  The  suggestion  that  that 
deterrent  will  be  weakened,  in  my  view,  is  inaccurate.  I  would  like 
General  Myers  to  comment  on  it. 

General  Myers.  I  would  just  add  to  that.  The  South  Korean 
Armed  Forces,  they  have  560,000  people  on  Active  Duty.  They  have 
3.8  million  in  Reserves.  We're  going  to  make  a  modest  change  in 
our  force  structure  there — by  a  fraction,  a  small  fraction  of  those 
numbers.  But  it  really  does  come  down  to  capability.  It  comes  down 
to  the  speed,  agility,  and  precision,  as  the  Secretary  said.  It  also 
comes  down  to  our  ability  to  command  and  control,  to  battle-man- 
age our  assets.  Any  comparison  of  the  security  situation  in  the 
South  and  our  abilities  to  deter  and  dissuade  the  North  are  unmis- 
takable. Our  deterrent  posture  will  not  change.  If  anything,  it's 
going  to  get  better  over  time. 

It  was  just  a  couple  of  years  ago,  this  committee,  we  were  consid- 
ering a  paucity  of  precision-guided  weapons.  Through  your  action, 
our  coffers  are  pretty  full.  It  was  only  a  couple  of  years  ago  when 
the  commander  of  U.S.  Forces  Korea  and  Combined  Forces  Com- 
mand worried  about  not  having  those  precision  weapons.  Today,  I 
mean,  just  a  couple  of  years,  that  situation  has  changed  dramati- 
cally, where  it  is  the  bedrock  of  General  LaPorte's  war  planning. 
So  there  should  be  no  mistake,  I  think,  on  anybody's  part  that  ac- 
tually our  capability  is  increasing  day  by  day.  It  is  also  important 
that  the  Republic  of  Korea  take  the  steps  necessary  to  assume 
those  missions  to  gain  that  capability  so  they  can  be,  with  their  re- 
sources, with  these  tremendous  numbers  in  their  Armed  Forces, 
prepared — better  prepared,  and  continue  to  evolve  too.  So  it  is  not 
an  issue  of  numbers;  it's  an  issue  of  capability  in  their  case,  as 
well. 

So  we're  working  this  really  hard.  We  talked  about  this  with  the 
Joint  Chiefs.  We've  talked  about  it  with  the  combatant  command- 
ers. There's  nobody  currently  responsible  for  this  part  of  the 
world — or,  for  that  matter,  anywhere  in  the  world — that  thinks  this 
is  going  to  diminish  our  capability  to  deter,  dissuade,  or  influence 


147 

North  Korea.  In  fact,  we  think  it  is  all  for  the  better,  for  all  the 
reasons.  Senator  Nelson,  some  of  which  you  stated,  and  some  of 
which  we  stated  here. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Actually,  I  just  add  that  the  force  adjust- 
ments on  the  Korean  Peninsula  have  absolutely  nothing  to  do  with 
the  four-,  or  five-,  or  six-party  talks  with  the  North  Koreans  with 
respect  to  their  nuclear  activities.  They  know  it,  we  know  it,  the 
other  participants  know  it. 

Senator  Ben  Nelson.  Do  you  think  the  North  Koreans  under- 
stand that,  exactly,  with  such  an  isolated  position  that  they  hold 
in  the  world  and  totally  an  insular  government,  as  I  understand  it? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  guess,  let  me  rephrase — or  let  me  answer 
this  question.  I  absolutely  do  not  think  that  there's  any  risk  that 
the  North  Koreans  are  going  to  misunderstand  the  combined  mili- 
tary capability — yesterday,  today,  and  tomorrow — of  South  Korea 
and  the  United  States  of  America. 

Senator  Ben  Nelson.  Our  resolution  to  stay  and  support  that 
Republic? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Absolutely. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you.  Senator. 

Senator  Ben  Nelson.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  Warner.  Senator  Dole. 

Senator  Dole.  Gentlemen,  there  are  no  shortages  of  proposals  to 
reorganize  the  Intelligence  Community.  A  spectrum  of  ideas  can  be 
found  in  the  recommendations  advanced  by  the  9/11  Commission, 
the  administration,  the  Scowcroft  Commission,  numerous  legisla- 
tive efforts,  and  the  proposals  by  distinguished  individuals,  such  as 
Secretary  Hamre,  whom  we  heard  from  yesterday.  Bob  Gates,  just 
to  name  a  few. 

Now,  these  proposals,  all  well-intentioned,  are  worthy  attempts 
to  achieve  unity  of  effort  in  our  Intelligence  Community  and  en- 
hance our  national  security.  The  diversity  among  these  numerous 
proposals  affects  the  operations  of  numerous  governmental  depart- 
ments and  agencies,  as  we  all  know,  all  of  which  fall  under  the  ju- 
risdiction of  multiple  congressional  committees.  As  a  result,  attain- 
ing a  comprehensive  assessment  and  comparison  of  these  proposals 
has  been  elusive,  at  best. 

The  testimony  and  subsequent  debate  that  we  heard  yesterday 
in  our  hearing  illuminated  numerous  concerns  about  intelligence 
reform,  as  well  as  the  merits  of  reform.  The  assessments  spanned 
the  spectrum.  Secretary  Hamre  noted  that  connecting  the  dots  and 
avoiding  group-think  are  in  tension  with  each  other.  Implementing 
an  organizational  solution  to  just  one  of  the  problems  will  worsen 
the  other. 

The  9/11  Commission  suggested  that  we,  as  lawmakers,  look  our- 
selves in  the  mirror.  I  touched  on  this  point  in  yesterday's  hearing. 
There  are  those  who  have  called  congressional  oversight  "lax,"  "un- 
even," and  even  "dysfunctional."  Problems  raised  include  overlap- 
ping jurisdiction  and  turf  battles. 

Now,  as  a  freshman  Senator,  I  don't  claim  to  be  an  expert  in  con- 
gressional oversight.  But  as  a  veteran  of  a  number  of  different 
branches  of  government,  perhaps  as  much  as  35  years  in  the  execu- 
tive branch,  I  do  have  concerns  with  some  proposals  that  have  been 


148 

made,  and  I  believe  rushing  to  judgment  on  implementing  them 
would  be  a  mistake. 

The  Department  of  Homeland  Security  serves  as  a  perfect  exam- 
ple. While  we  have  been  at  war,  Secretary  Tom  Ridge  and  his  top 
deputies  have  testified  at  290  hearings  in  the  past  year  and  a  half, 
they've  received  more  than  4,000  letters  from  Congress  requesting 
information;  furthermore,  88  committees  and  subcommittees  assert 
jurisdictional  interest  over  this  Department. 

I'm  not  sure  how  many  committees  would  have  jurisdiction  over 
a  National  Intelligence  Director,  but  I  imagine  it  would  be  more 
than  a  few.  A  back-of-the-envelope  survey  suggests  at  least  seven 
full  committees,  just  in  the  Senate. 

Dr.  Lowell  Wood,  of  Stanford  University,  I  think  made  a  key 
point,  and  I  want  to  quote  at  length  from  him:  "Only  when  Con- 
gress makes  major  changes  in  its  own  ways  of  doing  business  in 
any  area  does  the  rest  of  the  government  take  note  and  begin  to 
believe  that  it's  really  serious  about  the  corresponding  change  and 
that  things,  indeed,  must  change.  Really  big  changes  are  needed  in 
the  Nation's  strategic  intelligence  functions,  and  just  tinkering 
with  executive  structures  and  titles  and  organizational  arrange- 
ments and  locations  is  a  fooling-some-of-the-people-some-of-the- 
time  type  of  solution.  It  surely  won't  fool,  even  for  a  moment,  the 
hard-eyed  types  that  infest  the  mean  streets  of  the  present-day 
world.  Instead,  Congress  must  significantly  change  itself,  as  well  as 
the  executive.  Difficult  though  this  may  be,  anything  less  simply 
fails  to  rise  to  the  demands  of  the  present  challenge  posed  to  Amer- 
ica. 

I  spoke  last  week  with  former  Director  of  Central  Intelligence 
Bob  Gates,  who  advised  against  the  temptation  to  find  a  middle 
road,  a  compromise  that  mitigates  controversy  and  unhappiness 
both  in  the  executive  and  legislative  branches,  but  does  not  solve 
the  problems  identified  by  the  9/11  Commission. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld,  Henry  Kissinger  has  called  for  a  pause  for 
reflection  to  distill  the  various  proposals  into  a  coherent  concept.  A 
small  group  of  men  and  women  with  high-level  experience  in  gov- 
ernment could  be  assigned  this  task  with  a  short  deadline.  In  your 
opinion.  Secretary  Rumsfeld,  how  does  the  current  committee 
structure  in  Congress  have  to  be  reformed  in  order  to  be  able  to 
deal  with  a  massive  intelligence  overhaul  without  running  into  ju- 
risdictional issues  and  turf  wars?  Based  on  your  experience,  do  you 
feel  that  Dr.  Kissinger's  proposal  for  an  outside  panel  of  experts — 
elder  statesmen,  let's  say — should  be  considered  for  implementing 
the  Commission's  recommendations? 

I  would  like  to  ask  just  this  one  question — or  these  two  ques- 
tions— of  each  of  you  on  the  panel,  please. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Senator  Dole,  thank  you. 

With  respect  to  the  last  question,  I  have  not  seen  the  specific  rec- 
ommendation that  Dr.  Kissinger  made,  but  I  have  been,  in  effect, 
doing  that,  inviting  in  outside  experts,  senior  people,  elder  states- 
men, to  use  your  phrase,  because  I  value  their  thoughts  and  their 
ideas.  I've  had  in  Secretary  Cohen  and  Secretary  Brown,  and  Dr. 
Kissinger.  I've  talked  to  about  these  things,  and  any  number  of 
other  people  from  both  parties.  I  think  it's  a  useful  thing  for  this 


149 

committee  to  do.  Whether  it  ought  to  be  formahzed,  I  guess,  is  for 
others  to  decide. 

With  respect  to  your  question  on  Congress,  I  guess — I  haven't 
served  in  Congress  for  35  or  40  years,  so  I  don't  think  I'm  really 
current.  Further,  I  guess  it's  really  none  of  my  business,  tech- 
nically. On  the  other  hand,  I  appreciate  the  invitation. 

Chairman  Warner.  Don't  feel  any  constraints.  Go  ahead  and  let 
us  have  it.  [Laughter.] 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  appreciate  the  invitation. 

It  is  a  problem.  Let  me  first  look  at  it  in  a  macro  sense.  We  are 
conducting  a  global  war  on  terror  with  peacetime  constraints,  in 
large  part.  If  you  think  of  the  different  circumstances  we  can  be 
in — we  can  be  at  peace;  we  can  be  in  a  partial  emergency  situation, 
where  we  have  partial  authorities;  you  could  be  over  in  full  mobili- 
zation; you  could  be  in  a  declared  war — and  the  authorities  that 
Congress  delegates  to  the  executive  branch  change.  They  change 
depending  on  which  circumstance  we're  in. 

What  is  the  global  war  on  terror?  Where  does  it  fit  across  that 
spectrum?  How  ought  we  to  be  arranged  for  this  period,  which 
could  be  a  long,  tough  period,  a  dangerous  period,  in  the  21st  cen- 
tury where  technologies  have  evolved,  where  things  move  faster? 
That  would  be  a  very  useful  thing  for  Congress  to  address.  I  think 
it  could  be  done  usefully,  and  I  think  it  could  be — significantly  in- 
form what  we  do  so  we  could  look  at  it  in  a  macro  sense  rather 
than  each  little  piece. 

Do  we  need  better  contracting  authorities  in  a  crisis?  Ought  the 
DOD  to  be — ought  we  to  be  able  to  do  more  with  respect  to  training 
and  equipping  foreign  forces,  so  we  can  use  them  instead  of  our 
forces,  when  it  costs  a  fraction  as  much?  Yet  we're  all  tangled  up 
in  that  issue,  for  3  years  now.  We  weren't  able  to  do  the  training 
and  equipping  for  the  Afghan  army  after  the  war.  We  had  to  go 
around  tin-cupping  the  world.  So  there's  a — this  is  a  big  issue.  It's 
an  important  issue. 

Now,  with  respect  to  the  committee  situation,  sure — I  mean,  I'm 
not  an  intelligence  expert,  and  I  don't  have  to  testify  on  intelligence 
matters,  normally.  But  if  we're  worried  about  keeping  a  secret,  if 
we're  worried  about  congressional  oversight  and  assuring  that  Con- 
gress has  a  full  role  in  a  fast-moving  world,  I  would  think  that 
smaller  committees  or  a  joint  committee  on  intelligence  might  very 
well  serve  that  need  better.  I  would  think  that — it's  none  of  my 
business,  again — but  the  idea  that  there's  a — people  who  get  to  be 
experts  on  intelligence  then  have  to  leave  the  committee,  as  I  un- 
derstand it,  on  a  rotating  basis — maybe  that's  a  good  idea;  maybe 
it  isn't  a  good  idea.  I  think  there  are  things  that  Congress  could 
do. 

Clearly — you  mentioned  the  homeland  security  situation,  and  the 
multiplicity  of  committees — Dr.  Cambone,  I  think,  and  John 
McLaughlin  mentioned  the  number  of  committees  that  have  to  ap- 
prove reprogramming.  If  we're  building  a  budget  one  year,  getting 
it  approved  the  next,  and  not  implementing  it  until  the  third  year, 
the  idea  that  you  have  to  spend  4,  5  months  trying  to  get  a  change 
in  a  budget  that  you  know  you're  going  to  need  changes  in  is  mind- 
less in  the  21st  century.  We  have  to  fix  that. 

Chairman  Warner.  Dr.  McLaughlin? 


150 

Senator  Dole.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Senator,  those  are  really  important  questions, 
and  I  welcome  the  chance  to  comment  on  them. 

First,  for  the  Intelligence  Community — and  CIA,  in  particular — 
engagement  with  Congress  is  very  important.  In  2003,  we  had 
something  like  1,200  separate  meetings  with  Congress.  These 
weren't  with  committees  now.  Some  were  with  committees,  but  I'm 
including  in  that  count  briefings  to  individual  Members  and  so 
forth.  In  2004,  the  number  is  up  to  about  780.  I'm  not  complaining. 
This  is  important  to  us.  It's  important  to  us  for  a  number  of  rea- 
sons— those  kinds  of  meetings,  plus  oversight. 

With  the  military,  the  military's  connected  to  the  American  peo- 
ple in  a  variety  of  ways.  So  many  people  serve  in  the  military, 
every  town  has  a  recruitment  station.  People  understand  the  mili- 
tary. 

People  don't  understand  intelligence,  generally.  We  don't  have  a 
natural  constituency.  Our  oversight  process  is  the  thing  that  really 
ties  us  to  the  American  people  in  very  important  ways.  So  let  me 
say  that  I  start  as  a  strong  supporter  of  oversight,  and  believe  it's 
essential,  actually,  to  the  health  of  this  community. 

Now,  I  wouldn't  make  any  recommendations  about  committee 
structure — one,  two,  or  more.  At  present,  we  typically  report  to 
about  six  committees  when  we  do  our  budget,  and  I  think  you 
know  which  ones  they  are. 

I  would  comment  a  little  bit  about  the  way  oversight  works.  I 
think  the  words,  to  me,  that  are  most  important — if  I  were  charac- 
terizing the  ideal  oversight  situation,  the  two  words  I  would  use 
would  be  "continuous"  and  "constructive."  In  other  words,  oversight 
has  tended  to  focus,  I  think,  very  heavily  on  our  faults  and  our  mis- 
takes. I  would  not  ask  that  it  do  anything  less  on  those  issues.  In 
other  words,  when  we  make  an  error,  when  we  make  a  mistake, 
it  needs  to  be  brought  forward,  and  we  need  to  address  it  with  our 
oversight  committees. 

I  think  there  is  more  scope  for  what  I  would  call  the  "construc- 
tive"— that's  constructive,  in  its  own  way — but  for  a  different  kind 
of  oversight  that  also  includes  frequent  engagement  with  us  on 
issues  of  the  day.  Oversight  committees  ought  to  have  more  hear- 
ings on  things  like  what's  going  on  in  China,  what's  going  on  in 
Iran,  exploring  the  issue.  Oversight  committees  also  ought  to  look 
more  carefully  at  our  successes,  not  to  give  us  a  pat  on  the  back, 
but  to  learn  from  why  we've  succeeded  somewhere.  How  is  it  that 
we  took  down  the  A.Q.  Khan  network?  How  did  that  happen?  How 
is  it  that  we  have  captured  so  many  leading  figures  in  al  Qaeda 
since  September  11?  How  did  that  happen?  Now,  it  isn't  just  an 
academic  question,  because  embedded  in  the  "How  did  it  happen?" 
is  "What  do  we  need?"  to  do  more  of  that.  My  own  view,  in  my  own 
experience,  not  enough  of  that  goes  on  in  the  oversight  process. 

So 


Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you.  I  must 

Mr.  McLaughlin. — I  would  just  stop  there. 
Chairman  Warner. — interrupt,  if  I  may. 
Senator  Dole.  Thank  you  for  excellent  comments. 


151 

Chairman  Warner.  This  panel  has  to  be  at  the  White  House  at 
promptly  2:30.  We  have  five,  six  Senators  that  have  yet  to  have 
their  opportunity. 

So  I  thank  you,  Senator,  and  I  thank  you,  Dr.  McLaughlin.  You 
may  extend  your  remarks,  for  the  purpose  of  the  record,  volumi- 
nously, if  you  so  desire. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  I  was  finished. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Thank  you. 

Senator  Dayton. 

Senator  Dayton.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  gentlemen. 

Mr.  Secretary,  the  9/11  Commission  report,  according — here  on 
page  43,  states,  "In  most  cases  the  chain  of  command  authorizing 
the  use  of  force  runs  from  the  President  to  the  Secretary  of  De- 
fense, from  the  Secretary  to  the  combatant  commander."  President 
Bush,  because  of — by  his  account  and  others,  communications  prob- 
lems onboard  Air  Force  One  that  morning,  was  having  difficulty  es- 
tablishing communication  with  the  Vice  President  on  a  consistent 
basis.  The  Commission  goes  on  to  say  here  that  the  President 
spoke  with  you  for  the  first  time  shortly  after  10  o'clock,  which 
would  have  been  almost  2  hours  after  the  first  hijacking  began.  No 
one  can  recall  the  content  of  this  conversation,  but  it  was  a  brief 
call  in  which  the  subject  of  the  shoot-down  of  these  incoming  hi- 
jacked planes,  authority,  was  not  discussed.  At  10:39,  the  Vice 
President  updated  you  on  the  air  threat.  The  Vice  President  was, 
understandably,  under  the  belief  that  since  he  had  communicated 
twice,  possibly  three  times,  according  to  this  report,  through  a  mili- 
tary aid  to  North  American  Aerospace  Defense  Command 
(NORAD),  the  authority  from  the  President  to  shoot  down  an  in- 
coming plane  that  did  not  detour,  that  that  was  the  instruction 
that  had  been  passed  on.  The  NORAD  commander  told  the  Com- 
mission— both  the  mission  commander  and  the  senior  weapons  di- 
rector of  NORAD  indicated — and  according  to,  again,  the  Commis- 
sion report,  they  did  not  pass  the  order  to  the  fighters  circling 
Washington  and  New  York  because  they  were  unsure  how  the  pi- 
lots would  or  should  proceed  with  this  guidance. 

What  is  the  necessary  chain  of  command  to  be  established  so 
that  an  order  directed  from  the  President  verbally  from  the  Vice 
President  to  NORAD  is  carried  out — or  is  communicated,  I  should 
say,  to  those  who  must  carry  it  out? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Dick  Myers  and  Dr.  Cambone  were  with 
me  that  day.  The  way  you've  stated  it  is  not  the  way  I  recall  it, 
the  2-hour  figure  you  used.  My  recollection  is,  the  first  tower  was 
hit  sometime  around  8:46,  I  think. 

Senator  Dayton.  Sir,  I  said  the  first  hijacking  commenced  at 
8:14. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Oh,  the  first  hijacking,  I  beg  your  pardon. 

Senator  Dayton.  You're  right,  though,  about  an  hour  and  a  half 
after  the  first  plane 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  think  the  way  to  respond  to  this,  Senator, 
is  as  follows.  Under  the  way  the  national  security  arrangement  is, 
and  was — I  should  say  "was" — the  responsibility  of  the  DOD  was 
essentially  to  defend  our  country  from  external  threats.  Indeed,  the 
responsibility  for  internal  threats,  which  is  obviously  what  was  tak- 
ing place  on  September  11,  not  an  external  threat — it  was  from 


152 

within  the  country — was  the  responsibihty  of  the  FBI,  and,  in  the 
case  of  a  hijacked  aircraft,  the  Federal  Aviation  Administration 
(FAA).  The  responsibiUties  of  DOD  was  as  a  supporter  of  an  attack 
on  our  country,  in  the  event  we  were  asked.  But  Congress  and  the 
country  has,  for  many  decades,  kept  the  DOD  out  of  the  law  en- 
forcement business,  out  of  the  crime  business,  out  of  internal  law 
enforcement  issues  under  the  Posse  Comitatus  Act. 

So  the  DOD  was  oriented  externally.  Our  radars  were  pointed 
out,  not  in.  The  FAA  was  the  one  that  then  had  the  responsibility 
to  say,  "There's  a  hijack,"  and  then  ask  the  DOD,  say,  "will  you 
track  and  report  on  that  hijacking?" — the  hijacking,  traditionally, 
being  a  situation  where  a  plane  is  taken  for  the  purpose  of  going 
someplace  and  then  getting  some  political  advantage  for  it,  not  fly- 
ing it  into  a  building. 

So  the  way  you  characterized  the  chain  of  command  is  correct — 
from  the  President  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  to  the  combatant 
commander — but  it  applied  to  things  from  external  threats,  not  the 
responsibility  of  the  FBI  or  the  FAA. 

Senator  Dayton.  I  respect,  sir,  that  the  circumstances  of  that 
morning  were  very  different  from  what  anybody  had  foreseen. 
Given,  however,  that  the  Vice  President,  at  that  point,  from  the 
command-control  bunker  of  the  White  House  is  communicating — 
again,  I'm  using  the  9/11  Commission  report's  information  here — 
via  military  aide,  to  NORAD  the  President's  verbal  authority  to 
shoot  down  a  plane,  and  that  information  is  not — that  instruction 
is  not  communicated,  then,  to  the  fighter  pilots  circling  the  United 
States  Capital  and  New  York  City,  is  that  the  way  it's  supposed 
to  function?  Would  that  happen  again  if  we  were  to  be  surprised 
again  today? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I'm  going  to  ask  General  Myers  to  add  to 
this,  but  the  answer  is,  of  course  not.  Since  that  day,  a  great  many 
adjustments  and  changes  have  been  made,  and  we  have  various 
types  of  fighter  aircraft  on  alert.  We  have  established  an  Assistant 
Secretary  for  Homeland  Security  in  the  DOD.  We  have  established 
a  Northern  Command,  that  never  existed,  for  the  DOD  to  be  ad- 
dressing the  homeland  security  issues  from  a  Defense  Department 
standpoint.  We  have  a  new  Department  of  Homeland  Security  that 
exists.  There's  just  a  dozen  things  that  are  different. 

The  way  to  stop  airplanes  is,  clearly,  from  the  ground — that  is 
to  say,  to  have  air  marshals  and  to  have  reinforced  doors  and  to 
have  baggage  inspections  and  to  not  allow  terrorists  on  aircraft 
that  they  can  then  take  that  aircraft  and  fly  it  into  a  building. 

Now,  as  a  last  resort,  is  it  possible  that  we  could  shoot  down  an 
aircraft  in  the  event  that  was  necessary?  Yes,  it's  possible.  Air- 
planes fly  right  past  the  Pentagon  every  5  minutes,  and  what  it 
takes  is  simply  to  lower  your  nose  and  go  into  something.  Could  we 
stop  that?  No.  I  mean,  the  fact  of  the  matter  is,  with  all  the  air- 
planes flying  around  in  the  skies,  it  is  not  possible  to  do  it  in  many 
instances.  We  do  spend  a  lot  of  money  and  a  lot  of  effort  to  try  to 
stop  it,  both  from  the  ground  and  from  the  air. 

The  answer  to  your  question  is,  yes,  a  great  deal  has  changed. 

Senator  Dayton.  Anyway,  my  time  has  expired.  Mr.  Chairman, 
if  I  may  just  ask  the 

Chairman  WARNER.  Let's  have  General  Myers 


153 

General  Myers.  Yes,  sir. 

Senator  Dayton. — may  I  ask  him  also — well,  yes,  sir. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Go  ahead,  Senator. 

General  Myers.  Senator  Dayton,  I  would  just  add,  to  the  Sec- 
retary's remarks,  now  that  NORAD  is  focused  inward  as  well  as  ex- 
ternally, that  there  are  rules  of  engagement  that  have  been  pro- 
mulgated, that  are  well-understood — in  a  classified  session  or  out- 
side this  room  we  could  talk  about  that,  if  you  want  to — but  they're 
very  well-understood  up  and  down  the  chain  of  command,  and  it's 
practiced  all  the  time. 

Clearly,  we're  talking  about  some  very  serious  issues  here,  as  the 
Secretary  said.  It  also  involves  ground  defenses,  not  just  air  de- 
fenses. But  the  rules  of  engagement,  the  command  and  control 
structure  that's  set  in  there  is  completely  different  because  the  mis- 
sion for  NORAD  changed  after  September  11,  and  no  longer  were 
they  asked  to  look  just  externally,  but  also  internally. 

The  relationship  between  NORAD  and  the  FAA  has  also  changed 
dramatically,  and  we've  worked  those  arrangements  where  we 
have,  I  think,  very  good  communications  today.  I  talked  to  General 
Eberhardt  today  about  that  particular  issue,  and  he  certainly 
agrees. 

Senator  Dayton.  Mr.  Chairman,  if  I  may  just  ask  that  he  re- 
spond, also — Mr.  Chairman,  if  you  would — in  writing,  to  the — I 
think  it's  inference,  but  it's  also  really  an  explicit  accusation  made 
in  the  substance  of  the  report  on,  particularly,  page  34,  that 
NORAD's  testimony,  20  months  after  September  11,  to  the  9/11 
Commission  about  the  sequence  of  events,  particularly  the  failure 
of  the  FAA  to  inform  NORAD  in  a  timely  basis  of  three  of  the  four 
hijackings,  was  inaccurate.  The  statement  made  by  NORAD  pub- 
licly 1  week  after  September  11,  which  is  very  similar  to  that  testi- 
mony made  20  months  later,  was  also  inaccurate,  seriously  mis- 
leading anybody  trying  to  assess  the  response  and  non-response 
that  day  in  a  way  that  I  think  is  far  more  alarming  about  FAA's 
failure — proper  response  than  NORAD's,  but  I — if  you  would  please 
review  that  testimony  and  see,  because  I  don't  believe  anybody  has 
held  those  discrepancies — or  anyone  to  account  for  those  discrep- 
ancies that  I  consider  them  to  be — more  than  just  oversights.  I 
think  they're  serious  misrepresentations  of  the  facts.  Thank  you. 

Senator  Dayton.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

General  Myers.  Could  I  make  just  a  comment  on  that,  Senator 
Dayton?  I  liken  this  to  an  accident  investigation  board  when  an 
aircraft  crashes.  I've  been  a  reviewing  official  at  the  table  at  many 
of  those.  Normally  what  happens  when  an  incident  happens,  there 
is  the  first  report,  which  has  some  accuracies  and  many  inaccura- 
cies. So  statements,  what  people  believe  happened  immediately 
afterwards  and  in  the  next  week  or  2  weeks,  is  what  they  believe. 
But  as  they  continue  to  harvest  the  facts,  and  as  we  go  to  machines 
that  record  things — like  aircraft  recorders,  like  radar  scope  record- 
ers, and  so  forth — the  facts  become  clearer,  and  what  people 
thought  they  saw  or  thought  they  understood  or  thought  they 
heard  changes  over  time.  That's  the  nature  of  these  kind  of  inves- 
tigations. 

I  think  NORAD  would  be  the  first  to  say  that,  because  of  the  ac- 
cess that  the  9/11  Commission  had  to  certain  parts  of  this  appara- 


154 

tus  that  was  collecting  this  data,  that  it  sharpened  their  focus,  too, 
and  things  they  thought  happened  turned  out  to  be  either  different 
or  incomplete.  It  took  a  lot  of  work  and  a  lot  of  months  to  come 
to  what  was  ground  truth.  The  same  thing  is  true  in  accident  in- 
vestigations. It  takes  us  sometimes  many  months  to  come  to 
ground  truth,  and  what  people  thought  they  heard,  what  they 
thought  they  saw,  will  be  changed  as  they  review  the  facts.  I  think 
that's  the  case. 

I've  talked  to  General  Eberhardt  about  this.  I  do  not  know  what 
the  motivation  of  NORAD  would  be  to  ever  lie  or  deceive.  I  mean, 
that's  not  what  they're  pledged  to  do.  They're  pledged  to  do  the 
same  thing  we  all  are,  in  uniform,  and  that's  defend  this  country. 
I  would  take  exception  to  anybody  that  thinks  they  had  any  other 
motive. 

Chairman  Wakner.  Thank  you  very  much,  General. 

Senator  Dayton.  If  I  could  say,  Mr.  Chairman,  this  20  is  months 
after — sworn  testimony  to  the  Commission  20  months  after  the 
event,  I  think,  is  worthy  of  your  scrutiny,  please.  Furthermore,  be- 
cause— I  bring  this  up,  not  just  for  historical  reasons — 2  months 
ago — and  if  you  have  a  chance  to  review  the  circumstances,  the 
plane  that  caused  the  evacuation  of  the  Capitol  complex,  with  thou- 
sands of  people  running  for  their  lives  here,  being  informed  to  do 
so  by  the  Capitol  Police  because  of,  again,  a  failure  of  FAA — and 
that's  almost  entirely  based  on  the  evidence  I  have — their  failure 
to  communicate  just  basic  information  to  air  defense,  to  anyone 
else,  including  the  Capitol  Police,  that  we  had  a  situation  there,  the 
closest  simulation  I  think  we  could  possibly  have — because  people 
thought  it  was  a  real  threat,  until  they  found  out  otherwise — that 
we  could  have — and  here,  2V2  years  after  September  11  has  oc- 
curred, we  find,  basically,  again,  a  complete  breakdown  of  commu- 
nication by  the  Federal  authorities — and,  again,  primarily  FAA — 
but  to  National  Defense  Command  and  to  others  so  that  we  don't 
have  a  response.  We  talk  about  things  not  changing  as  a  result  of 
September  11,  this,  to  me,  is  the  most  horrific  example  that  I  could 
imagine.  If  we  don't  deal  with  the  fact  that  we  failed 

Chairman  Warner.  Senator 

Senator  Dayton. — now  a  second  time  on  the  basic  elements  of 
communication  and 


Chairman  Warner.  Senator,  I  have  to 

Senator  Dayton. — following  protocols 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you. 

Senator  Dayton. — and  procedures.  Sir,  I  waited,  sir,  for  3  and  4 

hours  here 

Chairman  Warner.  Yes 


Senator  Dayton. — if  I  just  may  finish. 

Chairman  Warner. — but  you're  cutting  out  the  time  of  other 

Senators  to  be  able  to  ask 

Senator  Dayton.  I've  waited 


Chairman  Warner. — a  single  question. 

Senator  Dayton. — a  long  time,  sir. 

Chairman  Warner.  I  ask  your  indulgence  to  supply,  for  the 
record,  please,  so  that  I  can  turn 

Senator  Dayton.  Before  September  11  happens  again,  I  ask  that 
we  review  that  evidence. 


155 

Thank  you. 

General  Myers.   Senator  Dayton,  I'll  respond  to  that,  for  the 
record,  if  I  may,  Mr.  Chairman  and  Senators. 
[The  information  referred  to  follows:] 

The  incident  in  question  involved  the  Governor  of  Kentucky's  aircraft.  Despite 
communication  shortfalls,  the  end  result  is  that  the  checks  and  balances  in  effect 
prevented  a  tragedy  from  taking  place.  The  North  American  Aerospace  Defense 
Command  (NORAD)  took  appropriate  action  and  did  not  shoot  down  the  aircraft. 

The  Kentucky  Governor's  aircraft  did  not  have  a  pre-flight  waiver  for  flying  into 
the  Air  Defense  Identification  Zone  (ADIZ)  without  a  transponder.  Upon  airborne 
notification  of  a  transponder  malfunction,  the  pilot  requested  and  the  Federal  Avia- 
tion Administration  (FAA)  granted  permission  to  continue  to  Ronald  Reagan  Wash- 
ington National  Airport.  NORAD  was  not  informed  that  the  aircraft  would  be  per- 
mitted to  fly  into  the  ADIZ  without  a  functioning  transponder  and  that  FAA  control- 
lers were  in  communication  with  the  plane.  However,  NORAD  assets  tracked  and 
positively  identified  the  aircraft  prior  to  its  landing. 

Since  the  incident,  FAA  has  made  it  mandatory  that  all  aircraft  must  have  an 
operational  transponder  in  order  to  enter  the  National  Capital  Region  ADIZ.  In  ad- 
dition, FAA  has  provided  the  same  radar  displays  used  by  Potomac  Terminal  Radar 
Control  to  people  in  the  National  Capital  Region  Command  Center. 

Chairman  Warner.  I'm  going  to  have  to  ask,  respectfully,  that 
you  provide — this  is  an  important  colloquy,  but  I've  had  Senators 
waiting  just  as  long. 

Senator  Cornyn,  it  is  your  time. 

Please  reply  for  the  record.  General. 

Senator  CoRNYN.  Undoubtedly,  the  9/11  Commission  has  per- 
formed an  important  public  service.  But,  by  definition,  their  focus 
was  on  the  causes  of  that  terrible  event  on  that  terrible  day.  I 
think  we  should  all  be  chastened  by  some  of  the  testimony  we've 
already  heard  here  today  that  any  solution  should  logically  flow 
from  the  problem  that  has  been  identified — or,  I  believe.  Director 
McLaughlin,  you  said  the  form  ought  to  follow  the  function.  I  think 
that's  good  advice. 

It  seems  to  me  that  a  number  of  the  solutions  are  directed  to- 
ward preventing  another  September  11.  For  example,  the  National 
Counterterrorism  Center,  perhaps,  something  that's  been  described 
as  "TTIC  on  steroids,"  the  congressional  oversight  reform,  which  I 
think  is  an  important  subject,  and  which — it's  been  touched  on  a 
little  bit  today.  But  I  guess  the  question  I  have  really  relates  to  the 
National  Intelligence  Director,  because  it  seems  to  me  that,  in 
some  ways,  what  we're  doing  is  creating  a  position  and  then  trying 
to  find  things  for  that  person  to  do,  which,  to  me,  seems  like  the 
opposite  of  how  we  ought  to  address  it,  because  I  do  believe  that 
we  ought  to  let  the  form  follow  the  function,  or  the  solution  logi- 
cally flow  from  the  problems  that  have  been  identified. 

Which  leads  me  to  the  question — Director  McLaughlin,  specifi- 
cally— you  alluded  to  a  number  of  things  that  have  happened  since 
September  11  which  have  made  America  safer:  passage  of  the  Pa- 
triot Act,  tearing  down  the  wall  between  law  enforcement  and  in- 
telligence authorities,  creation  of  the  Department  of  Homeland  Se- 
curity, creation  of  the  Terrorist  Threat  Integration  Center.  But 
could  you  tell  us,  sir,  today,  what  additional  authority  could  this 
Congress  provide  to  you,  as  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  or 
to  the  National  Intelligence  Director,  that  would  make  this  country 
safer  and  which  would  be  more  likely  to  prevent  another  Septem- 
ber 11? 


156 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  I  think — I  would  start  by  the  things  that,  from 
where  I  sit,  I  need  most  at  this  point  in  the  fight  against  terrorism. 
The  first  thing  I  would  say  is,  I  need  more  experienced  people. 
We've  done  a  lot  since  September  11  and  in  the  last  5  or  6  years 
to  build  up  our  staff  that  is  on  the  front  line  against  terrorism,  but 
we  need  still  more  people,  and  we  need  them  with  experience. 

The  second  thing  I  need  in  order  to  get  that  is  still  more  time, 
in  the  sense  that  you  don't  produce  those  kinds  of  people  overnight; 
they  have  to  be  in  the  pipeline,  they  have  to  be  training,  they  have 
to  be  in  the  field,  they  have  to  learn  their  business.  So  as  much 
as  we  have  improved,  there's  still  a  ways  to  go  on  that  score. 

Looking  through  the  9/11  recommendations,  the  things  that  jump 
out  at  me  as  things  that  would  most  improve  our  counterterrorism 
posture  are  things  like  a  common  intelligence — a  common  informa- 
tion-technology architecture  for  the  Intelligence  Community.  At  the 
end  of  the  day,  sharing  intelligence,  sharing  information,  means 
moving  information.  I  think  counterterrorism,  at  the  end  of  the 
day,  is — apart  from  the  people  who  fight  terrorists — all  about  fus- 
ing information.  It's  about  taking  the  information  you  get  from 
some  highway  patrolman  in  Indiana,  some  agent  of  yours  in  the 
Middle  East,  an  overhead  satellite,  an  intercepted  conversation, 
and  having  that  all  come  together  on  a  desk  somewhere,  where 
someone  looks  at  it  and  says,  "I  see  connections  that  I  didn't  see 
before." 

So  that  means  putting  people  together,  as  we  have  in  TTIC.  To 
the  extent  that — if  you  walk  through  TTIC  now,  you  would  see  that 
the  thing  they  probably  most  need  to  deal  with  the  26  networks 
that  flow  into  that  place  is  a  common  information  architecture  to 
merge  them  all  together  so  that  every  individual  has  all  of  that  in- 
formation popping  up  on  their  screen  every  day. 

Now,  I  should  be  brief  here,  but  the  other  thing  is,  if  you  want 
to  look  at  these  recommendations,  and  you  wanted  to  pick  out 
something  that  would  make  a  difference,  I  think  a  separate  budget 
appropriation  for  the  NFIP  would  make  a  difference;  that  is,  sepa- 
rating that  out  so  that  it  would  have,  just  by  virtue  of  its  separa- 
tion, fewer  congressional  committees  to  go  through.  It  would  make 
a  lot  of  things  simpler. 

I  could  go  on,  but  those  are  the  first  things  that  occur  to  me. 

Senator  Cornyn.  I  know  all  of  us  are  interested  in  improving  our 
intelligence  outputs,  and  I  hope  we  just  don't  look  at  budgetary  in- 
puts and  minutia  like  that  when  we  really  need  to  be  focusing  on, 
"How  do  we  improve  our  intelligence  and  not  do  anything  that 
would  harm  what  we  currently  have,  or  the  improvements  that 
have  occurred  since  September  11,  and  perhaps  other  unintended 
results  that  would  be  detrimental  to  the  security  of  our  country?" 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  That's  why  I  say  the  fusion  of  data  is  most  im- 
portant. If  you  bring  it  together,  and  you  see  the  picture,  and  then 
you  have  the  ability  to  act  on  it,  as  we  must,  literally  within  min- 
utes, transmitting  a  picture  that  we've  developed  to  someone  in  the 
field  who  takes  action,  anjrthing  that  helps  that  fusion  and  trans- 
mission is  critical. 

Senator  Cornyn.  Thank  you,  my  time  is  up. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you.  Senator,  for  your  courtesy. 

Senator  Bayh. 


157 

Senator  Bayh.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Gentlemen,  thank  you  for  your  service  to  our  country.  I  deeply 
appreciate  your  grappling  with  these  tremendously  important 
issues.  I  know  they're  not  easy.  While  we  want  to  move  with  as 
much  haste  as  possible,  it  is  important  that  we  get  it  right.  So  I 
thank  you  for  your  dedication  to  that. 

It  seems  to  me  that  we,  Mr.  Chairman,  have  all  gathered  here 
for  the  same  purpose.  We  may  have  different  ways  of  getting  to  the 
goal,  but  it's  to  try  and  prevent  a  future  September  11.  It  seems 
to  me  that  our  ability  to  accomplish  that  objective  is  going  to  de- 
pend upon  how  well  we  grapple  with  the  profound  change  that  has 
swept  the  world  since  over  the  last  50  to  60  years  when  the  Intel- 
ligence Community  was  first  organized,  and  particularly  the  last  15 
to  20 — rogue  nations,  collapsed  states,  non-state  actors,  prolifera- 
tion of  weapons  of  mass  destruction  that  are  difficult  to  con- 
template. 

My  concern,  gentlemen,  is  that  in  the  private  sector,  there  is  an 
engine  for  change.  It's  the  bottom  line.  You  either  succeed  or  you 
perish,  and  that's  fought  each  and  every  day.  In  the  governmental- 
side  thing,  you  don't  have  quite  the  same  impetus  to  stay  up  with 
the  changing  times,  and  so  governments  adapt  more  slowly.  It 
sometimes  takes  a  great  shock,  as  we  have  experienced,  to  serve 
as  the  impetus  for  the  kind  of  change  that  is  necessary. 

So  I  think,  while  we  want  to  make  sure  we  get  it  right,  at  the 
same  time,  I  hope  we  can  think  big,  and  use  this  as  an — not  just 
as  a  challenge  to  be  met,  but  as  an  opportunity  to  perhaps  make 
some  of  the  changes  that,  in  government,  are  too  often  too  long  in 
the  coming. 

I  am  somewhat  concerned,  not  by  what  you've  said  here  today, 
but  just  the  general  drift  of  events,  that  perhaps  we  have  let  the 
moment  pass,  that  the  momentum  for  constructive  change  has  been 
dissipating,  that  perhaps  the  bureaucratic  and  congressional  iner- 
tia is  reasserting  itself.  I  hope  that's  not  the  case,  but  I  am  some- 
what concerned. 

So  I  have  one  question,  Mr.  McLaughlin,  for  you,  and  then  two 
observations  that  I'd  like  to  make  before  my  time  expires. 

My  question,  Mr.  McLaughlin,  is  a  followup  on  something  that 
Senator  Collins  first  raised.  I'd  like  to  ask  it  in  a  little  bit  different 
way.  That  is,  the  comment's  been  made  by  members  of  the  commit- 
tee and  the  panelists  here  today  that  we're  at  war.  That  is  undeni- 
ably true,  we  are  at  war.  This  observation  was,  I  think,  first  made 
by  a  previous  DCI,  Mr.  McLaughlin,  even  before  September  11, 
when  Mr.  Tenet  observed  that  Osama  bin  Laden  has  declared  war 
on  us,  and  we  are  at  war  with  him,  and  he  sought  to  mobilize  the 
resources  of  the  community.  But,  in  the  opinion  of  the  9/11  Com- 
mission, apparently  the  message  wasn't  received  or  internalized  by 
enough  people.  I  think  the  head  of  the  NSA,  when  I  asked  about 
that  statement — and  his  response  was,  he  wasn't  aware  that  the 
DCI  had  declared  war  on  al  Qaeda. 

My  question  to  you,  George  Tenet  was  not  a  wallflower.  He  was 
a  fairly  strong  personality.  I  can't  think  that  he  didn't  make  his 
wishes  known.  What  powers  did  he  lack  to  put  into  effect  the  no- 
tion that  we  were  at  war,  and  that  we  needed  to  mobilize  ourselves 
as  if  we  were  at  war,  and  act  as  though  we  were  at  war?  What 


158 

powers  does  the  DCI  lack  that  prevented  him  from  acting  upon  his 
observation? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Well,  it's  a 

Senator  Bayh. — or  getting  others  to  act  upon  his  observation. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Yes.  It's  a  complicated  question  and  a  com- 
plicated answer,  but  I'll  be  brief. 

I  think  the  9/11  Commission  probably  underrated,  to  some  de- 
gree, the  responsiveness  that  we  saw.  That  said,  it  probably  wasn't 
all  that  it  should  have  been.  There  are  many  reasons  for  this.  Part 
of  them  may  lie  in  authorities.  Inevitably,  if  a  Director  has  author- 
ity to  move  people  and  money  and  individuals  rather  than  relying 
on  the  power  of  persuasion  and  the  force  of  personality  that  you  al- 
lude to,  the  Director  can  do  more  things  more  rapidly. 

TTIC  is  a  good  example.  I  was  able  to  put  60  people  in  TTIC 
overnight,  because  they  were  my  people.  I  took  them  right  out  of 
CIA  and  put  them  there.  A  week  after  I  said  go,  they  were  going. 
So  there's  a  directness  of  authority  that  improves  things. 

Senator  Bayh.  But  could  I — I  don't  want  to  cut  you  short — for- 
give me  for  that.  Let  me  cut  to  the  chase  here.  We  had  a  long  set 
of  discussions  about  the  whole  budget  issue 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Yes. 

Senator  Bayh. — which  is  one  of  the  things  we  need  to  do.  I  un- 
derstand the  administration  is  grappling  with  that.  In  your  opin- 
ion, if  there  had  been  a  different  alignment  of  budgetary  authority, 
as  has  been  suggested  by  the  Commission  and  the  DCI,  would  it 
have  elicited  a  different  response? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  If  it  would  have  hastened  and  made  more  di- 
rect the  Director's  ability  to  put  people  together  and  determine 
what  they  were  doing,  day  in  and  day  out,  yes,  it  would  have  made 
a  difference. 

Senator  Bayh.  I  suspect  it  would  have.  Let  me  follow  up 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  There  are  other  things  in  the  climate.  I  just 
need  to  say,  though,  that  it  isn't  just — in  that  time,  it  wasn't  just 
budget  authority;  it  was  that — for  lack  of  a  better  term,  the 
crystalizing  event  of  September  11  had  not  happened.  Even  in  the 
summer  of  2001,  when  we  had  high  threat  warning,  it  was  still  dif- 
ficult, not  just  for  people  in  the  United  States,  but  for  our  liaison 
partners,  our  intelligence  partners  overseas,  to  digest  the  serious- 
ness of  it.  Once  that  event  occurred,  as  I  said  in  my  testimony,  ev- 
erything changed,  and  the  limited  authorities  we  had  were  more  ef- 
fective. So  that's  part  of  it,  too. 

Senator  Bayh.  We  all  see  the  world  differently  following  Septem- 
ber 11  than  before.  But  it  did  strike  me  that  it  was  with  some  re- 
markable clairvoyance  that  he  announced  we  were  at  war. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Oh,  and  he  said  it  in  worldwide  threat  testi- 
monies, in  1998,  1999,  and 

Senator  Bayh.  My  two  observations,  and  then  my  time  has  ex- 
pired, are  as  follows.  First,  Mr.  McLaughlin,  you  said  that — I  think 
you  asked — you  said  the  most  important  question  we  needed  to 
keep  in  mind  is,  who  will  we  hold  responsible?  I  think  that's  right. 
But  I  would  disagree  with  you  when  you  said  that  today  it's  the 
DCI.  From  my  point  of  view,  if  we  were  to  ask  those  who  were  re- 
sponsible to  appear  before  us  today,  it  would  be  three  or  four  indi- 
viduals. All  of  you  have  the  authority.  You  have  mentioned  that  ac- 


159 

tually  enforcing  the  authority  is  sometimes  difficult,  takes  the  force 
of  personaUty,  working  collegially,  those  kinds  of  things.  There  may 
be  other  issues  there.  It  seems  to  me  today  the  person  we  hold  re- 
sponsible is  the  Commander  in  Chief,  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  I  wonder  if  that  situation  serves  him  or  the  Nation  well, 
and  that,  regardless  of  how  we  come  down — and  whether  it's  a  DCI 
with  more  authority,  a  NID  without — a  super-empowered  NID,  a 
NID  that's  just  simply  serving  a  coordinating  function — we  do  need 
to  try,  as  much  as  we  can,  to  answer  that  question,  "Who  do  we 
hold  responsible?"  In  some  ways,  I  think  you  were  being  a  little 
tough  on  yourself. 

My  final  observation,  Mr.  Secretary,  deals  with  something  you 
mentioned.  I  said  to  Senator  Lieberman — he  left  the  room — he  said 
he  thought  the  dog  hadn't  barked.  I  said,  "You  missed  the  Sec- 
retary's enthusiasm  for  the  subject  of  congressional  reform.  That 
certainly  energized  his  testimony."  My  comment  simply  would  be — 
it's  something  that  I  think  is  absolutely  appropriate — I  hope  that 
Congress — Congress's  zeal  for  reform  will  involve  as  much  a  look 
in  the  mirror  as  it  does  a  scrutiny  of  what  you  do.  Because,  from 
my  vantage  point,  we  take  up  a  lot  of  your  time,  and  yet  our  over- 
sight is  more  the  appearance  of  oversight  than  efficient  oversight, 
in  fact.  So  I  hope  that  meaningful  congressional  reform  will  be  a 
part  of  this  agenda.  I  think  we  will  all  know  it  has  arrived  when 
some  of  us  have  been  willing  to  cede  some  of  our  authority  for  the 
cause  of  reform,  as  much  as  it  is  asking  you  to  look  at  what  you 
do  and  perhaps  cede  some  of  yours. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  do.  Senator,  very  briefly.  Thank  you  very 
much.  Senator. 

Anyone  in  positions  of  responsibility  who  has  lived  through  Sep- 
tember 11  feels  an  enormous  sense  of  urgency.  Do  not  think  for  a 
minute  that  that  sense  of  urgency  is  not  there.  It  is,  and  we  are 
determined  to  continue  to  force  this  system  to  perform  better  for 
the  American  people  and  the  country. 

A  second  comment.  You  said,  "Who's  accountable?"  I  think  the — 
it's  important  to  say,  "Who's  accountable  for  what?"  Because  there's 
a  tendency  to  equate  counterterrorism — you  said  we're  here  to 
avoid  another  September  11 — that's  true,  to  be  sure.  But  we're 
dealing  with  the  entire  Intelligence  Community,  and  the  entire  In- 
telligence Community  has  tasks  well  beyond  counterterrorism.  We 
have  counterproliferation,  we  have  intelligence  for  the  warfighter, 
there  are  tasks  of  deterring  and  defending — and,  if  necessary,  fight- 
ing— for  this  country  that  the  Intelligence  Community  contributes 
to  all  of  that.  We  ought  not  to  think  that  the  task  before  us  is  to 
redesign  the  Intelligence  Community  to  fit  one  of  the  many  impor- 
tant functions  that  it  has. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Senator  Talent. 

Senator  Talent.  Thanks,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Senator  Bayh's  comments  and  the  Secretary's  comments  are  a 
good  segue  for  me  into  my  areas  of  interest. 

First  of  all,  empowering  the  DCI — I'm  glad  Senator  Bayh  said 
what  I've  been  thinking  the  whole  hearing — the  President  can  em- 


160 

power  the  DCI,  anytime  he  wants  to,  to  move  budgets  around  or 
personnel  around,  isn't  that  right,  Mr.  McLaughUn? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  There  is  a  statute  that  determines  all  of  that. 
It's  in  the — there  are  legislative  requirements,  I  think. 

Senator  Talent.  Yes.  I  don't  know  that  I  want  DCIs  to  be  declar- 
ing war  on  anything  on  their  own  authority,  under  this  system  or 
a  new  system.  I  thought  that's  what  the  President  did,  and  Con- 
gress did. 

Let  me  go  into  the  whole  issue.  Rather  than  me  going  into  the 
whole  issue,  I'm  going  to  focus  on  one  thing,  given  the  lack  of  time, 
but  on  the  National  Intelligence  Director  proposal,  and  particularly 
with  regard  to  those  aspects  of  the  Intelligence  Community  that 
today  support  warfighters,  which  Secretary  Rumsfeld  mentioned. 

If  Congress  created  a  directorate,  as  has  been  proposed,  and  gave 
the  Director  authority  over  budgets  and  personnel,  and  that  Direc- 
tor decided  that  too  much  of  the  NSA's  or  the  NGA's  or  the  NRO's 
resources  were  going  to  support  combat  operations  on  the  ground, 
and  wanted  to  draw  resources  away — under  that  scenario  I've 
painted,  who  could  overrule  that  decision?  If  we  empowered  him 
with  control  over  budgets  and  personnel — by  definition,  the  only 
person  would  be  the  President,  right?  He'd  be,  effectively,  a  Cabi- 
net-level officer,  acting  on  behalf  of  the  agencies  in  this  depart- 
ment. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Yes,  that's  correct.  I  would  say,  though,  that 
it's  very  difficult  for  me  to  imagine  circumstances  in  which  anyone 
who  heads  the  Intelligence  Community  would  arrive  at  the  conclu- 
sion you  just  arrived  at.  For  example,  I  understand  that  in  the  case 
of  those  agencies,  NSA,  NGA  and  so  forth,  I  think  there's  a — the 
Chairman  will  correct  me  if  I'm  wrong — biannual  review  of  their 
combat  readiness,  or  their  readiness  to  support  combat.  That  would 
have  to  continue.  I  would  recommend  that  whoever  has  this  au- 
thority, that  would  have  to  continue.  So  I  just  can't  imagine  cir- 
cumstances where  someone  would  take  away  from  that 
accessability. 

Senator  Talent.  I've  heard  this  repeatedly,  "We  can't  imagine 
the  circumstances  where  we  give  somebody  a  power  and  he  would 
not  exercise  it  in  a  way  that  we  don't  agree  with."  Maybe  that 
would  be  the  case  in  the  next  6  months  or  the  next  year.  We  don't 
know  what's  going  to  happen  2,  3,  or  4  years  from  now.  Probably 
this  Director  is  going  to  be  somebody  who  comes  from  the  civilian 
Intelligence  Community,  comes  from  somebody  who's  interested  in 
covert  operations  or  non-proliferation  or  domestic  surveillance — I'm 
not  trying  to  argue  with  you,  Mr.  McLaughlin,  I'm  trying  to  air  my 
concerns  here. 

The  only  person  I  think  could  overrule  him  would  be  the  Presi- 
dent. Where  is  the  President,  under  this  scenario  I've  painted,  get- 
ting his  view  of  intelligence  and  intelligence  priorities?  From  this 
person.  So  the  President's  hearing — and  because  we  don't  want  him 
to  hear  a  whole  lot  of  different  views,  he's  getting  one  view  from 
this  Director,  who  then  says,  after  presenting  it,  "Mr.  President,  I 
really  think  we  need  to  take  some  of  these  resources  and  personnel 
away  from  combat  support  operations,  because  that's  okay  right 
now,  and  we  need  to  put  it  into  this  counterintelligence.  If  we  don't. 


161 

we  can't  prevent  another  September  11."  What's  the  President 
going  to  do? 

Or,  under  the  current  system,  this  committee  would  have  some- 
thing to  say  about  it,  because  we  have  jurisdiction  over  the  activi- 
ties of  the  armed  services.  But  if  we  followed  through  with  the  rec- 
ommendations and  turned  all  congressional  jurisdiction  over  to  one 
committee — and  who  would  they  be  hearing  from?  Who  would  they 
be  getting  their  intelligence  information  from?  This  one  person. 

We're  all  presenting  this  as  if  this  can't  possibly  happen.  Let's 
think  back  on  people  who  have  run  intelligence  agencies  and  who 
have  acquired  a  great  deal  of  power,  over  time,  at  least  over  their 
particular  areas.  I  think  we're  rushing — as  Secretary  Schlesinger 
said  yesterday  before  the  committee — that  fools  rush  in  where  an- 
gels fear  to  tread. 

You  say — near  the  end,  Mr.  McLaughlin,  you  say  you'd  also  see 
more  progress  by  a  DCI  or  NID  on  things  like  common  policies  for 
personnel,  training,  security,  and  information  technology.  The  NSA, 
the  NGA,  the  NRO,  their  personnel  and  training  policies,  and  cer- 
tainly their  information  technology,  are  designed  to  be  compatible 
with  what's  going  on  in  the  rest  of  the  department  that  they  sup- 
port. Isn't  that  correct? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  For  the  most  part. 

Senator  Talent.  Yes,  and  so 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  They  also  support  other  departments. 

Senator  Talent.  I  got  you.  But — so  we  could  have  a  Director,  the 
NID  who  says,  "I'm  not  so  sure  I  agree  with  how  the  Army  is  set- 
ting up  the  architecture  for  future  combat  systems.  I  don't  know 
that  I  want  our  satellite  technology  to  fit  in  exactly  with  that." 
Then  if  he  decided  that,  who'd  be  in  a  position  to  tell  him  he  was 
wrong? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  I  also  said  in  my  testimony — and  bear  in  mind 
now,  it's  important 

Senator  Talent.  I  understand  you're  not- 


Mr.  McLaughlin.  No,  but  it's  important  to- 


Senator  Talent.  I'm  deliberately  using  you  as 

Mr.  McLaughlin. — step  back 

Senator  Talent. — a  sounding  board,  because  these  are  my  con- 
cerns. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  It's  important  to  step  back  here  and  say  the 
Intelligence  Community  didn't  raise  this.  We're  all  talking  about  it 
because  it  was  raised  by  the  9/11  Commission.  You  need  our  profes- 
sional judgment  on  what  would  happen  if  you  did  what  the  Com- 
mission recommends.  That's  just  to  get  that  in  context  here. 

So  my  view  would  be,  if  you  did  what  the  Commission  rec- 
ommended here,  with  the  National  Intelligence  Director,  you  would 
need  the  assurance — you  raise  a  valid  question — that  that  National 
Intelligence  Director  would  not  take  away  from  the  combat  support 
capabilities  of  those  agencies.  You  might  need  to  have  that  assur- 
ance through  an  executive  order.  You  might  need  to  have  it 
through  legislation.  But  you  would  need  that  assurance.  Anyone 
who  enacts  this  would  need  to  build  that  into  the  system. 

Senator  Talent.  I  appreciate  that,  and  your  service  and  your  tes- 
timony. 


162 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  agree  with  something  you  said  right  at  the  out- 
set of  this.  This  is  the  committee — it's  been  our  responsibihty  and 
our  privilege  to  make  sure  that  our  men  and  women  in  the  field 
have  what  they  need  to  defend  us,  and  for  as  many  of  them  to  come 
home  as  possible.  I  know  you  and  the  ranking  member  take  that 
very  seriously.  I  think  we  need  to  look  at  this  with  that  in  view. 

The  one  part  of  the  intelligence  operation  that  we  all  agree  is 
working  is  the  support  of  these  agencies  of  tactical  combat  oper- 
ations, and  we  don't  want  to — we  don't  want  to  break  what  isn't 
broken  in  an  attempt  to  fix  what  is. 

I  thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Warner.  Senator  Clinton.  Thank  you  for  your  pa- 
tience, Senator. 

Senator  CLINTON.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  thank  you  for 
holding  these  hearings. 

There  are  so  many  questions,  and  so  little  time,  and  everyone 
has  been  here  for  so  long,  I  would  ask  unanimous  consent  to  sub- 
mit some  additional  questions  for  the  record,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Warner.  The  record  will  remain  open  until  the  close 
of  business  today  for  further  questions  to  the  panel  by  all  members. 

Senator  Clinton.  Thank  you. 

Senator  Clinton.  There  are  a  number  of  questions  that  the  Sep- 
tember 11  families  have  provided  that  I  feel  are  very  important, 
and  I  want  to  submit  them. 

Senator  Dayton  was  able  to  ask  a  variety  of  questions  about  the 
activities  on  the  day  of  September  11,  the  chain  of  command, 
NORAD,  et  cetera.  I  think  he  will  be  furthering  those,  and  I  will 
add  to  them,  as  well. 

I  don't  think  any  of  us  disagree  with  the  very  strong  assumption 
that  whatever  we  do  cannot,  and  should  not,  in  any  way  undermine 
the  provision  of  intelligence  to  our  warfighters  and  our  combatant 
commanders.  But  I  think  there  is  a  concern  on  the  part  of,  not  just 
the  September  11  families,  but  many  people  who  have  watched  the 
interplay  between  the  DOD  and  the  intelligence  agencies  and  the 
provision  of  information  to  the  Commander  in  Chief  over  a  number 
of  years,  that,  at  the  end  of  the  day,  the  Defense  Department  has 
an  enormous  amount  of  authority,  both  explicit  and  implicit,  which 
it  operates  under,  and  which  it  does  use  to  influence  how  intel- 
ligence is  not  only  collected  and  analyzed,  but  how  it's  used  for  de- 
cisionmaking. 

So  among  the  questions  that  the  September  11  families  have 
asked  me  to  pose  to  you.  Secretary  Rumsfeld,  are  the  following: 

Imagine,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  there  is  an  NID,  as  pro- 
posed by  the  9/11  Commission.  What  are  the  assurances  that  you 
would  need  in  the  legislation  that  would  enable  you  to  feel  com- 
fortable that  the  warfighters  and  combatant  commanders  were  pro- 
vided for  and  that  the  primary  obligation  of  providing  tactical  intel- 
ligence was  protected? 

Second,  with  respect  to  tactical  intelligence,  I  think  it  is  impor- 
tant, as  I  said  yesterday,  that  we  not  go  into  this  assuming  that 
everything  is  100  percent  perfect  in  the  area  of  tactical  intelligence. 
I  think  that  would  be  a  mistake.  I  think  that  there  are  questions 
that  need  to  be  raised,  and  among  them  are  those  that  have  been 
raised  by  officers  who  have  testified  before  this  committee,  starting 


163 

last  spring,  with  respect  to  lessons  learned.  In  the  9/11  Commis- 
sion, pages  210  to  212,  there  is  a  description  of  the  coordination 
problems  between  DOD  and  CIA  that  resulted  in  what  they  call  a 
missed  opportunity  to  use  armed  Predators  to  attack  Osama  bin 
Laden.  There  have  also  been  questions  raised  with  respect  to  the 
intelligence  that  was  used,  or  not  used,  in  the  battle  situation 
known  as  Tora  Bora.  So  I  think  that  part  of  our  obligation  on  this 
committee  is,  not  just  to  assume  that  everything  DOD  does  has  a 
level  of  perfection,  and  we're  only  looking  at  the  intelligence  out- 
side of  DOD.  I  know  that,  inside  DOD,  there  are  lots  of  after-action 
reports  and  lessons  learned,  and  I  think  it's  important  that,  as  we 
proceed  with  his  inquiry  as  to  how  to  reform  intelligence,  we  have 
the  advantage  of  your  recommendations  with  respect  to  changes  at 
the  tactical  level  that  could  influence  some  of  these  decisions  going 
up  the  chain. 

Finally — this  is  also  directed  to  Under  Secretary  Cambone — it  is 
bewildering  to  me  that  there  were  pieces  of  information  within 
DOD,  within  CIA,  within  FBI  that  were  not  shared.  That  has  noth- 
ing to  do  with  budget  authority,  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  human 
intelligence  capacity.  It  has  to  do  with  a  breakdown  somewhere  in 
the  chain  that  would  have  gotten  information  pushed  to  the  top 
and  shared  among  respective  agencies.  If  any  of  you  can  lend  any 
light  to  the  operational  opportunities  that  were  missed,  again,  as 
set  forth  in  the  9/11  Commission  on  pages  355  and  356,  I  think  for 
any  of  us  who  read  this,  it  is  very  hard  to  understand  how  the  FBI 
wouldn't  be  given  information  that  the  CIA  had. 

That  continued  with  respect  to  Iraq.  As  I  understand  the  prob- 
lems with  the,  so-called,  source  "Curveball,"  that  information  was 
not  conveyed  to  the  CIA  as  to  the  background  of  this  individual, 
the  reliability  of  his  information. 

So  we  can  spend  a  lot  of  time  talking  about  rearranging  the 
boxes  on  the  organization  chart,  but  unless  there  is  a  fundamental 
commitment  to  the  sharing  of  information  at  all  levels — national, 
strategic,  operational,  tactical — we're  just  spinning  our  wheels. 

Finally,  because  I  know  you  have  to  put  in  a  lot  of  words  before 
the  time  goes  up,  this  whole  question  of  secrecy  is  something  that 
I  think  deserves  a  lot  of  attention.  My  predecessor,  the  late  Senator 
Moynihan,  wrote  a  book  called  "Secrecy,"  which  I  commend  to  you 
because  in  it  he  raises  some  very  interesting  questions  about  what 
we  need  to  keep  secret  and  what  we  don't  need  to  keep  secret.  In 
fact,  we  have  over-classified  a  whole  lot  of  information  that,  if  not 
kept  secret,  could  have  actually  helped  people  at  all  levels  of  our 
government  respond  to  situations  that  they  were  confronted  by.  It 
is,  I  think,  a  legitimate  concern  that  we  have  to  figure  out  how  to 
keep  secret  what  is  worth  keeping  secret,  but  we  have  to  quit  this 
over-classifying,  and  create  almost  an  incentive  for  people  to  share 
information,  and  sometimes  to,  I  think,  very  detrimental  con- 
sequences, such  as  the  outing  of  Valerie  Plame  and  also  the  latest 
outrage,  which  was  the  revealing  of  Mr.  Khan's  name.  I  find  those 
things  just  inexcusable  and  unbelievable,  and  it  happens  all  the 
time.  So  I  think  the  whole  question  about  secrecy,  what  should  or 
couldn't  be  classified  needs  to  be  looked  at  at  the  same  time. 

So,  having  exhausted,  I'm  sure,  my  time,  I'd  appreciate  any  re- 
sponse that  any  of  you  might  have  to  any  of  these  points. 


164 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I'll  leave  the  CIA/FBI  piece  to  John 
McLaughlin,  but  let  me  just  say  that  you're  exactly  right,  that  the 
problem  of  stovepiping  and  not  sharing  information  is  a  serious 
one.  It  is  addressed  in  this  report  by  the  9/11  Commission,  prop- 
erly. It's  been  addressed  by  the  executive  branch.  It  occurs  not  only 
between  organizations,  as  you  suggest,  but  within  organizations. 

Second,  I  am  familiar  with  Pat  Moynihan's  book  "Secrecy,"  and 
you're  correct  there,  too,  it  is — when  you're  dealing  with  these 
things  every  day,  I  very  often  ask,  "Why  is  this  classified,"  and, 
"Give  me  a  declassified  version,"  that  comes  out  almost  the  same. 
It  is  because,  I  suppose,  people  are  busy;  they  want  to  be  safe,  not 
sorry;  and  there's  a  process,  always,  to  review,  after  some  period 
of  time.  But  the  over-classification  is,  I  agree,  something  that,  very 
properly,  ought  to  be  addressed  in  a  serious  way,  and  we'd  be 
happy  to  respond  to  some  of  the  other  questions  and  your  com- 
ments, for  the  record. 

Senator  Clinton.  What  about  the  issue  of  Curveball? 

Dr.  Cambone. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  That  probably  is — well,  maybe  Steve  has  a 
comment  on  it,  but  it's  properly  in  my  arena,  as  well. 

My  sense,  looking  back  at  that  one,  was  that  the  real  problem, 
Senator  Clinton,  was  the  fact  that  we,  collectively — the  Defense  In- 
telligence Agency  and  CIA — did  not  have  direct  access  to  that 
source,  which  generated  over  a  hundred  technically — seemingly 
solid  reports  from  a  technical  basis.  I  think  that  was  the  key  thing 
that  impeded  our  use  of  that  source. 

I  don't  know  whether  Dr.  Cambone  has  something  to  add  on  that 
or  not. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you  very  much 

Yes? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  May  I  just  answer  one  or  two  of  your  other 
points.  Senator  Clinton? 

On  the  secrecy  issue,  I  think  this  is  a  complicated  question  in  our 
age,  and  particularly  when  it  comes  to  terrorism.  If  you  think 
about  it,  back  in  the  Cold  War,  or  even  prior  to  September  11,  the 
kinds  of  secrets  we  had  to  go  out  and  find  were  mostly  in  govern- 
ments, ministries,  cabinets,  and  so  forth,  overseas.  Today,  the 
enemy  we're  facing,  particularly  in  terrorism,  compartments  secrets 
down  to  a  handful  of  people  in  a  cave  somewhere.  It's  very  well- 
documented  in  the  9/11  report  how  few  people  knew  about  that. 

So  what  I  take  from  this  is,  they  use  secrecy  as  a  strategic  weap- 
on. It's  a  strategic  weapon  for  them.  Because  it's  asymmetric — 
asymmetrically,  it  works  against  us  because  we  don't  keep  secrets 
very  well.  Most  of  what  we  have  to  say,  most  of  what — it's  all  out 
there.  As  the  Secretary  said,  they  go  to  school  on  us. 

So  while  I  support  a  lot  of  what  Senator  Moynihan  had  to  say — 
and  I'm  familiar  with  his  book — I  just  think  we  do  need  to  rethink 
the  whole  secrecy  thing  when  we're  going  against  terrorists. 

On  the  information-sharing,  this  is  another  complicated  issue. 
We  have  to  be  careful  not  to  point  fingers  on  this,  because  it  is 
complicated.  People  have  different  memories  of  what  was  shared, 
what  wasn't  shared.  CIA  has  some  differences  with  the  9/11  Com- 
mission on  this  point,  particularly  on  the  issue  of  sharing  with  FBI. 
We  have  pointed  out  to  them  that  the  original  reporting,  for  exam- 


165 

pie,  on  the  two  hijackers — pointed  out  to  the  9/11  Commission — 
that  the  original  intelligence  on  them  was  available  to  a  wide  array 
of  agencies,  including  FBI,  CIA,  NSA,  State  Department,  and  so 
forth.  We  pointed  out  to  them  that  we  made  an  association,  with 
the  FBI,  between  one  of  these  hijackers  and  the  U.S.S.  Cole  bomb- 
er, one  of  the  U.S.S.  Cole  bombers,  Khaled,  in  approximately  De- 
cember 2000,  I  believe  it  was.  For  some  reason,  they  didn't  accept 
that,  and  the  report  says  what  it  does.  That  said,  there  were  many 
instances  where  information  wasn't  shared.  But  I  just  think  it's 
been  a  bit  overdrawn  in  the  report. 

Chairman  Warner.  Thank  you.  Director  McLaughlin. 

Thank  you,  Senator  Clinton. 

Senator  Graham. 

Senator  Graham.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  McLaughlin,  I've  heard  the  story  often  repeated  that 
Zarqawi — is  that  the  way  you  say  the  person's  name? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Abu  Musab  al  Zarqawi,  yes. 

Senator  Graham.  Did  he  go  to  Baghdad,  at  any  time,  to  receive 
healthcare  treatment? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  We  think  he  did. 

Senator  Graham.  Okay.  We  think  he  went  to  Baghdad  when 
Saddam  Hussein  was  in  power,  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Yes. 

Senator  Graham.  One  thing  that  I've  learned  from  looking  at 
this  report  very  briefly  is,  it  tells  us  a  lot  about  the  past,  and  some 
things  about  the  present,  but  it  also  tells  us  about  the  future.  The 
one  thing  that  I  get  from  this  report  that  I  think  we're  overlooking 
a  bit  is  that  this  war  is  going  to  go  on  a  lot  longer  than  any  of  us 
begin  to  realize.  The  report  says,  "The  enemy  is  just  not  terrorism, 
it  is  the  threat  posed  specifically  by  Islamist  terrorism,  by  Osama 
bin  Laden,  and  others,  who  draw  on  a  long  tradition  of  extreme  in- 
tolerance within  a  minority  strain  of  Islam  that  does  not  distin- 
guish politics  from  religion,  and  distorts  both.  The  enemy  is  not 
Islam,  the  great  world  faith,  but  a  perversion  of  Islam.  The  enemy 
goes  beyond  al  Qaeda  to  include  the  radical  ideological  movement 
inspired  in  part  by  al  Qaeda  that  has  spawned  other  terrorist 
groups  and  violence.  Thus,  our  strategy  must  match  our  means  to 
two  ends:  dismantling  the  al  Qaeda  network  and,  in  the  long  term, 
prevailing  over  the  ideology  that  contributes  to  Islamist  terrorism." 

Do  all  of  you  agree  that  the  American  public  needs  to  understand 
that,  for  years  to  come,  we  will  be  at  war  with  these  groups?  Is 
that  a  correct  statement?  Do  you  agree  with  the  9/11  Commission's 
findings  there? 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  I  do. 

Senator  Graham.  Having  said  that,  the  structural  changes  that 
we're  debating  here  today  are  important  to  me.  Now,  I've  come 
away  with  one  conclusion.  If  we're  going  to  have  a  National  Intel- 
ligence Director,  he  or  she  needs  to  be  the  person  held  accountable, 
and  they  need  all  the  power,  not  part  of  the  power. 

I  came  in  here  as  a  believer  in  that  position.  Now  I'm  not  so  sure. 
The  reason  I'm  not  so  sure  is  because  the  functions  you  just  de- 
scribed that  you  currently  have — if  given  to  the  National  Intel- 
ligence Director,  I  don't  know  how  you  incorporate  all  those  func- 


166 

tions  and,  at  the  same  time,  give  the  President  a  variety  of  options 
and  a  variety  of  opinions. 

But  having  said  all  of  that,  my  question  to  you,  Secretary  Rums- 
feld— the  Commission  tells  us  that  if  we're  going  to  win  this  war, 
we  have  to  deny  our  enemies  sanctuaries.  Could  you  tell  the  com- 
mittee, without  disclosing  any  secret  information,  what  countries, 
in  your  opinion,  are  providing  sanctuary  to  al  Qaeda,  or  terrorist 
groups  like  al  Qaeda,  and  what  strategy  do  we  have  to  dry  up  that 
sanctuary? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Yes,  I'm  doing  something  that's  strange: 
I'm  thinking  how  to  respond. 

Senator  Graham.  Because  that's  a  tough  question. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  It  is  a  tough  question. 

Senator  Graham.  Who  are  they,  and  what  do  we  do  about  them? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Let  me  answer  the  first  question  first.  You 
talked  about  whether  or  not  the  NID  ought  to  have  all  the  power. 
I  think  it's  terribly  important  that  we  ask  ourselves  the  question, 
"All  the  power  for  what?" 

Senator  Graham.  Right. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  You  were  talking  about  the  global  war  on 
terror.  The  Intelligence  Community,  as  we  said,  has  a  much  broad- 
er set  of  tasks.  We  do  not  want  to  organize  the  Intelligence  Com- 
munity to  fit  one  element 

Senator  Graham.  Right. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  — important,  to  be  sure — but  to  fit  any  one 
element,  because  the  responsibilities  are  so  broad. 

Second,  with  respect  to  sanctuaries,  you  used  the  phrase,  "Which 
countries  are  providing  it?"  There  are  sanctuaries  that  are  provided 
by  countries,  as  we  know.  There  are  also  sanctuaries  that  are  not 
provided  by  the  countries  at  all.  They  have  portions  of  their  coun- 
tries that  they  do  not  govern  effectively,  and  cannot  govern  effec- 
tively. Then  there  are  countries  that  aren't  countries,  that  are — I 
mean,  Somalia  is  a  situation  that  is  a  geographical  country,  but, 
in  terms  of  a  government,  it — I  don't  think  it  could  be  said—John, 
correct  me  if  you  disagree — but  I  don't  think  it  could  be  said  that 
they  have  a  government  that  presides  over  the  real  estate  in  that 
country  in  an  effective  way. 

I  guess  the  word  "sanctuary"  also  is  a  problem,  because  you  have 
to  define  it.  Is  the  ability  to  use  the  banking  system  a  sanctuary? 
Is  the  ability  to  use  wire  transfers,  cyberspace,  is  that  a  sanctuary? 

We  know  that  seams  are  used  effectively.  The  Pakistan/Afghan 
border  is  a  problem.  The  Saudi/Yemeni  border  is  a  problem.  The 
Syrian/Iraqi  border  is  a  problem.  The  Iranian  border  is  a  problem. 

We  know  that  countries  vary  in  their  behavior  with  respect  to 
terrorists,  that  some  are  aggressive  and  go  after  them,  that  some 
tolerate  them  and  don't  do  much  about  them,  and,  in  effect,  are, 
kind  of,  fellow  travelers  with  it,  but  not  active 

Senator  Graham.  Would  Iran  be  in  the  country  that  tolerates 
and  does  very  little  about  them? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  It's  a  mixture.  I  think  John  would  be  better 
to  answer  this.  But  clearly  they  are  active  with  Hezbollah,  and 
that's  a  terrorist  organization  by  our  definition.  Clearly  there  have 
been,  and  probably  are  today,  al  Qaeda  in  Iran  that  they  have  not 


167 

dealt  with  in  a  way  that  a  country  that  was  against  al  Qaeda 
would  have  done.  They  have  had  the  Ansar  al  Islam  organization 
back  and  forth  across  their  borders. 

John,  do  you  want  to  elaborate?  You're  the  expert. 

Mr.  McLaughlin.  Those  are  all  the  right  points,  Mr.  Secretary. 
If  you're  talking  about  Iran — I  think  the  Secretary  said  it  accu- 
rately— it's,  on  this  score,  a  bit  schizophrenic.  You'll  find  elements 
of  the  government  that  are  uncomfortable  with  this,  but  the  pre- 
vailing elements  in  that  government  are  tolerant  toward  terrorists, 
and  there's  no  question  that  they  support,  actively,  Hezbollah. 
Hezbollah  draws  its  inspiration  and  origins  from  Iran,  back  in  the 
late  1970s,  and  continues,  to  this  day,  to  be  dedicated  to  the  de- 
struction of  Israel  and  to  receive  support  from  Iran  for  that  pur- 
pose. 

Chairman  Warner.  Senator,  I  thank  you.  I  thank  the  witnesses. 
We've  had  an  excellent 

Yes,  Mr.  Secretary? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  apologize,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  do  want  to 
have  the  record  clear.  Senator  Warner,  you  and  Senator  Levin  were 
briefed  on  our  global  posture 

Chairman  Warner.  That  is  correct 


Secretary  Rumsfeld.  — at  a  breakfast 

Chairman  Warner. — in  your  office. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  — in  my  office  by  me,  by  the  Chairman,  by 
Andy  Hoehn. 

Chairman  WARNER.  Correct. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Since  then,  the  committee's  professional 
staff  have  been  briefed  at  least  twice.  Four  or  5  weeks  ago,  brief- 
ings were  conducted  for  the  personal  staffs  of  all  committee  mem- 
bers. There  is,  and  has  been,  an  outstanding  offer  to  brief  any  com- 
mittee member.  We  have  briefed  a  significant  number  of  Members 
of  the  Senate  and  the  House,  and  staffs  of  not  just  your  committee, 
but  the  Appropriations  Committee,  the  Armed  Services  Committee, 
the  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  and  the  MILCON  Subcommittees 
of  some  House  and  Senate  Members.  We  have  made  a  major  effort 
on  the  global  posture  because  it  is  a  big  and  important  issue;  and 
I  would  not  want  the  record  to  suggest  that  those  opportunities 
have  not  been  available  to  staff  members,  because  they  have. 

Chairman  Warner.  I've  indicated  to  you  that  I  verified  those 
facts.  There  has  been  a  complete  disclosure  by  you  to  the  Senator 
and  myself  and  others  over  the  course  of  time. 

Senator  Levin.  Mr.  Chairman,  just  to  clarify  further,  I  thank  the 
Secretary  for  those  briefings  that  he  made  reference  to,  including 
the  very  general  one  in  his  office.  However,  I  think  it  is  fair  to  say 
that  the  actual  decision  that  was  made,  the  details  of  it,  were  not 
briefed  to  Members  of  the  Senate,  were  not  offered,  as  is  usually 
the  customary  courtesy,  that,  prior  to  an  announcement  of  some- 
thing of  this  dimension,  that  Members  of  the  Senate  would  be  of- 
fered a  briefing  of  that  particular  decision,  to  the  details  that  were 
so  critically  important  that  were  outlined  yesterday  were  not 
briefed,  either  in  your  office,  as  far  as  I  remember,  or  offered. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  They  were  briefed,  and  they  were  offered. 

Senator  Levin.  The  details? 


168 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  The  details  that  have  been  released  and 
that  we  know.  We're  now  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  process  of 
going  to  country  after  country  and  deciding,  with  them,  what  we 
will  do  with  them,  and  to  what  degree  will  we  have  usability  of 
their  forces,  but 

Senator  Levin.  In  which  case 


Secretary  Rumsfeld.  — there's  no  question 

Senator  Levin. — in  which  case,  there  weren't  many  details  yes- 
terday. I  guess  that's  the  summary,  then. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  There  weren't.  Because  they  will  roll  out  as 
each  country  is  dealt  with.  When  one  country  may  be  our  first 
choice,  and  we  would  go  to  them,  try  to  work  out  an  arrangement; 
if  it  doesn't  work  out,  we  have  other  options.  Then  we  would  slide 
off  that  and  go  somewhere  else.  But  the  broad  thrust  of  it  was 
what  we  briefed,  and  what  we  have  offered  to  brief.  As  I  said  ear- 
lier, we'd  be  happy  to  hold  a  hearing  on  this  and  give  you  anything 
we  have. 

Chairman  Warner.  That  opportunity  will  be  given. 

I  thank  you,  Mr.  Secretary.  I  thank  you,  Director.  I  thank  you. 
General.  We've  had  a  very  good  hearing.  We  are  adjourned. 

[Questions  for  the  record  with  answers  supplied  follow:] 

Questions  Submitted  by  Senator  Carl  Levin 

PROBLEMS  in  THE  DOD  IN  THE  REPROGRAMMING  PROCESS 

1.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld,  during  the  hearing  we  discussed  the  9/11 
Commission's  recommendation  on  giving  overall  budget  execution  authority  for  the 
National  Foreign  Intelligence  Program  (NFIP)  to  a  new  National  Intelligence  Direc- 
tor (NID),  including  authority  for  reprogramming  funds  during  the  execution  of  the 
budget.  Could  you  provide  any  examples  where  there  have  been  problems  within  the 
administration  within  the  last  3  years  of  getting  approval  to  reprogram  funds  in 
NFIPs? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  The  Department  has  not  experienced  problems  getting  ap- 
proval to  reprogram  funds  in  NFIP  programs.  The  DOD  has  not  opposed  any  NFIP 
reprogramming . 

PROBLEMS  IN  THE  CIA  IN  THE  REPROGRAMMING  PROCESS 

2.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughhn,  could  you  provide  any  examples  where 
there  have  been  problems  within  the  administration  within  the  last  3  years  of  get- 
ting approval  to  reprogram  funds  to  correct  emergent  problems  in  NFIPs? 

Director  McLaughlin.  Over  the  last  3  years,  there  have  never  been  formal  writ- 
ten objections  by  the  Secretary  or  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense  to  NFIP  reprogram- 
ming actions.  However,  significant  coordination  issues  occasionally  increase  the 
amount  of  time  required  to  obtain  concurrence  by  the  OSD  and  move  the  transfer 
request  through  the  approval  process.  For  example,  in  2002,  OSD  delayed  concur- 
rence for  an  NRO  reprogramming  action  for  6  months  to  ensure  sufficient  General 
Transfer  Authority  would  be  available  for  DOD  reprogramming  actions.  Eventually 
Congress  appropriated  funds  for  the  project  in  a  supplemental  and  NRO  withdrew 
its  request. 

3.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughlin,  during  the  hearing,  you  mentioned  a  fig- 
ure of  5  months  as  representative  of  the  time  that  is  required  to  obtain  approval 
of  an  NFIP  reprogramming  request.  Could  you  provide  some  specific  examples  of  re- 
programming actions,  including  the  times  it  took  to  obtain  Department  of  Defense 
(DOD),  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  (0MB),  and  congressional  approval,  that 
led  you  to  this  assessment? 

Director  McLaughlin.  Each  reprogramming  request  is  unique,  and  the  time  re- 
quired to  obtain  approval  can  vary  depending  on  the  type  of  reprogramming  and  the 
authority  under  which  the  action  is  requested.  On  average,  after  the  programs  sub- 
mit requests.  Community  Management  Staff  (CMS)  and  OSD  staffing  require  about 
a  month  to  coordinate  with  the  programs  and  General  Counsel,  prepare  the  transfer 


169 

documents,  and  obtain  approvals.  0MB  approval  generally  adds  another  2  weeks  to 
the  process  and  congressional  notification  takes  up  to  a  month.  OSD  apportionment 
takes  only  a  couple  of  days.  Generally,  the  greatest  delays  arise  as  a  result  of  the 
staffing  process,  legal  interpretations,  or  debates  over  offset  choices  within  and 
among  the  programs,  CMS,  OSD,  and  0MB.  All  in  all,  reprogramming  requests  re- 
quiring congressional  notification  require  approximately  5  months;  those  that  do  not 
take  between  3  and  4  months. 

CMS  works  closely  with  the  programs  on  reprogrammings  and  transfers,  even  be- 
fore requests  are  formally  submitted  to  CMS,  so  specifying  the  exact  amount  of  time 
it  takes  for  programs  to  submit  reprogramming  requests  to  CMS  can  be  inexact.  The 
staffs  also  attempt  to  mitigate  delays  by  working  concurrently  with  OSD  and  0MB 
counterparts  while  formal  approvals  are  being  obtained.  This  allows  the  staff  to  ad- 
dress concerns  expeditiously  and  alleviate  delays  that  are  inherent  in  the  sequential 
approval  process. 

RESTRUCTURING  CHECKLIST 

4.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld,  I  am  going  to  list  a  series  of  recommenda- 
tions that  the  9/11  Commission  makes  and  would  appreciate  your  telling  the  com- 
mittee whether  you  agree  or  disagree  with  each  individual  recommendation  and 
why: 

•  The  National  Counterterrorism  Center  (NCTC)  should  perform  joint  plan- 
ning. The  plans  would  assign  operational  responsibilities  to  lead  agencies, 
such  as  Department  of  State  (State),  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA), 
the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  (FBI),  Defense  and  its  combatant  com- 
mands. Homeland  Security,  and  other  agencies. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  The  DOD  has  had  nearly  20  years  of  experience  with 
"jointness"  and  is  proof  of  how  powerful  a  joint  perspective  driving  joint  operations 
can  be  as  evidenced  recently  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq.  I  endorse  adopting  the  DOD 
model  (following  Goldwater-Nichols  Act  1986)  of  centralized  planning  and  decentral- 
ized execution  for  the  NCTC  as  a  means  of  improving  indications  and  warning  and 
more  actionable  intelligence  in  support  of  the  counterterrorism  mission.  In  this  con- 
struct, the  NCTC  would  provide  strategic  guidance,  mission  parameters,  and  broad 
operational  concepts  to  the  designated  department  or  agency  to  facilitate  operational 
planning  and  mission  execution.  The  department/agency  would  develop  an  oper- 
ational counterterrorism  plan,  suitable  for  mission  execution  with  close  review  by 
the  NCTC.  The  designated  department/agency  would  execute  those  plans  in  receipt 
of  an  executive  order  from  the  national  authority.  Throughout  the  process  of  oper- 
ational planning  and  execution,  the  NCTC  and  the  designated  department/agency 
would  be  generating  intelligence  at  the  strategic  and  operational  level  thereby  en- 
suring competitive  analysis.  In  addition,  the  operations  themselves  would  be  creat- 
ing new  intelligence  that  in  the  end  will  enhance  our  ability  to  provide  indications 
and  warning  and  a  better  intelligence  product  to  the  national  command  authority 
and  to  the  operator. 

•  The  NID  should  have  the  authority  to  reprogram  funds  among  the  na- 
tional intelligence  agencies  to  meet  any  new  priority. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  The  NID  should  have  authority  to  reprogram  funds  among 
the  national  intelligence  agencies  when  there  is  a  higher  priority  or  unforeseen  in- 
telligence requirement.  I  can't  imagine  that  the  NID  would  not  want  to  consult  with 
the  head  of  the  department  or  agency  head. 

•  Should  the  President  issue  a  new  Executive  Order  12333  that  would  give 
a  NID  budget  execution  authority,  including  reprogramming  authority,  for 
DOD  intelligence  agencies? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Since  the  August  17  hearing,  the  President  has  issued  Exec- 
utive Order  13355,  "Strengthened  Management  of  the  Intelligence  Community," 
which  expands  the  authority  of  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence  over  reprogram- 
ming of  intelligence  funds.  On  September  8,  the  White  House  announced  that  the 
President  supports  providing  this  expanded  authority  to  a  newly  created  NID. 

•  The  NID  should  approve  and  submit  nominations  to  the  President  of  the 
individuals  who  would  lead  the  CIA,  Defense  Intelligence  Agency  (DIA), 
FBI  Intelligence  Office,  National  Security  Agency  (NSA),  National 
Geospatial-Intelligence  Agency  (NGA),  National  Reconnaissance  Office 
(NRO),  Information  Analysis  and  Infrastructure  Protection  Directorate  of 
the  Department  of  Homeland  Security,  and  other  intelligence  capabilities. 

•  Should  Congress  amend  section  201  of  title  10  which  gives  the  Secretary 
of  Defense  the  authority:  (1)  to  nominate,  after  seeking  the  concurrence  of 


170 

the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence,  the  Directors  of  NRO,  NGA,  and  NSA; 
and  (2)  to  nominate  the  Director  of  DIA,  after  consulting  with  the  Director 
of  Central  Intelligence? 
Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  support  the  President  and  his  plan  to  create  a  strong  NID. 

•  Lead  responsibility  for  directing  and  executing  paramilitary  operations, 
whether  clandestine  or  covert,  should  shift  to  the  Defense  Department. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  The  DOD  and  the  CIA  have  embarked  upon  a  study  of  this 
question.  The  Department  will  report  to  the  President  by  February  18,  2005. 

•  The  NID  would  manage  this  national  effort  [managing  the  national  intel- 
ligence program  and  overseeing  the  component  agencies  of  the  Intelligence 
Community]  with  the  help  of  three  deputies,  each  of  which  would  also  hold 
a  key  position  in  one  of  the  component  agencies."  (NOTE:  The  organization 
chart  in  the  Commission's  report  implies  that  these  deputies,  including  the 
one  for  Defense,  the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Intelligence,  would  be 
responsible  for  all  hiring,  training,  acquiring,  equipping,  and  fielding  of  in- 
telligence capabilities  within  their  respective  departments.) 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  support  the  position  put  forward  by  the  President. 

DIRECTOR  OF  CENTRAL  INTELLIGENCE  COMMENTING  ON  PUBLIC  STATEMENTS  OF 
ADMINISTRATION  OFFICIALS 

5.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughlin,  in  responding  to  my  question  about  the 
difference  between  the  internal  intelligence  assessment  on  the  likelihood  that  Sad- 
dam Hussein  would  give  a  weapon  of  mass  destruction  to  terrorists,  you  said,  "I  just 
don't  think  it's  our  job  to  comment  on  the  public  statements  of  the  administration 
or  of  Congress.  There  are  times,  as  we've  explained  in  the  past,  when  we  will  take 
someone  aside,  either  a  Member  of  Congress  or  a  member  of  the  administration,  and 
quietly  tell  them  there's  new  information  on  this  and  I  would  describe  it  differently." 

In  an  October  7,  2002  letter,  the  DCI,  George  Tenet,  to  Senator  Bob  Graham, 
Chairman  of  the  Senate  Select  Committee  on  Intelligence,  said: 

"Saddam  for  now  appears  to  be  drawing  a  line  short  of  conducting  terror- 
ist attacks  with  conventional  or  chemical  or  biological  warfare  (CBW) 
against  the  United  States. 

"Should  Saddam  conclude  that  a  U.S. -led  attack  could  no  longer  be  de- 
terred, he  probably  would  become  much  less  constrained  in  adopting  terror- 
ist actions.  Such  terrorism  might  involve  conventional  means,  as  with  Iraq's 
unsuccessful  attempt  at  a  terrorist  offensive  in  1991,  or  CBW. 

"Saddam  might  decide  that  the  extreme  step  of  assisting  Islamist  terror- 
ists in  conducting  a  weapons  of  mass  destruction  (WMD)  attack  against  the 
United  States  would  be  his  last  chance  to  exact  vengeance  by  taking  a  large 
number  of  people  with  him." 
But  the  same  day,  October  7,  2002,  in  a  speech  in  Cincinnati,  the  President  said: 
"Iraq  could  decide  on  any  given  day  to  provide  a  biological  or  chemical 
weapon  to  a  terrorist  group  or  individual  terrorists.  Alliances  with  terror- 
ists could  allow  the  Iraqi  regime  to  attack  America  without  leaving  any  fin- 
gerprints." 
Are  you  aware  of  any  attempts  to  inform  the  President  that  the  intelligence  as- 
sessment of  Saddam  Hussein  sharing  weapons  of  mass  destruction  would  likely  be 
done  as  "his  last  chance  to  exact  vengeance  by  taking  a  large  number  of  people  with 
him"  rather  than,  "on  any  given  day?" 

Director  McLaughlin  did  not  respond  in  time  for  printing.  When  received,  answer 
will  be  retained  by  in  committee  files. 

6.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughlin,  in  an  October  8,  2002,  interview  with  the 
New  York  Times,  Director  Tenet  said  "there  is  no  inconsistency"  between  the  CIA 
views  in  the  letter  and  those  of  the  President.  Is  such  a  public  statement  by  Director 
Tenet  consistent  with  a  policy  not  "to  comment  on  the  public  statements  of  the  ad- 
ministration or  of  Congress?" 

Director  McLaughlin  did  not  respond  in  time  for  printing.  When  received,  answer 
will  be  retained  by  in  committee  files. 

CONSOLIDATING  PERSONNEL  AND  BUDGET  CONTROL  TO  IMPROVE  INFORMATION  FLOW 

7.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld,  Director  McLaughlin,  and  General  Myers, 
there  apparently  was  a  number  of  instances  where  components  of  the  Intelligence 


171 

Community  possessed  information  that  might  have  helped  other  agencies  take  ac- 
tion before  the  September  11  terrorist  attacks.  The  9/11  Commission  has  rec- 
ommended giving  a  new  NID  control  of  personnel  and  budget  of  the  national  intel- 
ligence program,  which  I  assume  would  equate  to  the  NFIP.  A  large  portion  of  the 
NFIP  funding  currently  supports  organizations  that  work  for  both  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  and  the  Director  of  Central  Intelligence. 

One  specific  example  of  failure  to  share  information  was  the  CIA's  failure  to  share 
information  on  the  presence  of  two  of  the  September  1 1  plotters  with  the  Immigra- 
tion and  Naturalization  Service  (INS)  or  the  FBI.  This  was  despite  the  fact  that  the 
CIA  staff  and  budget  were  operating  under  the  control  of  the  DCI  (the  current  ver- 
sion of  the  proposed  NID).  Will  each  of  you  indicate  if  you  believe  that  there  are 
currently  impediments  to  sharing  data  that  can  only  be  broken  down  by  changing 
organizational  relationships,  and  if  so,  what  laws  need  to  be  changed? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  DOD  strongly  supports  improving  information  sharing  and 
supports  the  President's  proposal  on  this  subject. 

Director  McLaughlin.  [Deleted.] 

General  Myers.  I  do  not  believe  there  are  currently  any  impediments  to  sharing 
information  that  can  only  be  solved  by  changing  organizational  relationships.  The 
information-sharing  problems  we  have  experienced  are,  for  the  most  part,  rooted  in 
cultural  bias,  not  structural  obstacles. 

8.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughlin,  is  there  any  reason  to  believe  that  the 
CIA's  failure  to  share  data  with  the  INS  or  FBI  was  influenced  in  any  way  by  the 
DCI's  personnel  and  budget  execution  control  of  the  CIA? 

Director  McLaughlin  did  not  respond  in  time  for  printing.  When  received,  answer 
Avill  be  retained  by  in  committee  files. 

9.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld,  Director  McLaughlin,  and  General  Myers, 
are  any  of  you  aware  of  any  evidence  that  DOD  agencies  had  unshared  data  that 
might  have  helped  prevent  any  of  the  September  1 1  attacks? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  am  not  aware  of  any  evidence  that  there  was  unshared 
data  in  a  DOD  agency  which  could  have  prevented  the  September  11  attacks. 

Director  McLaughlin.  No,  CIA  is  not  aware  that  any  of  the  DOD  agencies,  or 
for  that  matter,  any  U.S.  Government  entity,  had  any  unshared  data  that  might 
have  helped  prevent  any  of  the  September  11  attacks.  It  is  likely  that  CIA,  FBI, 
and  NSA  all  had  bits  and  pieces  of  information  that  were  somehow  related  to  one 
or  more  of  the  19  hijackers,  but  none  of  that  information,  even  if  it  had  all  been 
amalgamated  prior  to  September  11,  would  have  been  enough  to  have  prevented  the 
September  11  attacks.  We  still  would  have  been  missing  the  answers  to  the  who, 
what,  when,  or  where  questions. 

General  Myers.  No.  I  am  not  aware  of  any  evidence  that  DOD  agencies  had 
unshared  data  that  might  have  helped  prevent  any  of  the  September  11  attacks. 

NCTC  authority  TO  ASSIGN  OPERATIONAL  RESPONSIBILITIES  TO  THE  MILITARY 

10.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General  Myers,  the  9/11  Commission 
recommended  the  following:  "Lead  responsibility  for  directing  and  executing  para- 
military operations,  whether  clandestine  or  covert,  should  shift  to  the  Department 
of  Defense.  There  it  should  be  consolidated  with  the  capabilities  for  training,  direc- 
tion, and  execution  of  such  operations  already  being  developed  in  the  Special  Oper- 
ations Command."  Tasking  for  counterterrorism  paramilitary  operations  would  be 
from  the  NID  through  the  National  Counterterrorism  Center  (NCTC)  to  the  oper- 
ational force.  The  Commission  report  is  silent  on  tasking  for  paramilitary  activities 
other  than  on  behalf  of  counterterrorism.  If  the  NCTC  were  to  have  the  authority 
to  "assign  operational  responsibilities"  to  combatant  commanders  to  conduct 
counterterrorist  operations,  how  could  we  avoid  creating  conflicting  or  confusing 
chains  of  command? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  The  shape  and  functions  of  the  National  Counterterrorism 
Center  (NCTC)  are  presently  being  addressed  in  accordance  with  the  President's  ex- 
isting executive  order  and  the  Intelligence  Reform  and  Terrorism  Prevention  Act  of 
2004  by  an  interagency  task  force  in  which  DOD  is  participating.  We  are  also  ad- 
dressing the  9/11  Commission's  recommendation  on  paramilitary  operations  under 
a  November  18,  2004,  presidential  directive  for  a  joint  review  by  myself  and  the  Di- 
rector of  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency.  On  both  the  NCTC  and  the  Paramilitary 
question,  DOD,  the  CIA,  and  other  elements  of  the  interagency  are  working  together 
closely  to  provide  a  coordinated  set  of  responses  and  recommendations  to  the  Presi- 
dent. As  to  the  suggestion  that  operational  taskings  should  flow  directly  from  the 


172 

NCTC  to  the  operational  force,  if  the  taskings  were  intended  for  execution  by  DOD, 
such  a  construct  would  be  unacceptable  due  to  its  infringement  on  the  chain-of-com- 
mand  responsibilities  inherent  to  the  Department  and  its  military  forces. 

General  Myers.  If  the  NCTC  were  to  have  the  authority  to  "assign  operational 
responsibilities,"  it  would  violate  the  chain  of  command  and  lead  to  confusion  and 
loss  of  unity  of  effort.  If  the  NCTC  were  to  have  such  responsibility,  it  is  imperative 
that  the  NCTC  recommend  any  requirements  for  combatant  commanders  to  the  Of- 
fice of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Secretary  of  Defense  approval  and  military  ad- 
vice. This  would  be  the  only  way  to  keep  the  chains  of  command  clear. 

11.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General  Myers,  how  would  a  combat- 
ant commander  resolve  conflicting  directives  from  the  DOD  chain  of  command  and 
from  the  NCTC?  Wouldn't  such  an  arrangement  be  violating  the  fundamental  prin- 
cipal of  unity  of  command? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Routing  all  military  directives  via  the  Office  of  the  Secretary 
of  Defense  would  mitigate  any  potential  conflicts  and  would  ensure  unity  of  com- 
mand. The  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  and  the  Joint  Staff  ensure  that  mili- 
tary advice  is  provided  to  the  President  and  coordination  is  effected  for  all  oper- 
ational directives. 

General  Myers.  Routing  all  military  directives  via  the  Office  of  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  would  mitigate  any  potential  conflicts  and  would  ensure  unity  of  command 
remains  intact.  As  stipulated  by  law,  the  military  chain  of  command  originates  with 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  through  the  Secretary  of  Defense  to  the  combat- 
ant commanders.  Furthermore,  this  arrangement  permits  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
to  get  military  advice  from  the  CJCS  and  JCS  as  well  as  permits  combatant  com- 
manders to  address  perceived  conflicting  guidance  directly  with  the  Office  of  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  without  injecting  confusion  within  the  NCTC. 

12.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General  Myers,  would  the  President 
and  the  Secretary  of  Defense  have  to  approve  each  such  assignment? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  As  the  principal  assistant  to  the  President  in  all  matters  re- 
lating to  the  Department  of  Defense,  the  Secretary  of  Defense  would  approve  the 
assignment  of  operational  responsibilities  to  combatant  commanders  in  support  of 
counterterrorist  operations  coordinated  by  NCTC. 

General  Myers.  As  the  principal  assistant  to  the  President  in  all  matters  relating 
to  the  Department  of  Defense,  the  Secretary  of  Defense  would  approve  the  assign- 
ment of  operational  responsibilities  to  combatant  commanders  in  support  of 
counterterrorist  operations. 

The  NCTC  should  not  have  command  authority  and  should  not  inject  itself  in  the 
chain  of  command  by  directing  commanders  to  perform  actions.  As  suggested  by  the 
9/11  Commission's  report,  the  NCTC  will  likely  work  through  existing  government 
agencies.  The  27  August  2004  executive  order  directing  the  establishment  of  the 
NCTC  states  the  NCTC  shall  be  "implemented  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  au- 
thority of  the  principal  officers  of  agencies  as  heads  of  their  respective  Agencies", 
and  heads  of  agencies  "shall  keep  the  Director  of  the  Center  fully  and  currently  in- 
formed of  [their]  activities."  The  declared  goal  of  creating  NCTC  is  to  strengthen  in- 
telligence analysis,  strategic  planning  against  global  terrorist  threats  and  to  ensure 
intelligence  support  to  operations. 

13.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughlin,  what  effect  would  such  operational  as- 
signment authority  within  the  NCTC  have  on  the  counterterrorist  operations  of  the 
CIA? 

Director  McLaughlin.  [Deleted.] 

LEAD  FOR  ALL  PARAMILITARY  OPERATIONS 

14.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  Director  McLaughlin,  the  government 
is  currently  operating  in  foreign  areas  with  a  clearly  defined  separation  of  functions 
between  the  DOD  and  the  CIA.  The  CIA  is  responsible  for  conducting  covert  action 
operations,  where  the  government  has  the  ability  to  deny  involvement  in  such  ac- 
tivities if  they  are  compromised.  The  DOD  is  responsible  for  conducting  other  clan- 
destine or  secret  operations  where  the  potential  revelation  of  U.S.  Government  in- 
volvement would  not  be  so  sensitive.  Under  the  current  system,  this  possible  covert 
action  would  be  approved  through  the  normal  executive  branch  approval  process 
and  the  President  would  submit  a  finding  to  Congress  before  executing  such  an  op- 
eration. Upon  approval  and  appropriate  notification,  the  DCI  would  task  the  CIA 
to  conduct  this  mission.  Under  the  9/11  Commission  recommendations,  the  process 


173 

for  presidential  approval  and  congressional  notification  wovdd  presumably  be  simi- 
lar, but  the  NID  would  task  someone  within  DOD.  It  is  not  exactly  clear  whether 
the  Commission  intends  that  the  tasking  would  be  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  or 
directly  to  the  Special  Operations  Command  or  to  one  of  the  combatant  command- 
ers. Then  forces  working  for  the  Special  Operations  Command  or  forces  working  for 
the  combatant  commander  would  execute  the  mission.  I  would  like  to  ask  each  of 
you,  do  you  agree  that  this  is  the  way  such  operations  would  be  changed? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  do  not  support  direct  taskings  of  U.S.  Special  Operations 
Command  or  any  other  combatant  command  outside  the  channels  constituted  by  the 
legally  prescribed  chain  of  command  which  runs  from  the  President,  through  the 
Secretary,  to  those  commanders.  Current  statutes  and  the  military  chain  of  com- 
mand preclude  direct  tasking  of  the  U.s.  Special  Operations  Command  or  any  other 
combatant  command  by  the  National  Counterterrorism  Center  (NCTC)  or  the  Direc- 
tor for  National  Intelligence. 

Director  McLaughlin  did  not  respond  in  time  for  printing.  When  received,  answer 
will  be  retained  by  in  committee  files. 

15.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  Director  McLaughlin,  do  you  believe 
it  would  be  appropriate,  and  consistent  with  our  obligations  under  the  Geneva  Con- 
ventions, for  U.S.  military  personnel  to  become  involved  in  conducting  covert  oper- 
ations pursuant  to  presidential  findings? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Pending  the  completion  of  the  presidentially  directed  study 
on  the  9/11  Commission  paramilitary  recommendation,  it  would  be  inappropriate  for 
me  to  comment. 

Director  McLaughlin  did  not  respond  in  time  for  printing.  When  received,  answer 
will  be  retained  by  in  committee  files. 

USDri)  REPORTING  TO  NATIONAL  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTOR  RATHER  THAN  SECRETARY  OF 

DEFENSE 

16.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld,  Director  McLaughlin,  General  Myers,  and 
Under  Secretary  Cambone,  the  9/11  Commission  recommends  that  the  new  NID 
should  approve  and  submit  the  nomination  to  the  President  for  the  Under  Secretary 
of  Defense  for  Intelligence,  who  would  then  report  to  the  NID.  Currently  the  Under 
Secretary  of  Defense  for  Intelligence  is  recommended  by,  and  reports  to,  the  Sec- 
retary of  Defense.  I'd  like  to  ask  each  of  you,  what  are  the  pros  and  cons  of  having 
the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Intelligence  selected  by  and  reporting  to  the 
NID,  vice  the  Secretary  of  Defense,  and  do  you  agree  with  this  recommendation? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  Secretary  Cambone.  The  position  of  the  Under  Secretary 
of  Defense  for  Intelligence  was  created  by  law  (section  137  title  10)  to  be  the  prin- 
cipal staff  assistant  and  advisor  to  the  Secretary  of  Defense  and  Deputy  Secretary 
of  defense  on  intelligence-related  matters,  counterintelligence  and  security.  I  sup- 
port the  President's  position  on  this  subject. 

Director  McLaltghlin.  While  it  may  be  implicit  in  the  context  of  its  recommenda- 
tions for  appointing  the  other  two  Deputy  NIDs  for  Foreign  and  Homeland  Intel- 
ligence, the  9/11  Commission  report  does  not  explicitly  spell  out  who  would  approve 
and  submit  the  nomination  of  the  Deputy  NID  for  Defense  Intelligence  (the  USD(I)). 
But  the  commission  is  clear  in  making  the  point  that  the  three  Deputy  NIDs  would 
also  hold  key  positions  in  their  component  department  or  agency.  So  even  if  the  NID 
were  to  "approve  and  submit"  the  nomination  for  the  USD(I),  the  Secretary  of  De- 
fense would  still  play  a  major  role  in  selecting  this  official.  The  fundamental  prob- 
lem with  the  proposal  is  less  a  question  of  who  appoints  the  three  deputies  than 
it  is  of  potential  for  conflict  inherent  in  a  situation  where  officials  are  asked  to  wear 
two  hats. 

While  I  understand  the  commission's  position,  I  do  not  support  the  recommenda- 
tion. One  of  the  reasons  behind  the  commission's  proposal  to  create  an  NID  was  the 
judgment  that  the  Director  of  the  CIA  wears  too  many  hats.  Creating  a  structure 
where  key  intelligence  officials  also  wear  departmental  hats  is,  I  believe,  the  wrong 
approach.  Even  more  important  in  my  view,  the  Deputy  NIDs  as  proposed  by  the 
commission,  would  constitute  an  unnecessary  layer  of  management  interposed  be- 
tween the  NID  and  the  heads  of  the  major  IC  agencies.  To  be  effective  in  today's 
environment,  the  NID  needs  to  be  able  to  direct  and  guide  the  activities  of  the  CIA, 
DIA,  NGA,  NRO,  NSA,  and  other  agencies.  Placing  a  deputy  layer  between  the  NID 
and  those  agency  heads  would  actually  have  an  effect  opposite  to  the  one  the  com- 
mission intended. 

General  Myers.  The  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Intelligence  is  a  key  member 
of  the  Secretary's  staff.  It  is  not  clear  how  an  official  in  this  position  would  be  se- 


174 

lected  by  someone  other  than  the  Secretary.  I  do  not  agree  with  this  recommenda- 
tion. 

17.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General  Myers,  would  you  have  con- 
cerns about  inserting  the  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  into  the  chain  of  command  for 
tasking  the  intelligence  activities  within  the  Department  of  Defense? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  In  current  law,  the  Secretary  of  Defense  has  the  authority 
to  task  collection  elements  within  the  Department  of  Defense.  In  practice,  the  Under 
Secretary  generally  does  not  engage  in  the  day-to-day  operations  within  the  Defense 
Intelligence  Community.  USD(I)  serves  as  the  staff  assistant  and  advisor  to  the  Sec- 
retary and  Deputy  Secretary  of  Defense,  and  has  as  a  principal  duty  the  overall  su- 
pervision of  all  intelligence  and  intelligence-related  affairs  of  the  Department  of  De- 
fense. These  responsibilities  and  functions  do  not  equate  to  being  engaged  in  the 
substantive  side  of  tasking,  processing,  exploiting,  ad  disseminating  intelligence. 

General  Myers.  The  Under  Secretary  of  Defense  for  Intelligence  is  a  vital  staff 
position.  As  a  principal  of  the  Secretary's  staff  and  a  key  figure  in  the  policy  process, 
USD(I)  clearly  has  intelligence  needs  that  must  be  supported;  however,  this  position 
is  not  in  the  military  operational  chain  of  command  nor  should  it  be. 

REVEALING  SOURCES  AND  COMPROMISING  INTELLIGENCE  MISSIONS 

18.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughlin,  press  accounts  suggest  that  revealing 
the  name  of  the  Pakistani  individual  who  was  cooperating  with  U.S.  officials  search- 
ing for  al  Qaeda  operatives  compromised  the  mission  after  the  public  disclosure  of 
his  name.  Is  that  an  accurate  impression? 

Director  McLaughlin.  [Deleted.] 

19.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughlin,  a  USA  Today  article  from  August  10, 
2004,  quotes  National  Security  Adviser  Condoleezza  Rice  as  saying  that  the  name 
of  the  individual  had  been  disclosed  to  reporters  in  Washington  "on  background." 
Should  the  name  of  any  such  cooperating  individual  be  released  under  any  cir- 
cumstances? 

Director  McLaughlin  did  not  respond  in  time  for  printing.  When  received,  answer 
will  be  retained  by  in  committee  files. 

20.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughlin,  were  you  asked  and  did  you  approve  the 
decision  to  reveal  the  source's  name  publicly  or  on  "background"  to  a  reporter? 

Director  McLaughlin.  No,  the  DDCI  was  not  asked  to  approve  the  decision  to  re- 
veal the  source's  name  publicly  or  "on  background"  to  a  reporter. 

EFFECT  OF  A  NATIONAL  INTELLIGENCE  DIRECTOR  ON  COMPETITIVE  ANALYSIS 

21.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughlin,  during  the  development  of  the  National 
Intelligence  Estimate  (NIE)  on  Iraq's  WMD  capabilities,  which  was  prepared  prior 
to  the  war  and  which  proved  to  be  so  inaccurate  in  its  judgments,  a  number  of  intel- 
ligence analysts  in  the  U.S.  Government  held  views  that  differed  from  the  prevailing 
CIA  view.  Notable  examples  of  this  include  the  Department  of  Energy  and  State  De- 
partment Intelligence  and  Research  Bureau  (INR)  assessments  on  whether  the  now- 
famous  aluminum  tubes  were  intended  for  centrifuges,  and  the  Air  Force  Intel- 
ligence Agency  assessment  of  whether  Iraqi  unmanned  aerial  vehicles  were  intended 
to  deliver  WMD.  Both  of  these  differing  assessments  have  been  validated  since,  but 
were  overruled  by  the  CIA  in  developing  the  NIE.  The  9/11  Commission  rec- 
ommends consolidating  control  and  budgeting  responsibility  for  national  intelligence 
activities  under  a  new  NID.  If  Congress  were  to  give  a  National  Intelligence  Direc- 
tor that  authority,  what  steps  should  we  take  to  encourage  competing  analyses  and 
ensure  differing  views  and  debate  within  the  Intelligence  Community  to  improve  the 
quality  of  our  intelligence? 

Director  McLaughlin.  The  views  of  the  Department  of  Energy  and  INR  were 
fully  presented  in  the  NIE  on  Iraq's  WMD. 

Striking  a  balance  between  greater  centralization  of  authority,  including  authority 
over  resources,  while  retaining  healthy  competitive  analysis,  is  one  of  the  critical 
issues  in  intelligence  reform.  Almost  every  committee  (or  commission)  that  has 
looked  into  this  matter  has  come  out  in  favor  of  greater  authority  at  the  center  of 
U.S.  intelligence,  whatever  the  title  of  the  official  occupying  that  center.  At  the 
same  time,  these  same  studies  and  proposals  have  warned  against  the  danger  of 
"group  think." 


175 

There  is  a  major  difference  between  empowering  an  individual  to  give  central  di- 
rection to  the  Intelligence  Community  and  allowing  that  individual  to  impose  his 
or  her  views  on  the  community.  No  one  is  suggesting  the  latter  formulation.  There 
must  always  be  a  healthy  competition  of  views  on  major  issues. 

Encouraging  competitive  analysis  and  ensuring  differing  views  will  involve  one 
part  internal  mechanisms  such  as  analytic  training  that  emphasizes  personal  integ- 
rity; management  that  fosters  competitive  and  alternative  analyses;  and  the  willing- 
ness to  "tell  it  like  we  see  it"  to  policymakers,  along  with  effective  evaluation  and 
"lessons  learned"  mechanisms — and  one  part  active  oversight  in  both  the  executive 
and  legislative  branches.  One  key  component  of  oversight  will  be  an  active  effort  to 
ensure  that  objectivity  remains  the  cornerstone  of  any  and  all  analytic  efforts. 

22.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughlin,  what  steps  should  be  taken  to  ensure 
that  the  Intelligence  Community  provides  independent,  objective,  and  accurate  anal- 
yses? 

Director  McLaughlin.  Again,  we  start  with  a  sense  of  the  values  of  the  profes- 
sion, the  first  of  which  is  that  our  job  is  to  provide  accurate,  timely  information  be- 
cause our  national  security  is  dependent  on  it  as  are  the  lives  of  the  American  peo- 
ple we  serve.  We  must  continue  to  train  our  employees  on  the  centrality  of  this  mis- 
sion from  their  first  day  on  the  job,  and  we  must  continue  to  emphasize  this,  in 
word  and  in  deed,  throughout  their  careers.  Beyond  that  we  can  build  internal 
mechanisms  to  reinforce  this  sense  of  integrity.  We  need  the  benefit  of  active  exter- 
nal oversight  to  ensure  that  we  are  always  meeting  our  standards  in  this  area. 

23.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughlin,  would  consolidation  of  budget  control  of 
most  of  the  intelligence  analysts,  as  well  as  hiring  and  firing  authority  over  national 
intelligence  agency  leaders  under  a  single  official,  support  or  hurt  this  aim? 

Director  McLaughlin.  We  simply  must  accept  one  basic  fact:  One  consequence  of 
consolidating  budget  control,  along  with  personnel  (hiring  and  firing)  over  the  entire 
community  in  the  hands  of  a  single  official  will  be  the  need  for  active,  ongoing  ef- 
forts to  ensure  that  a  desirable  consolidation  on  the  resource  side  does  not  make 
inevitable  the  homogenization  of  analysis  or  of  anal3^ic  perspectives.  I  emphasize 
the  word  "ongoing;"  this  cannot  be  a  "set  it  and  forget  it"  approach  to  the  processes 
that  ensure  that  honest,  competitive  analysis  remains  the  hallmark  of  U.S.  intel- 
ligence. 

DCI  AUTHORITIES  COMPARED  TO  NID  AUTHORITIES  (BUDGET) 

24.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughlin,  the  9/11  Commission  has  recommended 
giving  a  new  NID  sole  responsibility  for  budgets  of  the  national  intelligence  agen- 
cies. As  I  understand  the  process  now,  the  DCI  is  responsible  for  developing  and 
submitting  the  budget  for  the  NFIP  to  the  President,  but,  since  Executive  Order 
12333  confers  authority  for  fiscal  management  for  the  DOD  combat  support  agencies 
to  DOD,  the  DCI  would  have  to  obtain  the  concurrence  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
before  requesting  0MB  approval  of  any  reprogrammings  involving  the  DOD  combat 
support  agencies.  If  the  Commission's  recommendations  were  implemented,  would 
this  change  in  reprogramming  authority  be  the  principal  difference  between  the 
DCI's  current  budgeting  authority  and  what  the  budgeting  authority  of  the  NID 
would  be? 

Director  McLaughlin.  No,  other  changes  would  be  necessary  to  enhance  the 
DCI's  or  NID's  authority  over  the  NFIP  budget  to  address  the  recommended  actions 
of  the  9/11  Commission.  The  DCI  or  the  NID  would  need: 

•  Authority  to  decide  independently  the  content  of  the  NFIP  budget  request 
to  the  President.  In  the  past,  the  DCI,  under  the  National  Security  Act,  had 
the  authority  to  "develop"  the  NFIP  budget,  but  Secretary  of  Defense  ap- 
proval was  needed  to  incorporate  DCI  decisions  into  the  Defense  budget  be- 
fore submission  to  the  President,  and  ultimately,  to  Congress.  The  Presi- 
dent recently  gave  this  authority  to  the  DCI  in  Executive  Order  13355. 

•  Authority  to  manage  the  allocation  of  enacted  appropriations  to  Intel- 
ligence Community  components.  Making  appropriations  for  the  NFIP  to  a 
single  appropriation  to  be  allocated  by  the  DCI,  after  apportionment  by 
0MB,  would  further  enhance  the  NID's  ability  to  control  the  NFIP  budget. 

•  Authority  to  transfer  appropriations  or  personnel  within  the  NFIP  with- 
out the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense  or  any  other  head  of  a  depart- 
ment with  NFIP  resources.  The  National  Security  Act  currently  requires 
that  the  head  of  the  affected  department(s)  "not  object"  to  transfers. 

The  President's  proposal  would  provide  the  NID: 


176 

•  Authority  to  decide  independently  the  content  of  the  NFIP  budget  request 
to  the  President. 

•  Authority  to  manage  NFIP  appropriations  through  the  comptrollers  of 
cabinet  departments. 

•  Authority  to  transfer  appropriations  after  consultation  with  the  Secretary 
of  Defense  or  any  other  head  of  a  department  with  NFIP  resources. 

The  President's  proposal  also  would  prevent  disclosure  of  the  total  amount  of  in- 
telligence funding. 

25.  Senator  LEVIN.  Secretary  Rumsfeld,  what  would  the  consequences  for  DOD  be 
of  giving  the  new  NID  the  authority  to  reprogram  funds  out  of  DOD  programs  and 
activities  without  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  Defense? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  My  understanding  is  that  NID  authority  to  reprogram  funds 
would  be  for  designated  programs,  not  all  DOD  programs,  and  would  be  after  appro- 
priate consultation  with  the  Secretary  of  Defense. 

26.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  Director  McLaughlin,  who  would  re- 
solve any  potential  conflict  between  supporting  DOD  requirements  and  supporting 
broader  requirements  of  decisionmakers  and  other  agencies? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Under  the  President's  proposal,  the  NID. 

Director  McLaughlin.  It  is  not  yet  certain  what  the  authorities  of  the  proposed 
NID  will  be.  Under  current  law  (section  103  of  the  National  Security  Act),  the  DCI 
establishes  the  requirements  and  priorities  to  govern  the  collection  of  national  intel- 
ligence by  Intelligence  Community  elements.  He  also  approves  collection  require- 
ments, determines  collection  priorities,  and  resolves  conflicts  in  collection  priorities 
levied  on  national  collection  assets,  except  as  otherwise  agreed  with  the  Secretary 
of  Defense  pursuant  to  the  direction  of  the  President.  The  new  Executive  Order  on 
intelligence  (EO  13355)  contains  similar  language. 

It  seems  likely  that  the  NID  will  have  at  least  as  much  authority  as  the  DCI  cur- 
rently has  in  this  area.  It  also  bears  noting  that,  as  a  practical  matter,  the  DCI  and 
the  Secretary  of  Defense  have  always  been  able  to  work  out  their  differences  over 
the  tasking  of  national  collection  assets,  and  have  never  had  to  refer  such  a  dispute 
to  the  President  for  resolution. 

DCI  AUTHORITIES  COMPARED  TO  NID  AUTHORITIES  (PERSONNEL) 

27.  Senator  Levin.  Director  McLaughlin,  as  I  understand  the  process  now,  the 
Secretary  of  Defense  must  obtain  the  concurrence  of  the  DCI  in  appointing  anyone 
to  head  the  NSA,  the  NRO,  or  the  NGA.  For  the  head  of  the  DIA,  the  Secretary 
must  only  consult  with  the  DCI  on  that  appointment.  The  9/11  Commission  has  rec- 
ommended giving  a  new  NID  sole  responsibility  for  hiring  and  firing  of  leaders  of 
the  national  intelligence  agencies,  including  the  head  of  DLA.  Is  there  any  indication 
that  the  heads  of  the  DOD  combat  support  agencies  have  been  unresponsive  to  the 
direction  or  tasking  of  the  DCI? 

Director  McLaughlin.  First  of  all,  I  would  note  that  the  "combat  support"  agen- 
cies are  national  intelligence  agencies.  The  inclusion  of  the  word  "national"  in  the 
names  of  the  three  agencies  was  not  an  accident;  it  clearly  signaled  the  intent  of 
Congress,  and  the  administration  at  the  time  of  their  formation,  that  a  principal 
role  of  NGA,  NRO,  and  NSA  was  to  support  the  national  intelligence  mission  as  de- 
fined by  the  National  Security  Council  and  carried  out  by  the  DCI.  Although  the 
NRO  is  not  a  combat  support  agency  and  NSA  is  not  a  combat  support  agency  for 
all  purposes,  each  agency  has  a  combat  support  role,  a  function  that  becomes  pri- 
mary when  U.S.  forces  are  engaged  in  combat  operations  and  combat  support  be- 
comes, in  effect,  the  highest  national  intelligence  priority.  Non-DOD  agencies,  nota- 
bly the  CIA,  also  have  combat  support  roles  that  they  have  always  carried  out  with 
distinction. 

In  my  view,  the  Directors  of  NGA,  NRO,  and  NSA  do  an  excellent  job  of  balancing 
their  national  missions  with  their  combat  support  functions.  They  all  have  resources 
in  the  DOD,  JMIP,  and  TIARA  programs  that  help  them  respond  to  specific  tactical 
needs,  but  a  considerable  portion  of  their  national  programs  is  used  to  support  the 
military  as  well. 

The  ability  of  these  agencies  to  successfully  carry  out  both  sets  of  responsibilities 
does  mean  that  serving  two  masters  is  the  ideal  way  to  operate.  NGA,  NRO,  and 
NSA  must  participate  in  strategic  planning,  program  and  budgeting,  requirements 
definition,  and  policy  development  processes  in  both  the  Intelligence  Community 
and  the  Department  of  Defense.  While  we  have  made  efforts  to  minimize  redun- 
dancy where  possible,  the  fact  remains  that  the  agency  heads  now  must  respond  to 


177 

two  bosses,  with  all  the  potential  for  redundancy  and  conflict  that  entails.  Establish- 
ing a  strong  NID  would  help  to  reduce  this  redundancy  and  conflict,  thereby  mini- 
mizing overhead  and  enabling  these  agencies  to  devote  more  of  their  resources  to 
both  the  national  and  military  support  missions. 

28.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General  Myers,  do  you  have  concerns 
about  any  effects  on  support  to  military  operations  or  otherwise  of  transferring  this 
authority  (particularly  for  DIA)  to  a  new  NID? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  support  the  President's  proposals. 

General  Myers.  At  this  stage  of  the  intelligence  reform  process,  without  knowing 
or  working  out  all  the  necessary  agreements  between  the  Department  of  Defense 
and  the  NID  that  establish  intelligence  support  priorities,  it  is  difficult  to  address 
all  concerns.  In  broad  terms,  every  commander  requires  timely  and  accurate  intel- 
ligence to  support  decisionmaking  across  all  missions,  ranging  from  combat  to  thea- 
ter security  cooperation.  Regardless  of  the  final  Intelligence  Community  structure, 
combatant  commanders  must  have  the  ability  to  influence  national  intelligence  pri- 
orities and  intelligence  asset  allocation.  Any  initiative  or  reform  that  creates  gaps 
between  the  intelligence  agencies  or  that  dilutes  the  DOD's  ability  to  influence  intel- 
ligence resource  allocation  and  prioritization  of  intelligence  efforts  or  removes  and/ 
or  transfers  senior  DOD  intelligence  analysts  outside  of  the  Department  causes  me 
concern  because  of  the  impact  on  the  warfighter  and  the  ability  to  successfully  exe- 
cute the  mission. 

29.  Senator  Levin.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General  Myers,  do  you  believe  there 
is  a  way  to  do  so  and  still  ensure  that  military  requirements  for  intelligence  are 
satisfied? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  I  support  the  President's  proposals. 

General  Myers.  The  heads  of  defense  intelligence  agencies  are  properly  appointed 
by  the  Secretary  of  Defense.  Current  statute  requires  DCI  concurrence  for  the  ap- 
pointments of  the  heads  of  the  NSA,  NGA,  and  the  NRG.  Appointment  of  the  Direc- 
tor of  the  DIA  requires  consultation.  We  have  worked  very  hard  for  a  number  of 
years  to  develop  synergy  from  integrating  defense  and  national  requirements  and 
activities.  Over  these  years,  a  reasonable  state  of  balance  has  been  achieved  be- 
tween defense  and  national  requirements.  As  combat  support  agencies  in  the  Sec- 
retary of  Defense  chain  of  command,  military  requirements  receive  an  emphasis 
that  could  be  lost  under  an  alternate  arrangement. 


Questions  Submitted  by  Senator  Mark  Dayton 

PRESIDENTIAL  "SHOOT-DOWN"  AUTHORITY 

30.  Senator  Dayton.  General  Myers,  was  the  presidential  shoot-down  request 
withheld  from  the  pilots  by  the  Northeast  Air  Defense  Sector,  as  identified  on  page 
43  of  the  9/11  Commission  report? 

General  Myers.  The  pilots  were  not  informed  of  the  presidential  engagement  au- 
thority. However,  direct,  positive  command  and  control  was  maintained  between  the 
commanders  and  the  pilots  at  all  times  on  September  11,  2001,  and  the  authority 
would  have  immediately  been  relayed  had  there  been  a  target. 

31.  Senator  Dayton.  Secretary  Rumsfeld,  was  there  an  investigation  into  the  deci- 
sion not  to  forward  this  order  to  the  pilots?  If  an  investigation  or  after-action  review 
was  conducted,  identify  the  investigation/review  officer  and  provide  a  written  copy 
of  the  report  to  the  committee  for  review. 

General  Myers.  No,  an  investigation  was  not  required  and  therefore  not  con- 
ducted into  the  decision  regarding  forwarding  presidential  engagement  authority  to 
the  pilots. 

32.  Senator  Dayton.  Secretary  Rumsfeld,  a  statement  on  page  17  of  the  9/11 
Commission  report  indicates  that  the  Defense  Department  and  National  Command 
Authority  considered  the  need  to  shoot  down  a  commercial  airliner  prior  to  Septem- 
ber 11,  2001: 

"Prior  to  September  11,  it  was  understood  that  an  order  to  shoot  down  a 
commercial  aircraft  would  have  to  be  issued  by  the  National  Command  Au- 
thority (a  phrase  used  to  describe  the  President  and  Secretary  of  Defense). 
Exercise  planners  also  assumed  that  the  aircraft  would  originate  from  out- 
side the  United  States,  allowing  time  to  identify  the  target  and  scramble 
interceptors.  The  threat  of  terrorists  hijacking  commercial  airliners  within 


178 

the  United  States — and  using  them  as  guided  missiles — was  not  recognized 
by  North  American  Air  Defense  Command  (NORAD)  before  September  11." 

Did  NORAD  conduct  exercises  or  develop  scenarios,  prior  to  September  11,  2001, 
to  test  a  military  reaction  to  an  aircraft  hijacking  which  appeared  destined  to  result 
in  a  suicide  crash  into  a  high-value  target?  If  so,  identify  the  five  exercises  con- 
ducted on,  or  immediately  prior  to  September  11,  2001;  include  dates,  participants, 
scenario,  and  sjTiopsis  of  exercise  results. 

General  Myers.  Prior  to  September  11,  2001,  NORAD  exercises  were  not  designed 
to  exercise  or  develop  procedures  to  shoot  down  civilian  airliners.  Pre-September  11 
exercises  were  designed  to  practice  command  and  control  procedures,  rules  of  en- 
gagement, external  agency  coordination  and  hijack  shadow  and/or  escort  procedures. 

The  following  five  exercise  hijack  events  included  a  suicide  crash  into  a  high-value 
target.  Synopses  of  exercise  results  are  not  available.  They  were  discarded  in  accord- 
ance with  DOD  directives. 

Exercise  Name:  Vigilant  Guardian  01-1 

Exercise  Date*  23  Oct  00 

Participants:  HQ  NORAD/Continental  U.S.  NORAD  Region  (CONR)/Sectors 

Scenario:  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  directed  at  the  United  Nations — an  indi- 
vidual steals  a  Federal  Express  aircraft  and  plans  a  suicide  attack  on  the 
United  Nations  Building  in  New  York  City. 

SjTiopsis  of  actions:  Conducted  an  interception,  exercised  command  and  control 
and  coordinated  with  external  agencies. 

Exercise  Name:  Vigilant  Guardian  01-1 

Exercise  Date:  16  Oct  00 

Participants:  HQ  NORAD/Cheyenne  Mountain  Operations  Center/CONR/Cana- 
dian  NORAD  Region/Sectors 

Scenario:  Due  to  recent  arrests  involving  illegal  drug  trafficking  in  Maine,  an  in- 
dividual steals  a  Federal  Express  plane  and  plans  a  suicide  attack  into  the 
United  Nations  Building  in  New  York  City. 

Synopsis  of  actions:  Exercised  command  and  control,  coordinated  with  external 
agencies  and  followed  hijack  checklists. 

Exercise  Name:  Falcon  Indian  99-3 

Exercise  Dates:  5  Jun  00 

Participants:  CONR/Sectors 

Scenario:  Learjet  hijacked  maintaining  tight  formation  with  Canadair  airliner, 
loaded  with  explosives.  Learjet  planned  to  crash  into  the  White  House. 

Synopsis  of  actions:  Exercised  command  and  control,  coordinated  with  external 
agencies  and  followed  hijack  checklists. 

Exercise  Name:  Falcon  Indian  00-1 

Exercise  Dates:  5  Jun  00 

Participants:  CONR/Sectors 

Scenario:  Communist  party  faction  hijacks  aircraft  bound  from  western  to  eastern 
United  States.  High  explosives  on  board.  Intends  to  crash  into  the  Statue  of 
Liberty. 

Synopsis  of  actions:  Cross-sector  hand  over.  Exercised  command  and  control,  co- 
ordinated with  external  agencies  and  followed  hijack  checklists.  Federal  Avia- 
tion Administration  requested  assistance. 

Exercise  Name:  Falcon  Indian  00-1 

Exercise  Date:  6  Nov  99 

Participants:  CONR/Sectors 

Scenario:  China  Air  fi-om  Los  Angeles  to  JFK  airport  hijacked  east  of  Colorado 
Springs  by  five  terrorists.  If  not  intercepted,  intends  to  crash  into  United  Na- 
tions building. 

S3Tiopsis  of  actions:  Cross-sector  hand  over.  Exercised  command  and  control,  co- 
ordinated with  external  agencies  and  followed  hijack  checklists. 


Questions  Submitted  by  Senator  Hillary  Rodham  Clinton 

QUESTIONS  from  THE  SURVIVORS  OF  THE  VICTIMS  OF  SEPTEMBER  11 

33.  Senator  Clinton.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General  Myers,  before  today's 
Armed  Services  Committee  hearing,  I  attended  a  hearing  of  the  Senate  Govern- 
mental Affairs  Committee  where  representatives  of  the  September  11  families  testi- 
fied about  the  9/11  Commission  report.  Specifically  the  Governmental  Affairs  Com- 
mittee heard  testimony  from  Mary  Fetchet,  the  Founding  Director,  Voices  of  Sep- 
tember 11  and  Member,  Family  Steering  Committee;  Stephen  Push,  Co-Founder 


179 

and  Board  Member,  Families  of  September  11;  and  Kristen  Breitwieser,  Founder 
and  Co-Chairperson,  September  11  Advocates  Member,  Family  Steering  Committee. 
During  that  hearing,  I  asked  the  family  representatives  if  they  wanted  me  to  ask 
you  any  questions  during  the  hearing.  They  asked  me  to  convey  the  following  ques- 
tions to  you. 

One  family  member  stated  it  is  unacceptable  for  the  Department  of  Defense  to 
claim  it  cannot  both  take  care  of  the  boots  on  the  ground  as  well  as  reorganize  their 
departments  to  be  more  effective,  because  al  Qaeda  and  other  terrorist  groups  are 
doing  a  thousand  things  at  once.  How  would  you  respond  to  that  concern? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  The  DOD  has  not  taken  such  a  position.  To  the  contrary, 
that  family  member  should  be  reassured  that  we  are  doing  things  simultaneously 
every  day.  We  are  deploying  military  forces  to  fight  and  win  the  global  war  on  ter- 
rorism, we  are  transforming  departmental  organizations  and  capabilities  to  deal 
with  the  threats  of  the  21st  century,  and  we  are  devoting  extraordinary  energy  and 
resources  to  support  the  training,  protection,  health,  welfare,  and  morale  of  the  he- 
roic men  and  women  in  uniform  that  so  diligently  serve  their  nation.  I  view  these 
efforts  as  inseparable  and  mutually  supporting.  Each  is  a  necessary  component  of 
and  adjunct  to  the  others. 

General  Myers.  It  is  a  fundamental  responsibility  of  the  Department  of  Defense 
to  take  care  of  servicemembers  and  their  families  while  meeting  our  security  obliga- 
tions and  ensuring  we  are  prepared  for  the  future.  The  Department  dedicates  the 
appropriate  level  of  effort  to  every  aspect  of  these  responsibilities.  This  includes  im- 
proving quality  of  life  for  families  and  assisting  them  in  dealing  with  the  demanding 
operational  tempo  of  their  servicemembers.  It  also  includes  ensuring  that  members 
of  the  military  receive  the  best  possible  training  and  equipment  available.  At  the 
same  time,  we  are  involved  in  an  extensive  effort  to  transform  departments  to  be 
more  effective.  This  effort  is  designed  to  prepare  us  to  better  succeed  in  the  chal- 
lenges we  face  today  while  ensuring  the  U.S.  military  is  ready  for  the  security  chal- 
lenges of  the  future. 

34.  Senator  Clinton.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General  Myers,  another  family 
member  asked  you  to  imagine  there  is  a  NID  as  proposed  by  the  Commission — what 
assurances  does  the  Department  of  Defense  need  to  be  secure  that  the  existence  of 
a  NID  won't  negatively  effect  military  operations? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  DOD  must  have  the  authority  and  capability  to  conduct  or 
task,  and  to  receive  all-discipline  information  (HUMINT,  SIGINT,  GEOINT,  etc.) 
and  to  return  all-source  analysis  to  support  defense  needs,  including  military  oper- 
ations. 

General  Myers.  The  Department  of  Defense  relies  extensively  on  national  assets 
for  the  planning  and  execution  of  military  operations.  In  an  era  with  a  NID,  the 
Department  needs  processes  and  procedures  that  ensure  the  NID  plans  and  budgets 
for  those  assets  (material  and  manpower)  required  for  military  operations  and  oper- 
ates them  against  priorities  that  support  military  planning  and  operations,  includ- 
ing future  threats  that  U.S.  forces  might  someday  face.  We  have  worked  hard  over 
the  years  to  ensure  a  mutually  supportive  relationship  between  the  Secretary  of  De- 
fense and  the  DCI.  We  must  ensure  this  rapport  is  not  harmed. 

35.  Senator  Clinton.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General  Myers,  another  family 
member  asked  for  an  explanation  of  the  protocols  for  the  military  and  NO  RAD  on 
September  11  vidth  respect  to  the  hijackings.  Can  you  provide  a  description  of 
NORAD's  reaction  on  September  11? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  In  accordance  with  Department  Defense  directives  in  effect 
on  September  11,  NORAD  was  to  monitor  and  report  the  actions  of  any  hijacked 
aircraft,  as  requested  by  the  Federal  Aviation  Administration.  We  had  procedures 
for  potential  air  hijackings,  which  were  based  on  the  premise  that  a  hijacked  air- 
craft would  be  used  for  ransom  or  political  purposes,  not  as  a  weapon. 

General  Myers.  On  the  morning  of  September  11,  NORAD  was  conducting  a  com- 
mand post  exercise  and  was  postured  for  "wartime  conditions."  Six  minutes  prior 
to  the  first  attack  on  the  World  Trade  Center,  the  Federal  Aviation  Administration 
informed  NORAD  of  potential  hijack  of  American  Airlines  Flight  11.  Throughout  the 
attacks  of  September  11,  NORAD  responded  by  launching  fighter  aircraft  and  insti- 
tuting airspace  controls.  Immediately  after  the  attacks,  armed  fighters  flew  arovmd- 
the-clock  air  patrols.  Within  a  24-hour  period,  NORAD  had  over  400  aircraft  air- 
borne and  on  ground-based  alert  to  prevent  additional  attacks. 


180 

DOD  INTELLIGENCE 

36.  Senator  Clinton.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General  Myers,  although  the  9/11 
Commission  largely  focuses  on  national  and  strategic  intelligence,  tactical  intel- 
ligence for  military  personnel  on  the  ground  and  coordination  among  agencies  to 
capitalize  on  that  intelligence  is  also  critical  to  winning  the  global  war  on  terrorism. 
The  9/11  Commission  report  details  the  issues  surrounding  the  use  of  the  Predator 
unmanned  aircraft  to  strike  Osama  bin  Laden  during  the  March  to  September  2001 
timeframe.  What  caused  the  confusion  that  existed  among  CIA,  OSD,  and  the  Air 
Force  regarding  the  authority  to  strike  Osama  bin  Laden  (detailed  on  pages  210- 
212  of  the  9/11  Commission  report)? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  The  9/11  Commission  report  cites  interviews  with  U.S.  Gov- 
ernment officials  regarding  discussions  of  the  Predator  during  the  March-September 
2001  timeframe.  Two  main  interagency  policy  issues  arose  regarding  use  of  an 
armed  version  of  the  Predator,  then  in  development:  (1)  whether  DOD  or  CIA  was 
liable  for  the  costs  associated  with  the  operation,  and  (2)  whether  DOD  or  CL\. 
should  operate  the  system  and  other  employment  considerations  (Was  it  legal  to  kill 
Osama  bin  Laden?  Who  would  authorize  strikes?  Who  would  pull  the  trigger?). 

General  Myers.  There  appears  to  be  a  slight  factual  misunderstanding  concerning 
this  timeframe,  since  no  armed  Predators  were  in  Afghanistan  during  March  to  Sep- 
tember (armed  Predators  were  being  modified  and  tested  through  the  summer  of 
2001).  However,  the  9/11  Commission  report  accurately  captures  the  djTiamic  envi- 
ronment within  the  National  Security  Council  during  spring  and  summer  2001  as 
policy  options  were  explored  to  counter  the  al  Qaeda  threat.  The  Air  Force  was  al- 
ready in  the  early  stages  of  developing  an  armed  Predator  and  had  their  first  mis- 
sile launch  from  a  Predator  in  February  2001.  As  this  technology  was  proving  to 
be  promising,  CIA  was  considering  the  desirability  of  deploying  this  capability  as 
soon  as  it  was  viable.  While  the  technology  was  being  developed  and  tested,  the  pol- 
icy direction  was  being  evaluated  and  crafted.  As  Director  Tenet  stated,  "this  was 
new  ground,"  and  there  were  serious  policy  and  statutory  issues  to  reconcile.  The 
open  discourse  and  range  of  opinions  captured  in  the  9/11  Commission  report  reflect 
a  robust  policy  development  forum  for  use  of  a  new  technology  rather  than  confu- 
sion. There  were  no  missed  opportunities  by  unmanned  Predators  to  strike  Osama 
bin  Laden  during  the  period  of  policy  resolution  as  the  armed  Predators  were  not 
yet  ready  for  deployment. 

37.  Senator  Clinton.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General  Myers,  is  there  a  clear  de- 
termination on  how  this  operation  would  happen  if  the  opportunity  presented  itself 
again  today? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Yes.  By  August  2002,  a  more  detailed  Concept  of  Operation 
and  Memorandum  of  Agreement  were  established  between  DOD  and  CIA  that  re- 
solve the  lines  of  authority  and  implement  decisionmaking  on  armed  Predator  oper- 
ations. 

General  MYERS.  If  the  opportunity  to  strike  Osama  bin  Laden  presented  itself 
today  where  we  have  military  forces  deployed,  we  have  clear  authority  to  act. 

38.  Senator  Clinton.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General  Myers,  are  there  clear 
rules  of  engagement  and  release  authority  for  striking  other  targets  that  need  im- 
mediate approval  authority? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Yes,  there  are  clear  rules  of  engagement  and  release  author- 
ity for  striking  other  targets  that  need  immediate  approval  authority. 

General  Myers.  Yes.  Combatant  commanders  (CBTCDRs)  have  been  provided 
clear  rules  of  engagement  (ROE)  and  release  authority  to  strike  emerging  and/or 
time  sensitive  targets.  In  broad  terms,  ROE  promulgated  to  the  CBTCDRs: 

1.  Clearly  establishes  the  identity  of  hostile  forces. 

2.  Identifies  what  type  of  force  and/or  weapons  are  authorized  for  use. 

3.  Identifies  categories  of  targets  and  authorizes  strikes  against  those  tar- 
gets. 

4.  Identifies  areas  of  operation. 

5.  Defines  high  collateral  damage  targets  and  restrictions  against  those 
targets  (if  any). 

[Deleted.] 

39.  Senator  Clinton.  Secretary  Rumsfeld  and  General  Myers,  near  the  end  of 
major  combat  operations  in  Afghanistan  it  appeared  as  if  Osama  bin  Laden  was  re- 
stricted to  the  Tora  Bora  mountains  and  possibly  within  our  grasp.  Did  readily 
available  intelligence  get  to  the  soldiers  on  the  ground  quickly  to  possibly  assist 


181 

them  in  his  capture  or  were  there  problems  with  the  tactical  intelligence  provided 
to  our  forces  that  helped  him  escape? 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  Joint  Task  Forces  conducting  combat  operations  routinely 
utilize  all  intelligence  data  provided  by  both  defense  and  national  intelligence  enti- 
ties. These  range  from  tactical  reconnaissance  data  gathered  by  maneuver  forces, 
to  DOD  airborne  ISR  platforms,  to  geospatial  and  other  overhead  collection  capabili- 
ties. DOD  has  made  significant  strides  in  recent  years  in  ensuring  that  tactically 
relevant  data,  from  both  defense  and  national  sources,  is  pushed  to  the  lowest  eche- 
lon of  military  units  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  many  of  those  capabilities  were  em- 
ployed in  the  Tora  Bora  operation  (e.g.  live  overhead  video  feeds  of  the  tactical  en- 
gagements were  used  by  multiple  tactical  consumers  across  the  depth  of  the 
battlespace).  While  we  acknowledge  that  more  work  needs  to  be  done  to  make  this 
intelligence  sharing  and  distribution  even  more  robust  in  the  future,  there  is  no  reli- 
able way  for  DOD  to  calculate  whether  the  survival  of  a  given  combatant  is  a  direct 
or  indirect  result  of  a  particular  intelligence  shortfall.  Tactical  engagements,  par- 
ticular ground  combat,  are  far  too  chaotic  and  complex  for  such  links  to  be  drawn. 

General  Myers.  At  that  point  in  our  Afghanistan  operations,  all-source  intel- 
ligence reports  gave  us  a  high  level  of  confidence  that  Osama  bin  Laden  was  in  the 
Tora  Bora  area;  however,  his  presence  there  was  never  confirmed.  Tora  Bora  quickly 
became  CENTCOM's  main  operational  effort  and  the  primary  focus  of  all  national, 
DOD  and  CENTCOM  intelligence  collection  and  reporting.  From  CENTCOM's 
Tampa  headquarters,  CENTCOM  J-2  and  J-3  operated  a  co-located  operations  and 
intelligence  fusion  cell  that  provided  direct  and  continuous  support  to  the  forces  de- 
ployed in  the  Tora  Bora  area.  Intelligence  fusion  was  facilitated  by  interagency,  spe- 
cial operations,  and  other  government  agency  representation  in  the  Tampa  cell  that 
was  reporting  directly  to  the  commanders  on  the  ground  in  Tora  Bora.  Intelligence 
dissemination  to  U.S.  forces  was  continuous  and  direct,  bypassing  other  layers  of 
command  in  order  to  enhance  the  agility  of  the  warfighter. 


Questions  Submitted  by  Senators  Mark  Dayton  and  Hillary  Rodham  Clinton 

NORAD'S  performance  on  SEPTEMBER  11 

40.  Senator  Dayton  and  Senator  Clinton.  Secretary  Rumsfeld,  we  have  a  ques- 
tion posed  by  April  Gallop,  a  September  11  survivor,  that  we  would  like  answered 
for  this  hearing's  record.  Your  testimony  on  August  17,  2004,  indicates  the  North 
American  Air  Defense  Command's  mission  structure  on  September  11,  2001,  was  de- 
signed to  defend  our  country  from  external  threats.  Was  an  investigation  or  after- 
action review  conducted  regarding  NORAD's  activities/actions  on  September  11, 
2001?  If  an  investigation  or  after-action  review  was  conducted,  identify  the  date  of 
investigation,  the  investigating/review  officer,  and  provide  a  written  copy  of  the  re- 
port to  the  committee  for  review. 

Secretary  Rumsfeld.  The  Department  of  Defense  did  not  conduct  an  after-action 
review  regarding  NORAD's  actions  on  September  11,  2001.  However,  during  the 
course  of  the  9/11  Commission's  investigation,  NORAD  provided  thousands  of  docu- 
ments and  numerous  personal  accounts  of  NORAD's  response  to  the  terrorist  at- 
tacks. In  the  aftermath  of  September  11,  NORAD  has  strengthened  its  ability  to  de- 
tect, assess,  warn,  and  defend  against  threats  to  North  America.  Today,  NORAD 
forces  remain  at  a  heightened  readiness  level.  Pilots  fly  irregular  air  patrols  over 
metropolitan  areas  and  critical  infrastructure  facilities.  NORAD  has  partnered  with 
the  FAA  to  enhance  its  ability  to  monitor  air  traffic  within  the  interior  of  the  coun- 
try. We  have  established  a  system  of  conference  calls  to  facilitate  the  sharing  of  in- 
formation among  the  White  House,  DOD,  FAA,  U.S.  Customs,  and  law  enforcement 
agencies.  In  addition,  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  Defense  have  approved 
rules  of  engagement  to  deal  with  hostile  acts  within  domestic  airspace. 

41.  Senator  Dayton  and  Senator  Clinton.  General  Myers,  who  was  held  account- 
able for  NORAD's  inability  to  effectively  respond  to  the  airline  hijackings  and  FAA 
response  requests? 

General  M^'ERS.  The  military  chain  of  command  is  accountable  for  NORAD's  ac- 
tions on  September  11.  However,  no  disciplinary  measures  are  warranted.  Prior  to 
September  11,  NORAD's  aerospace  warning  and  control  missions  were  oriented  and 
resourced  to  detect  and  identify  all  air  traffic  entering  North  American  airspace.  On 
the  morning  of  the  attacks,  existing  rules  of  engagement  provided  no  guidance  for 
civilian  aircraft  participating  in,  or  with  clear  intent  to  participate  in,  an  attack 
against  our  Nation.  As  the  September  11  attacks  unfolded,  NORAD  responded  im- 
mediately with  fighters  and  appropriate  airspace  control  measures.  Unfortunately, 


182 

due  to  late  notification  and  the  constraints  of  time  and  distance,  they  were  unable 
to  influence  the  tragic  circumstances. 

[Whereupon,  at  2:35  p.m.,  the  committee  adjourned.] 

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